JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This application in revision is directed against an appellate order of the Civil and Sessions Judge of Orai by which he upheld the conviction of the applicant under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act read with Sections 3 and 4 of the U. P. Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1963, by a magistrate 1st class. 2. The facts found by the learned Civil and Sessions Judge are these. On 18-10-1963 Sri R. P. Singh, Senior Marketing Inspector, found 57 bags of wheat-gram and 45 bags of wheat belonging to the applicant stored at the shop of Ram Das in Bara Gopal Gunj. The applicant who happened to be present when the Senior Marketing inspector inspected the shop and found the above stock of grain there admitted that the gram belonged to him, but he failed to produce any licence. The quantity of grain that the applicant had stored at the shop of Ram Dass exceeded the produce of his own land. It is on the basis of these facts that the applicant has been convicted and the question is whether this conviction is justified in law. 3. Obviously, the obligation to take a licence could attach to the applicant only if he was carrying on business as a dealer, and it was, therefore, incumbent upon the prosecution to establish that the applicant was a dealer. Clause 2 of the U. P. Food-grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1963 (hereinafter called the Order) has defined the expression 'dealer' thus: "dealer means a person engaged in the business of purchase, sale or storage for sale of any foodgrain, who at any one time purchases, sells, or stores for sale - (i) ten quintals or more of food grains of any one kind, or (ii) twenty-five quintals or more of all the kinds of foodgrains, so purchased, sold or stored, as the case may be. taken together;" 4. taken together;" 4. It is plain that before a person can fall within the terms of the definition he has to be, firstly, a person engaged in the business of purchase, Sale or storage for sale of any foodgrains and, secondly, a person who at any one time purchases, sells, or stores for sale 10 quintals or more of food-grains of anyone kind or 25 quintals Of more of all the kinds of foodgrains so purchased, sold or stored, as the case may be, taken together. Both these conditions are separate and distinct and they must coexist in order that a person may acquire the character of a dealer; and if either of them is wanting he does not become a dealer within the meaning of the Order. 5. For holding that the applicant is covered by the definition the learned Civil and Sessions Judge has relied on the presumption created by sub-clause (2) of clause 3 of the Order which is as follows: "for the purpose of this clause, any person who stores any foodgrains in quantity of ten quintals or more of any one time shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to store the foodgrains for the purpose of sale." 6. The quantity of foodgrains found stored by the applicant at the shop of Ram Das was more than 15 quintals and there would consequently be a presumption that he had stored it for the purpose of sale, and the second condition laid down in the definition of a 'dealer' must, therefore, be regarded as satisfied. The applicant not only led no evidence to counteract the said presumption but also admitted that the grain in question had been stored by him for safe. The presumption of sub-clause (2) of clause 3 of the order does not, however, extend to the first condition of the definition and the prosecution is not relieved of the duty of proving the existence of that condition before the applicant can be held to have become subject to the liability imposed by the Order upon a dealer. The learned Civil and Sessions Judge appears to have overlooked that the definition of the word dealer in clause 2 of the Order is composed of two requisite conditions and to have erroneously concluded that the presumption embraces the entire definition. The learned Civil and Sessions Judge appears to have overlooked that the definition of the word dealer in clause 2 of the Order is composed of two requisite conditions and to have erroneously concluded that the presumption embraces the entire definition. Sub-clause (2) of clause 3 is limited to a presumption that a person who stores food-grains in quantity of ten quintals or more at any time shall be deemed to store the foodgrains for the purposes of sale and it does not authorise the further presumption that such a person is engaged in the business of sale or storage for sale of any food-grains. 7. The two conditions laid down in the definition of a "dealer" in clause 2 of the Order are, as I have already observed, separate and distinct and the existence of the second condition does not pre-suppose the existence of the first. Indeed, the proper construction of clause 2 is that it is only when a person does the acts specified in the second portion of the definition as part or in the course of the activity mentioned in the first portion that he can be called a 'dealer'. A person may at any one time store or sell the quantity of food-grains specified in the definition and yet he may not be engaged in the business of sale or storage for sale. The words 'engaged' and 'business' used in the definition of `dealer' in clause 2 and the word 'business' in clause 3 connote a certain continuity of action and a course of transactions, and a solitary act of purchase, sale or storage for sale, by itself and without anything further, is not sufficient to impart to the does of the act the character of a 'dealer' as contemplated by the definition and to warrant the conclusion that he is carrying on business of a dealer. 8. The prosecution examined Sri Harihar Srivastava (P.W. 1) the Executive Officer of the Municipal Board to prove that the applicant was a dealer in foodgrains, but the learned Civil and Sessions Judge has very rightly observed that the evidence of the Executive Officer is valueless. 8. The prosecution examined Sri Harihar Srivastava (P.W. 1) the Executive Officer of the Municipal Board to prove that the applicant was a dealer in foodgrains, but the learned Civil and Sessions Judge has very rightly observed that the evidence of the Executive Officer is valueless. The Executive Officer merely proved his signature on a report purporting to state that the applicant did business in grain but he did not depose to the contents of the report on oath and did not state it as a fact that the applicant was really doing such business. The position, therefore, is that there is a total absence of any proof of the fact that apart from the quantity of foodgrains which the applicant had stored for sale at the shop of Ram Das he had on any other occasion sold or stored for sale any quantity of foodgrains, and in these circumstances there remains no basis for holding that the applicant was a 'dealer' within the meaning of the Order. As such, it was not necessary for the applicant to obtain a licence and his conviction cannot be sustained. 9. The result is that the application is allowed, the conviction and the sentence of the applicant are set aside and he is acquitted. The applicant is on bail, he need not surrender to his bail and his bail bonds are discharged. The foodgrains in respect of which the applicant was prosecuted shall he returned to him.