Judgment Narasimham, J. 1. This is an application to quash the order of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chotanagpur Division dated 1-8-1968 directing the reinstatement of a workman of the petitioner employer and giving further directions of a consequential nature. The workman in question had served for eighteen years under the petitioner-employer. He fell ill and took leave from 4-5-1959. Subsequently, he applied for extension of leave on medical grounds which was granted till 6-1-1960. He did not join on that date and again applied for extension of leave up to 31-3-1960 on the ground of ill health. To that application for extension the employer sent a reply saying that his post could not be kept vacant indefinitely and arrangements were being made to fill it up. The workman again applied for extension of time on several subsequent dates till 31-7-1960 and wanted permission to resume duties on and from 1-8-1960. The employer, however, refused to allow him to join saying that the post had already been filled up and that if in future a vacancy arose, the question of absorbing him as a new entrant would be considered. There was no formal order of the employer terminating the service of the workman. He was only not permitted to rejoin his duty on the expiry of his leave. Hence when the labour dispute was raised, the Government in their order of reference under Sec.10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act referred the following question for decision by the Tribunal, namely, whether Shri Harinandan Sharma is entitled to reinstatement and or any other relief. 2. Before the learned Tribunal it was first urged that the dispute was an individual dispute and not an industrial dispute. This was based mainly on the fact that the dispute was sponsored by the Secretary, Colliery Mazdoor Sangh, Dhanbad, whereas the workman was employed in fire brick and pottery works. An attempt was made to show that the union was of a different industry altogether which had nothing to do with manufacture of fire-bricks and pottery works. But evidence was led before the Tribunal to the effect that about 350 workmen of the petitioner employer were members of the said union. An attempt was made to show that the union was of a different industry altogether which had nothing to do with manufacture of fire-bricks and pottery works. But evidence was led before the Tribunal to the effect that about 350 workmen of the petitioner employer were members of the said union. On the basis of this evidence the learned Tribunal held that a large number of workmen of the petitioner employer were interested in the dispute even though the Union may be named the Union of colliery workers. I think the learned Tribunal was justified in holding that this was an industrial dispute in view of the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Dharam Pal Prem Chand (Saugandhi) V/s. Dharm Pal Prem Chand (Saugndhi) AIR 1966 SC 182 . See in this connection the observations of His Lordship of the Calcutta High Court in Express Newpapers (Private) Ltd. V/s. First Labour Court, West Bengal (1959) 1 Lab LJ, 600 at p. 603: ( AIR 1959 Cal 265 at p. 268). I may quote the following passage : "If a large number of workmen of a particular industry become members of an union which is not, strictly speaking, the union of the industry on the establishment concerned, the principle might be extended. The whole point is as to whether the employer is fighting a dispute with a large number of his workmen." Here, on the evidence that 350 labourers of the petitioner-employer are members of the said union, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the dispute had become an industrial dispute. 3 So far as the merits are concerned, on the evidence adduced before the Tribunal it could not possibly arrive at different conclusion. Even if it is assumed in favour of the employer that the labourer overstayed his leave and did not join his duties when required to do so, the employer would be bound under the standing orders as well as on the principles of natural justice to take it as an act of misconduct and to draw up regular proceedings against him either for termination of his service or for dismissal. Admittedly, this was not done and while the labourer was sending repeated applications for extension of leave, the employer coolly filled up the post by appointing somebody else and then informed the labourer concerned that there was no post in which he could be absorbed at that time. This was in the nature of an implied termination of service for which there was admittedly no provision in the contract of employment between the petitioner and the labourer. In these circumstances, the finding of the Tribunal that the workman was entitled to be reinstated was fully justified. 4. Mr. Bhattacharya for the petitioner-employer, however, urged that the terms of reference to the Tribunal were not properly put and both parties did not lead adequate evidence to show that apart from any irregularity in terminating the service of the labourer the latter was not entitled to reinstatement either because of physical incapacity or because there was no leave to his credit and that this was a fit case for remand with a view to give both parties an opportunity to adduce all available evidence on the same. I am not, however, quite satisfied that this is a fit case for remand. The pleadings of the parties are on record and they show clearly that the only question in controversy before the Tribunal was whether when the labourer, who had put in eighteen years of service, was repeatedly applying, for extension of leave on medical grounds, the employer was justified after granting leave for some period to fill up the post by appointing another person and to refuse to permit the former labourer to rejoin his duty after the expiry of the leave asked for. No question as to whether the leave due under the service conditions was exhausted or not was raised by either party Similarly, the Management did not raise the question that the labourer was still ill and unfit medically to rejoin duty. Hence no evidence was led on these questions and to allow a remand will be to allow the employer to make out a new case. We must therefore, reject the prayer for remand. 5. For these reasons, the application is dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs. G.N.Prasad, J. 6 I agree.