ORDER T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J. 1. The petitioner in Original Petition 91 of 1962 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Tellicherry, is the revision petitioner. The application filed by him under O.33, R.1, CPC for permission to sue as a pauper was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge in respect of his claim for partition of B schedule items 2 onwards against respondents 19 and 20 and the petitioner was directed to take back the petition for presentation to the proper court to enforce his relief if any in respect of B Schedule item 1. The civil revision petition is directed against the said order of the court below. 2. Respondents 1 to 18 and the petitioner are members of a marumakkathayam tarwad known as Pandara Tarwad and their common ancestress is one Choyichi. A schedule to the petition is the genealogy showing the relationship of the petitioner and respondents 1 to 18. B schedule item 1 is a leasehold right in favour of the pandara tarwad. B schedule items 2 onwards belonged to Murdoc Brown a Scotchman and on his death intestate his son Francis Carnac Brown inherited the estate. It is alleged by the petitioner, that Francis Carnac Brown married Manni, one of the daughters of Choyichi, and Manni had a son through Francis Carnac Brown by name Henry Carnac Brown. It is further alleged that Henry Carnac Brown became insane and was in the Madras Mental Hospital for some years and he died on 23rd April, 1941. Murdoc Brown and Jane Brown who are the other children of Francis Carnac Brown predeceased Henry Carnac Brown and the entire estate of Francis Carnac Brown devolved on Henry Carnac Brown. Since Henry Carnac Brown died intestate the entire estate devolved on the tarwad of Manni namely the Pandara tarwad. According to the petitioner, respondents 19 and 20 who are in management of the estate have created certain documents claiming right in themselves. The petitioner therefore prays for partition and recovery of 1/19th share in the B schedule items. 3. On notice to the State it was reported that the petitioner is not possessed of any properties. No objection was raised by j respondents 1 to 18 regarding the right of the petitioner to claim a share in the B schedule properties. The petitioner therefore prays for partition and recovery of 1/19th share in the B schedule items. 3. On notice to the State it was reported that the petitioner is not possessed of any properties. No objection was raised by j respondents 1 to 18 regarding the right of the petitioner to claim a share in the B schedule properties. But respondents 19 and 20 I raised objections to the claim of the petitioner for a share in B schedule items 2 onwards. Respondents 19 and 20 contend that these items belong to them absolutely and the members of the Pandara tarwad including the petitioner have no right to them According to respondents 19 and 20, Francis Carnac Brown to whom the estate belonged executed Ext. B 1 will dated 9-9-1868 bequeathing the properties to his daughter Jane Brown and his sons Henry Carnac Brown and Murdoc Brown. Since Murdoc Brown died unmarried and intestate, his interest the estate devolved on the other two legatees who became joint owners of the properties. The will was probated by the Madras High Court and Ext. B 2 dated 20-1-1869 is the certified copy of the probate. 4. Jane Brown executed a will dated 4-10-1906 bequeathing her half share in favour of Jessie Clara Brown Maria Brown and Robert Ashby Brown. Ext. B 30 shows that the said will was probated and letters of administration were issued to Robert Ashby Brown in respect of that will on 14-2-1907 by the District Judge of North Malabar. 5. Jessie Clara Brown and Maria Brown executed wills bequeathing their interest in the estate to Robert Ashby Brown. Ext B 4 dated 12-3-1909 is the certified copy of the will executed by Jessie Clara Brown. Exts. B 5 and B 6 prove that the wills executed by Jessie Clara Brown and Maria Brown were Probated in 0. P. 861 of 1915 and O. P. 160 of 1920 on the file of the District Court of North Malabar. It will thus be seen that the entire estate which belonged to Francis Carnac Brown became vested in Robert Ashby Brown and Henry Carnac Brown. 6. Robert Ashby Brown executed a will on 14-7-1930 and a codicil on 23-7-1930. Ext. B 7 is the copy of the will and the codicil. This will was also probated and Ext. It will thus be seen that the entire estate which belonged to Francis Carnac Brown became vested in Robert Ashby Brown and Henry Carnac Brown. 6. Robert Ashby Brown executed a will on 14-7-1930 and a codicil on 23-7-1930. Ext. B 7 is the copy of the will and the codicil. This will was also probated and Ext. B 8 dated 18-8-1936 is the copy of the probate granted in respect of this will in O. P. 10 of 1936 on the file of the District Court of South Malabar. By Ext. B 7 one-half share was bequeathed to the 20th respondent and her brother George Brown. George Brown was adjudicated insolvent by the High Court of Bombay and his assets were sold by the Official Assignee. The 20th respondent purchased that right in auction and Ext. B. 9 is the sale deed executed by the official Assignee of Bombay on 30-5-1947. Thus the entire interest of Robert Ashby Brown became vested in the 20th respondent. 7. Henry Carnac Brown executed a will on 8-11-1888 bequeathing his share in the estate to his sister Jane Brown and to certain other persons. Ext. B-10 is the copy of the will. Since Henry Carnac Brown died a lunatic, proceedings under S.247 the Indian Succession Act were initiated by the Administrator General, Madras, in O. P. 65 of 1944 on the file of the High Court Judicature Madras. Ext. B-11 dated 9-3-1944 is the copy of the petition in O. P. 65 of 1944 and Ext. B-12 is the copy of the order thereon. By Ext. B-12 the Administrator General was appointed as the Administrator of the estate of Henry Carnac Brown and since the legatee's name in the will could not be got at, the Administrator General with the permission of the court sold the estate in auction and the sale proceeds were deposited in the High Court. The 20th respondent purchased the estate in auction. The sale deed executed by the Administrator General, Madras, in favour of the 20th respondent is Ext. B-13 dated 20-5-1946. Thus it will be seen that the 20th respondent has become the owner of the entire estate by virtue of Ext. B-9 dated 30-5-1947 executed by the Official Assignee of Bombay and Ext. B-13 sale deed dated 20-5-1946 executed by the Administrator General, Madras. The claim of the 20th respondent is based upon Exts. B-13 dated 20-5-1946. Thus it will be seen that the 20th respondent has become the owner of the entire estate by virtue of Ext. B-9 dated 30-5-1947 executed by the Official Assignee of Bombay and Ext. B-13 sale deed dated 20-5-1946 executed by the Administrator General, Madras. The claim of the 20th respondent is based upon Exts. B-9 and B-13. 8. The learned Subordinate Judge took the view that the claim of the petitioner to B schedule item 2 onwards is barred by limitation and that the petition does not disclose the right under which the petitioner as a member of the Pandara tarwad can claim to B schedule item 2 onwards. The learned Judge also held that the claim of the petitioner in respect of B schedule item 1 though sustainable the suit relating to that relief cannot be instituted in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Tellicherry. In view of these findings, the learned Judge refused permission to the petitioner to file the suit in forma pauperis in respect of B schedule items 2 onwards and directed the petitioner to take back the petition for presentation to the proper court to enforce his right if any in respect of B schedule item 1. 9. Order 33 Rule 5 C. P. C. enables the court to reject an application for permission to sue in forma pauperis on any of the grounds enumerated in the rule even before the issue of notice to the opposite party or to the Government Pleader. It is open to the court even at that stage to examine the applicant in respect of his pauperism as well as the merits of the case. (O.33 R.4 CPC). O.33 R.5 CPC has been amended by this court by adding Sub Rule d1. It is open to the court even at that stage to examine the applicant in respect of his pauperism as well as the merits of the case. (O.33 R.4 CPC). O.33 R.5 CPC has been amended by this court by adding Sub Rule d1. Order 33 Rule 5 C. P. C. as amended by this court reads thus: "The Court shall reject an application for permission to sue as a pauper (a) Where it is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by rules 2 and 3, or (b) where the applicant is not a pauper, or (c) where he has, within two months next before the presentation of the application, disposed of any property fraudulently or in order to be able to apply for permission to sue as a pauper, or (d) where his allegations do not show a cause of action or (d)(i) where the suit appears to be barred by any law, or (e) where he has entered into any agreement with reference to the subject matter of the proposed suit under which any other person has obtained an interest in such subject matter. O.33 R.6 CPC reads thus: "Where the court sees no reason to reject the application on any of the grounds stated in rule 5, it shall fix a day (of which at least ten days' clear ' notice shall be given to the opposite party and the Government Pleader) for receiving such evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of his pauperism, and for hearing any evidence which may be adduced in disproof thereof." The above rule also has been amended by this court and Order 33 Rule 6 as amended by this court reads as follows:- "Where the Court sees no reason to reject the application on any of the grounds stated in rule 5, it shall nevertheless fix a day (of which at least ten days' clear notice shall be given to the opposite party and to the Government pleader) for receiving such evidence as the applicant may adduce to prove that application is not subject to any of the prohibitions in rule 5, and for hearing any evidence which may be adduced to the contrary." Order 33 Rule 7 C. P. C. which prescribes the procedure at the hearing reads as follows:- "(1) On the day so fixed or as soon thereafter as may be convenient, I the Court shall examine the witnesses (if any) produced by either party, and may examine the applicant or his agent, and shall make a memorandum of the substance of their evidence. (2) The Court shall also hear any argument which the parties may desire to offer on the question whether, on the face of the application and of evidence (if any) taken by the Court as here in provided, the applicant is or is not subject to any of the prohibitions specified in rule 5. (3) The Court shall then either allow or refuse to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper, or direct that the application be filed as a plaint on the applicant paying the requisite court fee within 30 days or such reasonable time as the court may fix." 10. (3) The Court shall then either allow or refuse to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper, or direct that the application be filed as a plaint on the applicant paying the requisite court fee within 30 days or such reasonable time as the court may fix." 10. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner was that the enquiry whether the application to sue as a pauper is subject to any of the prohibitions contained in Order 33 Rule 5 CPC should be limited exclusively to the allegations contained in the petition and the court is not expected to conduct a very elaborate enquiry by going into complicated questions of fact and law even before the application is registered as a suit. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied on the expression 'appears' in O.33 R.5 sub-rule dl CPC I am not impressed with the contention advanced on behalf of the revision petitioner. O.33 R.6 CPC enables the court to hear any evidence adduced by the opposite party to show that the petition to sue as a pauper is subject to any of the prohibitions in Order 33 rule 5 CPC Further O.33 R.7 sub-rule 1 CPC provides that the court shall examine witnesses if any produced by either party and sub-rule 2 of the said rule provides that the court shall hear any argument which the parties may desire to offer on the question whether on the face of the application and of the evidence taken by the court, the applicant is or is not subject to any of the prohibitions in Order 33 Rule 5 CPC. 11. It is not open to the court to refuse to receive the evidence tendered by the opposite party to prove that the application is barred for any of the grounds in Order 33 Rule 5 C. P. C. The learned Subordinate Judge therefore acted within his jurisdiction when he considered the question of limitation in the light of the documents filed by respondents 19 and 20. The use of the expression 'appears' in sub-rule d l of R.5 of O.33 only goes to show that a very elaborate enquiry into complicated question law and fact cannot be had at that stage. The use of the expression 'appears' in sub-rule d l of R.5 of O.33 only goes to show that a very elaborate enquiry into complicated question law and fact cannot be had at that stage. The use of the expression 'appears' can only denote that the court should not embark upon considerations of doubtful questions of law or fact. Apart from this I do not find any other significance in the use of the word 'appears' in sub-rule d. 1 of R.5 O.33 especially because Order 33 Rules 6 and 7 empower all the parties to adduce evidence to prove that the application is or is not subject to the prohibitions under O.33 R.5. On an appreciation of the evidence court below held that the suit is barred by limitation. This finding is not in any way vitiated on account of any defect of jurisdiction. There are therefore no reasons to interfere with this finding. 12. The second point raised on behalf of the revision petitioner is based on Order 33 Rule 7 clause 3 reading as follows: "The Court shall then either allow or refuse to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper; or direct that the application be filed as a plaint on the applicant paying the requisite court fee within 30 days or such reasonable time as the Court may fix." The learned counsel for the petitioner contended on the wording of O.33 R.7 (3) CPC that even if one or some of the prayers in the petition are barred by limitation, the court has no jurisdiction to withhold leave to sue as pauper or to limit the leave to prayers not barred by limitation. In support of this position the learned counsel relied on the decision of a Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Arakchand v. Amarchand (AIR 1962 Madras 252). At page 253, the learned Judge observed thus: "A suit comprises all the prayers and not merely one or more of them. The plaintiff in. this case has sued in the main for partition and as incidental to that prayer he had asked for the other relief namely for setting aside the decree as also the mortgage. Those prayers by themselves did not constitute the 'suit' within the meaning of clause d(1) of Rule 5 of Order 33, C. P. Code. The plaintiff in. this case has sued in the main for partition and as incidental to that prayer he had asked for the other relief namely for setting aside the decree as also the mortgage. Those prayers by themselves did not constitute the 'suit' within the meaning of clause d(1) of Rule 5 of Order 33, C. P. Code. Where the court finds that one or more of the prayers, which cannot by themselves be said to constitute the suit, are barred by limitation, it has, in my view, no jurisdiction to withhold leave, provided of course the petitioner is pauper, to sue in forma pauperis, or to limit the leave to the prayers not, found to be barred by limitation, or even to direct the petitioner to file a fresh petition for leave confining the plaint to those prayers not barred by limitation. The court is bound to reject an application for permission to sue as a pauper only when it finds that the "suit" as such including all the prayers but not merely one or more of them is barred by limitation." 13. The above decision though based on the use of the expression 'suit' in O.33, R.5 sub-rule (d-1) of the CPC is distinguishable on the facts. In the application to sue as a pauper which gave rise to the decision in Arakchand v. Amarchand AIR 1962 Madras 252), the main prayer was for partition and prayers to set aside the decree and the mortgage were only incidental. The learned Judge also held that the view of the court below on the question of limitation was wrong. 14. The application to file the suit as a pauper in the case before me consists of two causes of action. One relates to the partition of B schedule item 1. The petitioner and respondents 1 to 18 who are members of the Pandara tarwad are alone concerned with this cause of action. Respondents 19 and 20 are not at all interested in this claim. The second cause of action relates to the partition of B schedule items 2 onwards and recovery of possession of the petitioner's share from respondents 19 and 20. Two distinct and separate causes of action are blended together in the application. Respondents 19 and 20 are not at all interested in this claim. The second cause of action relates to the partition of B schedule items 2 onwards and recovery of possession of the petitioner's share from respondents 19 and 20. Two distinct and separate causes of action are blended together in the application. If so the application comprises virtually two suits and under such circumstances it is open to the court to disallow the application in respect of a portion of the claim in the application forming a sui by itself. 15. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Vijai Pratap v. Dukh Haran Nath ( AIR 1962 SC 941 at P. 945) observed at page 945 thus: "An application to sue in forma pauperis, is but a method prescribed by the Code for institution of a suit by a pauper without payment of fee prescribed by the Court Fees Act. If the claim made by the applicant that he is a pauper is not established the application may fail But there is nothing personal in such an application. The suit commences from the moment an application for permission to sue in forma pauperis as required by 0 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure is presented, and OIR 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be as much applicable in such a suit as in a suit in which court fee had been duly paid. It is true that a person who claims to join a petitioner praying for leave to sue in forma pauperis must himself be a pauper. But his claim to join by transposition as an applicant must be investigated; it is not liable to be rejected on the ground that the claim made by the criminal applicant is personal to himself." 16. The above decision is therefore an authority for the proposition that the provisions of O.1, R.10, CPC can be applied to an application to sue as a pauper even before registering the same as a suit. On the same principle objections under O.1, R.13, CPC on the ground of non joinder or mis-joinder of parties or objections on the ground of mis-joinder of causes of action under O.2, Rule 7, CPC can also be taken in respect of an application to file the suit in forma pauperis. On the same principle objections under O.1, R.13, CPC on the ground of non joinder or mis-joinder of parties or objections on the ground of mis-joinder of causes of action under O.2, Rule 7, CPC can also be taken in respect of an application to file the suit in forma pauperis. Even though O.33, R.5, CPC does not specifically deal with a ground relating to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court to entertain an application to sue in forma pauperis, when such an objection is raised by the opposite party it is the duty of the court to deal with such an objection. It is settled law that the suit must be deemed to have been instituted on the presentation of the petition to sue as a pauper if the application is subsequently registered as a suit. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Stuart Skinner v. William Order (6 Indian Appeals 126) held that an application under O.33, R.1, is in fact a plaint coupled with a prayer to allow to sue without payment of court lee. Even though the court may not be justified in rejecting the petition because of want of pecuniary jurisdiction either under O.33, R.5 or under 33, R.7 sub clause (3) CPC the court is entitled to return the application for presentation to the proper court in view of S.141 read with O.7, R.10 CPC O.2, R.3, CPC which provides for joinder of causes of action against the same defendant by a plaintiff reads as follows: (1) Save as otherwise provided, a plaintiff may unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant, or the same defendants jointly; and any plaintiffs having causes of action in which they are jointly interested against the same defendant or the same defendants jointly may unite such causes of action in the same suit. (2) 'Where causes of action are united, the jurisdiction of the Court regards the suit shall depend on the amount or value of the aggregate subject matters at the date of instituting the suit." It is not open to applicant to confer jurisdiction on a court under sub-rule 2 of R.3 of O.2 CPC by uniting causes of action which are not allowed by sub-rule 1 of R.3 of O.2 CPC In such cases it cannot be argued that the court is not entitled to call upon the applicant to split the causes of action or dismiss the same for mis-joinder of causes of action. As already stated by me it is not 1 open to the petitioner to unite the causes of action relating to B I schedule item 1 and relating to B schedule item 2 onwards in the me suit. B schedule item.1 is an admitted tarwad property and according to the petitioner, respondents 19 and 20 are not interested that item. B schedule items 2 onwards are said to be in the elusive possession of respondents 19 and 20 and the petitioner before he gets a share in those items has to establish the right of the pandara tarwad over those items. If, therefore, respondents 19 and 20 had taken objections on the ground of mis-joinder of causes of action I am of the view that the said objection would have prevailed and the court below would have directed the petitioner to split the causes of action and file separate applications subject to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge's Court to entertain those applications. If that is the position the learned Subordinate Judge was quite correct in refusing the prayer of the petitioner for partition of B schedule items 2 onwards. If the decision in Arakchand v. Amarchand (AIR 1962 Madras 252) takes the view that even in such circumstances it is not open to the court to refuse the application to sue in forma pauperis in part, I am not inclined with great respect to the learned Judge to follow the said decision. The second contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner has therefore to be overruled. The second contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner has therefore to be overruled. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner did not attack the direction contained in the order for returning the petition in respect of the relief of partition of B schedule item 1 for presentation to the proper court. He also did not contend that the trial Judge should have directed the applicant to pay the requisite court fee and given him time for the same, in respect of the relief relating to B schedule items 2 onwards. In the result, the order of the learned Judge is correct and I dismiss the Civil Revision Petition but in the circumstances without costs.