ORDER :-This is an application to revise an order of the Sessions Judge upholding the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to proceed with the trial of the accused under Sec 353, I.P.C. 2. On an information lodged with the police a case under Secs. 228 and 353, I.P.C., was sent up against the accused to the Court of the Magistrate who framed charges against him in these terms :- "Firstly, that you on or about the 17th day of August 1953 at about 4 p.m. in Civil Lines at the Registration Office, Orai, intentionally offered insult and caused interruption to R.S. Lal, Sub-Registrar, while he was sitting in a stage of judicial proceeding, namely, was registering a document, and thereby committed an offence under Sec. 228, I.P.C. Secondly, that you on the same day at the same time and place assaulted R.S. Lal, Sub-Registrar, a public servant, with intent to deter him and prevent him from discharging his duty of registering a deed as public servant, and thereby committed an offence punishable under Sec. 353, I.P.C." 3. An objection was raised on behalf of the accused challenging the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence without a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned as required by Sec. 195(1), Cr. P.C. The Magistrate upheld the objection as regards the charge under Sec. 228, I.P.C., but overruled it with respect to Sec. 353, I.P.C. 4. The main point canvassed at the Bar was whether it was permissible for the prosecution to split up the facts of the case in order to get round the bar of Sec. 1.95, Cr. P.C. Now the crux of the allegation in the present case was that the Sub-Registrar was obstructed in the discharge of his official duty by the accused offering insult to and committing assault on him. It was said that accused used filthy language and displayed an attitude of defiance to his authority by means of gestures. On these facts it would hardly be possible to separate the element of insult from that of so-called assault because the two are so interwoven in the episode that they become merged one with the other. It was said that accused used filthy language and displayed an attitude of defiance to his authority by means of gestures. On these facts it would hardly be possible to separate the element of insult from that of so-called assault because the two are so interwoven in the episode that they become merged one with the other. It seems, therefore, clear that the Magistrate could only have proceeded to try the accused under Sec. 353 by disregarding the fact that the two offences fell in the same category and were of the same nature, in Bashir-m-Haq v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293 , the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of evading the provisions of Sec. 195, Cr. P.C., by resorting to devices and camouflages and said : " 'The test whether there is evasion of the section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the Court or of the public servant is required. In other words, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, upon the ground that such latter offence is a minor offence of the same character or by describing the offence as being one punishably under some other section of the Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the "category of sections mentioned in Sec. 195, Cr. P.C. Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence which is essentially an offence covered by the provisions of Sec. 195, prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by mis-describing it or by putting a wrong label on it." 5. The facts of the Supreme Court case were these : One Nurul Huda lodged information at the police station that Dhirendra Nath had beaten and throttled his mother to death and had taken her dead body for cremation. When the funeral pyre was in flames, Nurul Huda along with the Sub-Inspector of Police and some other persons arrived at the cremation ground and had the dead body takers out after getting the fire extinguished. The sub-Inspector did not find any marks of injury on the dead body and the post-mortem report also did not reveal any marks of violence. The sub-Inspector did not find any marks of injury on the dead body and the post-mortem report also did not reveal any marks of violence. Dhirendra Nath filed a petition of complaint in the Court of a Magistrate, First Class, charging the accused with offences under Secs. 297 and 500, I.P.C. An objection was raised on behalf of the accused that the allegations contained in the report disclosed an offence under Sec. 182 or Sec. 211, I.P.C. and, therefore, the same could not be taken cognizance of without a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned by virtue of Sec. 195, Cr. P.C. In view of the importance of the question of law raised in that case, the matter was laid before a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court which held that the conviction of the accused under Sec. 297, I.P.C., was perfectly legal because there was nothing in Secs. 195 to 199, Cr. P.C., which could in any way bar the prosecution of the accused under that section as it could not be said that it arose out of facts which would constitute an offence under Sec. 182 or 211, I.P.C. On the other hand, it arose from entirely different set of facts, namely, trespass by the accused in the burial ground and the removal of the corpse from the lighted funeral pyre. In regard to the offence under Sec. 500, it was observed that the prosecution for defamation was based on the false information given to a public officer. That circumstance, however, was no bar for the prosecution of the accused under that section because it was a distinct and separate offence wholly unconnected with the offence under Sec. 297. The matter was taken to the Supreme Court and it affirmed the view of the Full Bench. It is worthwhile to reproduce the observations of the Supreme Court. They said : "The charge for the offence under Sec. 297, I.P.C., could in no circumstance as pointed out by the High Court, be described as falling within the purview of Sec. 195, Cr. P.C. The act of trespass was alleged to have been committed subsequent to the making of the false report and all the ingredients of the offence that have been held to have been established on the evidence concern the conduct of the appellants during the post-report period. As regards the charge under Sec. 500. P.C. The act of trespass was alleged to have been committed subsequent to the making of the false report and all the ingredients of the offence that have been held to have been established on the evidence concern the conduct of the appellants during the post-report period. As regards the charge under Sec. 500. Penal Code, it seems fairly clear both on principle and authority that where the allegations made in a false report disclose two distinct offences, one against the public servant and the other against a. private individual, that other is not debarred by the provisions of Sec. 195 from seeking redress for the offence committed against him. . . Under Sec. 198, Cr. P.C., a complaint in respect of an offence under S. 499, I.P.C., can only be initiated at the instance of the person defamed, in like manner as cognizance for an offence under Sec. 182 cannot be taken 'except at the complaint of the public servant concerned.' " 6. The matter was considered in out own High Court in Ram Harsh Tiwari v. Rex, AIR 1950 All 465 , Malik, C.J., discussing the scope, of Sec. 195, Cr. P.C., observed that where the facts stated in the complaint amount to an offence under Sec. 193, I.P.C., in the absence of a complaint by the Court under S. 195(1)(b), it is not open to the complainant to say that he would confine his case to the offence under Sec. 465, I.P.C., for which no complaint by the Court is needed, though the nature of the offence is the same. 7. The same principle was brought out forcefully by Happel, J., in re Chilukuri Antarvedi Sarma AIR 1946 Mad 489 . The learned Judge said that if the facts disclosed an offence under Sec. 193, I.P.C., parties could not be allowed to circumvent the law by filing a complaint under Sec. 407 I.P.C., and that it would be wrong to ignore the elements of the offence which brought it under Sec. 467 in respect of which no special complaint was necessary. The same point of view had been expressed in two earlier Division Bench cases of the Madras High Court : In re Ravennappa Reddi, ILR 55 Mad 343 : (AIR 1932 Mad 253) and In re Appadurai Nainar. ILR 59 Mad 165 : (AIR 1936 Mad 89). 8. The same point of view had been expressed in two earlier Division Bench cases of the Madras High Court : In re Ravennappa Reddi, ILR 55 Mad 343 : (AIR 1932 Mad 253) and In re Appadurai Nainar. ILR 59 Mad 165 : (AIR 1936 Mad 89). 8. Again, In re Chinnayya Goundan, AIR 1948 Mad 474, Govinda Menon, J., after considering the case-law, stated : "The principle deducible from these cases is that when a complaint is made to a Court, the facts should be considered as a whole and there should be no splitting up of the facts. Therefore, the Court is not entitled to disregard some of the facts and try an accused person for an offence which the remaining facts disclose. Considering the facts as a whole if they disclose an offence for which a special complaint is necessary under the provisions of Sec. 195, Cr. P.C., the Court cannot take cognizance of the case at all unless that special complaint has been filed." 9. In State v. Kathi Unad, AIR 1955 Sau 10, the learned Judge relying on the Supreme Court case of Basir-ul-Haq, AIR 1953 SC 293 , said that the very act of obstruction lay in the assault and the hurt to complainant and that the offence primarily committed was under Sec. 186, I.P.C., and to convict the accused for the offence under Sec. 332, I.P.C., would he tantamount to holding them guilty under Sec. 185, I.P.C., and then convicting them for the offence under Sec. 332, I.P.C. They came to the conclusion that the prosecution could not circumvent the provisions of Sec. 195 by a dubious method. (See also Makaradhwaj Sahu v. State, AIR 1951 Orissa 175). 10. I have been referred on behalf of the State to the case of Ganga Singh v. State, AIR 1962 All 150 . In that case it was contended that the conviction of the accused under Sec. 218, I.P.C., was not legally sustainable because the crime committed by him was essentially an offence of fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in a judicial proceeding which was punishable under Sec, 193, I.P.C., and that the accused could only be prosecuted on a complaint filed by the Court concerned in accordance with S. 195(1)(c), Cr. P.C. Broome, J., observed that the facts made out an offence punishable both under Sec. 218 and under Sec 193, I.P.C" and added that "whereas all the ingredients of an offence under Sec. 465 are included in Sec. 193, Sec. 218, I.P.C., contains certain important ingredients which are not at all covered by Sec. 193 in the sense that Sec. 218 is not a minor offence of Sec. 193 but a completely different species of crime." On this reasoning he upheld the conviction of the accused under Sec. 218. I.P.C. 11. With great respect, I am unable to accede to the proposition that where the ingredients of two offences, one falling under Sec. 218 and the other under Sec. 193, are common and overlap each other, it is open to the complainant to bypass, as it were, the provisions of Sec. 195 by choosing to prosecute the accused under Sec. 218, I.P.C., only. As was observed by the Supreme Court in Basir-ul-Haq, AIR 1953 SC 293 , if in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of sections mentioned in Sec. 195, Cr. P.C., it is not open to the Court to convict an accused without complying with the provisions of that section. 12. For the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that the prosecution of the accused under Sec. 353, I.P.C., is not legally sustainable. I accordingly quash the proceedings pending against him under Sec. 353, I.P.C. 13. This revision is accordingly allowed and the proceedings against the accused under Sec. 353 are set aside. Petition allowed.