JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - The petitioner is a registered partnership firm which carries on the business of manufacture and supply of glass bottles and phials. The petitioner has been selling the goods manufactured by it at different rates to customers in different zones. With effect from March 1, 1961, excise duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1941, was levied for the first time on glass and glass-wares. The duty levied on such articles was on ad valorem basis. On July 31, 1961, the Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise, Allahabad, sent a letter to the petitioner, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure 1' to the petition. By this letter the petitioner was requested to furnish a fresh price-list with a uniform price variety wise so that assessment of duty may be made on and from August 1, 1961, on the basis of the uniform list. It was also mentioned in this letter that in the event of the petitioner failing to supply such a list the assessments from August 1, 1961, will be made on the basis of the highest of the various prices declared in the petitioner's price list. In effect, this letter directed the petitioner to sell its glass-ware at a uniform price to all its customers wherever situated. One of the grievances of the petitioner is that the directions given in this letter are illegal. The second grievance of the petitioner wises out of the assessment of duty for the period March 21, 1961 to July 31, 1961. For this period of the petitioner had been assessed to duty on the value calculated on the basis of zonal price lists supplied by the petitioner. Subsequently it was discovered that the assessment of duty was not correct and, therefore, a notice of demand dated April 28, 1962, was served upon the petitioner demanding a differential duty amounting to Rs. 4,318.46 p. A copy of this notice of demand is attached as Annexure 'II' to the writ petition. It is con-tended by the petitioner that the original assessment of duty was correct and no differential duty was payable by it. 2. The only question which arises for consideration in this case relates to the determination of the value of the article chargeable with duty on ad valorem basis. It is con-tended by the petitioner that the original assessment of duty was correct and no differential duty was payable by it. 2. The only question which arises for consideration in this case relates to the determination of the value of the article chargeable with duty on ad valorem basis. Admittedly this is provided for in clause (a) of Section 4 of the Act which reads as hereunder: "Determination of value for the purposes of duty: Where under this Act, any article is chargeable with duty at a rate dependent on the value of the article, such value shall be deemed to be (a) the wholesale each price for which an article of the like kind and quality is sold or is capable of being sold at the time of the removal of the article chargeable with duty from the factory or any other premises of manufacture or production for delivery at the place of manufacture or production, or if a wholesale market does not exist for such article at such place, at the nearest place where such market exists, ..............". 3. The contention of the petitioner is that according to Section 4 (a) the value of the article is the wholesale cash price for which the article has been or is capable of being sold at the place of sale. The contention of the Department is that the value of the dutiable article is to be determined on the basis of the wholesale cash price for which an article of like kind and quality is sold or is capable of being sold in the wholesale market at the place of production or if a wholesale market does not exist for such article at such place, then the wholesale cash price at the nearest place where such market exists. The difference between the two contentions is this that whereas the petitioner contends that the value is to be determined according to the price prevailing in the wholesale market where he has actually sold his goods, the Department contends that the value is to be determined according to the price in the wholesale market at the place of manufacture or production or at the market nearest to that place. In deciding as to which of the contentions is correct one has to keep in mind the fact that excise duty is a duty on the manufacture of goods and, is, in the present case, chargeable on the value of goods manufactured. Excise duty is not like sales tax where the sale price of the goods sold is the relevant factor. Here we have to determine the value of the goods manufactured. This must then be the value of the goods at the place of manufacture. It is to be noted that the value is not to be determined on the basis of the sale of the article in question but on the basis of the wholesale cash price for which an article of the like kind is sold or is capable of being sold. Therefore, the sale, sale price or place of sale of the article in question is irrelevant to the determination of the value of the article. From the language of Section 4 (a) also it appears that it was intended that the value should be determined according to the wholesale cash price for which an article of like kind and quality is sold or is capable of being sold in the wholesale market at the place of manufacture or where no such market exists, at the nearest place where such market exists. A learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in National Tobacco Company of India Ltd. v. The Collector of Central Excise, AIR 1961 Calcutta 477 has also taken a similar view. I accordingly hold that under Section 4 (a) of the Act the value of an article chargeable with duty is the wholesale cash price for which an article of like kind and quality is sold or is capable of being sold in the wholesale market at the place of manufacture or production or, if a wholesale market does not exist for such an article at such place, then the wholesale cash price at the nearest place where such market exists. 4. It has not to be seen whether the order of the Deputy Superintendent, Central Excise, contained in his letter dated July 31, 1961, is justifiable under Section 4(a). 4. It has not to be seen whether the order of the Deputy Superintendent, Central Excise, contained in his letter dated July 31, 1961, is justifiable under Section 4(a). As already stated, by his letter the Deputy Superintendent, Central Excise, asked the petitioner to supply a fresh price-list of uniform prices and informed the petitioner that if it failed to supply such a list the assessment from August 1, 1961, shall be based on the highest of the various prices declared in the price-list. It appears from the counter affidavit of the Department that at that time prices in the price-list for Allahabad were the highest and the prices for other zones were lower. The Department was entitled to fix the value on the basis only of the wholesale cash price in the Allahabad market. If that was the highest cash price then the assessment would be perfectly valid. But if a particular time the wholesale cash price in the Allahabad market was lower than the wholesale cash price in the market in the other zones where the petitioner was selling its goods the Department would be entitled to determine the value even in that case only on the basis of the wholesale cash price at Allahabad. There is no justification for the Deputy Superintendent, Central Excise, saying that the assessments will be based on the highest of the various prices declared by the petitioner in its price-list. Whatever the prices at which the petitioner sells its goods in other zone, the Department, can, under Section 4(a), assess the value only on the basis of wholesale cash price at Allahabad. That being the position, there was no warrant for the Deputy Superintendent, Central Excise, for directing the petitioner to furnish a uniform price-list for all the zones or for threatening to assess the value on the basis of the prices in other zones. To the extent indicated above, the directions contained in the letter dated July 31, 1961, are illegal. 5. It has then to be considered whether the demand notice of the different duty is in accordance with the provisions of Section 4(a). According to the petitioner itself, there is one price at which it sells its articles in the wholesale market at Allahabad and there are other prices at which it sells its articles in other zones. 5. It has then to be considered whether the demand notice of the different duty is in accordance with the provisions of Section 4(a). According to the petitioner itself, there is one price at which it sells its articles in the wholesale market at Allahabad and there are other prices at which it sells its articles in other zones. It appears from paragraphs 7 and 19 of the counter affidavit that according to the price-lists submitted by the petitioner to the Department the price quoted for the Allahabad market were higher than the prices quoted for other zones and that the demand for differential duty has been made on the basis of the wholesale prices prevalent in the nearest wholesale market in Allahabad. There is no reason as to why this statement should not be accept. Even though the value was determined on the basis of the highest price in the price-lists of the petitioner that price related to the wholesale market at Allahabad. It is reasonable to assume that articles like those of the petitioner were capable of being sold for the same wholesale cash price in the Allahabad market as that for which the petitioner's articles were sold. Thus it is obvious that the value of the petitioner's articles has been determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 4(a) and the differential duty has been calculated on the basis of such determination. That being so, the demand notice dated April 28, 1962 is perfectly valid and legal. 6. The writ Petition is dismissed insofar as it prays for the quashing of the notice of demand dated April 28, 1962. The writ petition is allowed insofar as the prayer relating to Annexure 'I' is concerned and the Department is directed not to enforce the order contained in the letter of the Deputy Superintendent, respondent no. 3, dated July 31, 1961. In the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs of this petition.