Judgment :- 1. This motion is by the 1st defendant in a suit by an otti-mortgagee of Malabar to enforce pre-emption on sale of the equity of redemption, and the prayer is to revise an order of the Munsiff dismissing his petition to issue a commission to assess the market value of the equity of redemption payable to him. It is urged by counsel that the judgment in the case, reported in 1966 KLT. 724, has directed "a fair determination of the market price payable for the equity of redemption" and that therefore the issuance of a commission to assess such market price is imperative and the Munsiff "has no jurisdiction to dismiss the said petition," The Munsiff has observed "no right purpose can be served by taking out a commission to inspect the property to ascertain the value of the mortgagor's interest in the property as on 2 31953....the same can be proved by the petitioner by letting in oral evidence and by the production of documents by which sale of such rights had been effected in 1953 or earlier in relation to properties in the neighbourhood of the plaint property. The commissioner will not be in a position to furnish any data in respect of this apart from what would be gathered from documents and from the oral evidence of witnesses. The petitioner is therefore directed to let in such evidence as he can in respect of the claim for value of the equity of redemption...." (2 31953 is the date of sale of the equity of redemption by the mortgagor-2nd defendant to the 1st defendant as per Ext. B2.) 2. The Bench judgment (1966 KLT. 724), in its material part, reads: "The judgment of the learned judge (Madhavan Nair J.) holding that the rules of Muhammadan Law are applicable to the exercise of the right of pre-emption by an ottidar in Malabar has not been supported by counsel for the respondent on the grounds and reasons given therein, and we think, quite rightly. This would normally have resulted in the allowance of these appeals and the restoration of the decrees passed by the learned District Judge. This would normally have resulted in the allowance of these appeals and the restoration of the decrees passed by the learned District Judge. However, counsel for respondent has contended before us that there has not been a fair and proper determination of the market value of the equity of redemption payable to him in the suit for specific performance (O. S. No. 38 of 1954) instituted against him by the appellant. We think that in the circumstances of the case, while declaring and recognising that the appellant before us has the right of pre-emption, it is only just and proper that there should be a fair determination of the market price payable for the equity of redemption. On the same being determined, the trial court will pass a decree for specific performance on payment of the said amount." It is conceded that this suit (O. S. No. 38 of 1954) is a suit to enforce pre-emption. It is difficult to understand what their Lordships meant in the above-quoted passage as "specific performance". Whether the suit be for specific performance or for pre-emption, a determination by Court of the market price of the interest to be conveyed would not normally be required as the price payable is what has already been settled between the concerned parties. In a suit for specific performance the Court would be enforcing the very contract struck by the parties, and if the contract is not complete and definite in its terms no decree for specific performance would be given. As regards pre-emption the Supreme Court has observed in Audh Behari v. Gajadhar (AIR. 1954 S. C. 417 at 421) "the right of pre-emption... could not be a right of re-purchase either from the vendor or the vendee involving a new contract of sale. It is simply a right of substitution entitling the pre-emptor, by reason of a legal incident to which the sale itself was subject, to stand in the shoes of the vendee in respect of all the rights and obligations arising from the sale under which he has derived his title. It is simply a right of substitution entitling the pre-emptor, by reason of a legal incident to which the sale itself was subject, to stand in the shoes of the vendee in respect of all the rights and obligations arising from the sale under which he has derived his title. It is in effect, as if in a sale deed the vendee's name was rubbed out and the pre-emptor's name was substituted in its place." Of course, it is most unfortunate that the principles laid by the Supreme Court in the above-cited case, which I have closely followed in my judgment in this case (reported in 1961 KLT. 809-see Para.29 to 32 thereof) have not been accepted by the Bench who reversed my judgment on the sole ground "the judgment has not been supported by counsel for the respondent", without any discussion on the nature, incidents or conditions of enforcement of the right in question all of which aspects I have discussed in detail in my judgment citing numerous precedents of High Courts, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court. (The decision in AIR. 1961 S. C, 1747 is also pertinent on those aspects). But, whatever be the merits of the decision, the final judgment in the case has to stand and in so far as the judgment of the Bench has not been reversed in appropriate proceedings it has to bind the parties even if it be against law declared by the Supreme Court. 3. As regards the price payable to the petitioner, a new fixation may appear justified in the light of the devaluation of the current rupee (though it came to be only long subsequent to the Bench decision in this case) and the fall since 1953 in the purchasing power of the rupee, if that be proved by cogent evidence. In Naylor v. Yorkshire Electricity Board (1966,3 W. L. R.654 C. A.) Lord Justice Salmon, with concurrence of Lord Justice Danckwerts, took note of the fall in the purchasing power of the pound by two and a half times between 1941 and 1964 and observed: "It is conceded that in 1941 the value of money was two and a half times as great as it was in 1964 when the deceased died. In 1938, when the child died in Benhan v. Gambling 1941 A. C. 157,165 (and this is the material date), the pound was worth still more. It has been urged that in assessing damages it is impossible to make exact mathematical calculations. This, no doubt, is generally true. Pounds, shillings and pence are, however, only symbols of pecuniary value, for money is only the mechanism of exchange. If the pound in 1941 had had the same value as it has today, I find it very difficult to believe that the House of Lords would have awarded less than about f 500. Looking at it the other way round, to my mind, Sit is of great importance that in assessing damages the courts today should take the present value of money into account when considering sums which are taken to have been correctly awarded by way of damages in the past. This may not be easy. Having been used in the past to an award of damages in certain circumstances being f x, we naturally find it strange that today in the same circumstances the proper sum should be f 2x or f 3x.... If the correct assessment of damages in cases such as the present was f 500 in the early 1940s, it must be at least f l,000 today." 4. The question here is whether the direction in the Bench decision in this case to determine the market price payable for the equity of redemption has been violated by the Munsiff in the order impugned here. I do not think it has been. The Munsiff has expressly allowed all evidence relevant to the question to be adduced. All that he has observed is that a commission to gather inferences from documentary evidence or oral, testimony of knowledgeable persons is not warranted in law. I think he is right in that observation. Facts have to be proved in Court and that is what the Munsiff has insisted on. To determine the value of the property payable by one party to another in the suit is the function of the Court. A commissioner cannot be deputed to do that work. A commission may be deputed to gather data to help such determination by the Court. But in the circumstances of this case, no relevant data can be expected to be gathered on a local inspection of the property. A commissioner cannot be deputed to do that work. A commission may be deputed to gather data to help such determination by the Court. But in the circumstances of this case, no relevant data can be expected to be gathered on a local inspection of the property. I do not find any error in the order of the Court below much less an error of the kinds contemplated in S.115, CPC. If the view of the respondents' counsel is material, as has been pointed out in this very case by the Division Bench, Mr. Sen, appearing for the respondents in this motion, says that the order of the Munsiff is perfectly correct and should not be disturbed by me. 5. In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed, with costs. Dismissed.