JUDGMENT : Das, J. - The Petitioner has been convicted u/s 12(A) of the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Ordinance, 1964, and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1,0001-, in default to undergo R.I. for six months. The seized paddy has been directed to be confiscated to the State. 2. On 30-12-1964, the supply inspector (p.w.1) visited the shop and the house of the Petitioner in village Reamal in the district of Sambalpur, and seized 17 quintals of paddy kept in twenty-seven bags and also a loose stock of forty-five quintals. He seized them under seizure list, Ext. 1. When demanded, the accused could not produce his licence. So p.w.1 submitted precution report against the accused for alleged violation of Section 3(2), of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act No. 10 of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'.) 3. The accused admits the recovery of the paddy, but his case is that he is not a dealer and as such no licence was necessary and the stock of paddy seized from his possession was the yield of his land. In sup part of his plea he examined one defence witness. 4. The learned trial Court held that the Petitioner accused was a 'dealer' as defined under Clause 2 of the Orissa food grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1959 and as he found him carrying on business without a licence, he convicted and sentenced 9im as hereinbefore stated. The Petitioner challenges this conviction and sentence in the present application. 5. At the stage of admission of this application, notice for enhancement was issued and as such the Petitioner had the advantage of placing the entire evidence before the Court to make out a case if the conviction was at all justified. 6. Section 2 of the Act defines the classes of commodities which are 'essential commodities' within the meaning of the Act. There is no dispute over the fact that paddy is an essential commodity. u/s 3(2) powers have been vested in the Central Government to control production, supply, distribution etc. of essential commodities and without prejudice to the gener powers, specific powers have been given u/s 3(2)(d) for regulating such production and distribution, storage and transport by issue of licence, permits etc.. u/s 3(2) powers have been vested in the Central Government to control production, supply, distribution etc. of essential commodities and without prejudice to the gener powers, specific powers have been given u/s 3(2)(d) for regulating such production and distribution, storage and transport by issue of licence, permits etc.. u/s 5 of the Act the Central Government has been given the right o delegate powers to the State Government or to such officer subordinate to State Government to make orders u/s 3 in relation to such subjects and such conditions as may be specified in this behalf in exercise of the said powers conferred u/s 3 of the Act and the powers delegated in the notification of the Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, dated 15-11-1958;, the State Government promulgated what is known as the Orissa Foodgrains Df'alers Licensing order, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Order'). Clause 3(1) of that Order prohibits a person from carrying on business 3S a dealer in foodgrains, such as paddy and rice except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence issued in this behalf by the licensing authority, meaning an officer appointed by the State Government of Orissa. Under Clause 2(a) of the Order, deal on the relevant date has been defined to mean "any person who is engaged in the business of: (1) purchase and/or sale of anyone or more of the foodgrains in quantities of eight quintals of paddy or more in a single calendar day and/or, (ii) Stores for sale in quantities exceeding twenty quintals for purpose of sale. Subclause (2) of Clause (3) of the Order says that for the purpose of this Clause any person who stores any foodgrains in quantity of twenty quintals or more, shall, unless the contrary is proved deemed to store the foodgrains for the purposes of sale. Violation of the Order is punishable u/s 17 of the Act and the offence is triable in a summary way u/s 12(A) of the Ordinance. 7. Violation of the Order is punishable u/s 17 of the Act and the offence is triable in a summary way u/s 12(A) of the Ordinance. 7. The trial Court held that the accused was found to be in possession of more than twenty quintals of paddy and he shall be deemed to have stored the same for the purposes of sale under Sub-clause (2) of Clause 3 of the Licensing Order unless the contrary was proved by him, and since the accused had failed to establish by any evidence that the said stock was not meant for sale, he found him guilty under the Act. 8. It is well-settled by authorities that in spite of the presumption, available under Clause 3(2) of the Order, the prosecution has still to show that the store of foodgrains was made by the accused for the purpose of carrying on the business. The statement of business essential to attract the provisions of Clause 3(1) is not covered by the presumption raised under Clause 3(2). That part of the case has "ti I to be proved by the prosecution independent evidence See Manipur Administration Vs. M. Nila Chandra Singh. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with a case under the Manipur Foodgrains Licensing Order, 1958, which is essentially the same as the Orissa Food. grains Dealers Licensing Order. It is thus necessary to see whether there is any evidence to show that the prosecution has been able to establish that the accused was carrying on any business in foodgrains. The word "business" denotes a sort of continuity or repetition of transaction of sale and purchase. There must be some evidence to justify the conclusion that store which was made for the purpose of sale was made by the person for the purpose of carrying on the business. A single, solitary or casual transaction of sale, purchase or storage would not make a person, a dealer. On these points, however, the evidence falls far short of the mark. Apart from the evidence of p.w.1 and p.w.5 with which I shall deal a little later, the other witnesses such as p. ws. 2, 3 and 4 do not support the prosecution version that the accused was a dealer. P.w.2 has said that he is unable to say if the accused deals in paddy and rice. P. ws. Apart from the evidence of p.w.1 and p.w.5 with which I shall deal a little later, the other witnesses such as p. ws. 2, 3 and 4 do not support the prosecution version that the accused was a dealer. P.w.2 has said that he is unable to say if the accused deals in paddy and rice. P. ws. 2 and 4 have gone further and said that they have not seen the accused dealing in rice and paddy. P.w.5 is the Sub. Inspector of Police who accompanied p.w.1 at the time of the search. According to him he joined the Reamal police.station in July, 1964. In his evidence-in-chief he has not said a word whether the accused was carrying on business in paddy. To a question by the Court, if the accused is a dealer in rice and paddy, the witness stated that so far as he knew the accused deals in rice and paddy. In cross examination by the accused the witness frankly admitted that he cannot say of any particular instance of the accused's dealing in rice and paddy. Thus, the evidence of p.w.5 is of no assistance to the prosecution to make out a case whether th accused was in fact a dealer in paddy on the date of seizure. P.w.1 the Civil Supplies Inspector is the only witness on this point. He joined at the place in January, 1964. His evidence is that has seen the accused doing paddy business in 1964. His explanation for not prosecuting him for carrying on business in 1964 without a licence is that the accused used to sell and purchase about four to five quintals. Though he claims to have seen the accused selling and purchasing in 1963, he admitted that he was not working in that sub-division in that year. Tims, the evidence of p.w.1 does not conclusively establish that the accused was dealing in paddy as his business. On the contrary the evidence shows that the paddy seized may be the yield of his cultivable lands. The evidence of the Sub-Inspector shows that the paddy was kept in a Kothi, the usual place where the cultivators store the paddy after harvest. It is the evidence p.w.2 .that the accused is a cultivator and the father of the accused claimed the seized paddy to have been kept for seedling purposes for the year. The evidence of the Sub-Inspector shows that the paddy was kept in a Kothi, the usual place where the cultivators store the paddy after harvest. It is the evidence p.w.2 .that the accused is a cultivator and the father of the accused claimed the seized paddy to have been kept for seedling purposes for the year. P.w.3 has stated that the accused is a cultivator. The defence has also examined a witness to prove that the accused has some cultivable lands and the yearly yield of paddy of the accused was nearly forty to fifty Pudugs (approximately sixty to seventy quintals). That being that position on evidence it is not improbable that the accused as a cultivator was in possession of this stock of paddy. Clause 10 of the Orissa Licensing Order specifically lays down that nothing in the Order shall apply to the cultivators unless they engage themselves in the business of purchase and sale or storage for sale as dealers. There is no legal bar to an agriculturist for being also a dealer within the meaning of the Licensing Order. But the important question that requires to be considered in a case of this nature is whether there is evidence to show that the accused was found engaged in the business of sale and purchase so as to be a dealer within the meaning of the said Order. Even apart from the presumption under Clause 3(2) the prosecution had to establish that the storage of paddy was for the purpose of sale in course of business. This was also the view held by this Court in Mesala Subba Rao v. State ILR 1965 Cutt. 610. We have already seen from the evidence that the prosecution has not been able to establish that the accused-Petitioner was carrying on business in paddy which is said to have been seized from his possession. In view of this position, the conviction of the Petitioner and the sentence passed upon him by the trial Court cannot be sustained and must be set aside, and the revision allowed. Revision allowed. Final Result : Allowed