ORDER S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a Defendant's second appeal from the decree of the Second Additional Civil Judge, Varanasi reversing that of the Munsif, Haveli, Varanasi and decreeing the Plaintiff-Respondent's suit for a declaration that she is the sole owner of a house and for the ejectment of the Appellant from it. 2. The parties are relations. The Plaintiff-Respondent Smt. Dhupa alleged that the house in dispute belonged to her maternal grand-mother Kaleshwari and that when Kaleshwari died she left two grand daughters as her heirs--the Plaintiff and her sister Smt. Panna. She further alleged that her sister Panna was wealthy, whereas she (the Plaintiff) was poor and that Smt. Panna was residing in West Bengal and did not oppose the Plaintiff's claim to the exclusive ownership of the house. She further alleged that the second and the third Respondents were the sons of a deceased grandson of Smt. Kaleshwari and not entitled to succeed to the property and that the fourth Defendant was the widow of that grand son and also not entitled to succeed. She further alleged that the last named four Defendants were in possession of the property to which they were not entitled. She, therefore, asked for a declaration of her title as the full owner to the exclusion of all others and for the recovery of possession after the ejectment of the aforesaid four Defendants. 3. The sister Smt. Panna did not enter appearance and the suit was decided against her. The other four Defendants resisted the suit and denied the Plaintiff's title. They alleged that the house did not belong to Smt. Kaleshwari but her husband Peeru. They admitted that the house was purchased in the name of Smt. Kaleshwari but alleged that the transaction was benami and the real purchaser was Peeru himself. They contended that on Peeru's death Smt. Kaleshwari, his widow, succeeded and on her death they (the contesting Defendants) inherited the property. 4. The trial court held that the property was purchased by Peeru in the name of his wife and he was the real owner. On this finding it dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned Civil Judge disagreed and held that Smt. Kaleshwari purchased the house herself and not as benamidar for her husband. He also accepted the Plaintiff's allegations that she was poor and her sister was wealthy. On this finding it dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned Civil Judge disagreed and held that Smt. Kaleshwari purchased the house herself and not as benamidar for her husband. He also accepted the Plaintiff's allegations that she was poor and her sister was wealthy. He also held that the other Defendants were excluded from the inheritance by the Plaintiff. On these findings he allowed the appeal and granted the Plaintiff a declaration of title as the full owner of the property and ordered the ejectment of the aforesaid four Defendants. Smt. Panna has submitted to the decree but one of the four contesting Defendants has come up here in second appeal. 5. Mr. K.C. Saksena urged the following arguments in support of this appeal. First, he contended that the finding of the lower appellate court that the purchase of the house in dispute by Smt. Kaleshwari was not a benami transaction is erroneous. Learned Counsel contended that this finding is vitiated because the lower court did not consider two vital documents which certainly showed that the purchase was benami. I have perused the judgment of the court below and found no error of law in its finding. It is true that the learned Civil Judge disagreed with the Munsif on the question of benami but this Court cannot interfere with a finding of fact in second appeal. 6. Learned Counsel then argued that the Plaintiff Respondent Smt. Panna (?)(Dhuppa) should have been granted a declaration of her title as joint owner with Smt. Panna and not as full owner. Learned Counsel argued that the principle of Hindu Law that the poorer daughter excludes the richer does not extend to grand daughter. But Mr. A.N. Bhargava, for the Respondents, contended that the Appellant is not entitled to raise this objection as she and the other contesting Defendants have been held by the court below to be trespassers. Learned Counsel argued that it was for Smt. Panna to raise this point. After hearing learned Counsel for both sides at considerable length I am of the opinion that the Appellant is not entitled to challange the title of Smt. Panna unless she can establish a title superior or equal to that of hers. The Plaintiff filed the suit claiming that as the poorer of the two grand-daughters she was entitled to be the exclusive owner. The Plaintiff filed the suit claiming that as the poorer of the two grand-daughters she was entitled to be the exclusive owner. The other grand daughter did not enter appearance and therefore vertually admitted her claim. The Appellant and the other contesting Defendants have been held to be trespassers. In my opinion, a trespasser cannot resist a suit for ejectment on the ground that the Plaintiff is merely a joint owner nor oppose her right for a declaration of full ownership. 7. Lastly, Mr. Saksena argued that Smt. Panna the other grand daughter wants the contesting Defendants to continue in possession. But there is not the slightest evidence in support of this contention. On the other hand, the Plaintiff alleged in her plaint that her sister did not want to oppose her claim to full ownership and her story has been believed by the courts below. 8. Moreover, I aim inclined to the view that the principle of Hindu Law that a poorer daughter excludes the richer should extend to grand daughters. There is no reason why the principle of the exclusion of the richer heir by the poorer should apply to a rich daughter but not to a rich daughter of a daughter. This principle is not a technical rule but based on equity, justice and good conscience and should apply equally to the second and third generation of female heirs. I see no reason why a rich daughter should be excluded but a rich grand daughter should not be. 9. No other point was urged. 10. The appeal is dismissed. But, in the circumstances I direct that the parties should bear their own costs throughout. The Appellant, second and third Respondents are given six months to vacate the house.