This second appeal under sec. 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act has been filed against the judgment and decree of the learned Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur, dated 28.8.1964, whereby the judgment and decree of the Assistant Collector. Jhun-jhunu dated 13.12.62 was set aside and the defendants-appellants were ordered to be evicted from Khasra Nos. 144 and 146 falling in village Chorodi as trespassers. The facts of the case are not disputed. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit in the court of the Assistant Collector, Jhunjhunu under sec. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act against the defendants-appellants. It was alleged that his father, Jawara, owned Khasra Nos. 144,145 and 146. Jawara had another son Lakshman who died at a young age leaving behind his widow Mst. Rajoli. As she was very young, Jawara gave herin second marriage to one Buddha. The defendants-appellants are the sons of Mst. Rajoli through Buddha. At the time of the marriage, Jawara gave Khasra No. 145 to Rajoli and Buddha for their maintenance, but retained the other two Khasra Nos. in his own possession. He, however, sought the help of the defendants-appellants in the cultivation of this land. When Jawara died in St. year 2012, these two Khasra Nos. were mutated in favour of his surviving son, Gadsi, the plaintiff-respondent. As, however, the defendants-appellants would not relinquish the possession of the same, he brought a suit against them under sec. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The defendants-appellants resisted the suit and claimed that the land had been given to them by Jawara and that they had been cultivating it for a long time. After framing the necessary issues and recording evidence, the trial court came to the conclusion that the defendants-appellants had acquired Khatedari rights in the land and the suit was, therefore, dismissed. Having felt aggrieved by this order, the plaintiff respondent filed an appeal before the learned Revenue Appellate Authority who reversed the finding of the trial court on the ground that the defendants had not pleaded any tenancy rights over the land, but had resisted the title of the plaintiff on the basis that they had been in the possession of these fields on behalf of Jawara. It was held that this would not confer any title on the defendants-appellants in supersession of the title of the sole survior of Jawara namely, Gadsi, the plaintiff-respondent. It was held that this would not confer any title on the defendants-appellants in supersession of the title of the sole survior of Jawara namely, Gadsi, the plaintiff-respondent. The defendants-appellants were, therefore, ordered to be evicted from the suit lands. Hence this second appeal. The main argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the defendants-appellants had entered upon the land lawfully with the permission of Jawara and the case would not, therefore fall within the ambit of sec. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. It is, further, claimed that appellants are also the descendants of Jawara inasmuch as their mother was first married to Lakshman, the deceased son of Jawara and that they continued to live under the same roof with Jawara. It is, further, asserted that having been in the cultivatory possession of the land with the permission of Jawara, no action could be brought against them by the plaintiff. The fallacy in the argument is easily exposed if a reference is made to sec. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act according to which a trespasser who has taken or retained possession of any land without lawful authority is liable to ejectment. It is obvious that this section provides for the ejectment not only of the person whose possession is illegal from the very beginning but also of the person who retains possession without title after he has been asked to relinquish the same by the lawful landholder. This question came up for examination in Pyar Chand vs. Surajmal (1965 RRD 1) before a D. B. of this Board of which one of us was a member. It was held therein that this section does not operate only against those persons who are admittedly trespassers. It operates against any person with a colourable pretext of right and calls for determination of the question of title. In case it is found that the defendant has no title, the suit must be decreed against him. As the section reads, it covers two types of cases; (a) trespassers ab initio viz. persons whose possession is illegal from the very beginning, (b) persons who retain possession without lawful authority after they have been asked to walk out by the land-holder. As the section reads, it covers two types of cases; (a) trespassers ab initio viz. persons whose possession is illegal from the very beginning, (b) persons who retain possession without lawful authority after they have been asked to walk out by the land-holder. Any person who is not able to justify his possession under any law shall be deemed to be in possession otherwise than in accordance with law for the time being in force and should be categorised as a trespasser as defined in sec. 5, sub-sec. (44) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. This section would certainly cover the case of a person who may have entered upon the land under some title, but subsequently looses this right and does not vacate the land on being asked by the landholder to do so. In the case before us, it may be admitted that the defendant-appellants entered upon the land lawfully, but what is their present status. They are the sons of the widow of the deceased brother of the plaintiff-respondent through another person to whom the widow was given in wedlock by Jawara, her father-in-law. This would not entitle them to claim any right of succession to the property of Jawara as they cannot claim to be his lawful descendants. The plaintiff-respondent being the sole surviving son of Jawara, is obviously his sole successor. In this connection, a reference may also be made to the extract from the Jama-bandi for the period 2012 to 2015 (Ex. P. 1) It carries an entry in favour of the defendants-appellants in column No. 5 relating to the name of the cultivator. This entry shows that the defendants-appellants were appointed as the cultivators for one year only. A similar entry is to be found in the copy of the Khasra girdawari for the years 2013 to 2016 (Ex. D. 19). This also shows that the period of tenancy of the defendants-appellants was one year. Their continuation beyond this period must, therefore, be considered as without lawful authority and they cannot be allowed to continue in possession under the colourable pretext that they had been admitted into the land by Jawara and were his lawful successors. In the result, therefore, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order and hereby dismiss the second appeal.