S. B. Capoor ( 1 ) THIS civil writ petition under Articles 22 6 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated the 5th of December, 1964 (copy Annexure d to the petition) of the presiding Officer of the Labour Court,delhi (respondentno. lto the petition) directing the petitioner. Miss Nirmala Joshi, to pay to her ex-employee, Jai Gopal Kapur, (respondent No. (2) compensation amounting to Rs. 2, 638. 00 in all, split up as follows :-Items Nos. (e) and (d) were awarded in view of the provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1917 (Act 14 of 1947-hereafter REFERRED TO as the Act ). ( 2 ) THE facts as found by the Labour Court, and which the learned counsel for the petitioner has not for the purpose of this petition disputed befo me, are as follows :- (1) that the petitioner is an owner of an industrial concern; (2) that the respondent as an employee of the petitioner was drawing consolidated wages of Rs. 3951. 00 per mensern; and (3) that the respondent was retrenched with effect from 21st of May, 1964. The further findings of the Labour Court that it had jurisdiction to decide the matter on the respondent s application under section 33c- (2) of the Act and that the respondent was entitled to retrenchment compensation have, however, been challenged before me on behalf of the petitioner. ( 3 ) SO far as item No. (a) is concerned, there is no dispute at all about it because Mr. Yogeshwar Dayal, learned counsel tor the petitioner; has conceded that for the period of duty performed by the respondent before the 21st of May, 1964, he was entitled to earned wages for 21 days. With regard to item No. (b) that is, wages in lieu of unavailed leave, Mr. Yogeshwar Dayal s contention was that the respondent was not entitled to such wages as a matter of right, but he declared that the employer was prepared to let him have, as a matter of grace, those wages in lieu of anvalied leave. So it is not necessary to enter upon this item also. ( 4 ) WITH regard to items Nos. So it is not necessary to enter upon this item also. ( 4 ) WITH regard to items Nos. (e) and (d), however, it was strangly contended by Mr Yogeshwar Dayal that on application under action 33-C (2) of the Act the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to grant any relief under section 25-F and in this connection he has relied on a Bench ruling of the Gujarat High Court in Ambalal Shivlal. V in (D. M.)and others , which has been followed by Mahajan J. in an unreported case of Messrs B. L. Ghasi Ram v. The Labour Court and others decided on 21st of January, 1965. The ratio of these cases is as follows :- 6. Under sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act a Labour Court is to have jurisdiction in relation to matters specified in the Second Schedule of the Act while under section 7-A of the Act an Industrial Tribunal has Jurisdiction for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter, whether specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule. Now it is the Third Schedule under which are given items such as "wages", "leave with wages and holidays", and "retrenchment of workmen and. closure of establishment". The matters which are specified in the Third schedule are noted in the Second Schedule as being outside the ambit of that Schedule. However, withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege is a matter falling within the Second Schedue. Under section 25-F the Act a workman, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer, cannot be retrenched by that employer until- " (A) the workman has been given one month s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice : Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrechment is under an agreement which speefies a date for the termination of service; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which, shall be equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months;. . . . . . . . . "thus section 25-F lays down the conditions which have to be fulfilled before a valid order of retrechment is made and it does not create a new right in favour of the workman to receive retrechment compensation as well as pay for the notice period in case no notice has been given. It follows therefore that a workman retrenched without complying with the provisions of section 25-F cannot claim retrenchment compensation directly under section 25-F and having regard to the Third Schedule as well as section 7 and 10 of the Act, thelahoui Court will have no jurisdiction to determine the same in an application under section 33-C (2) of the Act. The principal is that jurisdiction of the Labour Court is confined only to the determination of the amount of benefit arising out of an existing right. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent does not challenge the correctness of the two decisions relied upon on behalf of the petitioner but he maintains that in as much as the particular point as to jurisdiction in this form was not raised before the Labour Court the employer should not be permitted to canvass that point in a writ petition, and in this connection reliance is placed on Jagatjit Cotton Texitile Mills Ltd, Phagwara v. Industrial Tribunal, Patiala and others". It was observed that the failure to raise objection to defect or Jack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal before it is always a material and relevant factor which must be taken into account by the High Court before it considers the case fit for exercise of its writ jurisdiction. However, the jearned Judges gualified their observation by emphasizing that it would naturally depend on the facts of each case as to whether such conduct has been established as would disentitle the petitioner to such relief. Now, what we find in this case is that objection as to the Labour Court s jurisdiction was actually taken on behalf of the employer and the basis was that jurisdiction of the Labour Court was confined to matters stated in the Second Schedule and that it could not be extended to any matter mentioned in the Third Schedule. Now, what we find in this case is that objection as to the Labour Court s jurisdiction was actually taken on behalf of the employer and the basis was that jurisdiction of the Labour Court was confined to matters stated in the Second Schedule and that it could not be extended to any matter mentioned in the Third Schedule. Repelling this objection the Labour Court observed that the question of compensation in lieu of retrenchment did not fall under the Third Schedule, as that schedule comprised only those cases in which the legality or the retrenchment or closure of establishment was in question and did not include within it cases of retrenchment or closure compensation. This view is, on the authorities relied upon by the petitioner, obviously incorrect and while it is true that Ambalal Shivlal s case was not cited before the Labour Court the omission to cite a judgment cannot preclude the petitioner from agitating the question of jurisdiction here also. As regards the case from our Court-Messrs B. L. Ghasi Ran v. The Labour Court and others , that decision was pronounced after the date of the impugned order. ( 6 ) THE next contention urged on behalf of the respondent to persnade me not to interfere by way of writ was that in view of the Labour Court s finding that the respondent s case was that of retrenchment he would be entitled to get retrenchment compensation from the Industrial Tribunal and he should not, therefore, bemade to resort to another proceeding. However, when the question is one of jurisdiction and the impugned order is, so far as items Nos. (e) and (d) are concerned, admittedly beyond jurisdiction, it has to be quashed to that extent. ( 7 ) THE writ petition is, therefore, allowed and the impugned order quashed so far as items Nos. (e) and (d)-viz. , one month s wages in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation under section 25 F of the Act- are concerned. In view of the divided success of the parties, they will bear their own costs in this court. Petition partly allowed.