Grover ( 1 ) THE petitioner vends chhole kulche and squals at a site outside the gate of Hindustan Times, Conriaught Circus New Delhi. He claims that he has been carrying on this trade at the same site since 1956. All the squatters within the area of New Delhi Municipal Committee formed themselves into the New Delhi Rehri Association in 1953 in order to press their demands for grant of licences and other facilities to the members of the Association. It is alleged that after certain discussions had taken place between the office bearers of the respondent Committee and the Association, the President of the Association sent a letter dated 5th January. 1956 to the Health Officer of the Committee confirming the agreement which had been mooted at the meeting which was that the members of the Association should form themselves into a Co-operative Society for the manufacture of edibles and build trolleys of specific designs and then licences would be issued to them if they agreed to stick to the places allotted to them. After the Health Officer had addressed a letter dated 23rd March, 1956 on those lines, a Co-operative Society was formed called the New Delhi Rehri Owners Co operative Society Limited. This Society was duly got registered and it is claimed that a substantial amount of Rs. 17. 000. 00 was contributed by the members for the construction of trolleys. Beofore, however, the licences were granted Shri Satish Chander, the President, was transferred and the Vice-President, resigned. The new Offlice-bearers took up a different and unsympathetic attitude. However, l14th May 1963 Shri Gajraj Singh, the new President of the Committee, made an annoucement that all squatters and stall-holders who had been squatting or holding stalls within the area of the Municipal Committee since 1957 would be granted licences Alist was prepared of all such squatters which was duly verified and the petitioner s name appeared therein. On 20th December 1963 the respondent Committee passed a resolution for the grant of licences to the squatters/stall-holders. The main terms of this resolution are reproduced in paragraph 15 of the petition. Temporary tehbazari permits were to be issued to the verified squatters and hawkers on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. On 20th December 1963 the respondent Committee passed a resolution for the grant of licences to the squatters/stall-holders. The main terms of this resolution are reproduced in paragraph 15 of the petition. Temporary tehbazari permits were to be issued to the verified squatters and hawkers on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. It is alleged that in July 1964 the respondent Committee sought to impose a condition on the tea and other stall-holders who had been granted licences that they should remove their stalls every day after sunset and re-establish them after sunrise. Various stall-holders challenged the aforesaid condition as unreasonable by way of writ petitions and civil suits. Thereupon the respondent Committee got annoyed and by way of a retaliatory measure stopped accepting any licence fee from any squater or stall-holder. Ultimately on the assurances given on behalf of the respondent Committee the stall-holders withdrew their cases. The respondent Committee then called upon various squatter and stall holders to submit declarations to the effect that they had paid tehbazari fee up to 30th June 1965 and they had been allotted altemative accommodation in lieu of the sites previously occupied by them and, therefore, they had ceased to squat on the previous sites. The petitioner submitted the requisite declaration upon which the respondent Committee accepted a sum of Rs. 375. 00 as licence fee up to 30th June 1965. It however, while allotting alternative sites to a large number of squatters in Ramakrishna Puram, did not allot any such site to the petitioner. It is said that the action of the respondent Committee which it purported to have taken under section 173 of the Punjab Municipal Act (hereinafter called the Act) of with-holding permission in respect of the petitioner squatting on the site where he has been squatting since 1956, is illegal, arbitrary and in excess of the powers conferred by the statute. ( 2 ) THE respondent Committee filed an affidavit dated 19th Novemeber 1965 of Shri R. S. Rai, officiating Secretary in reply. It was stated therein that the tehbazari permission was given to the petitioner and could be withdrawn at any time and that was clearly mentioned in the resolution of the respondent Committee dated 20th December, 1963. ( 2 ) THE respondent Committee filed an affidavit dated 19th Novemeber 1965 of Shri R. S. Rai, officiating Secretary in reply. It was stated therein that the tehbazari permission was given to the petitioner and could be withdrawn at any time and that was clearly mentioned in the resolution of the respondent Committee dated 20th December, 1963. It was further said that as the petitioner was not carrying out the conditions of the permission which was granted to him and was creating insanitary conditions hazardous to the health of the citizens, it was decided to cancel his permission and he was directed to remove his wares. It was also asserted that the site in question was a part of road-berm of public street and the petitioner s trade caused obstruction and interference with the use of the road. The temporary permission having been withdrawn and not renewed the petitioner was a tresspasser. In paragraph 16 of Mr. Rai s affidavit it was stated that-the respondent Committee did not allot any alternative site in Ramakrishna Puram but it was the Director of Estates, Ministry of Works and Housing, Government of India, who allotted platforms to some squatters/hawkers. ( 3 ) THE writ petition came up for hearing before a Bench consisting of J. S. Bedi ,ind Shamsher Bahadur JJ. on 13th December, 1965. They recorded the following order on that day :- "it has transpired during the course of arguments that the authority which has allotted sites to the squatters is the Director of Estates and for its own part, the respondent (New Delhi Municipal Committee) has made a recommendation in favour of the petitioner for allotment of a site. In such a situation, let notice issue to the Director of Estates and a copy of the writ petition sent to him. The injunction meanwhile will continue". The Director of Estates filed an affidavit dated 27th January, 1966 inwhich it was stated inter alia that the name of the petitioner was not in eluded in the list of eligible squatters furnished to the Director of Estates by the respondent Committee for allotment of platforms in Ramakrishna Puram and that all the available platforms were allotted to the eligible squatters. By means of a petition dated 2nd February, 1966, the respondent Committee sought to file a supplementary affidavit on the ground that Shri B. S. Saxena who was the actual incumbent of the office of the Secretary of the Conmittee was on leave in November, 1965 when the counter affidavit was filed by Shri R. S. Rai, officiating Secretary, and owing to the absence of the former certain material facts and documents could not be mentioned in the earlier affidavit. In the supplementary affidavit of Shri Saxena, it has been stated that by a resolution dated 20th December, 1963 the respondent Committee passed the Scheme of Re-origanisation of hawkers/squatters within its area under which those who lad been squatting since 12th April, 1957 were to be verified on the basis of proof of their continuous squatting. The persons so verified were to be allotted sites and granted permits on payment of the prescribed temporary tehbctzari permits fee. In the categories mentioned in paragraph 1 of this affidavit in category (4) of chhole kulche the number of verified squatters was stated to be 59. By another resolution dated 13th March, 1964 conditions were prescribed according to which such verified hawkers or squatters could carry on their trades. It was further stated that while the entire problem was being viewed by the authorities from different angles there were serious complaints of insanitary and unhygienic conditions created by some of the squatters, especially those who were concerned with the sale of cooked food. Another resolution was passed on 30th April, 1965 by which the Committee decided that no sale of cooked food including tea, chhole kulche, and dehi bara be permitted and that the selection and allotment of sites was to be entirely at the discretion of the Committee. While steps were being taken to implement these decisions Shri Mohan Singh, Senior Vice-President of the Committee, was able to prevail upon the Directorate of Estates to consider the feasibility of allotting open platforms in Ramakrishna Purain and on Ring Road Nauroji Nagar, New Delhi. This move was entirely on his own intitative as he wished to help the squatters in the matter of providing alternative accommodation. Applications were invited from the persons whose claims had been verified. This move was entirely on his own intitative as he wished to help the squatters in the matter of providing alternative accommodation. Applications were invited from the persons whose claims had been verified. The total number of verified squatters was found to be 725 and out of these, 156 persons were carrying on trades which had been declared to be prohibited trades as per resolution dated 30th April, 1965. The Senior Vice-President of the Committee placed two options before those persons who had been carrying on such trades. They were asked either to agree to shift to Ramakrishna Puram so that their cases might be recommended to the Directorate of Estates for allotment of platform accommodation there or they would be required to change their trade and accept such trade as might be permitted by the Commettee so that they might be allotted same sites approved by the Committee within its limits. The option offered to the squatters did not involve any commitment or obligation on the part of the Committee to obtain any allotment. The squatters were further asked to clear up the arrears due to them on account of the tehbazari charges for the period ending 30th June, 1965. Each squatter was also required to vacate the site on which he had been squatting and to make a declaration that he had ceased to squat and had vacated the site under his temporary occupion. As a result of this, 105 persons opted for allotment of sites in ramakrishna Puram and Nauroji Nagar. Out of these, 99 persons were recomnnended for allotment of platforms in Ramakrishna Puram while 6 were recommended for allotment in Nauroji Nagar. Of the remaining 51 persons some did not apply for allotment at all while others declared that they were willing to change their trade and they asked for allotment of some approved sites within the limits of the Committee. The petitioner submitted an application dated 24th July, 1965 (Annexure "x") accompanied by an affidavit in which he offered to change his trade from selling chhole kulche to that of sale of cloth and requested that the site where he was then working might be allotted to him. The petitioner submitted an application dated 24th July, 1965 (Annexure "x") accompanied by an affidavit in which he offered to change his trade from selling chhole kulche to that of sale of cloth and requested that the site where he was then working might be allotted to him. In this declaration the petitioner had also under taken that he would not re-squat in the said site nor would he seek any redress in a Court of Law pertaining to his squattmg rights vide Annexures "x" and "y". ( 4 ) AT the time of arguments before us Mr. Hardy, who appeared for the respondent Committee, stoutly maintained that the statement which was made at the Bar before the Bench on 13th December, 1965 by the counsel for the Committee that a recommendation had been made in favour of the petitioner for allotment of a site had been made under some misapprehension. We, therefore, required the counsel who had made that statement to clarify the position before us. Mr. V. . D. Misra, Advocate, then made a statement on 21st February, 1966 explaining the circumstances in which he had made that statement. According. to Mr. Misra, the information which had been supplied to him by Mr. Rai and the fact that the petitioner in his writ petition had stated that he had applied for alternative accommodation, furnished the basis on which he made the statement as he thought that. an application had been forwarded to the Director of Estates with the recommendation in favour of the petitioner for allotment of a site to him in Ramakrishna Puram. Later on it transpired that the petitioner had not actually applied for allotment of a platform there. Mr. Hardy also made a statement saying that Mr. V D. Misra had some misapprehension as to the correct position on 13th December, 1965. Mr. Hardy, however, in view of the previous statement of Mr. Misra has expressed willingness on the part of the Committee to allow the petitioner to squat and carry on such trade as may be allotted to him within a fornight by the New Delhi Municipal Committee at any place which the Committee may select interms of the petitioner s affidavit dated 24th July, 1965 (Annexure "y" ). This, according to Mr. This, according to Mr. Hardy, would be done as a matter of grace and not in recognition of any right or assertion of a claim on the part of the petitioner. ( 5 ) MR. Madan Bhatia, who has argued the case of the petitioner, has assailed the action taken by the respondent Committee on all the points on which it could possibly be challenged. He has contended firstly that the petitioner s name was admittedly included in the list of squaiters about whom verification was made and with regard to whom it was decided that they should be given permission on payment of a licence fee or tehbazari to carry on their trade at the places where they were doing so before 1957. The licence fee was also accepted from the petitioner up to 30th June, 19^5. Any action, therefore, which the respondent Committee desired to take could be taken only in accordance with the statute. Section 173 of the Act provides that the Committee may grant permission in writing, on such conditions as it may deem fit for the safety or convenience of persons passing by, or dwelling or working in the neighbour hood, and may charge fees for such permission, and may at its discretion withdraw the permission, etc. It is submitted that the decision of the Committee or its order withdrawing permission from the petitioner to squat at the site in dispute must satisfy certain tests failing which it would be liable to be struck down by the Courts. These tests were laid down in Mayor, etc. , of Westminister v. London and North Western Railway Company, by the House of Lords in the off-quoted passage from the speech of Lord Macnaghten, which has become locus classicus on the subject- "it is well settled that a public body invested with statutory powers such as those conferred upon the corporation must take care not to exceed or abuse its powers. It must keep within the limits of the authority committed to it. It must act in good faith. And it must act reasonably. "according to Mr. Bhatia, the action of the respondent Committee qua the petitioner is discriminatory, unreasonable and the exercise of discretion under section 173 is not bonafide. ( 6 ) AS regards discriminatory treatment, Mr. It must keep within the limits of the authority committed to it. It must act in good faith. And it must act reasonably. "according to Mr. Bhatia, the action of the respondent Committee qua the petitioner is discriminatory, unreasonable and the exercise of discretion under section 173 is not bonafide. ( 6 ) AS regards discriminatory treatment, Mr. Bhatia has laid a great deal of stress on the fact that out of the pre-1957 squatters, 99 persons were recommended for allotment of platforms in Ramakrishna Puram while 6 were recommended for allotment In Nauroji Nagar. As regards the remaining 51 persons, including the petitioner, they were forced to make the declarations that they were willing to change their trade etc. and that they should be allotted such sites as would be approved by the Committee. The grievance of Mr. Bhatia is that the petitioner was never asked whether he was willing to shift to Ramakrishna Puram and if he had been so asked he would have indicated his consent at once to opt for allotment there. The petitioner s grievance essentially is that although other persons who were similarly situated and circumstanced and were carrying on similar trades were recommended for allotment in Ramakrishna Puram and Nauroji Nagar, the petitioner was accorded discriminatory treatment by being made to sign the declaration which has already been mentioned and which left him entirely at the mercy of the respondent Committee. Mr. Hardy points out that in the supplementary affidavit of the Committee it has clearly been stated that the persons who were recommended for allotment in Ramakrishna Puram and Nauroji Nagar had actually opted for allotment in those places. It is apparent that the petitioner never asked for allotment of a site there. It is difficult to see how the respondent Committee can be charged with having treated him unfairly and in a discriminatory manner when he never originally expressed any desire to shift to Ramakrishna Puram or Nauroji Nagar. As a matter of fact, the petitioner was insisting on retaining the present site where he carries on his trade and that was the request which he made in the letter (Annexure "x" ). Moreover, the Committee was not the allotting authority for those places. It was the Director of Estates who made the allotment although that was done according to the recommendations made by the Committee. Moreover, the Committee was not the allotting authority for those places. It was the Director of Estates who made the allotment although that was done according to the recommendations made by the Committee. The mere fact that the Committee did not recommend the petitioner for allotment for the reasons mentioned before cannot possibly be regarded such an act as can be called discriminatory. ( 7 ) THE next contention of Mr. Bhatia is that the Committee had been holding out assurances and had virtually committed itself to providing alternative sites to those of the squatters who had been squatting before 1957 and with regard to whom a list was prepared and in face of those assurances and commitments the act of the Committee in finally revoking the permission granted to the petitioner without allotting any alternative site was an act of sheer high-handedness and could by no means be regarded as reasonable because the petitioner s only source of livelihood would be destroyed if lie did not have any place for carrying on his trade or business. Mr. Bhatia also says that the reasons, which have been given in the affidavits filedby the Committee based on hygienic and sanitary considerations, do not strictly fall within the meaning of the words "safety or convenience" in section 173. According to Mr. Hardy, the words "safety or convenience of persons passing by" would cover within their broad sweep such considerations which have been mentioned in the affidavits filed by the respondent Committee. He has relied, in particular, on paragraph of the supplementary affidavit in which it is stated that there were serious complaints of insanitary and unhygienic conditions created by some of the squatters, especially those who were concerned with the sale of cooked food. That is why the resolution dated 30th April, 1965 was passed and the Committee decided that on the road-berms presented an exceptionally difficult problem because certain facilities, e. g. , running water, washing facility and sewer connection etc. , which are necessary for maintaining minimum standard of sanitation c6uld not be made available at such sites. In Mr. Rai s affidavit it was stated categorically in paragraph 1 in reply to the writ petition on merits that the site was a part of roadberm of public street and the petitioner s trade caused obstruction and interference with the use of the road. In Mr. Rai s affidavit it was stated categorically in paragraph 1 in reply to the writ petition on merits that the site was a part of roadberm of public street and the petitioner s trade caused obstruction and interference with the use of the road. In T. B. Ibrahim v. Regional Transport Authority, the appellant was a lessee of a site in the town of Tanjore. He had been granted a licence to use it as a bus-stand by the local Municipality. He held that licence for a number of years. After following the procedure laid down in the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940, as amended the Regional Transport Authority altered the starting places from the existing bus-stand which was owned by the appellant to the Municipal bus-stand in another area of the town. The validity of the rules as also of the action taken was challenged but their Lordships observed at page 299- "there is no fundamental right in a citizen to carry on business wherever lie chooses and his right must be subject to any reasonable restriction imposed by the executive authprity in the interest of public convenience. The restriction may have the effect of eliminating the use to which the stand has been put hitherto but the restriction cannot be regarded as being unreasonable if the authority imposing such restriction had the power to do so. Whether the abolition of the stand was conducive to public convenience or not is a matter entirely for the transport authority to judge, and it is not open to the court to substitute its own opinion for the opinion of the authority, which is in the best position, having regard to its knowledge of local conditions to appraise the situation". It is not possible, therefore, to accede to Mr. Bhatia s contention that the safety and convenience of the passers-by was not being affected by the trade of the petitioner at the site in question. It is also not possible to see how in these circumstances the decision to withdraw the permission could be called unreasonable or actuated by mala fides. ( 8 ) THE permission which the Committee can grant under section 173 has to be in writing. It is also not possible to see how in these circumstances the decision to withdraw the permission could be called unreasonable or actuated by mala fides. ( 8 ) THE permission which the Committee can grant under section 173 has to be in writing. In the case of the petitioner no permission in writing was ever granted but even if it be assumed that when in the background, which has been set out: before, the Committee accepted the tehbazari fee from 1st January 1964 to 30th June 1965, the total amount having been paid at the rate of Rs. 25. 00 in July 1965 some sort of licence or permission was granted to the petitioner, it cannot be held that the petitioner acquired any legal right. The licence was not of the nature which could not be revoked. In Dominion of India v. R. B. Sohan Lal, the distinction between a bare licence and a licence coupled with a grant or interest was elaborately discussed by Das C. J. (as he then was) and it was said that a bare licence without more was always revocable at the will and the pleasure of the licensor. Mr. Bhatia agrees that in the present case the licence could not he considered to have been one which was coupled with a grant or interest. It was, therefore, revocable. Mr. Hardy points out that even if such a licence has been obtained for consideration yet if it is otherwise revocable and is revoked, the remedy of the licensee is by way of damages only. The petitioner has no right for which he can seek protection from this Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. According to Mr. Hardy, the petitioner is a trespasser -inasmuch as whatever permission had been granted to himno longer exists and since the existence of a right is the foundation of the issuance of a writ he cannot be granted any relief whatsoever in these proceedings. He has relied on Administration Municipal Committee v. Milap Chand Lurinda Ram a decision of Kapur J. (as he then was) on the result of the withdrawal of prmission granted under section 173. He has relied on Administration Municipal Committee v. Milap Chand Lurinda Ram a decision of Kapur J. (as he then was) on the result of the withdrawal of prmission granted under section 173. In this case it has been held that when the permission is withdrawn the licensee becomes a trespasser and the structure which was erected with permission on the public road becomes one without any permission of the Committee in writing. The Committee can then remove that structure without any delay by resorting to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 173. It was also observed in that case that the object of the Act was to keep public highways free from all obstructions even though either through ignorance or greed it permitted encroachment to be mad? upon them. Reliance has also been placed by Mr. Hardy on State of Orissa v. Ram Chandril Dev in which it was reteriated that before any writ or appropriate order could be issued in favour of a party, it must be established that the party had a right and that such a right was illegally invaded or threatened and that the existence )f a right was the foundation of such a petition. The decision in that case appears to put the matter beyond all pale of controversy so far as the present petition is concerned. Six petitions had been filed in the High Court of Orissa by the exzamindars of Ganjam District alleging apprehended danger to their property by threat of executive action. The petitioners there claimed that they had been granted certain areas by the sanads and that the lands could not be resumed as was sought to be done. The High Court granted the writs but on appeal their Lordships reversed the decision of the High Court. The main question on which the decision turned was whether the petitioners could be said to have proved any legal right in respect of the properties of which they apprehended they would be dispossessed. The High Court had not rightly embarked upon the enquiry as to title in those proceedings because that w. is a question which could be appropriately tried only in a regular suit. It followed in the view of their Lordships that no right could be postulated in favour of the petitioners on the basis of which a writ could be issued in their favour. It followed in the view of their Lordships that no right could be postulated in favour of the petitioners on the basis of which a writ could be issued in their favour. Even long possession could not give them a legal right against the State as the possession of the grantee under a resumable grant could not be said to confer any right on him which would justify a claim fora writ under Article 226 where the grant had been resumed. The case of the petitioner before us can by no stretch of reasoning be considered higher than that of a grantee under a resaolable grant, and, therelore,. whether he is a licensee or a permit holder he ,has no such legal on the basis of which he can ask this Court to issue a writ in his favour once the license of the permission- has been revoked. ( 9 ) MR. Bhatia lastly contended that since the Columittee hasroae an offeras an act of grace in terms of the statement of Mr. Hardy which the petitioner would gratefally accept since he has failed to persuade this Court that he has a legal right in the matter we. may issue a direction that he should not be outside from the present site for appriod of fortnight till another site is allotted to him in terms of, the undertakiag given by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the respondent Committee. Such a course is not permisible vide The State Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungra ( 10 ) IN the result, the petion fails and it is dismissed, but in view of the entire circumstances there will be now order as to costs. ( 11 ) I agree.