JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - One Balakrushna Das had 2 sons, deceased Girish Chandra Das and Rajkrushna Das. The five Petitioners are the sons of Girish Chandra. On 12th of August, 1946, the Petitioners filed T.S. No. 32 of 1946 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Cuttack for partition of all their joint family properties including the disputed house which is situate in Choudhury Bazar in Cuttack town claiming - /8/ - annas interest in the entire property. On 30th of October, 1946, Rajkrushna sold the entire disputed house to Bharat Industrial Bank which was impleaded as a party to the partition suit. The suit was dismissed by the Additional Subordinate Judge on 22nd of December, 1948. On 5-7-1955, the First Appeal No. 18 of 1949 filed by the Petitioners was allowed and a preliminary decree for partition was passed. It may incidentally be stated that the judgment of the be High Court was confirmed by the Supreme Court on 7-5-1964 dismissing Rajkrushna's appeal No final decree has yet been passed. During the pendency of the First Appeal, Rajkrushna entered into an agreement for sale 24-4-1951 in respect of the disputed house with Minatunnisa Bibi (Opposite party). It may be noted that Rajkrushna had no interest by that time as he had sold the house to' Bharat Industrial Bank on 30-10-1946. Sometime in 1951, one Sridhar Panigrahi in execution of a decree against the Bharat Industrial Bank brought to sale -/8/ - annas interest in the disputed house. The opposite party filed an application under Order 21, Rule 58, CPC on 1-2-1954 on the basis of the agreement for sale dated 24-4-1951. This application was dismiss on 3-2-1954. On 22-5-1954, opposite party filed T.S. No. 18/37 of 1957/54 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Cuttack under Order 21, Rule 63, CPC Code. In that suit, Sridhar Panigrahi, Bharat Industrial Bank and Rajkrushna were made parties. Petitioners were, however, not made parties to the suit. On 22-6-1954, the opposite party took a sale deed from Rajkrushna in accordance with the agreement dated 24-4-1951. T.S. NO',18/.37 of 1957 /54 ws dismissed on 0-1-1958.F. No. 43 of 1958 filed by Opposite party ended In a compare on 13-12-1961. Under the compare Bharat Industrial Bank and Sridhar Panigrahi abandoned their claim to the disputed house in favour of the opposite party on payment of certain amount. T.S. NO',18/.37 of 1957 /54 ws dismissed on 0-1-1958.F. No. 43 of 1958 filed by Opposite party ended In a compare on 13-12-1961. Under the compare Bharat Industrial Bank and Sridhar Panigrahi abandoned their claim to the disputed house in favour of the opposite party on payment of certain amount. As the Petitioners were not parties to the suit, they were also not parties to the compare. On 22-2-1962, the opposite party filed T.S. 16 of 1962 against Rajkrushna for recovery of possession. This suit was decreed on terms of compare on 16-4-1962. The Petitioners assert that they were forcibly dispossessed from the entire disputed house which was in exclusive possession of themselves and their tenants in execution of the aforesaid decree on 1-6-1'3(12. They filed miscellaneous Case No. 106 of 1962 on 19-6-1962 under Order 21, Rule 100, CPC Code. The tenants also filed certain miscellaneous Cases which do not constitute the subject matter of this application. The learned Subordinate Judge allowed the application under Order 21, Rule 100, CPC with the following direction: The claimants Rajendra Narayan Das and others in miscellaneous Case No. 106 of 1962 shall be put in joint possession of their house in respect of their -/8/ - annas share in the manner provided in Order 2, Rule 35(2), CPC Code. It is against this order that the Petitioners have filed this civil revision. 2. Mr. Mohapatra for the Petitioners contents that the Petitioners were in exclusive possession of the disputed house through themselves and through the tenants and that though Rajkrushna had -/8/ - annas interest in the disputed house, he not being in physical possession of any portion of the house, the opposite party was entitled to symbolic possession under Order 21, Rule 35(2), CPC in execution of the decree in T.S. No. 16/62 and that the Petitioner was entitled to be restored to the possession of the entire house under Order 21, Rules 100 and 101, CPC Code. Mr. Mohanty, on the other hand contends that on 1-6-1962, the Petitioners were dispossessed in execution of the decree in T.S. 16/62 even though they had -/8/ - annas interest in the disputed house. Mr. Mohanty, on the other hand contends that on 1-6-1962, the Petitioners were dispossessed in execution of the decree in T.S. 16/62 even though they had -/8/ - annas interest in the disputed house. Once they were dispossessed in execution of the decree, even if wrongly they cannot be put back into physical possession but would be entitled to be put into joint possession under Order 21, Rule 35(2), CPC and they would work out their rights either in a properly constituted partition suit or in course of the final decree proceedings arising out of T.S. No. 32/46. He also contends that Rajkrushna and not the Petitioners was in exclusive possession of the disputed house. The rival contentions require careful examination. 3. My attention was drawn to certain statement of facts made in paragraph 11 of the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge wherein he stated that 'there is no dispute that delivery of possession was taken from the Petitioners on 1-6-1962 and the tenants inducted by the Petitioner. On the basis of this statement Mr. Mohapatra contends that the Petitioners were in exclusive possession of the disputed house and had been dispossessed therefrom. Mr. Mohanty, on the other hand challenges the correctness of the statement and invited my attention to the counter filed by the opposite party to the application under Order 21, Rule 100, CPC wherein it is asserted that Rajkrushna and not the Petitioners were in exclusive possession of the house. It is conceded by the learned Advocates for both the parties that besides the aforesaid statement of fact there is no discussion and finding as to who was in possession of the disputed house on the date of delivery of possession. I am satisfied that there is no finding as to who was in possession of the disputed house on the date of delivery of possession. This case would be remanded for recording a finding as to which of the parties was in exclusive possession of the disputed house on the date of delivery of possession. 4. Mr. Mohanty, however, contends that even on the assumption that the Petitioners were in exclusive possession of the disputed house on the date of delivery of possession, they are not entitled to be put back into physical possession of the house and are merely entitled to be put into joint possession which would be symbolical one. 4. Mr. Mohanty, however, contends that even on the assumption that the Petitioners were in exclusive possession of the disputed house on the date of delivery of possession, they are not entitled to be put back into physical possession of the house and are merely entitled to be put into joint possession which would be symbolical one. If this contention would be correct there would be no necessity for remanding the case and as such it requires examination. For proper appreciation of Mr. Mohanty's contention Order 21, Rules 100 and 101 may be quoted: 100. Dispossession by decree-bolder or purchaser: (1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed .of immovable property by the bolder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession. (2) The Court shall fix a day of investigating the matter and shall summon the party against whom the application is made to appear and answer the same. 101. Bona fide claimant to be restored to possession:Where the Court is satisfied that the applicant was in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor, it shall direct I that the applicant be put into possession of the property. Both these rules must be read together. On the assumption that the Petitioners were in exclusive possession of the disputed house in which they have only -/8/ - annas interest they are in possession of undivided -/8/ - annas interest on their own account.- So far as the other -/8/ - interest is concerned, the title undoubtedly vested in Rajkrushna which had been purchased by the opposite party in respect of which she had obtained a decree. In respect of that -/8/ - annas of interest, the actual physical possession was with the Petitioners, though in the eye of law their possession was on behalf of Rajkrushna who was a co-owner. In respect of the -/8/ - annas interest belonging to Rajkrushna, the Petitioners cannot raise a valid objection that the decree-holder cannot be put into possession at all. In respect of the -/8/ - annas interest belonging to Rajkrushna, the Petitioners cannot raise a valid objection that the decree-holder cannot be put into possession at all. Their only objection would be that Rajkrushna or the opposite party was entitled to symbolical possession under Order 21, Rule 35(2), CPC Code, which lays down that: 35(2) Where a decree is for the joint possession of immovable property, such possession shall be delivered by affixing a copy of the warrant in Borne conspicuous place on the property and proclaiming by beat 'of rum, or other customary mode, at some connivent place, the substance of the decree. When the Petitioners had title to the -/8/ - annas of the property and physical possession in the whole house the decree passed in favour of the opposite party on 22-2-1902 in T.S. 16/62 must be construed as in respect of half of the undivided house with joint possession. No decree could be passed in respect of the entire house when admittedly Rajkrushna had only title to -/8/ - interest there. Under the decree opposite party was entitled only to joint possession of -/8/ - interest in the disputed house which could be effected not by actual delivery of possession, but only by symbolical delivery of possession. It is this aspect of the matter which Mr. Mohanty ignores in his argument. The scope and am bit of these rules are to make an enquiry as to whether the applicants were in possession at the time of delivery of possession. If they are found in possession, th, are to be restored back to possession. These rules are concerned with actual physical possession and not with juridical possession. The objection of the applicants is to have the status qno ante. If it is assumed that the Petitioners were in exclusive possession of the disputed house, the opposite party was entitled to be put to joint possession of -/8/ - interest belonging to Rajkrushna. If as a:, result of writ of delivery of possession, opposite party was not given joint possession of the undivided half, but was given the physical possession of the entire dispute house, the Petitioners have to be restored actual physical possession of the entire disputed house, The wrong that was committed by the delivery of possession is to be rectified. If as a:, result of writ of delivery of possession, opposite party was not given joint possession of the undivided half, but was given the physical possession of the entire dispute house, the Petitioners have to be restored actual physical possession of the entire disputed house, The wrong that was committed by the delivery of possession is to be rectified. What the Petitioners actually lost must be restored back provided their physical possession on the date of delivery of possession is established. 5. Mr. Mohanty was unable to cite a single decision taking the contrary view. The aforesaid view receives consistent recognition from high authorities. In Govinda Nair v. Kesavan ILR Mad. 81. a Division Bench of the Madras High Court of which Sir Muttusami Ayar was a member observed a follows: His joint interest with the judgment-debtor could not prevent him from claiming in good faith in respect of his own interest. The effect of his obstruction and claim might be to set up a case in the judgment-debtor against the execution purchaser, if the joint right of, the judgment-debtor was in every respect similar to his. This was followed in Radha Gobinda Missir v. Raghnnath Missir A.I.R.. 1914 Cal. 186., in which Sir Asutosh. Mookherjee was a member. Their Lordships' observation may' be noticed: In our opinion, the terms of Rule 101.are comprehensive enough to cover a case of this description. There is no anomaly involved in the view we take. The only effect of our order in favour of the claimant is to restore him to joint possession in, th same manner as before, in other words the execution purchaser is placed in possession only to this extent; that the possession of his judgment-debtor is terminated and he has to remain in joint possession along with the claimant as his judgment-debtor had previously done. The two underlined expression clearly bring out the essence of the matter. Out of the two co-owners, one is put in possession -and the other in joint possession. The main question is which of the two would be put in actual physical possession and who would be in symbolical possession. The underlined expressions show that if the claimants were in actual physical possession on the date of delivery of possession, they would be put back into joint possession in the same manner as before. The main question is which of the two would be put in actual physical possession and who would be in symbolical possession. The underlined expressions show that if the claimants were in actual physical possession on the date of delivery of possession, they would be put back into joint possession in the same manner as before. This only means that the claimants would be restored to the actual physical possession and the opposite party would be put in joint possession with the claimants. The authority of this decision has never been questioned subsequent. On the other hand, it has been consistently followed in Indubhushan Das Vs. Haricharan Mandal AIR 1968 Nag. 442, Chhaterdhari Mahto and Others Vs. Nasib Singh and Others, and Pera Naidu and Another Vs. Soundaravalli Ammal, through her authorised agent Dharmalingaswami Bootham Bullavar Naicker and Others. In the last decision, Mr. Justice Venkatarama Aiyar, (as he then was) further clarified the observation in Radh Gobinda sir v. Raghunath 11. Missir AIR 1914 Cal. 186., to mean that the effect of an order under Order 21, Rule 101 was to restore the status quo before delivery was effected so far the applicant was concerned. I am satisfied that Mr. Mohanty's contention has no force and must be rejected. 6. As I have already stated if Mr. Mohanty's contention is not accepted, the case must go back on remand. The learned Subordinate Judge would decide as to whether the Petitioners or Rajkrushna were in exclusive possession of the disputed house on the date of delivery of possession, on 1-6-1962. If it is found that the Petitioners were in exclusive possession then application under Order 21, Rule 100, CPC Code must be allowed and the Petitioners should be restored to physical possession of the entire house. If on the other hand, Rajkrushna was in possession on that date, the Petitioners' application under Order 21, Rule 100, CPC would be allowed in the manner as indicated in the impugned order. That means they would be put into joint possession which would be symbolical one. Parties should be given full opportunity for adducing evidence on the point. The case a long pending one and it should be disposed of within two months from the date of reopening of the summer vacation with intimation to this Court. Shri A.K. Patro, Subordinate Judge would dispose of this cas'. Parties should be given full opportunity for adducing evidence on the point. The case a long pending one and it should be disposed of within two months from the date of reopening of the summer vacation with intimation to this Court. Shri A.K. Patro, Subordinate Judge would dispose of this cas'. The records be transmitted to the Court below within two days. 7. In the result, the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, is set aside and the Revision is allowed. The case is remanded as indicated above. In the circumstances, parties to bear their own costs upto this stage. Final Result : Allowed