ORDER W. Broome, J. - This writ petition filed by Sumer challenges an order passed by the Director of Consolidation (Commissioner of Agra) on 9-1- 1962 in revision u/s 48 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. 2. The revision had been filed against an order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 28-6-1961 in second appeal arising out of proceedings u/s 9 of the Act. The dispute between the parties was as to whether Sumer (the present Petitioner) was the Sumer, son of Jaswant, mentioned in the village papers as one of the co-tenants of a certain holding. Roshan and Gauri Shanker (Respondents 3 and 4) claimed that that Sumer had already died; but the Petitioner's case was that the deceased Sumer was his elder brother, who had died 40 years earlier. The Respondents relied on a copy of the death register entry, showing the date of Sumer's death as 17-10-1944; but the Petitioner asserted that the actual date of death was 17-10-1924. The Deputy Director sent for the original death register and found that the date of death recorded therein was actually 17-10-1924; and he accordingly accepted the Petitioner's case and held that he was the Sumer son of Jaswant, whose name stood recorded against the disputed holding and that the death register entry related to his elder brother, who had died long ago. 3. In revision, the Director held that the Deputy Director had been guilty of substantial irregularities in consulting the original death register and accordingly upset his decision and gave the finding that the Sumer son of Jaswant recorded in the papers was dead and that his name should be expunged. 4. The Petitioner's contention is that the Director has exceeded his jurisdiction u/s 48 of the consolidation of Holdings Act, as it stood in the year 1961. At that time he could interfere by way of revision only if he found that the Deputy Director had (a) exercised jurisdiction not vested in him in law, or (b) failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him, or (c) acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity, as a result of which substantial injustice appeared to have been caused. 5. 5. Learned Counsel for the contesting Respondents argues that the impugned order of the Director is cohered by the third clause, as it stood in the year 1961, inasmuch as the Deputy Director had acted with substantial irregularity. 6. There can be little doubt that the Deputy Director was guilty of procedural irregularity in disposing of the second appeal. When the Petitioner Sumer applied to him on 28-6-1961 for summoning the original death register, he ordered it to be summoned for the next day (29-6-1961) on payment of costs; but then it seems he sent for the register on 28-6-1961 and having inspected it proceeded to pronounce judgment in the second appeal forthwith. Mere irregularity by itself, however, would not entitle the Director to interfere u/s 48. He could only interfere with the Deputy Directors order if the irregularity committed by the later was substantial and had resulted in substantial injustice. In the present case the irregularity committed by the Deputy Director in sending for and perusing the death register one day earlier' than originally proposed does not strike me as at all material or substantial. Nor have the Respondents been able to satisfy me that they have suffered substantial injustice as a result of this irregularity, for no attempt has been made to contradict the assertion of the Deputy Director that the copy on which the Respondents relied was, at variance with the entry in the original death register. What seems to have happened is that after passing the order directing the register to be summoned for the next day, the Director found that he had time to see it that very day and consequently sent for it. There could be no material difference between his perusing it on 28-6-1961 or on 29-6-1961 and as already remarked, there is nothing to suggest that the conclusion he arrived at from his inspection was in any way incorrect or unsound. 7. Learned Counsel for the Respondents has placed reliance on an endorsement made by the Deputy Director on the application for summoning the register. That endorsement stated. I have seen the death register...and is dated 29-6-1961; and this it is argued, contradicts the statement made in the second appeal judgment of 23 -6-1961, stating that he had sent for and perused the death register before pronouncing that judgment. But the contradiction in the dates here is more apparent than real. That endorsement stated. I have seen the death register...and is dated 29-6-1961; and this it is argued, contradicts the statement made in the second appeal judgment of 23 -6-1961, stating that he had sent for and perused the death register before pronouncing that judgment. But the contradiction in the dates here is more apparent than real. When the Deputy Director wrote on 29-6-1961 "I have seen the death register", he did not mean that he had seen it on 29-6-1961: "I have seen the death register" could obviously mean "I have seen the death register yesterday". There is thus no force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents that there is a contradiction in the record suggesting that the Deputy Director did not inspect the death register at all before pronouncing judgment. 8. I am satisfied therefore that the Deputy Director was guilty of ho substantial irregularity and see no reason to hold that irregularity which he committed caused any substantial injustice. In such circumstances the Director had ho jurisdiction to interfere u/s 48 with the finding of fact given by the Deputy Director regarding the identity of the Petitioner Sumer. This writ petition is accordingly allowed with costs the impugned order of 9-1-1962 being quashed.