JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This revision is at the instance of the plaintiffs and is directed against an order holding that the appeal will be deemed to have been automatically dismissed with costs. 2. The matter arises in this way. The plaintiffs-applicants filed a suit for recovery of money on the allegation that the plaintiffs are the trustees of Sheo Charan Lal Trust and that they had deposited trust money with the defendants predecessor and the same has not been paid back. The Trial court held that the plaintiffs had deposited the money and the defendants were liable to repay it but dismissed the suit as barred by time. The plaintiffs went up in appeal. The appellate court directed the plaintiffs to amend the plaint. It set aside the decree and remanded the suit to the trial court with a direction to allow the plaintiffs to amend the plaint and decide the suit afresh. He, however, directed that the plaintiffs shall pay a sum of Rs. 60/- as costs of amendment, "within two weeks from todaysi date failing which the appeal shall stand dismissed with costs." This order was passed on 12th of January, 1962. The plaintiffs, therefore, had to pay a sum of Rs. 60/- within two weeks from this date. The plaintiffs submitted a tender for this sum of Rs. 60/- in the lower appellate court on 24-1-1962, a date which was well within the prescribed two weeks,. The court returned the tender to the plaintiffs after signature on 6-2-1962 and the money was actually deposited in the treasury on 7-2-1962. 3. The defendant-opposite parties made a miscellaneous application stating that the plaintiffs had not deposited the costs within the time fixed in the appellate judgment and as a result the appeal be treated as dismissed. The lower appellate court after hearing parties, upheld this contention and by the impugned order, has held that the appeal will be deemed to have been automatically dismissed with costs. Aggrieved by this declaratory order the plaintiffs have come to this Court in revision. 4. At the threshold the question arises whether the lower appellate court could interpret and declare the effect of its final judgment, in the miscellaneous application made by the defendants, which was not for review. Aggrieved by this declaratory order the plaintiffs have come to this Court in revision. 4. At the threshold the question arises whether the lower appellate court could interpret and declare the effect of its final judgment, in the miscellaneous application made by the defendants, which was not for review. If the remand order dated 12th of January, 1962, finally disposed of the appeal, the appellate court became functus officio and thereafter could not make any further order in it or interpret its earlier order except on review or under Sec. 151 or 152, C. P. C. - vide Order XX, Rule 3, C. P. C. None of these provisions were attracted. 5. It has been pointed out by a Bench of this Court in Nand Lal v. Kishori, A.I.R. 1914 Alld. 336 that if a court decides to restore a sot it dismissed for default on payment of damages by the plaintiff, the proper order to pass is to direct the plaintiff to deposit the amount of damages within a prescribed period and to reserve the passing of any final order until the prescribed period expired. But this authority recognises the practice of passing a final order immediately. It held that if a court orders restoration of a suit on condition of payment of damages within a prescribed period, and at the same time directs that otherwise the application for restoration shall stand dismissed, the court completely disposes, of the application. The principle laid down by this authority is applicable to the instant case. The lower appellate court had passed a complete order finally disposing of the appeal. It had indicated the consequence if the condition is not fulfilled. It had remanded the case to the trial court. If the matter had been raised before the trial court, that court would have had jurisdiction to decide whether the suit could be proceeded with in pursuance of the remand order or whether the remand order became infructuous because the latter order dismissing the appeal had taken effect. But the lower appellate court, after having become functus officio, retained no jurisdiction to interpret its judgment or declare if its conditions have been complied with. In this view, the impugned order declaring that the appeal shall be deemed to have been dismissed, is without jurisdiction. 6. But the lower appellate court, after having become functus officio, retained no jurisdiction to interpret its judgment or declare if its conditions have been complied with. In this view, the impugned order declaring that the appeal shall be deemed to have been dismissed, is without jurisdiction. 6. However, since the matter has come to the notice of this Court, it is desirable that the correct legal position be indicated. It is contended for the opposite parties that the deposit was actually made on 7th of February, 1962, beyond the two weeks fixed by the remand order, and as such the condition that the appeal shall stand dismissed, took effect. It has also been urged that since the plaintiffs had the option of making the payment to the defendants directly, they could comply with the condition within the time fixed; and they hot having done so, they were not entitled to choose the other option of depositing the money in court and for that purpose rely upon the laches of the office of the court in not returning the tender to hint within time. Reliance for this purpose has been placed upon a Division Bench of this Court in Ausaf Ali v. Pearey Lal, 1961 ALJ 889. In this case the various authorities of this Court have been reviewed and it has been held that where the only course open for making payment is by deposit in court, and, if the money could not be deposited by reason of the closure of the court, the party was protected by the principle that no person shall suffer by the actions of the court or should be compelled to do what is impossible for him to do and the payment will be deemed to have been made in time. In this, authority, as well as in those on which reliance has been placed therein, the concerned party had actually not even filed the tender in court within the time fixed. The inability to file the tender was caused by the closure of the court on the day when the time fixed expired or was about to expire. In this, authority, as well as in those on which reliance has been placed therein, the concerned party had actually not even filed the tender in court within the time fixed. The inability to file the tender was caused by the closure of the court on the day when the time fixed expired or was about to expire. For such class of cases, namely, where the tender was filed beyond the prescribed period, it has been laid down that the party would be protected by the principle that no person should suffer for the actions of the court, only in those cases where the party had no other option. But if he could comply with the order by making payment to the other party directly, then, he was not protected by the aforesaid principle. As noticed earlier, neither in Ausaf Ali's case, 1961 ALJ 889 nor in the other cases mentioned in it, was the tender made within the prescribed time. These cases are, therefore, distinguishable from the present on this point. In the present case the plaintiff had made the tender to the court well within the fixed period. If the making of the tender was a valid payment, then the plaintiff had complied with the condition of the remand order and was in no need of any protection. The question thus is: Is filing in Court of a tender, payment? Ausaf Ali's case, 1961 ALJ 889 does not shed light on the problem. 7. In Mt. Gomti v. Lachman Das, A.I.R. 1934 Alld. 817 it has been held that it is settled law that a bona fide tender amounts to payment unless there is a suggestion that the applicant was not in a position to make the payment at the time when he filed the tender in Court. In this case it was observed that according to the rule of practice which has been made with due regard to the administrative convenience of the Court, cash is not received by the Court, but is to be deposited in the treasury; that tender is merely an offer to the court of payment, if it is prepared to accept the amount therein entered; and if for its own convenience the Cour. directs the person offering payment to deposit elsewhere, the person liable to pay should be deemed to have done his part of the undertaking when he offered to pay. directs the person offering payment to deposit elsewhere, the person liable to pay should be deemed to have done his part of the undertaking when he offered to pay. In the instant case, there is no suggestion that the applicant was not in a position to make the payment. 8. Payment can be made in several ways. It may be made by delivery of coins or currency notes or by a negotiable instrument which represents and produces cash. When payment has to be made in Court, it is, in view of the prevailing practice, made by finding a tender and delivering the money to the treasury or bank in accordance with the order passed by the court on the tender. The tender, therefore, is like a negotiable instrument; it represents and produces cash and is treated as such by courts. Generally payment by a negotiable instrument is understood to be conditional. In Felix Hadley & Co. v. Hadley, (1898) 2 Ch. 680. it was observed: "In this case I think what took place amounted to a conditional payment. of the debt; the condition being that the cheque or bill should be duly met or honoured at the proper date. If that be the true view, then I think the position is exactly as if an agreement had been expressly made that the bill or cheque should operate as payment unless defeated by dishonour or by not being met; and I think that the agreement is implied from giving and taking the cheques and bills in question." 9. Benjamin on Sales, 8th Edition, p. 788, says: "The payment takes effect from the delivery of the bill, but is defeated by the happening of the condition, i.e. non-payment at maturity." 10. In Byles on Bills, 20th Edition, p 23, the law stated is: - "A cheque, unless dishonoured, is payment." 11. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay South, Bombay v. Messrs Ogale Glass Works Ltd. Ogale Wadi, A.I.R. 1954 SC 429 the Supreme Court summarised the position thus: "When it is said that a payment by negotiable instrument is a conditional payment what is meant is that such payment is subject to a condition subsequent that if the negotiable instrument is dishonoured on presentation the creditor may consider it as waste paper and resort to his original demand." 12. In some cases, however, the acceptance of a cheque has been treated as an unconditional discharge of the liability. It has been held that in the absence of an express agreement, it is only when the creditor elects to take a bill or cheque, having it in his power to obtain payment in cash, that is to say, takes a bill or cheque by choice or preference instead of cash, that an agreement may be implied that he took it as an unconditional and absolute payment of the debt, Secs. (1) and (2). 13. In the instant case the court for its own convenience and of its own choice does not take cash, but makes an order on the tender submitted to it for depositing the cash in the treasury or the bank. An agreement between the court and the litigant may be implied that the court accepts the tender as an unconditional payment; but it is unnecessary to finally hold that such an agreement is implied because the position, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. M/s. Ogale Glass Works, A.I.R. 1954 SC 429 is: "that in one view of the matter there was, in the circumstances of this case, an implied agreement under which the cheques were accepted unconditionally as payment and on another view, even if the cheques were taken conditionally, the cheques not having been dishonoured but having been cashed, the payment related back to the dates of the receipt of the cheques and in law the dates of payments were the dates of the delivery of the cheques." 14. On a parity of reasonings, cash having been deposited in accordance with the directions made on the tender, the payment related back to the date of the finding of the tender, and in law the date of payment was the date when the tender was presented to the court. 15. The plaintiffs are right in their submission that they having filed the tender in time made the payment within the prescribed two weeks and the condition imposed by the order of remand stood satisfied. The order of dismissal of the appeal, hence, never came in existence. 16. In the result, this revision succeeds. The order of the lower appellate court dated 6-10-1962 is set aside. The trial court shall proceed in accordance with the order of remand. The order of dismissal of the appeal, hence, never came in existence. 16. In the result, this revision succeeds. The order of the lower appellate court dated 6-10-1962 is set aside. The trial court shall proceed in accordance with the order of remand. The applicants will have their costs here and below.