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1966 DIGILAW 395 (ALL)

Ram Pratap v. State

1966-10-03

D.P.UNIYAL

body1966
ORDER D.P. Uniyal, J. - This revision is directed against the judgment of the Civil and Sessions Judge upholding the order of the Magistrate convicting the Applicants Under Sections 323 and 325 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and sentencing each of them to 2 months' RI on the first count and to 4 months' RI on the second count, the two sentences to run concurrently. 2. The facts of the case are simple and may be summarised thus. There was a partition suit in respect of certain agricultural plots between the Applicants on the one hand and the complainant on the other. The case was fought up to the High Court and the complainant succeeded in obtaining a decree for possession" of a moiety share of the disputed land. In execution of the decree he obtained actual physical possession (dakhaldehani) on 26-8-1962 through a Vakil commissioner. As a result he cultivated half portion of plots Nos. 122 and 123 and sowed pea-crop on them. When the crop was ready for harvesting he went to his field on 26-2-1963 accompanied by his wife and son. The accused party reached there and protested against his taking away the pea crop. When he refused to allow the accused to take possession of the crop the latter assaulted him and his wife causing simple and grievous hurt to them. 3. In defence the accused pleaded right of defence of property and contended that the Dakhaldehani was a mere paper transaction and actual possession had not passed to the complainant. 4. Both the courts below believed the case for the prosecution and held that on the date of incident pea crop was standing in the field belonging to the complainant and that the accused party had no right to interfere with his possession. They further held that possession of the disputed land had actually been delivered to the complainant in execution of the decree of the civil court. On these findings the Applicants were convicted and sentenced as said above. 5. The only point urged before me by the learned Counsel was that the injury reports of the complainants and his wife had not been legally proved and that the same were inadmissible in evidence. What appears to have happened is that Dr. On these findings the Applicants were convicted and sentenced as said above. 5. The only point urged before me by the learned Counsel was that the injury reports of the complainants and his wife had not been legally proved and that the same were inadmissible in evidence. What appears to have happened is that Dr. Mohan Lal who had examined the injuries of the complainant and his wife was transferred and could not be available without undue delay. An application was, therefore, made on behalf of the prosecution praying that the injury report prepared by the doctor may be allowed to be proved by his compounder who was present at the time of the preparation of the said report. The court allowed the prosecution to produce secondary evidence and the injury report was brought on the record. Regarding the admissibility of the evidence of the compounder, suffice it to say that Section 32 of the Evidence Act permits the reception of such evidence in circumstances mentioned in that section. Sub-section (2) of Section 32 provides that statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person whose attendance cannot be secured without undue delay or expense, which in the circumstances of the case appears to the court reasonable, are themselves relevant facts if the said statements consist of any entry or memorandum made by him in books kept in the ordinary course of business or in discharge of professional duties. In the instant case it is not disputed that the doctor who had prepared the injury report was then performing an official duty so that the report prepared by him was an official document. If the court found that there was sufficient reason for his not being produced in court the prosecution could, with the permission of the court, produce secondary evidence in respect of that report, as had been done in this case. 6. The Applicant's learned Counsel placed reliance on Rangappa Goundan Vs. Emperor, AIR 1936 Mad 426 , wherein it was observed that a post' mortem report proves nothing. It is not even evidence and can only be used by the witness who conducted the post-mortem inquiry as an aid to his memory. The observations made by the Madras High Court do not in any way go to show that a post-mortem report prepared by the medical officer is not provable by secondary evidence. It is not even evidence and can only be used by the witness who conducted the post-mortem inquiry as an aid to his memory. The observations made by the Madras High Court do not in any way go to show that a post-mortem report prepared by the medical officer is not provable by secondary evidence. The above observations were made only to emphasise that the primary evidence in the case is the statement of the doctor who prepares the report and not the report itself. On this there can be no two opinions. The point for consideration is whether a report prepared by the medical officer in discharge of his official duty can be proved by secondary evidence, if the doctor is not available. As I have said above, the law permits secondary evidence to be produced if the court is satisfied that there was sufficient justification for not examining the doctor concerned. 7. In Mohan Singh Vs. Emperor, AIR 1925 All 413 a Division Bench of this Court pointed out that the postmortem report made by the Civil surgeon would be admissible u/s 32(2) of the Evidence Act as being a statement made by a dead person in the ordinary course of business and in the discharge of his professional duty. In that case also the post-mortem report prepared by the doctor, who had died subsequently, was proved by secondary evidence. I am in respectful agreement with the above view. There is, therefore, no force in the contention made by the learned Counsel that the injury report prepared by the medical officer is inadmissible. 8. The revision must, therefore, fail and is accordingly rejected. The Applicants are on bail. They shall surrender to their bail and serve out the sentences awarded to them.