ORDER Gyanendra Kumar, J. - I have heard Mr. Kirty at considerable length. I am afraid this application is wholly misconceived. 2. The property in question belonged to Muslims, some of whom had migrated to Pakistan and some had remained in India. There was separation of evacuee and non-evacuee properties. The Petitioner is alleged to have purchased the property belonging to the evacuees at a public auction on 26-11-1959. The certificate of sale was made on 14-8-1964 and was registered on 3-10-1964. Jamil Ahmad and Jalil Ahmad claimed that a part of the property transferred to the Petitioner was not evacuee property but belonged to them. Accordingly on 22-7-1965 they gave a notice to the Petitioner as also to the Managing Officer-cum-Assistant Custodian. Evacuee Property, Varanasi and followed it up by instituting a suit for declaration of their rights on 18-10-64, in which the opposite party as well as the Petitioner were impleaded as Defendants. 3. There was some dispute about the area of the land sold to the Petitioner and this matter was agitated before the Managing Officer (opposite party) Varanasi and was determined against the Petitioner exparte. This was before the institution of the civil suit by Jamil Ahmad and Jalil Ahmad. Accordingly the Petitioner went up in appeal to the Settlement Officer, who also enjoyed the delegated powers of the Settlement Commissioner, UP Luck-now. The case of the Petitioner in the appeal was that the exparte proceedings had caused him irreparable loss and damage, particularly when the property was sold iong ago in August, 1964 and he had erected a building on the land. 4. The Settlement Commissioner allowed the appeal by his order dated 25-2-1966, holding that the Petitioner was not afforded an opportunity of proper representation by the Managing Officer, which was against natural justice and fair play. In the result he set aside the order of the Managing Officer and remanded the case to him, with the direction that the parties should be recalled, given adequate opportunity to be heard and then the matter be decided on merits. In the result he set aside the order of the Managing Officer and remanded the case to him, with the direction that the parties should be recalled, given adequate opportunity to be heard and then the matter be decided on merits. When the case again came up before the Managing Officer after remand, the Petitioner filed an objection before him to the effect that on 18-10-64 Jamil Ahmad and Jalil Ahmad had already filed a declaratory suit in the court of the Civil Judge and that pending decision of the civil suit, the proceedings before him (Managing Officer) should be either quashed or remain stayed. The Managing Officer dismissed this objection on the ground that, there was no injunction order to that effect from the Civil Court and secondly, in his view, he alone was competent to adjudicate upon the issue as to whether certain property was or was not a part of the evacuee property and as to what was its correct area. He accordingly ordered that the proceedings before him shall continue. 5. The grievance of the Petitioner is that once a civil suit had been filed, to which both he and the opposite party were impleaded as Defendant the Managing Oiicer could not hold a parallel enquiry and that his conduct in doing so amounted to contempt of the court of the Civil Judge, Azamgarh where the suit is pending. 6. If an authority bonafide considers that it alone has jurisdiction to determine the matter and under such belief, does not stay its hand; after the institution of a suit for declaration, I think it will not be committing contempt of the Civil Court. When the Managing Officer held that he alone had jurisdiction to proceed in the matter he was, perhaps, thinking of Section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, which runs as under: Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the Central Government or any officer or authority appointed under this Act is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. 7. 7. Suffice it to say that the action of the Managing Officer in the instant case in proceeding with tiie matter already pending before him under the direction of the Settlemejnt Officer does not amount to contempt of court of the Civil Judge, Azamgarhp where a suit for declaration was instituted subsequently. 8. The application is accordingly dismissed smmarily.