Judgment :- 1. This appeal is against the order of acquittal passed by the II nd Class Magistrate, Cannanore. The complaint was by the Executive Officer, Elayavoor Panchayat, under S.96 and 97 read with S.119 of the Kerala Panchayats Act and the rules made thereunder. S.96 and 97 of the Act read as follows: "96. Purpose for which places may not be used without a licence. The Panchayat may with the previous approval of the Director notify that no place in the Panchayat area shall be used for any of the purposes specified in the rules made in this behalf being purposes which in the opinion of Government, are likely to be offensive or dangerous to human life or health or property, without a licence issued by the executive authority and except in accordance with the conditions specified in such licence: Provided that no such notification shall take effect until the expiry of sixty days from the date of its publication. 97. Permission for the construction of factories and the installation of machinery. No person shall, without the permission of the Panchayat and except in accordance with the conditions specified in such permission (a) construct or establish any factory, workshop or work-place in which it is proposed to employ steam power, water power or other mechanical power or electrical power; or (b) install in any premises any machinery or manufacturing plant driven by any power as aforesaid, not being machinery or manufacturing plant exempted by the rules." S. 119 provides that no person shall be tried for an offence under the Act, or Rules except on complaint made by the Police or Executive Authority etc. within three months of the commission of the offence. within three months of the commission of the offence. The proviso to the section reads: Provided that failure to take out a licence or obtain permission under this Act shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed to be a continuing offence until the expiration of the period, if any, for which the licence or permission is required and if no period is specified, complaint may be made at any time within twelve months from the commencement of the offence." S. 132 of the Act provides that contravention of any of the provisions of the Act specified in the 1st and 2nd columns of Schedule III shall be punishable with fine, which may extend to the amount mentioned in the 4th column of the said schedule. In Schedule III for contravention of S.96, a fine of Rs. 100/- is indicated and for contravention of S.97, a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. 2. The charge against the accused in the present case was that he installed and worked a 5 horse-power motor in a building within the limits of the Panchayat, without a licence in spite of being called upon to take out one. The facts are that the premises of the accused were inspected on 9121964 and it was found that a 5 horse-power motor had been installed and was being worked. Application for a licence was prepared by the accused on 9121964 and was antedated as on 8121964, and was received in the office of the Panchayat on 10-12-1964. It is seen from the evidence that the said application for license (Ex. P-4) was made by the accused at the direction of P. W.1, the Executive Officer of the Panchayat. 3. The Magistrate acquitted accused mainly on the ground that there had been no notification issued by the Panchayat as required by S.96 of the Act. He also found that the prosecution was barred by time under S.119, the exact time of the commencement of the offence, which it was the duty of the prosecution to prove, not having been proved. It was also found that the burden was on the prosecution to establish that the accused installed the electric motor not for any purpose exempted under the Rules made under S.97 of the Act. (The Kerala Panchayats (Licensing of Dangerous Trades & Factories) Rules, 1963). It was also found that the burden was on the prosecution to establish that the accused installed the electric motor not for any purpose exempted under the Rules made under S.97 of the Act. (The Kerala Panchayats (Licensing of Dangerous Trades & Factories) Rules, 1963). It was conceded by the counsel appearing for the accused, that the prosecution need not prove that the installation was of any machinery or manufacturing plant not exempted by the Rules. We are therefore concerned to notice in this appeal only the other grounds given by the Magistrate for acquittal. 4. Before the Magistrate and before us, arguments proceeded on the footing that a notification was necessary to sustain the prosecution, and none had been issued under the Kerala Panchayats Act. Counsel for the Panchayat maintained that such a notification had been issued under the provisions of the Madras Village Panchayat Act, 1950 and was in force in the area with which we are concerned in this appeal, and that the non-issue of a fresh notification under the Kerala Act would not be fatal to the sustainability of the prosecution. It was contended that the notification issued under S.91 of the Madras Village Panchayats Act, 1950 (in practically identical terms as the S.96 of the Kerala Act), and published on 26121957 in the Cannanore District Gazette would be saved, first by reason of R.10 of Schedule V of the Kerala Act read with S.146 thereof; and secondly by reason of the provisions of S.18 of the Madras General Clauses Act read with S.121 of the States Reorganisation Act. That the notification, if any, issued under the provisions of the Madras Village Panchayat Act, would be saved under S.18 of the Madras General Clauses Act, read with S.121 of the States Re-organisation Act, seems to be clear from the principle of the decision in 1967 KLT. 39 on which reliance was placed by the counsel for the Panchayat. Counsel for the accused conceded that this was the effect of the said decision, but maintained that neither before the Magistrate nor in the Grounds of Appeal to this Court, was S.121 of the States Re-organisation Act, relied on, and a contention based upon the same ought not be entertained for the first time, in this appeal against the acquittal. We are not inclined to accept this technical objection. We are not inclined to accept this technical objection. Granting that the notification issued under the Madras Act is saved, we find that the prosecution has yet to forge another link in the chain, as pointed out by the counsel for the accused. There is no proof of the notification, as required by law. Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to a memo seen in the record, by which the complainant tendered the Gazette notification issued under the Madras Village Panchayat Act 1950 and the Rules framed thereunder, and also the Panchayat Journal for June 1963. The record forwarded to this Court shows certain extracts from the Local and Municipal supplement of the District Gazette. The same was not marked or exhibited before the Magistrate, and there was no reference to it, and no proof of it, at all, in the evidence of PW.1 who was the only witness examined for the prosecution. It has been ruled by a Division Bench in Chacko Pyli and Others v. State of Kerala (1966 KLT. 102), that a court is not entitled under S.57 of the Indian Evidence Act to take judicial notice of any notification issued by the Government and that proof of the notification had to be offered either by production of the Gazette, or a certified copy of the notification, coupled with proof of publication of the same, in the Gazette. To the same effect is also the ruling in Chandrasekharan v. The State (1966 KLT. 638). In the light of the Division Bench ruling, we cannot regard the notification in question as having been properly proved We cannot accede to the argument of the counsel for the appellant that the original of the notification may be summoned to be produced, or that an opportunity be afforded to prove the notification. We see no grounds to thus fill up the lacuna in the prosecution evidence. The result is that we should proceed on the footing, that for the purpose of this case, there was no notification issued under the Madras Act. In that case, it is clear that the prosecution is unsustainable. 5. In view of the above finding, we need not express our final view as to whether the prosecution was barred by limitation. On the language of the proviso to S.119, and on the principle of the rulings in President, District Board, Tanjore Adam Ghani Rowther (AIR. In that case, it is clear that the prosecution is unsustainable. 5. In view of the above finding, we need not express our final view as to whether the prosecution was barred by limitation. On the language of the proviso to S.119, and on the principle of the rulings in President, District Board, Tanjore Adam Ghani Rowther (AIR. 1932 Mad. 271) and Pavayammal v. District Board, Salem (1947 MWN. 49), we are inclined to think, that it was not. Nor is it necessary to consider the argument advanced by the counsel for the accused for the first time before us, that the offence in question is one which requires a mens rea, and that on the facts disclosed, the accused did not have any mens rea. We express no opinion on this question. 6. In view of our conclusion that an essential link in the prosecution case, namely, the issue of a notification as required by S.96 of the Kerala Panchayats Act, or S.91 of the Madras Act, has not been proved, we dismiss the appeal. Dismissed.