Shyam Sunder Narain Bakshi v. Dy. Director of Consolidation
1966-10-10
B.N.NIGAM
body1966
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT B.N. Nigam, J. - Shyam Sunder Narain Bakshi has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated January 8, 1965 and February 6, 1985, copies being annexures 3 and 4 respectively. 2. In the petition, I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the opposite party No. 3. 3. The petitioner states that village Bhanpur Pargana and Tahsil Malihabad, District Lucknow was notified for consolidation operations prior to the amendment of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by U.P. Act VIII of 1983. Four plots constituting groves were recorded in the name of the petitioner. Opposite party No. 3 raised an objection at the time of the field to field checking. No objection was filed before the Assistant Consolidation Officer but it was filed before the Consolidation Officer. This objection was dismissed on November 19, 1981. Opposite party No. 3 filed an appeal. This was dismissed on January 1, 1962. No second appeal was filed. However, on May 23, 1963 a revision application was filed and the revision application was dismissed on August 9, 1963 on the ground that it was not maintainable as it was not pending on March 8, 1963. In the meantime the village was de-notified under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, on June 2, 1963. The order dated August 9, 1963 was passed in the absence of opposite party No. 3. Opposite party No. 3 moved for restoration. This application was allowed on October 14, 1963. The earlier order in the revision application was set aside and after hearing the case was remanded back to the court of the Consolidation Officer. Thereafter the Consolidation Officer allowed the objection of opposite party No. 3. The petitioner preferred an appeal which was allowed on April 14, 1964. Thereafter opposite party No. 3 preferred no second appeal, but preferred a revision application. His revision application was dismissed on December 3, 1984. On December 18, 1984 opposite party No. 3 moved another application for restoration. By order dated January 8, 1965 the revision was restored. It is this order which has been impugned before me. Finally on February 6, 1985 opposite party No. 1 allowed the revision application and ordered the land in dispute to be recorded in favour of opposite party No. 3.
By order dated January 8, 1965 the revision was restored. It is this order which has been impugned before me. Finally on February 6, 1985 opposite party No. 1 allowed the revision application and ordered the land in dispute to be recorded in favour of opposite party No. 3. This order has also been impugned before me. 4. The arguments before me have ranged over a wide range. The learned counsel for the parties have argued at length as regards the meaning of the Full Bench decision in Prem Chandra and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Barabanki and others, 1966 R.D. 284 and in regard to the applicability of the Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood prior to its amendment by U.P. Act No. VIII of 1963 or the Act as it was after the amendment by that Act. It, however, appears to me that the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge the order dated October 14, 1963 and all proceedings before that i.e. whether the objection was filed before the Consolidation Officer and, whether the revision application filed on May 23, 1963 was competent or not. These are not questions that the learned counsel can be allowed to raise in this petition which was ins; tilted in this Court on April 9, 1965. The learned counsel had the opportunity of filing a writ petition against the order dated October 14, 1963 but did not avail of that. Again the question as to whether the revision application filed against the order dated April 14. 1964 was, properly instituted or not, cannot be raised before me, in as much as the learned counsel does not seek to impugn the order dated December 3, 1964. Thus while I had the benefit of a good discussion as regards the provisions of Section 47 of the U.P. Act VIII of 1963, that discussion has no material bearing on the decision of the writ petition before me. As the order dated December 3, 1964 has not been impugned by either party, will proceed on the assumption that the revision application was competent and was validly instituted.
As the order dated December 3, 1964 has not been impugned by either party, will proceed on the assumption that the revision application was competent and was validly instituted. If the learned counsel for opposite party No. 3 is of the opinion that the revision application was not competent, it will be for him to ignore that order and to file a second or even to make a prayer that the same revision application be treated a a second appeal. Such remedy would lie not before this Court but before the Consolidation Courts and I express no opinion either way as regards the availability of any relief in that court. 5. The question that is before me is merely as regards the order dated January 8, 1965. The learned counsel for opposite party No. 3 has objected that the petitioner cannot be allowed to question that order as he has accepted Rs. 10/- as costs that were granted by the Court. I called upon the learned counsel for opposite party No. 3 to point out any law or decision wherein the acceptance of the costs would debar a party where the question of jurisdiction was involved. The learned counsel was unable to show me any law or authority. I am, therefore, of opinion that the acceptance of the costs will not confer jurisdiction on any court which did not possess it and as there can be no conferment of jurisdiction either by consent or even by waiver, the petitioner cannot be estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction as regards setting aside of the order dated January 8, 1965 merely on the ground that he had accepted Rs. 10/- as costs. 6. The learned counsel for opposite party No. 3 has relied on the proceeding conducted under the provisions of Section 41 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act and Section 201 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act (U.P. Act III of 1901). I am of opinion that Section 201 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, will have no application. There is a clear difference between Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. Chapter IX appears to apply to proceedings in the trial court and Chapter X has reference to courts of appeal and revision.
I am of opinion that Section 201 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, will have no application. There is a clear difference between Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. Chapter IX appears to apply to proceedings in the trial court and Chapter X has reference to courts of appeal and revision. In the circumstances, it appears to me that the learned counsel cannot rely on the provisions of Section 201 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act which occurs in Chapter IX and not in Chapter X of the Land Revenue Act. 7. Further the terms of Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act clearly indicate that a revision application is to be decided by the Director of Consolidation after examining the record and after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard. Any order passed in such circumstances is an order on merits and cannot be set aside, because it cannot be said that any error of procedure has been committed. In the present case it is accepted that opposite party No. 3 had notice of the date of hearing fixed for December 3, 1964. Neither the opposite party No. 3 nor his learned counsel were able to attend, but they gave an application for adjournment which was rejected. That, however, does not mean that they were not afforded an opportunity of being heard. It, therefore, appears to me that there is no power, either specifically provided or inherent, in the Consolidation Courts of allowing a restoration, of any proceeding under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. That being so, the order dated January 8, 1965 is without jurisdiction and must be quashed. It follows that the second order dated February 6, 1965 must fail with the order dated January 8, 1965. 8. I, therefore, accept this writ petition and direct the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the two impugned orders dated January 8, 1965 and February 6, 1965 copies being annexures 3 and 4 with the petition. It will now be for the opposite party No. 3 to seek such remedy in the consolidation courts as he may be advised if ne is legally entitled to it. 9. The writ petition is allowed with costs against opposite party No. 3.