JUDGMENT S.N. Singh, J. - These three petitions arise out of three suits filed by the petitioner against Hukum Singh major, and Gyan minor in one case, Amar Singh in the second case and Adi Ram in the third case. It appears that there were other suits also in which the parties have compromised and those suits are not before this Court. 2. The petitioner is the widow of one Major Udai Bir Singh. It appears that Major Udai Bir Singh was in Military service and during the continuance of his Military service he let out different plots to different defendants. Major Udai Bir Singh retired from service in 1950 and died in the year 1954. Thereafter on June 12, 1950 these suits were instituted for the ejectment of the defendants treating them as asamis. 3. The three suits were contested on the allegation that Major Udai Bir Singh was not tenure holder and, therefore, the plaintiff petitioner could not get any right on the death of Major Udai Bir Singh. It was further alleged that the lease in favour of Major Udai Bir Singh was a fictitious lease executed only to prevent accrual of hereditary right in favour of the defendants. The defendants claimed to have become sirdar's or in any case adhivasi of the plots in suit by virtue of their cultivator possession in 1359F. Limitation was also pleaded as a bar to the suit. 4. The trial court accepted the defence contention that the land in different suits had been let out by Major Udai Bir Singh at a time when he was in Military service and was disabled land holder. It was further found that on April 9, 1946 ho continued to be a disabled landholder consequently the status of the defendants was that of an asami. Having found that the defendants were asamis the first appellate court decreed the plaintiff petitioner's suits. 5. Appeals were preferred against the decisions of the first appellate court and the Board of Revenue set aside the decrees in favour of the plaintiff petitioner and dismissed the suits as barred by time. Having found that the defendants were asamis the first appellate court decreed the plaintiff petitioner's suits. 5. Appeals were preferred against the decisions of the first appellate court and the Board of Revenue set aside the decrees in favour of the plaintiff petitioner and dismissed the suits as barred by time. The Board of Revenue applied the provisions of Section 202(f)(i) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and held that the limitation started running after the retirement of Major Udai Bir Singh and the subsequent disability of the plaintiff did not stop the running of the limitation in view of Section 9 of the Limitation Act. 6. The petitioner has filed the present writ petitions challenging the decision of the Board of Revenue as manifestly erroneous on the face of the record. 7. Sri V.K.S. Chaudhari learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that on the facts found by the first appellate court it is clear that the plaintiff petitioner was a disabled landholder at the date when she filed the present suits. It is submitted that the case of the petitioner fell under Section 202(f)(i) and not under Section 202(f)(ii) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act with the result that there was no question of limitation in the case. It was submitted that the Board of Revenue has unnecessarily discussed the applicability of Section 9 of Limitation Act and that the finding of the Board of Revenue that the case will be governed by Section 202(f)(ii) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act was patently wrong on the face of it. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective contentions. Having considered their submissions I am of opinion that these petitions have force and should be allowed. 9. The finding of fact recorded by the Additional Commissioner has not been shown to be vitiated in law by the learned counsel for the opposite parties. These petitions have to be decided accepting the finding of the Additional Commissioner to be correct on fact. The only question to be decided by the Board of Revenue was about limitation and that is the only question which has been canvassed before me and requires determination. The present suit was instituted by the petitioner who was a disabled landholder. To such a case in my opinion Section 202(f)(i) will apply. The only question to be decided by the Board of Revenue was about limitation and that is the only question which has been canvassed before me and requires determination. The present suit was instituted by the petitioner who was a disabled landholder. To such a case in my opinion Section 202(f)(i) will apply. Section 202(f) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act reads as follows :- "Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 338, an asami shall be liable to ejectment from his holding on the (suit of the Gaon Sabha or he landholder as the case may be) on the ground or grounds- (a) to (e)... (f) That he belongs to the class mentioned in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 or clause (b) of Section 133 and that- (i) the landholder wishes to bring the land under his personal cultivation and in cases where the lease is for a fixed term such term has expired, or (ii) the disability has determined, (g).. (h).. 10. Section 202(f)(i) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act applies to disabled land-holders. Whereas in my opinion Section 202(f)(ii) applies to a suit which has been instituted by a person who is not a disabled landholder. The two clauses of Section 202(f) are exclusive of each other. A case which falls under Section 202(f)(i) cannot fall under Section 202 (f)(ii) and vice versa. In this case the defendants could have succeeded if Major Udai Bir Singh landholder had not died till June 30, 1955. But since on the admitted facts of this case he died in 1954 the plaintiff petitioner became the landholder and the defendants became her asamis. It was open to the plaintiff petitioner to have let out the same plots to them or could have ejected them when she wanted to bring the land under her cultivation. It appears that she allowed the continuance of their possession as asamis for two years after the death of Major Udai Bir Singh. Thereafter since she wanted to cultivate the plots herself the present suits were instituted. The discussion of the Board of Revenue about the application of Section 9 of the Limitation Act has rightly been argued to be irrelevant for the purposes of these cases. There is no question of limitation having once started running. Thereafter since she wanted to cultivate the plots herself the present suits were instituted. The discussion of the Board of Revenue about the application of Section 9 of the Limitation Act has rightly been argued to be irrelevant for the purposes of these cases. There is no question of limitation having once started running. This is not a case of adverse possession started against the last male holder which would not have stopped by the subsequent disability of a limited owner. Here is a case wherein possession of the defendants was permissive from the very start of it and continued to be permissive till the date when the suit was instituted. Section 9 of the Limitation Act in my opinion is not applicable to the facts of these cases. Simple point for determination in these cases was as to whether Section 202(f)(i) which gives no limitation applied or the case was covered by Section 202(f)(ii) which permits a suit to be filed within three years of the cessation of disability. 11. I have already held above that these cases were governed by Section 202(f)(i) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act as such the suits could not be dismissed as barred by limitation. The Board of Revenue committed a mistake apparent on the face of the record in non-suiting the plaintiff petitioner. 12. In view of what has been said above these petitions succeed and are hereby allowed. The orders of the Board of Revenue dated January 11, 1962/May 23, 1962 in these three cases are hereby quashed. In the circumstances of these cases I make no order as to costs.