ORDER : In this application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner prays that this Court may be pleased to quash by the issue of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or order, as the case may be, the order of the Chief Commissioner respondent No. 1, dated 22-1-1964 removing the petitioner from service. 2. The facts leading up to this writ petition are as follows : The petitioner was appointed as a Revenue Collection Muhorar on 8-2-1945 on the scale of pay of Rs. 20-45 in the erstwhile State of Manipur. He was absorbed in the service of Government of Manipur after the integration of the State of Manipur with Union of India on 15-10-1949. From 1951 to 13-4-1959 the petitioner held the post of the Revenue Peshkar to the Deputy Commissioner. In the year 1959, the Deputy Commissioner Started departmental proceedings against the petitioner. On 13-4-1959, he framed 3 charges against him. In that enquiry all the charges were alleged to have been proved against the petitioner, therefore, he was dismissed from service on 20-3-60. Thereupon, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Chief Commissioner, Manipur and the Chief Commissioner partly accepted the appeal and reduced the penalty of dismissal to one of removal from service by his order dated 28-3-1961. Thereafter, the petitioner filed Civil Writ Application No. 7 of 1961, praying for a writ of certiorari before this Court challenging the aforesaid orders on the ground inter alia that the Deputy Commissioner was not the appointing authority and as such the impugned order of removal from service violated the mandatory provisions of Art. 311(1) of the Constitution of India. This Court accepted the above contention and quashed the orders by a writ of certiorari by the order dated 13-9-1962. Thereafter, on 7-5-63, the Chief Commissioner, Manipur as the Disciplinary Authority drew up another departmental proceeding against the petitioner and he framed the following 3 charges against him : (1) The petitioner while functioning as clerk (Peshkar) in the Manipur Administration during the period from February, 1945 to February, 1958 committed misconduct in the discharge of his official duties inasmuch us he, during the said period, acquired property worth Rs. 15,320 which was disproportionate to the known sources of his income, (2) The petitioner, while functioning in the aforesaid office, committed misconduct in the discharge of his official duties inasmuch as he submitted a statement of assets on 2-11-1957 to the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Manipur, which was found to be false, and (3) During the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office, the petitioner wilfully acted in contravention of R. 9(2) of the Government Servants Conduct Rules 1935 and Rule 15 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955 inasmuch as he purchased about 36½ bighas of landed property, worth about Rs. 7,300 in his name, and in the name of his son Firoz Ahmed Malik, and wife Piarijan, without previous sanction either of the local Government or the Head of his office. The petitioner was called upon to file his written statement of defence in answer to the charges within 3 weeks from the receipt of the memorandum containing the above charges. The petitioner acknowledged the receipt of the memorandum on 9-5-1963. The Chief Commissioner thereafter by an order No. 1/8/63-OMV dated 6-7-1963, appointed Shri S. Singson, E. A. C. (Departmental Enquiries), Manipur Secretariate, as the Enquiry Officer. The Chief Commissioner by another Order No. 1/8/63-OMV dated 6-7-1963, nominated Shri S.K. Deb, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, Shillong to present the case in support of the case before the Enquiry Officer, The petitioner filed written statement of defence on 12-6-1963. Before filing the written statement he filed application to the Chief Commissioner for inspection of record and taking extracts therefrom. His request was allowed. After the receipt of the statement of defence, evidence was led on both sides. The Enquiry Officer found the first two charges proved and the 3rd partly proved. Thereafter the Disciplinary Authority after consideration of the report came to the conclusion that the first two charges were proved and the 3rd was partly proved. The Chief Commissioner, therefore, provisionally came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not a fit person to be retained in service and that he should be removed from service. The petitioner was accordingly called upon to submit his representation, if any, against the proposed said action. The petitioner submitted his representation on 27-12-1963. The Chief Commissioner after considering his representation passed the impugned order removing him from service. The petitioner was accordingly called upon to submit his representation, if any, against the proposed said action. The petitioner submitted his representation on 27-12-1963. The Chief Commissioner after considering his representation passed the impugned order removing him from service. The petitioner being aggrieved with this order of Chief Commissioner has filed this writ petition with the contention that the order of the Chief Commissioner is illegal, and hence it should be set aside. 3. The respondents in their counter affidavit traversed the allegations of the petitioner and inter alia pleaded that the petitioner failed to give the satisfactory account for the acquisition of his properties which were quite disproportionate to his known sources of his income. He enriched himself by illegal gratification. In view of these facts the order of the, Chief Commissioner is quite appropriate and hence the writ petition should be dismissed. It was also alleged that the petitioner has got another remedy open to him by way of appeal against the impugned order under the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, but he has not availed himself of the same. The petitioner has not exhausted the aforesaid remedy, therefore, he has no right to invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The petition, therefore, should be rejected on that account. Lastly it was said that the impugned order is legal and valid, therefore, the writ" petition should be dismissed with costs. 4. Heard the learned lawyers appearing on behalf of the petitioner and the respondents and perused the record of the case. 5. I shall first of all deal with the preliminary objections raised by the Government Advocate. The first contention of the Government Advocate was that the petitioner filed this writ petition after a great delay of 6 months and no adequate explanation for this delay-has been given, therefore, he is guilty of delay and laches and hence it should be rejected on this ground. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner in reply stated that the impugned order was communicated to the petitioner on 22-1-1964 and he filed the writ on 18-2-1964, i.e., within 6 months. The writ was, therefore, filed within the reasonable time. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner in reply stated that the impugned order was communicated to the petitioner on 22-1-1964 and he filed the writ on 18-2-1964, i.e., within 6 months. The writ was, therefore, filed within the reasonable time. He further said that the petitioner spent some time in tracing out some documents regarding the introduction of Rules in Manipur and in attending the ailing mother and in the preparation of the memo of writ application, therefore, the delay should be condoned. 7. As regards the question of laches and delay in filing the writ petition, it is a well settled rule of practice that an application by way of writ of certiorari or other writ should be filed within a reasonable time from the date of the order which the applicant seeks to be quashed. In appropriate circumstances, the High Court certainly has the power to excuse the delay. In this case though there was delay in filing the writ petition but the writ was admitted as there were certain debatable points. As it was admitted after condoning delay in view of the facts mentioned in para 7 of the petition, so, it cannot be dismissed now on that ground. 8. The other contention advanced by the Government Advocate was that the petitioner had the right to appeal against the impugned order under the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, but he did not avail it. As he did not exhaust the remedy so he has no right to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner averred that the existence of another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the case of Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad Goenka, AIR 1962 SC 1694 . In this case Ayyangar, J. observed that High Court has a discretion to grant relief under Art. 226 even if there are other alternative statutory remedies. 10. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the case of Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad Goenka, AIR 1962 SC 1694 . In this case Ayyangar, J. observed that High Court has a discretion to grant relief under Art. 226 even if there are other alternative statutory remedies. 10. After having given my sincere consideration to the arguments advanced on both sides I find that under the law a person whose services have been wrongfully terminated, is entitled to institute an action to vindicate his rights, and in such an action, the Court will be competent to award all the reliefs to which he may be entitled, including some which would not be admissible in a writ petition. It is well settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ; but, the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs. And where such remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Art. 226 unless there are good grounds therefor. In the instant case the petitioner should have exhausted the other remedies before coming to this Court. Anyhow, after the admission of the writ, I feel that there would be no justification in rejecting the writ petition on that score. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Enquiry Officer without marshalling the evidence properly arrived to this conclusion. As this conclusion is not supported by the evidence on the record, so, the impugned order should be quashed. 12. There is no merit in this contention. It has to be remembered that this is not a judgment delivered by a Court of law, but only orders passed in a Departmental enquiry. The Enquiry Officer only collects the evidence, records his, findings and submits them to the authority which is competent to impose punishment. After receiving the records and the report of the Enquiry Officer the Disciplinary Authority gives the second show cause notice to the delinquent for submitting his reply. The Enquiry Officer only collects the evidence, records his, findings and submits them to the authority which is competent to impose punishment. After receiving the records and the report of the Enquiry Officer the Disciplinary Authority gives the second show cause notice to the delinquent for submitting his reply. In this case, from the record it is clear that the Chief Commissioner after receiving the records and reports of the Enquiry Officer gave the second show cause notice to the petitioner and he submitted an elaborate statement urging all the points in his favour and thereafter the Chief Commissioner after going through these records passed the impugned order. In these circumstances it is difficult to say that the order passed by Chief Commissioner is palpably erroneous. 13. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the statement made by some officials in previous proceedings against the petitioner held by the Additional District Magistrate were illegally used by the Enquiry Officer in this proceeding, therefore, the enquiry was vitiated and the petitioner was prejudiced. 14. The learned counsel for the State in order to meet this argument of the counsel for the petitioner averred that the Enquiry Officer took into consideration only that evidence which was led by the parties before him, therefore, the question of his being prejudiced does not arise in this case. 15. In view of these arguments, it has to be seen as to how the matter stands. Before scrutinising the facts of the case it is better to see how the Evidence Act is applicable to tribunals. The Evidence Act has no application to enquiries conducted by tribunals, even though they may be judicial in character. The law requires that such tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry and if they do so their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that which obtains in a Court of Law. The law requires that such tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry and if they do so their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that which obtains in a Court of Law. Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed. Now from the enquiry report of this case it appears that the Enquiry Officer has not considered the evidence of these witnesses whose evidence was not recorded before him. He has considered only those public documents which were produced in the presence of the petitioner and about which he was given an opportunity to rebut. Besides, the Enquiry Officer has relied mostly on facts admitted by the petitioner in coming to this finding against him. In view of these facts the contention of the petitioner is not tenable. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Central Service Conduct Rules, 1935 and 1955 were made applicable to the Union Territory of Manipur with effect from 1-6-1956, under Notification No. 25/35/55-Es. (A)-II dated 1-6-1956, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. Before the coming into force of these Rules, there were no such rules in erstwhile Manipur State. In the erstwhile Manipur State a Government servant was not required to submit a list of properties acquired by him. Besides, the Central Civil Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1955 had no retrospective effect in its application to the Union Territory of Manipur, therefore, the properties acquired before the alleged introduction of these rules and the manner and circumstances of such acquisition cannot be taken as attributable to any cause covered by or under the provision of R. 15 of the said rules or any provision thereof. In this case the properties were acquired between 1945 and 1955, therefore, the impugned order is not only perverse but illegal and hence it is liable to be quashed. 17. The Government Advocate in order to controvert this contention of the learned lawyer for the petitioner contended that the charge No. 1 which relates to misconduct in the discharge of his duties for having acquired property quite disproportionate to the known sources of his income, during the period from February, 1945 to February, 1958, was independent of the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, which had also meanwhile during this period became applicable to the Union Territory of Manipur. As the petitioner failed to give satisfactory account for the acquisition of his properties which were quite disproportionate to his known sources of income, it was therefore rightly presumed so, that he enriched himself by illegal gratification, and the charge for misconduct in the discharge of his official duties was, therefore, found proved. 18. After having given my most anxious consideration to the arguments advanced on both sides, I find that the contention of the Government Advocate carries weight. The Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955 lay down inter alia that Government servants should, at all times, maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. It is, in fact, axiomatic that Government servants especially those holding position of trust and responsibility should not only be honest and impartial in the discharge of their official duties but also have the reputation of being so. 19. This is a fact that there were no such rules in the erstwhile Manipur State, but the petitioner had no right to acquire property dishonestly even though he was not required to submit the list of properties. The question of submitting the list of properties is required to see that the officer maintain his integrity. In this case the petitioner failed to give satisfactory account for the acquisition of his properties which were quite disproportionate to his known sources of account, therefore, this charge will be taken as independent of the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955. 20. In this case the petitioner failed to give satisfactory account for the acquisition of his properties which were quite disproportionate to his known sources of account, therefore, this charge will be taken as independent of the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955. 20. The learned counsel for the petitioner next averred that the alleged non-observance of the provision of R. 15 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, cannot constitute by itself a misconduct in view of the fact that the relevant provisions of the said rules were never brought to the notice of the petitioner, therefore, the impugned order is illegal and void ah initio. This contention too is devoid of force. The Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955 became applicable to the Union Territory of Manipur with effect from 1-6-1956 under Notification No. 25/35/55-Es. (A) - 11 dated 1-6-1956 Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. The publication of these rules in official Gazette is deemed to be sufficient notice of the rules to all concerned. Besides, in respect of charge III against the petitioner the Enquiry Officer took into consideration only the transactions made after 1-6-1956. 21. The counsel for the petitioner averred that the report of the Vigilance Inspector was not supplied to the petitioner, therefore, he was prejudiced. The Government Advocate in reply contended that this report was not used in evidence, therefore, the question of prejudice does not arise in this case. 22. There appears merit in the contention of Government Advocate. From the record it appears that the report of the Vigilance Inspector was not used in evidence in this case, therefore, by its non-supplying it cannot be said that the petitioner was prejudiced. 23. The other contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the evidence led and explanation given by the petitioner in respect of charge II was not fully considered either by the Enquiry Officer or the respondent No. 1, therefore, it should he taken that the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity to defend himself. There does not appear any force in this contention. From the report of the Enquiry Officer, which is a detailed one it appears that he had covered all points. In para 18 of the report the Enquiry Officer has discussed the question about the property possessed by the petitioner. There does not appear any force in this contention. From the report of the Enquiry Officer, which is a detailed one it appears that he had covered all points. In para 18 of the report the Enquiry Officer has discussed the question about the property possessed by the petitioner. From the report it appears that the petitioner possessed lands comprising 36 B. 4 K. 3 L. But when called upon to submit a list of his immovable property the petitioner showed only a small quantity. Besides, as discussed in para 23 of the report, the petitioner produced some katcha sale deeds to support the alleged sale transactions which the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority refused to accept to be true and genuine. Moreover, the conclusions no questions of fact arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority are not open to challenge in this writ petition. On this point, I may refer to the case Syed Hassan Ali v. State of Mysore, AIR 1965 Mys 283. In this case Santosh, J. observed that it is not the function of the Court in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to go into questions of appreciation of evidence. The Court has to see whether Art. 311 of the Constitution has been contravened and whether the petitioner had reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges framed against him. Unless it is a case of total lack of evidence, the Court will not be justified in interfering in departmental enquiries, on question of appreciation or discussion of evidence. Orders passed in departmental inquiry are not judgments delivered by Court of law. Hence, the mere fact that there is no discussion of defence evidence or that no reasons were given for rejecting it would not be ground for interference. 24. The learned lawyer for the petitioner further averred that the second show cause notice given by the respondent No. 1 to the petitioner after the submission of the report of Enquiry Officer was for calling explanation only on the quantum of punishment and not in respect of the finding against him by the Enquiry Officer which the Disciplinary Authority had agreed to inflict, therefore, it offended the provisions of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India. 25. 25. In order to refute this contention the learned Government Advocate contended that vide Office Memorandum No. 1/8/63-OMV dated 5-12-1963, Government of Manipur, an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him was given to him in conformity with the provisions of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India, therefore, this contention is not tenable. 26. Now in view of the arguments advanced on both sides, it has to be seen what is meant by second show cause notice. The Constitution by Art. 311 (2) guarantees to a public servant charged with misdemeanour that he shall not be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to he taken in regard to him. The content of the guarantee was explained in Khem Chand v. Union of India, 1958 SCR 1080 at pp. 1096-97 : AIR 1958 SC 300 at p. 307. It was observed that : "the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provision under consideration includes - (a) an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or, otherwise of the charges proved against the government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the government servant". In the instant case two opportunities were given to the petitioner. The first was given when the charges were enquired into and the second opportunity was given after the enquiry authority had come to the conclusion on the charges. This notice was about the question of proper punishment. In this notice there was no necessity of mentioning about the truth and validity of charges on which conclusions have already been reached. The first was given when the charges were enquired into and the second opportunity was given after the enquiry authority had come to the conclusion on the charges. This notice was about the question of proper punishment. In this notice there was no necessity of mentioning about the truth and validity of charges on which conclusions have already been reached. The true ambit of the second stage of the proceedings is only to show cause against the proposed punishment and not against the truth and validity of the charges on which conclusions have already been reached. If it were otherwise, there would be a repetition at the second stage of what had already transpired at the first stage. What is more, the proceedings at the second stage would partake of an appeal against the conclusions already reached on the charges against the delinquent, and such an appeal would be to the same authority who had already arrived at the conclusions. Such a position is not contemplated by either the letter or the spirit of the constitutional pro vision already referred to. 27. The second stage of the proceedings is not an altogether independent stage totally unconnected with the earlier stage. The second stage on the other hand is only a logical continuation of the proceedings taken at the earlier stage. Therefore, the opportunity afforded al the second stage cannot be to canvass the correctness of the conclusions arrived at by the punishing authority at the end of the first stage but only to make representations against the punishment tentatively suggested by that authority. In this view, whatever be the cause shown by the delinquent at the second stage against the punishment proposed against him it should not run counter or conflict with the conclusions reached towards the end of the first stage that the delinquent is guilty of the charges. The charges should he only those formulated and enquired into in the presence of the delinquent and the findings on those charges should be arrived at only after giving the delinquent adequate opportunity not only to examine the material on which the charges are sought to be made out to cross-examine the witnesses called to prove those charges, but also to put forward and substantiate the defence. 28. 28. The findings so reached at the enquiry are then considered in the light of the material on the record and accepted by the punishing authority. If all this was duly done at the first stage there can be no case for the delinquent to canvass at the second stage the correctness of those findings. He can then only seek to show at the second stage that even on the basis of the correctness and validity of those conclusions, the punishment proposed to be meted out to him is not called for, being too harsh, etc. To enable him a reasonable opportunity to show such cause against the proposed punishment, he need not be supplied with the entire material which was brought out against him at the first stage of the proceedings. 29. It will be sufficient if the delinquent is given the findings on the charges against him and also an adequate summary of the grounds on which those findings are based. 30. The person who is to be dismissed or reduced must know that the punishment proposed is for certain acts or omissions on his part and must be told the grounds on which it is proposed to take such action and must be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why such punishment should not be imposed. 31. There is nothing wrong in principle in the punishing authority tentatively forming the opinion that the charges proved merit any one of the three major penalties and on that footing asking the Government servant concerned, to show cause against the punishment proposed to be taken in the alternative in regard to him. To specify more than one punishment in the alternative does not necessarily make the proposed action any the less definite; on the contrary, it gives the Government servant better opportunity to show cause against each of those punishments being inflicted on him, which he would not have had if only the severest punishment had been mentioned and a lesser punishment not mentioned in the notice had been inflicted on him. 32. In this case there has been full compliance of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. 33. 32. In this case there has been full compliance of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. 33. The last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Chief Commissioner has not properly marshalled the evidence nor he has given any reasons for accepting the findings of the Enquiry Officer, therefore, the order being not in conformity with law should be set aside. 34. The learned Government Advocate in order to controvert this contention of the lawyer for the petitioner strongly averred that the Chief Commissioner after carefully going through all the records and the grounds urged was satisfied that the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved. He further contended that in departmental proceedings, it is not necessary to give elaborate reasons in disposing of appeals. 35. After having given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced on both sides, I am of the opinion that there is no merit in the contention of the petitioner, that the order passed by Chief Commissioner is illegal and should be struck down. The Chief Commissioner, after going through the records, has held that there is no procedural irregularity as would have vitiated the proceedings. The Chief Commissioner has come to the conclusion that the charges framed against the petitioner have been property proved. He has held, after going through all the materials placed before him. Hence, I am o the opinion that there is no merit in this contention. 36. In the result, for the reasons state above, the writ petition fails and the, same is dismissed with costs. The Advocates fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.