JUDGMENT Lakshmi Prasad, J. - We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant in this special appeal. The contention of the learned counsel is that in so far as under the order of allotment passed under Section 7 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, possession had been delivered to the allottee during the pendency of the revision filed under Section 7-F of the Act, the State Government was not competent to cancel the order of allotment as it did by the impugned order a copy of which is annexure 9. The argument is that just as the authority passing the order of allotment is not competent to cancel that order after the order has exhausted itself in the sense that possession has thereunder been delivered to the allot-tee, the State Government is also incompetent to cancel the order of allotment subsequent to the delivery of possession under the order of allotment. We see no substance in the contention. As has been pointed out by the learned Single Judge with reference to the cases referred to in his judgment, that the said limitation placed on the power of the District Magistrate to cancel an order of allotment passed by himself, proceeds on the ground that he possesses no power as such except on the basis of Section 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act. Since the order of allotment is in the nature of an administrative order, he can exercise it only so long as the order is in existence, that is, so long as it has not exhausted itself by virtue of the delivery of possession having been made to the allottee. It is impossible to import a similar limitation on the power of the revisional authority acting under Section 7-F of the Act. The revisional authority is as much free to deal with the question of allotment as the District Magistrate was himself free at the time he passed the order of allotment. It is impossible to sustain the contention that a revision filed under section 7-F must fail merely because during its pendency the possession has been delivered to the allottee. 2. The other points urged were that the State overnment did not afford any opportunity to the appellant and furthermore there is no provision in the Act to entitle the State Government to cancel the order of allotment. 2. The other points urged were that the State overnment did not afford any opportunity to the appellant and furthermore there is no provision in the Act to entitle the State Government to cancel the order of allotment. We see no substance in any of these two points. As pointed out by the learned Single Judge the appellant was given an opportunity to show cause against the revision preferred by the opposite parties and the appellant actually filed a rejoinder. So far as the other point is concerned we are unable to appreciate it at all because if the State Government has power to revise an order of allotment under Section 7-F and if the State Government in exercise of that power comes to a conclusion that the order of allotment deserves to be set aside, it has but to set aside. The provision of Section 7-F itself implies that power. 3. No other point has been urged. We, therefore, dismiss it summarily. 4. Since the appeal has been dismissed, the Civil Misc. Application No. 2 (W) of 1966 is rejected.