ORDER C.B. Capoor, J. - This petition and the connected petition No. 2275 of 1965 purport to be u/s 561-A of Code of Criminal Procedure and have been made by the same Petitioners and may conveniently be disposed of together. There is a sugar factory at Neoli which is owned by the Commercial Industrial Corporation now known as Shervani Sugar Syndicate. One Sri B.R. Dubey is the General Manager of the aforsaid Factory. Sri B.P. Saxena Petitioner No. 8 is the Finance Secretary of the aforsaid Commercial Industrial Corporation and the other Petitioners are the Directors thereof. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Sugar and Vanaspati, Government of India, New Delhi issued an order on 3-3-1959 directing the Neoli Sugar Factory to supply 605 Mds. of sugar to M/s Dhani Lal Jagannath, Bagla Building, Nayaganj, Kanpur and on 12-3- 1959 aforesaid Deputy Director directed the General Manager Neoli Sugar Factory to supply (505 Mds. of sugar to M/s Ganesh Prasad Durga Prasad of Shanker Patti at Kanpur. Copies of the aforesaid orders were sent to the Commercial Industrial Corporation also. Two cases for contravention of the aforesaid orders were initiated against the General Manager, Neoli Sugar Factory, the Commercial Industrial Corporation now known as Shervani Sugar Syndicate and the Petitioners. The Petitioners' case is that there is no evidence to bear out that the alleged contravention of the aforesaid orders was committed with their consent or connivance or that it could in any way be attributed to any neglect on their part and as such no case whatsoever was made out against them. It may at this stage be mentioned with advantage that the petitions under consideration have not been filed either by the Commercial Industrial Corporation or by Sri Dubey. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State. It has been contended on behalf of the State that Sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the Petitioners is not at all attracted to the instant cases, inasmuch as the aforesaid sub-section comes into play when an offence under the Act has been committed by a company whereas in the instant cases the company has merely contravened an order made u/s 3 and as such the cases fell under Sub-section (1) of Section 10 referred to above. In order to appreciate the contentions advanced on behalf of the parties Section 10 may be quoted. It reads as below: 10(1) If the person contravening an order made u/s 3 is a Company, every person who, at the time the contravention was committed, was incharge of and was responsible to, the Company for the conduct of the business to the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable of be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment if he proves that the contravention took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a Company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director manager, secretary or other officer of the Company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation--For the purposes of this section-- (a) "Company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) "director" in relation to a firm means a partner in the firm." 2. Assuming for the sake of argument that Sub-section (2) is not at all attracted to the present cases it may first be considered as to whether any case Under Sub-section (1) has been made out against the Petitioners. It will be noticed that under the aforesaid sub-section guilt has been fastened, inter alia, on every person who, at the time of the contravention, was incharge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the Company. It is significant that the conjunction used is (and) and not (or) that is the persons deemed to be guilty of the contravention must be incharge of the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company and must be responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company. It is only on the co-existence of both the conditions that liability of guilt is entailed. It is only on the co-existence of both the conditions that liability of guilt is entailed. It has, therefore, to be seen as to whether the Petitioners have either been alleged or proved to have been incharge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The complaints filed against the Petitioners have been annexed to the petition and a reference to them will indicate that no such allegation has been made against the Petitioners. Paragraph 4 of the complaints reads as below: that neither accused No. 12 who was and is incharge of the Neoli Sugar Factory and responsible for the conduct of the business of the factory, nor accused Nos. 2 to 11 who were and are Directors and Secretaries of the Company mentioned as accused No. 1 complied with the order mentioned in paragraph 3. 3. It will be noticed that it is only accused No. 12 (Sri Dubey) who was stated to be incharge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. Accused Nos. 2 to II who are the Petitioners before this Court were not stated to be incharge of and responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business. Thus on the allegations made in the complaints no case is made out against the Petitioners Under Sub-section (1) of Section 10 referred to above. 4. It has been argued on behalf of the State that as the Petitioners were either the Directors pr Secretaries of the aforesaid industrial Corporation they must be held to be incharge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. I am, however, unable to accede to this contention. It has already been noticed that no such specific allegation has been made in the complaints and the allegations made therein far from indicating that the Petitioners were incharge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business lead to the conclusion that they figured as accused persons because they had consented to or connived at non-compliance with the orders of the Deputy Director and that non-compliance with those orders was attributable to their neglect. Those allegations bring the case under Sub-section (2) of Section 10 and fall far short of bringing it under Sub-section (1). 5. Those allegations bring the case under Sub-section (2) of Section 10 and fall far short of bringing it under Sub-section (1). 5. I now proceed to examine the correctness of the argument advanced on behalf of the State that Sub-section (2) referred to above is not at all attracted to the instant cases. The contention is in the main based on different phraseology used in the two sub-sections. Sub-section (1) embraces the contravention of an order made u/s 3 whereas Sub-section (2) comes into play where an offence under the Act has been committed. According to the contention a contravention of an order made u/s 3 is not an offence. The contention, as will presently appear, is wholly untenable. An offence has not been defined in the Essential Commodities Act nor has the offences under the Act been categorised as such. According to the General Clauses Act offence mea is any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act provides penalty, inter alia, for a contravention of any order made u/s 3 of the Act. It would thus appear that a contravention of an order made u/s 3 of the Act is an offence. In this connection it may with advantage be mentioned that the heading of Section 10 is "offences by companies". I am, therefore, wholly unable to accede to the contention that a contravention of the order made u/s 3 by a Company is not an offence under the Essential Commodities Act 1955 and if it is an offence under the Act as I hold it to be, the Sub-section (2) of Section 10 would be attracted if the other ingredients thereof are established. Sub-section (2) is in the nature of non-obstante provision and overrides Sub-section (1). The scope of Sub-section (2) is wider than the ambit of Sub-section (1). While Sub-section (1) fastens liability, inter al a, upon every person who, at the time the contravention committed, was incharge and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, Sub-section (2) fastens guilt upon the Director, Manager, Secretary or any other officer of the Company if the offence was committed with his consent or connivance Or is attributable to any neglect on his part. One of the vital differences between the two sub-sections is that while under Sub-section (1) the onus of proving that the contravention took place with his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention lies on the person who at the time the contravention was committed, was incharge and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business under the second sub-section the onus of proving that the offence had been committed with the consent or connivance of or was attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the Company rests on the prosecution. In the instant cases on behalf of the complainant two witnesses have been examined, namely, Sri A.L.N. Moorty (P.W.1) and Sri R.K. Gobhil (P.W.2) both Deputy Director, Sugar and Vanaspathi, New Delhi and their statements are annexures B and C to the affidavit accompanying the petition. They have not stated that the noncompliance with the orders issued by the Deputy Directors was with the consent or connivance of the Petitioners or was attributable to any neglect on their part. On behalf of the State it has been contended that as a copy of the order issued by the Deputy Directors had been endorsed to the Industrial Corporation referred to above it must be held that the non-compliance with the orders issued by the Deputy Director was with the consent or connivance of the Petitioners and was attributable to their neglect. I am, however, unable to draw such an inference. It further appears to me that the word 'neglect' as used in Sub-section (2) does not mean a mere omission or lapse rather it connotes a deliberate or wilful omission or lapse. The allegation made in the affidavits accompanying the present petitions that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses other than the two witnesses already examined is more or less of a formal nature and that they are not in a * position to depose as to whether the alleged non-compliance with the orders of the Deputy Director was with the consent or connivance of the Petitioners or was attributable to any neglect on their part has not been controverted in the counter affidavit. It has been specifically stated in the affidavits accompanying the petitions that the two prosecution witnesses already examined could have spoken about noncompliance with the order of the Deputy Director being with the consent or connivance of the Petitioners or attributable to their neglect and that allegation as has already been observed has not been controverted. 6. No case is, therefore, made out against the Petitioners either under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 and the petitions are accordingly allowed and the criminal proceedings pending against them are quashed. Let a copy of this order be placed in Criminal Misc. Case No. 2275 of 1965.