Judgment :- 1. It is a little surprising how both the lower courts have reached the conclusion they have come to; and I am afraid I will have to set aside their decision. 2. The admitted facts are that the appellant is the daughter of the first respondent by his first wife; that the first respondent settled the suit properties on his first wife and children to be born to her reserving a life interest in him; that the first wife died leaving the appellant, her only daughter; that the first respondent married a second time and begot some of the other respondents; that he thereafter settled some of the suit items on his children by the second wife and sold some other items to the other respondents including his brother; that a Samuel Nadar instituted O. S. No. 62 of 1950 as the next friend of the appellant while she was a minor; that Samuel Nadar reported to the court that the appellant became a major; and that the court thereafter dismissed the said suit for non-prosecution without issuing notice to the appellant. (Though there was dispute before the lower courts that the appellant was the daughter of the first respondent by his first wife, since both the lower courts have concurrently held that she is the daughter, that contention is no more pressed. There is also no dispute that under the settlement deed the first respondent has only a life estate and the absolute estate vests in the appellant). The lower courts have held that O. S. No. 62 of 1950 is res judicata under O. IX R.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and the sole question for decision is whether that conclusion is right. 3. The lower courts have observed that on the appellant attaining majority the next friend became functus officio; and that the court was not bound to issue notice to the appellant before it dismissed O. S. No. 62 of 1950 for non-prosecution. The case of the appellant is that Samuel Nadar who filed that suit was a fictitious person. The description of Samuel Nadar in that suit was that he was the karanavan (head of the family) of the appellant; but, there is no evidence to show how he was the karanavan. The case of the appellant is that Samuel Nadar who filed that suit was a fictitious person. The description of Samuel Nadar in that suit was that he was the karanavan (head of the family) of the appellant; but, there is no evidence to show how he was the karanavan. However, in the cross-examination of the appellant it has been brought out that Samuel Nadar is alive, so that he is not a fictitious person. The lower courts say that for a person to act as the next friend of a minor the person need not be a relation of the minor. That is so, and any person who has no interest adverse to that of the minor can act as the minor's next friend and bring a suit to protect the minor's interests. The law is clear that it tries to protect the interests of a minor. Even if no action is taken during the minority of a person, the minor's rights do not get barred; and the minor gets a longer period of limitation to bring a suit after he attains majority. If, however, a good friend or a good Samaritan takes the responsibility of bringing a suit as the next friend, he cannot just report to the court that the minor has become a major and withdraw from the suit. If he wants to withdraw while the minor is still a minor, he has to procure a fit person in his place to continue the suit (vide O. XXXII R.8). Similarly, if the minor after attaining majority establishes that the suit brought by the next friend was an unreasonable and an improper one, the next friend has to pay the costs (vide O. XXXII R.14). Again, if the next friend has to be discharged and the minor has to proceed with the suit, the discharge of the next friend can be ordered only after notice to the next friend [vide O. XXXII R.12(5)]. 4. The reasoning of the lower courts is that R.12 does not provide for any notice to the minor when the next friend reports that the minor has attained majority. I am afraid the lower courts have not understood the effect of the language of R.12 (1). The language used therein is that on attainment of majority the minor has to elect whether he will proceed with the suit or not. I am afraid the lower courts have not understood the effect of the language of R.12 (1). The language used therein is that on attainment of majority the minor has to elect whether he will proceed with the suit or not. Election is a conscious act, which the minor can do only if he knows that a suit is pending. If. the minor is unaware of the pendency of the suit, how can he elect to continue the suit or not? It follows that under the law the minor must be informed of the pendency of the suit. 5. I shall now consider the facts of this case in the light of the aforesaid principle. Samuel Nadar described himself as the karanavan of the appellant; but, there is no evidence as to how he was related to the appellant. He filed the suit, wherein issues were framed on 12th August 1952, and the suit was adjourned for evidence to 29th September. For well over two years thereafter nothing seems to have been done excepting the issue of summonses to witnesses. Ultimately, on 19th February 1955 Samuel Nadar reported that the appellant became a major, which fact was also recorded. The suit was adjourned for disposal to 25th February, on which date, since there was no sitting, the case was again adjourned to 28th of the month. On that date the suit was dismissed for default. From the above facts it is clear that Samuel Nadar was not one who was interested in the minor; and it is even likely that he was one set up by interested parties to bring such a suit, to mark time and then withdraw when the minor attained majority without notice to her. A person, who, during the minority of the appellant, took pains to espouse her cause and bring a suit, should naturally be expected to inform her when she attained majority; and the court should have directed him to take out a notice to the appellant. In the absence of such notice the appellant cannot be imputed with knowledge of the pendency of the suit; and the suit is not resjudicata or bar under O. IX R.9 of the Code. 6. In the absence of such notice the appellant cannot be imputed with knowledge of the pendency of the suit; and the suit is not resjudicata or bar under O. IX R.9 of the Code. 6. On this question the counsel have been able to bring to my notice only one decision; and that is the Division Bench ruling of the Lahore High Court in Ishar Singh v. Bakshish Singh [AIR. 1929 Lah. 555 (2)]. In that case, during the pendency of an appeal by a next friend of a minor it was discovered that the minor had attained majority after the institution of the appeal. The court, instead of calling upon the minor to elect whether he intended to proceed with the appeal or not, dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. When the matter reached the High Court, the counsel of the opposite party admitted that the procedure adopted by the lower appellate court was wrong and it should have issued notice to the minor before it dismissed the appeal. The lower courts seem to think that there might be some special provision in the Code of Civil Procedure of the Punjab, which required that notice should issue to the minor in such a case; and since there is no similar provision in our Civil Procedure Code, the said ruling does not apply to this case. No special provision in the Code of Civil Procedure of the Punjab has been brought to my notice. I am not also able to find any indication in the judgment of the Lahore High Court that the decision was the result of any such special provision in their Code. It must only be the result of the interpretation of the word elect in O. XXXII R.12. Therefore, the decision of the Lahore High Court applies to the case before me in interpreting O. XXXII R.12 of our Civil Procedure Code. 7. The first respondent is still alive; and he has admittedly life interest in the suit properties. Therefore, no question of recovery of possession can arise at this stage, nor any question regarding mesne profits, improvements or damages. 8. The second appeal is allowed, the decision of the lower courts is set aside and it is declared that the appellant is entitled to the suit properties subject to the life interest of the first respondent. Therefore, no question of recovery of possession can arise at this stage, nor any question regarding mesne profits, improvements or damages. 8. The second appeal is allowed, the decision of the lower courts is set aside and it is declared that the appellant is entitled to the suit properties subject to the life interest of the first respondent. It is also declared that the alienations impugned in the litigation are not binding on the rights of the appellant in the suit properties. The first respondent (the first defendant) will pay the court fee paid by the appellant in all the three courts; and the other costs incurred by her she will suffer. The other parties will also suffer their respective costs. Allowed.