ORDER M. Madhavan Nair, J. 1. This Criminal Revision Petition has arisen in a proceeding under Chapter X, Crl. P. C. 2. On November 30, 1965, the licensee of the 'Hundred acre Estate' hereafter the petitioner filed a petition before the Executive First Class Magistrate, Trivandrum, complaining of obstruction on the road to that estate through the adjoining 'Ten acre Estate'� by owners of the latter estate (hereafter the counter-petitioner), stating that the said road is a public way and praying for action under section 133, Crl. P. C. By an order of the same date, the Executive First Class Magistrate forwarded the petition to the Sub Inspector of Police, Vithura, for immediate enquiry and report. The report of the Sub Inspector is dated December 4, 1965, and reads thus: The property comprising of 10 acres of rubber estate belonging to C.P. No. 1 lying on the other side of the the Malayalam of the petitioner and he has only one way of getting into his property through this Malayalam. Likewise the petitioner has to go through the estate of C.P. No. 2 to get into his property. The C.Ps. are close relations. It has been agreed since a long time between both the parties by oral agreement that each party will allow access through their estates for going into their properties and this had been smoothly going on till recently when the petitioner objected C,P. No. 1 from using the roads in his estate. As a counter to this C.P. No. 2 also objected the petitioner in using the roads in his estates and hence the dispute. The roads are privately owned and as such both parties cannot claim right of way, but has to mutually respect each other need. The parties have to reach an agreement to solve this dispute, otherwise should purchase the portion lying in each other property and use them for their conveyance. These roads are primarily used only by these parties and as such application of section 133, Crl. P.C. do not arise.. There is an endorsement on the above said report of the Sub Inspector which reads: Returned. The Sub Inspector, Vithura, should see the spot again and submit a report within four days. By order, (Sd.) Head Clerk, 3-1-1966. These roads are primarily used only by these parties and as such application of section 133, Crl. P.C. do not arise.. There is an endorsement on the above said report of the Sub Inspector which reads: Returned. The Sub Inspector, Vithura, should see the spot again and submit a report within four days. By order, (Sd.) Head Clerk, 3-1-1966. It appears that this endorsement was made on account of a petition moved by the petitioner on 31st December 1965, though that petition is not seen among the papers here. The second report of the Sub Inspector is dated 30th January 1966. It reads: Thus an overall examination of the facts will show that the petitioner on behalf of the proprietors of 100 acre estate was using the road in question now obstructed by C.P. No. 1 unrestricted till recently as C.P. No. 1 was using the estate road to reach his property on the back side of 100 acre estate. The dispute regarding the use of these roads are purely private as these roads are exclusively used by C.P. No. 1 and the 100 acre estate people. There are no alternative paths to both parties to reach their properties. C.P. No. 2 is only a relative of C.P. No. 1 and has nothing to do with the obstruction of these roads as alleged in the petition. Regarding the mutual understanding there are no records available with both parties and no neighbours can afford to speak regarding that. The statement taken in this connection and copies of records are enclosed herewith. Arrangements have been made to keep the law and order situation normal in the locality. The facts revealed during enquiry do not go to say whether the road in question is in the entire possession of the petitioner on behalf of the 100 acre estate owners. Hence this may kindly be examined and orders passed to further proceedings. The temporary gate constructed by C.P. No. 1 is still available in the road and C.P. No. 1 is not using the estate road for vehicular traffic as was done before. The petitioner is using the road in question now at times of necessity with the then and there permission of C.P. No. 1. The temporary gate constructed by C.P. No. 1 is still available in the road and C.P. No. 1 is not using the estate road for vehicular traffic as was done before. The petitioner is using the road in question now at times of necessity with the then and there permission of C.P. No. 1. The aforesaid two reports of the local Sub Inspector of Police make clear that the roads in the petitioner estate and the counter-petitioners estate, were being mutually used as access to their respective estates, that they are private roads, that no public right of way exists over them, and that therefore no action under section 133, Crl. P.C. was called for. 3. On 26th February 1966, the petitioner moved another petition before the Executive First Class Magistrate, stating ......On a petition submitted by me on 31-12-1965 this Court, again forwarded the original petition to Sub Inspector of Police, Vithura, to report as to the present position regarding the obstruction made, directing the report to be sent within 4 days. But the Sub Inspector of Police, Vithura, has not yet returned the petition forwarded to him nor has he sent the report. This tantamounts to disobedience of orders of this court. The counter-petitioners are still obstructing the pathway thereby occasioning hardships, injury and inconvenience to the petitioner and also others. By the act of the counter-petitioners the petitioner is sustaining heavy losses every day. Hence it is humbly prayed that this Court be pleased to issue a reminder to the Sub Inspector of Police, Vithura, to send up a report, as called for by this Court, immediately. The First Class Magistrates endorsement on this petition is dated the same day (28-2-1966) and reads: "Forwarded to the C.I., Nedumangad for immediate report and remarks."� As has been mentioned above, the Sub Inspector had submitted his revised report on 30th January 1966. Apparently that has not been brought to the notice of the Executive First Class Magistrate when she passed the order on the above said petition on 28th February 1966, The Sub Inspectors report, dated 30th January 1966 does not bear any seal of the court or initial of the Magistrate or other officer of the court. There is therefore no indication therein as to the date of its arrival in the court. There is therefore no indication therein as to the date of its arrival in the court. The petitioner assertion that the Sub Inspector has disobeyed the orders of the First Class Magistrate and the Magistrate forwarding the petition to the Circle Inspector apparently accepting that assertion seem to be the result of that non-placing of the Sub Inspector report before the Magistrate or in the file, even though it must have been received in the office of the Magistrate a month ago. The suppression of the report might be accidental or deliberate; but the sluggish proceedings in this case of a dispute between individuals under rules designed for emergencies of serious injury to the public at large leave room for considerable suspicion that the suppression must have been deliberate and that it came out because the Circle Inspector report said: "Report on that endorsement is seen submitted by the Sub-Inspector on 30th January 1966 as per the station records." As the matter has arisen in a judicial proceeding it has to be viewed as an irregularity or misconduct that affected the administration of justice and merits a disciplinary enquiry and adequate punishment in accordance with the finding that may be arrived at such enquiry as to whether the suppression was accidental or deliberate, to prevent recurrence of such practices. A copy of this order will be forwarded to the Chief Secretary to Government for necessary action on the above observations. 4. The Circle Inspector of Police, Nedumangad, in compliance with the aforesaid direction, submitted his report on 5th March 1966. It also says: "These are private roads constructed and maintained by the Estate owners."� but he added "People living beyond the 100 acre estate had also been using it hitherto." But the report does not say that the public are using the road in question as of right or with permission of the estate owners. Counsel for the petitioner states that the Hundred acre Estate is an enclave bounded by river on three sides and the access to it is the disputed road. If that be so, the chance of public beyond the Hundred acre Estate using the access to the estate for their passage must be rare. Counsel for the petitioner states that the Hundred acre Estate is an enclave bounded by river on three sides and the access to it is the disputed road. If that be so, the chance of public beyond the Hundred acre Estate using the access to the estate for their passage must be rare. The Sub Inspectors reports are clear that no public right of way exists in this case and that the obstruction by the counter-petitioners was in retaliation of the petitioners obstructing their passage through the road in the Hundred acre Estate. I am inclined to believe the clear reports of the local Sub Inspector who made detailed enquiries at the spot. Along with his report, the Circle Inspector has forwarded a copy of a receipt executed by the father of C. P. No. 2 which reads: Malayalam It shows that the executant had no interest at the time in the property and that all that he undertook was to get a conveyance by his sons of a part of the estate for a road to the Hundred acre Estate, which is confirmatory of the fact that he is incompetent to convey the same and that the property really belongs to his sons, and not to himself. The receipt is then of no legal consequence. 5. However, acting on the report of the Circle Inspector of Police, the Magistrate passed a conditional order under section 133, Crl. P. C. on March 10, 1966. The petitioner application for an order under section 133 was on 30th November 1965 requiring the counter petitioners "to remove the obstruction (caused by putting a gate on the road) within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of this order or to appear before me on 31st March 1966 and show cause why the order should not be enforced."� On March 15, 1966, she supplemented that order by another order under section 142 (1) Crl. P.C. directing and enjoining "the counter-petitioners forthwith to remove the obstruction caused to the road"� This order purports to have been made on a petition dated 13th June 1966.� The date 13-6-1969 must be an obvious mistake, and no petition for an order under section 142 (1) is among the papers forwarded to this Court. In the circumstances detailed above particularly in view of the long interval in which the petition for action under section 133, Crl. In the circumstances detailed above particularly in view of the long interval in which the petition for action under section 133, Crl. P.C. was lying over it is difficult to believe that a case for immediate measures. to prevent imminent danger or injury of a serious kind to the public, arose to justify her order under section 142 (1) Crl. P.C. As the First Class Magistrate had already issued a conditional order asking the counter-petitioners to appear before her on 31st March 1966 and show cause why her order should not be enforced she ought not to have lightly passed the latter order on 15th March 1966 without scrutinising the case and recording adequate grounds therefor. The order of 15th March 1966 appears to have been passed as a routine order in general expression. I am afraid that the Executive First Class Magistrate did not exercise her discretion in the matter discreetly. 6. In compliance to the order 10th of March 1966 the 1st counter-petitioner entered appearance on 31st March 1966. The order sheet of the First Class Magistrate shows that on 31st March 1966 the case was Adjourned to 15th April 1966 by notification. The reason for that adjournment is not clear in that note, and from the expression by notification� I presume it to be the absence of the Magistrate on that day. On 15th April 1966, the 1st counter-petitioner put in his statement denying the existence of a public way within his Ten acre Estate. He had also moved a petition for conversion of the proceeding to one under section 147 Crl. P. C. which was dismissed rightly in my opinion on 22nd April 1966. On 22nd April 1966 the case was adjourned to 28th April 1966 for questioning the counter-petitioners on the denial of the public right. It was also ordered on 22nd April 1966 Witness schedule has been filed. Will be admitted after questioning the C. Ps. Thereafter it appears, in spite of several postings no witness was examined and no questioning of the counter-petitioners was done. It appears that on 13th June 1966 the petitioner moved another petition that petition is also not found among the papers sent to this Court stating that the counter-petitioners have caused further obstruction to the use of the road by taking a deep trench in and across the pathway. It appears that on 13th June 1966 the petitioner moved another petition that petition is also not found among the papers sent to this Court stating that the counter-petitioners have caused further obstruction to the use of the road by taking a deep trench in and across the pathway. No notice of that petition was given to the counter-petitioners. It was sent for report of the Police, and on the report of the police that the allegation is true, Executive First Class Magistrate, on August 8, 1966, Ordered "the counter-petitioners forthwith to remove the obstructions caused to the road"� The counter-petitioners have come up for a revision of the above said proceedings. 7. A proceeding under Chapter X of the Criminal Procedure Code is not an alternative for a civil suit. It is warranted only in cases of urgency where danger to public interest is concerned. Extraordinary powers are meant to be exercised under extraordinary circumstances only. Section 133, Crl.P.C. cannot be initiated by a Magistrate unless he is satisfied that the case is not one of dispute between individuals for determination of which the proper forum is the civil court. The two reports of the local Sub-Inspector of Police are clearly to the effect that the road concerned is a private road, allowed to be used by the owner of the adjoining estate on a mutual agreement, part of which has been violated by the complaining party, and that no public right of way exists over it to justify an action under section 133, Crl.P.C. Further, where on a conditional order issued under section 133, Crl.P.C., the person concerned has appeared and denied the public right of way that was the basis for the order, section 139-A Crl.P.C. imperatively requires the Magistrate to enquire into the matter and if the Magistrate finds any reliable evidence in support of the denial, he has to stay the proceedings until the existence of the public right of way is decided by a competent civil court. Here, the Executive First Class Magistrate appears to have been indifferent to the counter-petitioners denial of the public right of way, which denial finds considerable support even in the two reports of the local Sub-Inspector of Police, and to have been busy in ordering measures in enforcement of the alleged public right of way. Here, the Executive First Class Magistrate appears to have been indifferent to the counter-petitioners denial of the public right of way, which denial finds considerable support even in the two reports of the local Sub-Inspector of Police, and to have been busy in ordering measures in enforcement of the alleged public right of way. Section 139, Crl-P.C, is clear that the authority to determine a disputed right of public way is the civil court and not the Magistrate functioning under Chapter X of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In spite of the long lapse of time after the counter-petitioners have put forth their denial of the public right of way, no evidence was taken by the Magistrate on their denial of the right of way. Instead of that, she has, after the lapse of two months of the conditional order and that without notice to the counter-petitioners, who have already entered appearance before her, chosen to pass imperative orders in immediate enforcement of the right of way in favour of the petitioner. The reports of the Police and the petitions of the petitioner do not make out a case for action under sections 133 to 142 the Criminal Procedure Code. I feel certain that this is an abuse or misuse of criminal proceedings under Chapter X of Criminal Procedure Code, and the dispute that gave rise to the proceedings is a private one between individuals which ought to have been moved before the proper civil court. I would therefore revise and quash all the proceedings made in this case by the Executive First Class Magistrate, Trivandrum, inclusive of the conditional order passed under section 133, Crl. P.C. Order accordingly.