JUDGMENT. — This is a thoroughly hopeless Second Appeal totally devoid of substance. One Suryaprakasam had two sons, Swaminatha and Ayyaswami. This Suryaprakasam was adjudged insolvent in I.P. No. 126 of 1922 and Swaminatha in I.P. No. 109 of 1926 both on the file of this Court. Plaintiffs 1 to 5 and the second defendant are the sons of Swaminatha. The Official Assignee under the sale deed, Exhibit B-l, dated 10th February, 1928, sold two-third share (what precisely is sold is in dispute)in the suit property, which is door numbers 8 and 9, Anjaneya Koil Street, Poonamallee, to the first defendant for a sum of Rs. 2,500. Later on the first defendant under the sale deed, Exhibit B-8, dated 20th October, 1930, purchased Ayyaswami’s one-third share in the house for a sum of Rs. 1,250 with the result that the first defendant claims that he has become the owner of the entire house. The first defendant is the son-in-law of Suryaprakasam, having married his daughter. The five plaintiffs have filed the present suit in the year 1961 for partition and separate possession of their 5/21 share on the ground that under the sale in the insolvency the Official Assignee must be held to have sold only the one-seventh share of the insolvent, Swaminatha (the plaintiffs’ father). The plaintiffs’ further case is that during all this time their father Swaminatha was also in possession of the suit property in recognition of the plaintiffs’ rights; this circumstance being relied upon to save the suit from the bar of limitation. The first defendant, the purchaser from the Official Assignee, is resisting the suit on the ground that what the Official Assignee purported to sell and actually sold and what was actually purchased by the first defendant is a two-third share in the house under Exhibit B-l, thereby meaning the one-third share of Suryaprakasam, plus Swaminatha’s one-seventh share as well as the shares of his sons by virtue of the power of disposal of Swaminatha over the shares of his sons exercised by the Official Assignee under the sale deed. His further case is that immediately after the execution of Exhibits B-l and B-2 he obtained possession of the property, the entire house, that he has been in possession throughout from 1929 in his own right, and that whatever rights the plaintiffs or any other member of the family may have, have been extinguished by ouster and adverse possession. The first defendant also urged that the plaintiffs came to occupy the portion of the suit property as a tenant under the first defendant, that later on, misunderstandings arose between them, which resulted in the present suit for partition by the plaintiffs. The trial Court on a consideration of all the facts of the case came to the conclusion that what the Official Assignee purported to sell and actually sold was a two-third share in the house which took in the shares of the plaintiffs as well. It also held that after the purchase by the first defendant he has been in possession of the property in his own right from .1929 excluding all the members of the family, and that the plaintiffs’ rights were therefore barred by limitation. On appeal, this judgment of the trial Court was affirmed, the appellate Court taking the view that under the two sale deeds by the Official Assignee the first defendant had purchased the entire house, including the shares of the plaintiffs. In this view that the plaintiffs have no subsisting title, the lower appellate Court did not express any opinion regarding the question of limitation. Hence the present Second Appeal by the defeated plaintiffs. Learned Counsel for the appellants urged that on a proper interpretation of Exhibit B-l, the sale deed executed by the Official Assignee, the shares of the plaintiffs, 5/21, had not passed to the first defendant. In support of his contention learned Counsel placed considerable reliance upon the decision of Satyanarayana Rao, J., in Thirumaleshwara Bhatta v. Govinda Bhatta1. Before I refer to this decision it is necessary to mention a few facts. In support of his contention learned Counsel placed considerable reliance upon the decision of Satyanarayana Rao, J., in Thirumaleshwara Bhatta v. Govinda Bhatta1. Before I refer to this decision it is necessary to mention a few facts. When the Official Assignee applied for permission to sell the suit property he wanted permission to sell the house as a whole, including the share of the son, Ayyaswami (the non-insolvent) on the ground that the debts were all incurred by Suryaprakasa and Swaminatha for the maintenance of the family and were binding upon the joint family comprising the father and the two sons, but ultimately the Court passed the order authorising the Official Assignee to sell the shares of the father and the son, the insolvents, excluding the shares of the non-insolvent son. I am referring to this at the threshold to indicate that what was proposed to be sold by the Official Assignee was the entire property and not the shares of the insolvents alone. If the Official Assignee intended to sell the shares of the insolvents alone there was no question of his seeking permission to sell the share of the non-insolvent son, Nallathambi Ayyaswami. It is clear therefore that when Ayyaswami’s share was excluded what was proposed to be sold and what was authorised to be sold was the specific two-third share in the entire house, and that is what the purchaser bargained for. There is the further fact that this property along with the other properties was subject to an encumbrance in favour of a mortgagee, it was discharged at the time when the sale deed came to be executed by the Official Assignee, here again the object being that the property which is sold by the Official Assignee should be free from the claims of the mortgagee. This again emphasises that what was proposed to be sold and what was bargained to be purchased is the two-third share. The next circumstance to be borne in mind is that the price for the one-third share is Rs. 1,250 and the price for the two-third share is Rs. 2,500. Having regard to the fact that Exhibit B-l is earlier than B-8 in point of time and that the purchaser was exposed to a suit for partition and other incidental litigation, as against Ayyaswami who owned at that time one-third share, inevitable in insolvency proceedings, the price of Rs. 1,250 and the price for the two-third share is Rs. 2,500. Having regard to the fact that Exhibit B-l is earlier than B-8 in point of time and that the purchaser was exposed to a suit for partition and other incidental litigation, as against Ayyaswami who owned at that time one-third share, inevitable in insolvency proceedings, the price of Rs. 2,500 was a proper price for the purchase of the two-third share in the house. The price paid is not so ludicrously low or inadequate as to suggest that what was sold was only the one-seventh share of Swaminatha, excluding the shares of the plaintiffs. Reference may now be made to the relevant portion in the sale-deed which runs as follows:- “......whereas the house and ground described hereunder is now free from any encumbrance whatsoever and whereas the insolvent and P. N. Nallathambi Ayyaswami Mudaliar are jointly entitled to be the absolute owners of the said house and ground described hereunder and insolvents are possessed (i). of only a two-third share in the said house, (ii) and ground described below and whereas the purchaser herein offered the sum of Rs. 2,500 for the purchase of the said two-third share of the house and ground described hereunder which offer has been accepted by the Official Assignee and was confirmed by his Lordship Mr. Justice Kumaraswamy Sastry by an order dated 14th January, 1929,now this indenture witnesseth that in pursuance of the above recited agreement and in consideration of the sum of Rs. 2,500............the receipt of which sum the vendor herein doth hereby acknowledge, he the vendor and the other hereby convey, assign and transfer unto the purchaser all the right,title and interest and claim of the said insolvents and the Official Assignee in and to the property described below free from the mortgages effected thereunder together with the house, stables, cowsheds, wells, coconut trees and etc.......... Schedule. Schedule. Two-third share in house and ground with stable, cow-sheds including backyard bearing Village Survey No. 115-38-39 with wells, coconuts and other trees standing thereon including the ground compound and walls measuring east to west about 300 feet, south to north about 400 feet situate on the southern row of Anjaneyar Koil Street, bounded on the North, etc.........” It is unnecessary to refer to the recitals in the second sale-deed Exhibit B-8 and it is sufficient to state that it proceeded on the footing that the purchaser had purchased from the Official Assignee under Exhibit B-l two-third share in the house, that the purchaser has been put in possession of that two-third share in the house and that under Exhibit B-8 the purchaser was purchasing the remaining one-third hare. The important recitals in the sale-deed, Exhibit B-l, extracted above would show that what the Official Assignee conveyed under this sale-deed is two-third share in the house and the interests of the sons of the said Swaminatha, the plaintiffs herein, were not excluded. Learned Counsel for the appellants urged that the language employed in this document, Exhibit B-l is not sufficient to indicate that the Official Assignee not only sold the share of the insolvent, Swaminatha, but also exercised his power of sale of the shares of the sons of Swaminatha. He urged that the expression “ all the right, title and interest and claim of the insolvent” , however wide the language may be, would only mean the shares of the insolvent as such and would not take in the power of disposal of the Official Assignee over the shares and the interests of the sons of Swaminatha. In substance, his contention is unless the Official Assignee, had, in the sale-deed expressly and specifically stated that in addition to conveying the share of the insolvent, the Official Assignee was also exercising the power of sale over the sons’ share, and by virtue of that power the sons’ share also was being conveyed to the purchaser, the title conveyed under the sale-deed must be confined and restricted only to the share of the insolvent father. The decision in Thirumaleshwara Bhatta v. Govinda Bhatta1, relied upon by him no doubt to some extent supports his contention. The decision in Thirumaleshwara Bhatta v. Govinda Bhatta1, relied upon by him no doubt to some extent supports his contention. Before I refer to the reasonings in that decision it is necessary to mention that the facts of that case are easily distinguishable from the instant case. In that case, the dispute arose immediately after the sale by the Official Receiver. The learned Judge held that the fact that in the sale list in the preamble it was stated that what was purported to be sold was the entire right possessed by the said insolvent in the immoveable property described in the schedule and the fact that in the schedule the entire property was described was not sufficient to convey the entire property inasmuch as the recitals in the sale-deed showed that what was being conveyed was the property belonging to the insolvent. The learned Judge also took the view that reference in the sale-deed to certain proceedings taken by the Official Receiver to set aside a trust deed executed by the insolvent and his son also showed that what was conveyed was only the insolvent’s share. The learned Judge wound up by saying that there was no specific language in the deed conveying the interests of the son in the property, nor any other indication in the deed from which such an inference could be drawn. It will therefore be noticed that the decision in that case turned upon the particular facts of the case and the particular language employed in the sale-deed in question. Here the facts and the circumstances under which the Official Assignee executed the sale-deed (referred to earlier) show that the intention of all concerned, including the Court, was to convey a two-third share in the house thereby meaning the shares of the plaintiffs and the second defendant. This decision has been noticed not with complete approval in later decisions of this Court and other Courts. It is sufficient to refer to a Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Perraju v. Perraju1, the decision of a Bench consisting of Viswanatha Sastri and Krishna Rao, JJ. This decision has been noticed not with complete approval in later decisions of this Court and other Courts. It is sufficient to refer to a Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Perraju v. Perraju1, the decision of a Bench consisting of Viswanatha Sastri and Krishna Rao, JJ. In that case too it was argued that there must be a specific recital in the sale-deed to the fact that the Official Receiver in addition to selling the share of the insolvent-father was also exercising the power of sale of the father over the sons’ shares which also vested in the Official Receiver. The Bench rejected that argument and it was observed as follows at page 611 while referring to the decision of Satyanarayana Rao, J.: “We are not here concerned with the correctness of the conclusion of the learned Judge on the facts of the particular case. All that we respectfully point out is that it is sufficient if the Official Receiver in fact exercises the right of the father to sell the share of the sons and conveys the entire interest in the property to the purchaser. The Official Receiver need not purport to” exercise the right to sell the right of the father to sell the son’s share as well, whatever this might mean“. It is sufficient if he sells the absolute interest in the property. There is no doubt a difference between the existence of a power and its actual exercise and the mere existence of power may not be sufficient to show that in any particular case that it was exercised. At the same time the deed of sale executed by the Official Receiver need not specifically recite that he was exercising the power of sale vested in him under sections 28 and 28-A of the Act. It will be sufficient if he purports to convey the entire interest in the property and not merely the share of the insolvent-father. In the present case, what has been sold is the right of the insolvent in the property described in the schedule. .... The schedule annexed to the sale-deed clearly describes the property and there is no indication in the document that anything less than the entire property or the property excluding the son’s shares was sold. In the present case, what has been sold is the right of the insolvent in the property described in the schedule. .... The schedule annexed to the sale-deed clearly describes the property and there is no indication in the document that anything less than the entire property or the property excluding the son’s shares was sold. It was not only the right but the duty of the Official Receiver to sell the entire property of the insolvent for the benefit of his creditors and where the insolvent’s property included the power to sell his sons’ shares in respect of the insolvent’s antecedent debts not tainted by illegality or immorality it may be presumed that the Official Receiver exercised the right vested in him by law for the benefit of the creditors though the sale-deed does not say so. We have also to take due notice of the fact that at the time of the sale by the Official Receiver, the well understood legal position was that the father could convey the interest of his sons for the discharge of his untainted debts and that the Official Receiver in whom the father’s interest vested on his insolvency, had also a similar right. The question in these cases is what was intended and accepted to be sold and actually was sold according to the law understood to be prevailing at the time and not what might have been sold under an alteration in the law as subsequently declared by judicial decisions.” The position in the instant case is a fortiori. In the case of the Official Assignee governed by the Presidency Town’s Insolvency Act it is undoubted law that under the Act what vests in the Official Assignee is the share of the insolvent as well as the power of disposal over the sons’ share, regarding it also as property. With respect, I am unable to agree with the view taken in Thirumaleshwara Bhatta v. Govinda Bhatta2. With respect, I am unable to agree with the view taken in Thirumaleshwara Bhatta v. Govinda Bhatta2. The attention of the learned Judge, Satyanarayana Rao, J., was not drawn to a Bench decision of this Court in Sankaranarayana Pillai v. Rajamani3, in which, applying the principle of the leading decision of the Privy Council in Bijraj Nopani v. Pura Sundary Dasee4, it was held that if the sale-deed by the Official Receiver uses the “all estate” clause thereby intending to convey, absolutely the property outright, it must be held that the Official Receiver not only sold the share of the insolvent but also intended to exercise the power of disposal, in which case only the purpose of the sale could be effectuated, namely, conveying the entire property outright to the purchaser. In that Bench decision a father and his minor sons were adjudged insolvents. The Official Receiver sold some property in its entirety. The question arose as to what exactly was conveyed under the sale-deed by the Official Receiver. The Bench held that even assuming that the order adjudicating the minor sons as insolvents was wrong, and their shares did not vest in the Official Receiver a sale by the Official Receiver purporting to be of the whole family estate passed to the vendee, the sons’ share also, since the Official Receiver who stood in the shoes of the father could have sold the sons’ shares also for discharging the debts which were neither illegal nor immoral. The recital in the saledeed in that case too was merely a sale of the property and there was no specific recital (referring to the exercise of the power of sale of the Official Receiver) over the shares of the various persons. The recital in the saledeed in that case too was merely a sale of the property and there was no specific recital (referring to the exercise of the power of sale of the Official Receiver) over the shares of the various persons. It is sufficient to refer to the following observations of Venkatasubba Rao, J., at page 472: “In Bijraj Nopani v. Pura Sundary Dasee1, it was held that the title vested in an executor passed under the deed by which he purported to convey all his right and title in the property sold although he did not expressly state in it, that he was conveying the property in his capacity as executor, Their Lordships observe, ‘The deed states plainly that whatever right or title the vendors possess is to go to support the conveyance and it is a settled rule that the meaning of a deed is to be decided by the language used, interpreted in its natural sense’.” This principle was also recognised in Gharib-ulla v. Khalak Singh.2. One of the three brothers constituting an undivided Mitakshara family was a minor, and his mother as his guardian executed the mortgage deed along with the two adult brothers. It was found that the mother was incompetent to act as the minor’s guardian but their Lordships held that the mortgage must be considered to be a “mortgage by the family entered into by its karta and could, so far as the mortgage was found to have been made for the benefit of the family and for legal necessity be enforced against all the members. The true principle deducible from these cases seems to be this. The first question that arises is did the executant purport to pass the whole property? The next question is, was he in a position to validly convey it? If the two questions are answered in the affirmative, the third question arises, is there anything in the deed to repel the presumption that he intended to convey the title he possessed in every capacity? The next question is, was he in a position to validly convey it? If the two questions are answered in the affirmative, the third question arises, is there anything in the deed to repel the presumption that he intended to convey the title he possessed in every capacity? Judged by this test, there can be no doubt that the alienees before us acquired the interest of the fathers as well as of the sons in the properties conveyed by the Official Receiver.” I may also next refer to a Bench decision of this Court in Muthiah Chettiar v. Rayalu Ayyar Nagaswami Ayyar & Co.3, the observations at page 551, in which the principle of the decision of the Privy Council in Bijraj Nopani v. Pura Sundary Dasee1, was applied. In that case the managing member of the family executed a mortgage of certain properties describing them as self acquisitions. But it was found that the properties were joint family properties. It was argued that as the manager mortgaged the property only in his own individual right and did not purport to represent the family acting as the managing member of the family, the mortgage would not bind the interests of the other members of the family. This argument was not accepted in the view that if the actual bargain between the parties was that the mortgagee should get a valid enforceable security over the property sought to be mortgaged, the mortgagee would be entitled to invoke for his aid any other capacity or circumstance which would enable the mortgagor to secure that interest even though there was no express reference to that circumstance or capacity in the deed of mortgage. At this stage, I may refer to a Bench decision of this Court consisting of Satyanarayana Rao and Balakrishna Aiyar, JJ., in Sreenivasan v. Rangachari4, in which the question arose as to the nature of the interest purchased by a purchaser in execution of a money decree obtained against the father. The argument was that what was sold and purchased was only the share of the father and the sons’ interest did not pass to the purchaser. That argument was rejected. The argument was that what was sold and purchased was only the share of the father and the sons’ interest did not pass to the purchaser. That argument was rejected. Satyanarayana Rao, J., who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Bench, put the matter thus at page 597: “ No such contention seems to have been raised in the plaint by the plaintiffs-appellants and it is perhaps for that reason that no material has been placed before the Court such as the sale proclamation, etc., to consider whether what was sold was the property itself or only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor. There is the sale certificate, Exhibit B-3, which however states that what was sold was the property described in the schedule. It does not state that what was sold was only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor.” It is significant to notice that the learned Judge has emphasized that the fact that the property as a whole is described in the schedule and that the schedule did not expressly say that what was sold was only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor, would indicate that what was sold was the entire property. From this decision, it is seen that so long as there is no exclusion of the share of the son, the sale of the entire property, as such described in the sale certificate, would be sufficient to convey the entire property. In the instant case, there is not only no exclusion of the shares of the sons, but what was sold was expressly the entire 2/3rd share using the “ all estate clause” . Further, under section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, in the absence of a different intention expressly or by necessary implication, a transfer of property should pass to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is capable of passing in the property. This principle underlying section 8, Transfer of Property Act, was applied by the Bench decision in Muthiah Chettiar v. Rajalu Ayyar Nagaswami Ayyar &38; Co.1, already referred to. For all these reasons, I hold that the Official Assignee intended and actually conveyed the 2/3rd share in the house including the plaintiff’s shares and the first defendant also bargained for and purchased a 2/3rd share in the entire house. For all these reasons, I hold that the Official Assignee intended and actually conveyed the 2/3rd share in the house including the plaintiff’s shares and the first defendant also bargained for and purchased a 2/3rd share in the entire house. Even assuming that under Exhibit B-l, the shares of the plaintiffs were no conveyed, the plaintiff’s rights, long ago, became barred by limitation and extinguished, as a result of ouster. Learned Counsel for the appellants drew my attention to some decisions in which it was held that as between co-owners, the mere fact that one co-owner is in possession of the entire property would not be sufficient evidence of ouster so as to extinguish the rights of the other co-owner. The principle of those cases will have no application in the instant case as in this case there has been an alienation by the Official Assignee which amounts to alienation by a co-owner to a stranger. In such a situation, the decision of the Bench of this Court in Palani Pillai v. Ibrahim Rowther2, clearly applies. In that case in respect of property owned by the members of a Muhammadan family, some of the co-owners executed a usufructuary mortgage of certain specific items and the mortgagee entered into possession of the mortgaged items. It was held that adverse possession i.e., ouster in such a case, started from the date of possession by the mortgagee and not from the date of ouster to the knowledge of the other members. The principle of this decision is that while possession of one co-owner is in itself rightful and does not imply hostility, the position is different when the stranger is in possession and that his possession itself indicates that it is adverse to the true owners. It is unnecessary to refer to other cases on the point and it is sufficient to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Chenbasavana Gowd v. Mahabaleswarappa3, in which the principle was applied in the case of a lease by the father including the son’s share. Learned Counsel for the appellants lastly urged that in the instant case, the plaintiff’s father and grand-father had been in occupation of the house and that that should be regarded as recognition of the plaintiffs’ right to a 5/21 share. This argument is totally devoid of substance. Learned Counsel for the appellants lastly urged that in the instant case, the plaintiff’s father and grand-father had been in occupation of the house and that that should be regarded as recognition of the plaintiffs’ right to a 5/21 share. This argument is totally devoid of substance. So far as the 1st plaintiff is concerned, in the same place he was living in a rented house and came to occupy the house in 1956. In the affidavit which he filed in Appeal No. 65 of 1961, Exhibit B-9, he has stated that it was only in 1951, he came to know that the suit property was his family property and that it was only when he began to live in a rented house that some villagers told him that he need not live in a rented house when he has himself got a house meaning the suit house, in his own right. This shows that till 1956, the 1st plaintiff never knew that he had a right in this house. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to recognise the possession, if any, of the plaintiffs’ father or grand-father as referrable to the plaintiffs’ right. Unless the plaintiffs are able to establish that the first defendant allowed the plaintiffs’ father and grandfather to remain in occupation of the house, recognising the plaintiffs’ right in pursuance of an arrangement with the plaintiffs, express or implied, the possession of their father, even if true, would not enure for the benefit of the plaintiffs. This question has been considered by the learned District Munsif in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the judgment. The conclusion arrived at by him is correct and is supported by adequate and satisfactory evidence, with the result that the plaintiffs’ right, if any, must be deemed to have been extinguished by ouster and adverse possession from the year 1930. I have no doubt in my mind that all these thirty years, the 1st plaintiff himself knew that the entire 2/3rd share in the house had been told to the first defendant. It was only as a result of recent misunderstandings, the plaintiffs had embarked upon this frivolous and vexatious litigation. Looked at from any point of view, the plaintiffs’ suit lacks substance and has been rightly dismissed. The Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. No leave. V.K. --------- Appeal dismissed.