JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - In this revision the maintainability of the appeal instituted before the lower appellate court is impeached. 2. The plaintiff applicant filed a suit ,for partition. A preliminary decree was, in due course, passed. In the course of the proceedings for the preparation of the final decree, the defendants made an application claiming benefit under Section 4 of the Partition Act. The trial court held that the plaintiff was a member of the same family and was not a stranger and hence Section 4 of the Partition Act was inapplicable. The application was consequently rejected. Against this order, the defendants filed an appeal. At the hearing, the plaintiff raised an objection as to the maintainability of the appeal. The learned Civil Judge rejected the objection on the strength of a decision of the Nagpur High Court in Laxman Dliondanant Borikar v. Mst. Lahana Bai, A.I.R. 1937 Nag. 4. There it was held that Section 8 of the Partition Act covers an order dismissing the application under Section 4. The learned Judge went on to decide the merits of the application and ultimately set aside the order of the learned Munsif and remitted the matter back with a direction to sell the half share of the plaintiff to the defendants-appellants in accordance with the Partition Act. Aggrieved, the plaintiff have come to this Court in revision. 3. It has been urged that the appeal filed before the lower appellate court was incompetent as Section 8 of the Partition Act was not applicable. The submission is, in my opinion, correct. Section 8 of the Partition Act, 1893 says: "Any order for sale made by the court under Sections 2, 3, or 4 shall be deemed to be a decree within the meaning of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 4. Under Sections 2, 3, or 4 several conditions are prescribed on the fulfilment of which the court can make an order for sale. If those conditions are not established, the court will refuse to make an order for sale. Knowing this, the legislature specifically described the nature of the order which will be deemed to be a decree. It provided that a positive order for sale shall be treated as a decree. This Specification of the nature of the order which will be deemed to be a decree. Knowing this, the legislature specifically described the nature of the order which will be deemed to be a decree. It provided that a positive order for sale shall be treated as a decree. This Specification of the nature of the order which will be deemed to be a decree. excludes the inclusion of any other kind of order which may be passed under Sections 2, 3 or 4 from the purview of Section 8. Order 43, C. P. C. provides for appeals against many kinds of orders. Under Order 43, rule 1, clause (j) an order under rule 72 or rule 92 of Order XXI setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale is appealable. Under cl. (1) an order under rule 10 of Order XXII giving or refusing to give leave are both appealable. Similarly under clause (n) an order under rule 3 of Order XXIII recording or refusing to record an agreement, compromise or satisfaction is appealable. Here there is a specific provision for an appeal against both positive or negative kind of orders under a particular provision. On the other hand, under clause (c) of Order 43, rule 1 an order under rule 9 of Order IX rejecting an application, and under clause (d) an order under rule 13 of Order IX rejecting an application, have been made appealable. It is settled that an order granting such an application are not appealable. Similarly an appeal is provided by clause .(w) from an order under rule 4 of Order XLVII granting an application for review. Thus wherever the nature of the order is described and prescribed by the legislature itself, there is no room for importing in it any other kind of order by implication or interpretation. If the legislature had intended that all orders made under Sections 2, 3 or 4 or orders rejecting an application under those provisions should also be deemed to be a decree, it would not have singled out only one kind of order, i.e. an order for sale. It could have conveniently said that orders made under Sections 2, 3 or 4 shall be deemed to be a decree. In my opinion, only a positive order for sale can be deemed to be a decree and appealable as such. It could have conveniently said that orders made under Sections 2, 3 or 4 shall be deemed to be a decree. In my opinion, only a positive order for sale can be deemed to be a decree and appealable as such. An order rejecting an application under Section 4 of the Partition Act cannot be deemed to be a decree and is not appealable as a decree. The correctness of an order rejecting an application under Section 4 can be questioned only in an appeal which may be filed against the final partition decree. 5. In the case of Laxman Dhondanant Borikarl the Nagpur High Court did not indicate any reason for holding that an order rejecting an application under Sec. falls within Section 8 of the Partition Act. The view that an order rejecting such an application is not deemed to be a decree under Section 8, has been accepted by the Calcutta High Court in the cases of Bhubhan Mohan v. Brojendra, AIR 1941 Calcutta 311 and Nitish Chandra v. Promode Kumar, AIR 1953 Calcutta 18. 6. There is another difficulty in the way of the opposite parties. Under Section 8, the order is deemed to be a decree. It will, therefore, be appeable as a decree. A regular appeal under Section 96, C. P. C. after payment of advalorem court-fee would alone be maintainable. The opposite parties did not file a regular appeal. They filed a miscellaneous appeal treating the trial court's order as an order and not as a decree. Order 43, C. P. C. does not provide an appeal from any such order. From this point of view the appeal presented by the opposite parties before the lower appellate court was not competent. In either view of the matter, the lower appellate court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the trial court rejecting the application under Section 4 of the Partition Act. 7. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The order of the lower appellate court is set aside. The applicant shall have his costs here and in the lower appellate court.