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1966 DIGILAW 41 (ORI)

UPENDRANATH DAS v. RUKMINI PATNAIKANI

1966-04-29

DAS

body1966
JUDGMENT : Das, J. - This revision is directed against an order u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure passed by the Subdivisional Magistrate, Sonepur. 2. The disputed land was previously a Bhogra land situate in village Lachhipur in the district of Bolangir. The father of the present Petitioner was the Gountia of the said village and claimed to have enjoyed the land. He died some time in 1942 and after him the present Petitioner succeeded the office of the Gountia and the Bhogra lands continued to remain in his possession. On 20-6-1946 the Petitioner leased out the land to Banshidhar Patnaik, the husband of the opposite party fora period of eight years. The case of the Petitioner is that even before the expiry of the lease period, the opposite party gave up possession of the land sometime in December 195,2 after harvesting the crop of that year. By a notification of the Government the Gountiani tenure was abolished on 1-4-1956 declaring that those who were in possession on 1-7-1955 will be entitled to be settled with as raiyats in respect of the said lands. After some enquiry by the Collector of Bolangir, the disputed land was settled with the opposite party as she was found in possession on 1-7-1955. As against that settlement by the Collector, the Petitioner preferred an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Commissioner but the same was dismissed and in the final record of rights of 1963 the opposite party was recorded as the tenant-in- possession. 3. The case of the Petitioner is that he was all along in possession and has been paying the rent throughout in respect of the disputed land and the opposite-party was never in possession, but has merely been recorded in the record-of-rights to be in such possession. On an application being filed by the opposite party, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sonepur, issued a prohibitory order u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure against the Petitioner on 30-9-1965. Against the said order the Petitioner moved this Court in Criminal Revision No. 507/65 contending that the dispute being one relating to possession of immovable property and there having been apprehension of breach of peace, the propel' proceeding that should have been initiated by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was the one u/s 145, and not u/s 144, Criminal Procedure Code. Against the said order the Petitioner moved this Court in Criminal Revision No. 507/65 contending that the dispute being one relating to possession of immovable property and there having been apprehension of breach of peace, the propel' proceeding that should have been initiated by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was the one u/s 145, and not u/s 144, Criminal Procedure Code. He withdrew the said petition and made a regular application before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for converting the proceeding into one u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code. The said application having been rejected by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on 02-11-1965, the Petitioner has preferred the present revision. 4. The main contention of Mr. Panda, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, is that when a bona fide dispute regarding possession of land exists between parties it is incumbent on the Magistrate to institute a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure and conclusively decide the question as to who 18 in possession of the disputed land. It however appears from the order of the Magistrate that he took into consideration the fact of execution of the lease-deed and also the fact that the settlement operations took place after expiry of the period of lease and that the possession was recorded in favour of the opposite party and that the Petitioner who carried an appeal to the Revenue Commissioner was unsuccessful in getting his name recorded in the record-of-rights. On the basis of this material, the learned Magistrate was not inclined to draw up a proceeding u/s 145. In other words, he was not satisfied that a bona fide dispute regarding possession existed between the parties. 5. I do not think, the Magistrate was bound to initiate a proceeding u/s 115, Code of Criminal Procedure merely because a party wanted such a proceeding to be instituted. At the initial stage the Magistrate has to be satisfied if there is a dispute and whether the dispute is a real one and the claim put forward by any of the parties is not a mere pretence. In other words the Magistrate is not to act as a mere automaton and initiate the proceeding on the mere application of a party. He has to apply his mind to the facts of the case to see whether the dispute warranted action u/s 145. In other words the Magistrate is not to act as a mere automaton and initiate the proceeding on the mere application of a party. He has to apply his mind to the facts of the case to see whether the dispute warranted action u/s 145. There are a number of authorities in support of the view that when the dispute is a mere pretence the proper order to be passed is the one u/s 144, and not u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code. 6. In Bhuneshwar Prasad and Others Vs. Rommoy Roy, it was held that only where there is a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace concerning any land or water or boundaries thereof and the dispute requires to be decided on evidence that resort to Section 146 becomes necessary and for that purpose the dispute has to be a real dispute and not a mere pretence put forth on behalf of one of the contesting parties. Where there s no such real dispute and there is an imminent danger of breach of peace order u/s 144 is proper. It is also settled by authorities that an order u/s 144 being of a temporary duration which will automatically expire by afflux of time, should not lightly be interfered with unless there are strong reasons do so. In Madhu Singh v. Emperor AIR 1912 Pat. 331, the same View was also taken and it was held, hat, a dispute regarding land can also be dealt with u/s 144"1 provided in the opinion of an authorised Magistrate, there is, sufficient ground for proceeding under this section for immediate avoidance of breach of peace and for a speedy ready the dispute. Even at the stage of institution of the proceeding, the Magistrate has to exercise certain amount of discretion in passing temporary orders like the one u/s 144. 7. In the present case the successive decisions of the Revenue Courts in favour of the opposite party and the record of rights made in her favour had been taken into consideration by the Magistrate and on the basis of the same he did not think it necessary to institute a proceeding u/s 145. 7. In the present case the successive decisions of the Revenue Courts in favour of the opposite party and the record of rights made in her favour had been taken into consideration by the Magistrate and on the basis of the same he did not think it necessary to institute a proceeding u/s 145. No doubt, in a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure the Magistrate is solely concerned with the question of possession and consideration regarding title have no bearing that enquiry, but at the same time the Magistrate has also to apply his mind to some basic materials before he decides to take action under that section and his decision would not be a capricious act, but is based upon some judicial considerations. He cannot possibly ignore at that stage the recent delivery of possession given to one of the contesting parties by the Civil Court. In a decision of this Court in Banamali Mohapatra Vs. Bajra Nahak and Others it was held that a proceeding u/s 145 should not be allowed to proceed when there is a decision of the Civil Court in favour of the other party. In such a case a proceeding u/s 107 or 144, Code of Criminal Procedure may be more appropriate. 8. In Sankudia Singh and Ors. v. Gadadhar Jena and Ors. 22 C.L.T. 273 it was held that it may not be correct to say that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had no jurisdiction whatsoever to start a proceeding u/s 145; yet in appreciating the evidence of possession, the Court cannot ignore the previous decision given in an Orissa Tenants Protection Court specially when the interval between the two is too short. Viewed in this legal position, the order of the Magistrate cannot be held to be illegal and without jurisdiction so as to call for an interference of this Court. The revision is dismissed. Revision dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed