JUDGMENT U.P. Uniyal, J. - This application in revision is directed against an order repecting the objection that the complaint under Sections 193 and 199, I.P.C. could not be entertained by the Magistrate as the same had not been preferred by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer before whom the alleged false affidavit i was filed. 2. The facts giving rise to the present revision may now be stated. One Munna Lal who was the landlord of certain accommodation, applied under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (The Act) seeking permission to file a suit to eject his tenant, the applicant Des Raj. The application under Section 3 was contested by the tenant who filed an affidavit before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer making certain statements which disentitled the landlord from seeking permission to eject the tenant. The result was that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application of the landlord. Thereafter the landlord filed a complaint under Section 193 and 192 I.P.C. against the applicant alleging that the latter had made false statements in-the affidavit filed before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The applicant raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the complaint and contended that the Magistrate could not take cognizance of the offence inasmuch as the complaint had not been preferred by the court in accordance with the provisions of Section 195(1) (b) of Cr.P.C. The Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge overruled the objection and hence the revision. 3. The sole point for consideration is whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is a court as contemplated by Section 195 Cr.P.C. The expression court is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code. 3. The sole point for consideration is whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is a court as contemplated by Section 195 Cr.P.C. The expression court is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 3 of the Eviction Act defines court as follows :- "Court includes all judges and magistrates and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence." Sections 19 and 20 of the Penal Code define the terms Judge and Court of Justice as under :- Section 19 "The word Judge denotes not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, definitive judgment, or a judgment which is not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definite, or who is one of a body of persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment." Section 20 "The words Court of Justice denote a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially." 4. The definition of court given in the I.P.C. connotes that unless and until a binding and authoritative judgment can be pronounced by a person or body of persons it cannot be regarded as a court. It has, however, been held that a tribunal is not necessarily a court in the strict sense of the term even it is able to pronounce a final judgment. In Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam. Sunder, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1669 it was pointed out with the growth of civilisation and the problem arising from social and economic conditions, a large number of administrative tribunals have been empowered to decide disputes between parties and give definite judgment; still such tribunals are not regarded as courts. The Supreme Court observed: "These tribunals have the authority of law to pronounce upon valuable rights; they act in a judicial manner and even on evidence on oath, but they are not part of the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. The Supreme Court observed: "These tribunals have the authority of law to pronounce upon valuable rights; they act in a judicial manner and even on evidence on oath, but they are not part of the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. They share the exercise of the judicial power of the State, but they are brought into existence to implement some administrative policy or to determine controversies arising out of some administrative law. They are very similar to Courts but are not Courts. When the Constitution speaks of Courts in Articles 136, 227 or 228 or Articles 233 to 237 or in the Lists, it contemplates Court of Civil Judicature but not tribunals other than such Courts. This is the reason for using both the expressions ill Articles 136 and 227." The Supreme Court emphasised the point that: "by Court it meant Courts of Civil Judicature and by tribunals those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. . . .Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. Their procedures may differ, but the functions are not essentially different. What distinguishes them has been successfully established. Lord Stamp said that the real distinction is that Courts have an air of detachment. But this is more a matter of age and tradition and is not of the essence. Many tribunals, in recent years, have acquitted themselves so well and with such detachment as to make this test insufficient." 5. Regarding the definition of court as given in the Indian Evidence Act the Supreme Court in Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 66 laid down that the definition of court in Section 3 Eviction Act is not exhaustive but framed only for the purpose of that Act and is not to be extended where such extension is not warranted. 6. It remains to consider whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under the U.P. Act is an authority invested with quasi-judicial powers or is a court in the strict sense of that term. A similar question arose in Bharat Bank v. Employees of Bank, A.I.R. 1950 S.C 188. 6. It remains to consider whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under the U.P. Act is an authority invested with quasi-judicial powers or is a court in the strict sense of that term. A similar question arose in Bharat Bank v. Employees of Bank, A.I.R. 1950 S.C 188. In that case the point for consideration was whether a tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, exercises all or any of the functions of a court of justice and, if so, whether it is a court in the technical sense of the word. After considering a large number of authorities it held that the Industrial tribunal was entrusted with the duty of adjudicating a dispute of a peculiar character and it was for this reason that it was armed with extraordinary powers. These powers, however, are derived from the statute. The adjudication of the dispute has to be in accordance with evidence legally adduced and the parties have a right to be heard and being represented by a legal practitioner. Right to examine and cross-examine witnesses has been given to the parties and finally they can address the tribunal when evidence is closed. The whole procedure adopted by the Act and the rules is modelled on the Code of Civil Procedure. The Industrial Tribunal has, therefore, all the necessary attributes of a Court of Justice. The Supreme Court further emphasised that the exercise of such wide powers by the tribunal did not make them courts of justice. "They may rightly be described as quasi-judicial bodies because they are out of the hierarchy of the ordinary judicial system." 7. In order to see whether a tribunal or authority vested with judicial power is or not a court we have to examine the provisions of the Act under which the said tribunal or authority has been constituted. For this purpose the preamble of the Act, its aims and objects and the I powers vested under the statute have to be looked into. For this purpose the preamble of the Act, its aims and objects and the I powers vested under the statute have to be looked into. For instance, it was provided in Section 11(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 that a tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in 3 civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely :- (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) dealing with production off documents and material exhibits; (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. 8. Thus the statute itself had made it clear that the Industrial Tribunal was not a Court of Civil Judicature but had been invested with the powers of a civil court for certain purposes. From this it follows that it was not a civil court but a tribunal exercising the powers and functions of civil courts for certain purposes. 9. The same view was expressed in Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 153. That was a case under the Representation of the People Act, 1951; the appellant in that case was a candidate for election to the House of the People and had made a declaration on solemn affirmation under rule 6 of the Election Rules before the Returning Officer. The objection that the declaration was false was rejected by the Returning Officer who accordingly accepted the nomination paper. Subsequently the rival candidate filed a complaint before a first Class Magistrate charging the appellant with offences under Sections 181, 182, and 193 of the I.P.C. The appellant raise an objection that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence mentioned in the complaint is view of the provisions of Section 195(1) (a) and (b) of the Cr.P.C. The point which arose for consideration was whether the Returning Officer was a court as contemplated by the provisions of the Cr. P.C. Dealing with this question the Supreme Court observed that the powers entrusted to the Returning Officer are those mentioned in Section 38 (2) of the Representation of the Peoples Act. These powers are undoubtedly judicial in character but the Returning Officer is not required to act judicially in discharging them and is not, therefore, a court for the purpose of Section 195 (1) (b). 10. These powers are undoubtedly judicial in character but the Returning Officer is not required to act judicially in discharging them and is not, therefore, a court for the purpose of Section 195 (1) (b). 10. For the proper understanding of the question posed in this case we may look into certain provisions of the U. P. Act. The preamble of the Act says that it has been enacted to provide for the continuance, during the limited period of power, to control the letting and the rent of residential and non-residential accommodation and to prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom. Section 2 (d) defines "District Magistrate" as including an officer authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under this Act. So that any officer of whatever rank, may be authorised by the District Magistrate to perform the functions entrusted to him under the Act; the matter has been left entirely to his discretion. Section 3 provided that subject to any order passed under sub-section (3) no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds: Section 7G(2) provides: "The District Magistrate shall, in so far as such powers are necessary for carrying out the different provisions of this Act, have power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production of documents in so far as may be in the same manner as is provided in the case of a court under the C.P.C., 1908." 11. The provisions laid down in Section 7G (2) above make it abundantly clear that the District Magistrate acting under Section 3 is not a civil court but has been invested with powers of a civil Court for certain purposes. It will be noticed that the provisions of Section 7G (2) are analogous to those of Section 11 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 referred to in Bharat Bank v. Employees of Bharat Bank (supra). A reading of the provisions of the U.P. Act makes it plain that the R. C. and E. O. is not a court but only an authority who had been invested with certain powers of a civil Court, for carrying out the purposes of the Act. A reading of the provisions of the U.P. Act makes it plain that the R. C. and E. O. is not a court but only an authority who had been invested with certain powers of a civil Court, for carrying out the purposes of the Act. In Lala Shri Bhagwan and another v. Ram Chand and another, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1767 the point raised before the Supreme Court was whether the R.C. and E.O. under the U. P. Act exercised the power of a court or whether he is merely a tribunal exercising judicial functions. Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for the court, said that :- "The right conferred on the tenants not to be evicted except on the specified grounds enumerated by Cls. (a) to (g) of Section 3 (1) is a statutory right of great significance, and it is this statutory right of which the tenants would be deprived when the landlord obtains the sanction of the District Magistrate .......... the appropriate authorities rave to consider the natter in a quasi-judicial manner and are expected to follow the princieles of natural justice before reaching their conclusions." It was clearly laid down that the powers exercised by the District Magistrate under the U.P. Act were quasi-judicial powers and that the District Magistrate acting under Section 3 is not a court. In Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 308 Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) delivering the majority judgment of the Court said :- "The concept of quasi-judicial act implies that the act is not wholly judicial; it describes only a duty cast on the executive body or authority to conform to norms of judicial procedure in performing some acts in exercise of its judicial power". It follows that when an authority or tribunal makes an order and the order is of a quasi-judicial nature, it cannot be regarded as an order made by a Court. The same view has been expressed in Jagannath Prasad v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 416. 12. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the RC and EO is not a court as contemplated by Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. and the complaint was rightly entertained by the Magistrate. 13. Learned Counsel for the applicant referred to Bilas Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1925 Allahabad 737. 12. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the RC and EO is not a court as contemplated by Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. and the complaint was rightly entertained by the Magistrate. 13. Learned Counsel for the applicant referred to Bilas Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1925 Allahabad 737. The point which arose for consideration in that case was whether the Election Commissioners were civil Courts within the meaning of Section 476 Cr.P.C. Sulaiman, J. expressed the view that the word includes in Section 185 (2) has a wider connotation than the word means and, as such, the Election Commissioners would be covered by the expression court. The learned Judge, however, made it clear that "it is impossible to hold that the Election Commissioners are a civil Court within the meaning of Section 476 Cr.P.C. and I must, therefore, hold that they had no jurisdiction to proceed under that section". Deniels, J. agreed with Sulaiman, J. that Election Commissioners are not a civil Court, but he disagreed with him on the interpretation of the word includes in Section 195 and said that this word in an enactment is not always of a wider significance than the word means as held by the Privy Council in Dilworth v. The Neiv Zealand Commissioners of Stamps, 1899 A.C. 99. The learned Judge went to say- "If the term Court in Section 195 is really wider than the civil, revenue or criminal court in Section 476, the curious result follows that whereas the order of the civil, revenue or criminal court making or refusing to make a complaint is subject to appeal and to a special procedure prescribed by Section 476, a similar order passed by a court constituted is not subject to any appeal". 14. The above decision, if anything, goes against the contention raised by the learned counsel that the Election Commissioners are a Civil Court. 15. Reference was also made to Bajaj Apajik Kote v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1947 Bom. 7. In that case it was held that Section 195 (1) (b) applies if a judicial proceeding is in existence at the time when it is sought to prosecute the offender for an offence mentioned in Section 195 Cr.P.C. The view of the Bombay High Court in that case runs counter to the opinion expressed by our own court in Emperor v. Kashi Ram, I.L.R. 48 All. 906 and Emperor v. Prag Dutt, I.L.R. 51 All. 382. None of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel are relevant to the point under consideration. The matter has been finally settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Lala Shri Bhagwan (5) and it has been held that the proceedings before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under the U.P. Act are not judicial proceedings in a court but are quasi-judicial proceedings before an authority appointed under the Act. 16. I am, therefore, clearly of the view that the complaint filed by the landlord against the applicant was rightly entertained by the Magistrate. The revision accordingly fails and is dismissed.