JUDGMENT Rajeshwari Prasad, J. - This is a plaintiffs' second appeal against the judgment and decree of the 1st Civil Judge, Muzaffarnagar dated January 4, 1963. 2. When the second appeal came up for hearing before Hon'ble S.N. Singh, J. sitting singly, learned counsel for the parties stated that interpretation of Sec. 3(e) read with Sec. 7(3) of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act was involved in the case, and as the learned Single Judge was of the view that such a question was an important one and that it needs authoritative pronouncement by this Court, the second appeal was directed to be referred to a larger Bench. This is how this second appeal has come up before this Bench. 3. Plaintiffs-appellants came to court with the allegation that they were the owners of the house in suit, which was let out to defendant No. 1 Daya Ram on a rent of Rs. 80/- per month; rent was in arrears; notice of demand was issued but the tenant failed to make payment within a month of the service of the notice, consequently the tenant was in default and liable to be ejected. It was further alleged that the plaintiffs had illegally sublet the premises to defendants 2 to 7 without consent or permission of the plaintiffs and for that reason also, the defendants were liable to be ejected. A further ground for seeking the ejectment of the defendants was taken by the plaintiffs which was to the effect that the defendants had committed nuisance inasmuch as defendant No. 6 Musammat Salli was a prostitute and her immoral way of life was affecting the morals of the people of the locality. A bhatti for cleaning gold and silver was being worked in the premises and this gave rise to bad smell and was injurious to the health of the inhabitants of the locality. The tenant was alleged to have used the premises for purposes inconsistent with the purpose for which it was let out to him. On such allegations the plaintiffs sought to recover the sum of Rs. 421/- as arrears of rent and to eject the defendants from the premises. Claim for mesne profits was also made. 4. The tenant was alleged to have used the premises for purposes inconsistent with the purpose for which it was let out to him. On such allegations the plaintiffs sought to recover the sum of Rs. 421/- as arrears of rent and to eject the defendants from the premises. Claim for mesne profits was also made. 4. The suit was contested by defendant Daya Ram on the allegations that he had been admitted to tenancy in the year 1937 and that since then he had been permitted to sublet the premises. The premises had been throughout in the occupation of subtenants. He denied that he had committed default in payment of rent and asserted that he had sent the rent by Money Order, which was wrongly refused by the plaintiffs. He thereafter deposited the rent in the court of Munsif Muzaffarnagar under Sec. 7(c) of the aforesaid Act. He had not committed any nuisance. Kesho Das had been admitted to subtenancy by the defendant Daya Ram under permission of the plaintiffs and Kesho Das had started a bhatti in collusion with the plaintiffs. It was also denied that Musammat Salli was a prostitute and carried on immoral life. He did not use the premises for purposes inconsistent with the purposes of letting. Musammat Salli was in occupation under an order of allotment. 5. The trial court came to the conclusion that Daya Ram defendant No. 1 had not committed any default in payment of rent. It further held that the defendant Daya Ram had sublet some portions of the premises after the year 1946 without the consent of the plaintiffs and of the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar, and as such he was liable to be evicted. The admission of Kesho Dass as a sub-tenant for starting a bhatti resulted in creating nuisance. The trial court, therefore, granted a decree to the plaintiffs for the eviction of defendant No. 1 and the other defendants except defendants 6 and 7. A decree for mesne profits was also granted by the trial court. 6. Both the parties filed appeals be fore the lower appellate court. The anneal of defendant Daya Ram was allowed by the lower appellate court. The decree passed by the trial court was set aside. The plaintiffs were, however, declared entitled to withdraw the sum of Rs. 421/- deposited by defendant No. 1 in the court of Munsif Muzaffarnagar. 6. Both the parties filed appeals be fore the lower appellate court. The anneal of defendant Daya Ram was allowed by the lower appellate court. The decree passed by the trial court was set aside. The plaintiffs were, however, declared entitled to withdraw the sum of Rs. 421/- deposited by defendant No. 1 in the court of Munsif Muzaffarnagar. The other appeal which was the appeal of the plaintiffs was dismissed. 7. The plaintiffs have come up to this Court against the decision of the lower appellate court. Both the courts, below have taken the view that defendant No. 1 had not made default in the payment of rent inasmuch as the entire rent was deposited within a month of the service of notice, in court. The learned counsel for the appellant has not pointed out any reason for this Court to disagree with that finding of the courts below. We, therefore, hold that the defendant Daya Ram did not make default in payment of rent, and that the plaintiffs are not entitled to eject him on that ground. 8. The lower appellate court further, agreeing with the trial court, returned the finding that Daya Ram defendant did not create any nuisance. This is clearly a finding of fact and it has not been shown to be unwarranted. We, therefore, agree with the courts below that defendant Daya Ram is not liable to be ejected on the ground of creating nuisance. Likewise, the finding of the lower appellate court that the defendant Daya Ram has not used the building for any purpose inconsistent with the purpose for which it was let out to him, is a finding of fact with which, in second appeal, this Court could not interfere. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants has, however, laid stress on the ground that defendant Daya Ram sublet portions of the premises without permission of the plaintiffs, consequently, plaintiffs were entitled to evict him from the premises along with other defendants, who are the sub-tenants. The lower appellate court considered the evidence adduced by the parties and came to the conclusion that defendant Daya Ram had been subletting portions of the premises in pursuance of a contract between him and the plaintiffs. According to the testimony of Daya Ram, Daya Ram came in as a tenant of the premises in the year 1937. The lower appellate court considered the evidence adduced by the parties and came to the conclusion that defendant Daya Ram had been subletting portions of the premises in pursuance of a contract between him and the plaintiffs. According to the testimony of Daya Ram, Daya Ram came in as a tenant of the premises in the year 1937. The contract of tenancy was entered into between him on the one hand, and Sri Hari Raj Swarup through Bhagwan Swarup on the other hand, according to his statement, a rent note had also been executed by him. Bhagwan Swarup is admittedly dead and Hari Raj Swarup did not enter the witness box. The only witness competent to prove the contents of the lease, was Daya Ram. According to him, it had been agreed between the parties to the contract that the tenant, namely, Daya Ram was free to sublet the premises. It was also not seriously disputed that from the very beginning of the tenancy, Daya Ram had been subletting portions of the premises to various tenants. Shyain Lal (D. W. 3) corroborated the statement of Daya Ram and stated that the premises had been in possession of sub-tenants from the very beginning. Receipts had been granted to the sub-tenants. Manzoor Ahmad (D. W. 4) stated that he had been in occupation of premises for five or six years after Daya Ram had taken them on a rent. Kanhaiya Lal (D. W. 7) likewise has stated that he had been sub-tenant on behalf of Daya Ram since 1937. Jeoti Prasad (P. W. 1) who is a Mukhtare-aum of the plaintiffs stated that Daya Ram had taken the premises on rent in 1937. He of course stated that Daya Ram had not been permitted to sublet the premises, but he also admitted that Daya Ram had sublet the premises to Kanhaiya Lal, Dhan Prakash, and Hukam Chand five or seven years before, and to others, four or five years ago. His testimony that at the time when Daya Ram was taken in as a tenant in the year 1937, he was not permitted to sublet the premises, cannot be accepted as reliable inasmuch as he was not present on that occasion. He could not deny that Daya Ram had executed a rent note in favour of the plaintiffs. His testimony that at the time when Daya Ram was taken in as a tenant in the year 1937, he was not permitted to sublet the premises, cannot be accepted as reliable inasmuch as he was not present on that occasion. He could not deny that Daya Ram had executed a rent note in favour of the plaintiffs. P.W, 2 stated that Kesho Das had been a sub-tenant of defendant No. 1 since 1958, Ram Dass since 1959, and Musammat Salli since 1956. He did not know the state of affairs prior to 1950. The evidence, therefore, adduced by the parties clearly shows that the finding of the lower appellate court that there was a contract between the parties under which Daya Ram defendant had been subletting the premises, is correct. 10. What has been urged before us is that although there may have been a contract between the landlord and the tenant when the premises was let out to him in the year 1937, permitting the tenant to sublet the premises, such subletting of the premises which had been made after 1946, should have been made after obtaining express permission from the landlord. The question, therefore, that arises for decision is whether it was necessary for the tenant to obtain a further permission from the plaintiffs for subletting the premises after 1946 although it had been found that the tenant was doing so under a contract with the plaintiffs. 11. Reliance has been placed on Sec. 3 (1) (e) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, which reads as follows: - "That the tenant has, on or after the first day of October 1946, sublet the whole or any portion of the accommodation without the permission of the landlord." 12. Two conditions laid down by the above provision of law are: (1) that the tenant, had on or after the first day of October 1946, sublet the whole or any portion of the accommodation, (2) that such subletting was without the permission of the landlord. It is conspicuous to note that the prescribed date in that provision is not the date for taking permission but the date, for subletting. No date or time has been prescribed for obtaining the permission of the landlord. It is conspicuous to note that the prescribed date in that provision is not the date for taking permission but the date, for subletting. No date or time has been prescribed for obtaining the permission of the landlord. The analogous provision in the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Ordinance 1946 was as follows: - "That the tenant has contrary to the terms of the contract sublet the whole or any portion of the accommodation, provided that if the accommodation had been so sublet before the 1st day of October 1946, the tenant shall not be liable to ejectment if he obtained the consent in writing of the landlord to such subletting within one month from the date the Ordinance comes into force." 13. The taking of consent in writing from the landlord was made necessary only in those cases, where the tenant had sublet the whole or any portion of the accommodation in contravention of the terms of the contract. It, therefore, follows that there the subletting had not been in contravention of the terms of the contract or where the subletting was on the basis of the terms of the contract, a subsequent consent in writing of the landlord within the period prescribed, to validate such subletting, was not necessary. If consent of the landlord was not necessary for validating a sub-tenancy created on the basis of a contact between the landlord and tenant, under the Ordinance, there does not appear to be any reason to told that such a consent of the landlord would be necessary after the enforcement of the Act. As has been pointed out by us, no precise form and no specific time is prescribed for such permission of the landlord under Sec. 3(1) (e). A sub-tenancy, therefore, created by the tenant on the basis that the right to sublet had been granted to him under the contract of his tenancy, does not appear to have been intended to be covered by Sec. 3(1) (e) of the Act. It would not under those circumstances be a case of subletting without the permission of the landlord. 14. It may here be noticed that under Sec. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, a tenant has a right to sublet the premises of which he is a tenant, unless there was a contract between the parties to the contrary. It would not under those circumstances be a case of subletting without the permission of the landlord. 14. It may here be noticed that under Sec. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, a tenant has a right to sublet the premises of which he is a tenant, unless there was a contract between the parties to the contrary. In the case in hand, it is not necessary for defendant Daya Ram to justify subletting on the strength of his statutory right, as tenant, to sublet, inasmuch as it had been found, and we have agreed with that finding, that there was an express contract between Daya Ram and the plaintiffs, permiting Daya Ram to sublet the premises, which was being rented out to him. A statutory right could not be equated with an express contract. We are, therefore, of the view that on the facts of this case, it was not necessary for the defendant Daya Ram to obtain any further permission from the landlord for subletting the portions of the premises after the year 1946. 15. Reference was also made to Sec. 7 Cl. (3) of the aforesaid Act. The section deals with the subject of control of letting. Cl. (3) provides that no tenant shall sublet any portion of the accommodation in his tenancy except with the permission in writing of the landlord and of the District Magistrate previously obtained. This provision has no bearing on the question that arises in this appeal. A subletting by tenant without the permission in writing of the landlord and of the District Magistrate may be prohibited by this particular provision of the Act, but that does not give an additional ground to the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant from the premises in question. The grounds given in Sec. 3 (1) of the Act from (a) to (g) are alone exhaustively the grounds on which a landlord can file suit against a tenant for eviction from the accommodation, unless permission of the District Magistrate to do so, had been obtained. If Sec. 7(3) is contravened, the consequences prescribed for contravention of the provisions of the Act would follow, but it is difficult to see how such an action could be treated as an additional ground by landlord for seeking the eviction of his tenant. 16. If Sec. 7(3) is contravened, the consequences prescribed for contravention of the provisions of the Act would follow, but it is difficult to see how such an action could be treated as an additional ground by landlord for seeking the eviction of his tenant. 16. We are, therefore, of the view that the result arrived at by the lower appellate court is correct, and this second appeal is liable to be dismissed. 17. This second appeal is dismissed with costs.