R. S. Narula ( 1 ) THOUGH the short question which calls for decision in this case is whether the appropriate authority acting on behalf of the State Government while dealing with objections Tinder section 68-D (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 4 of 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act, can decide these objections without issuing notice to the respective objectors and without affording them adequate opportunity of being heard in support of their objections against the proposal to cancel the stage carriage permits of the objectors, the history of the case 13 rather chequered. ( 2 ) THE petitioner held a stage carriage permit on Delhi B uland- shahar route which had been issued by the State Transport Authority, Delhi and countersigned by the relevant U P. Transport Authority. His application for renewal of the regular stage carriage permit was not granted on the ground that the the was considering nationalisation of that route. Writ petitions were filed by private operators against the non-renewal of their permits. These were granted by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in re. Moti Lal v. State of U. P. It was held in that case that the proposal to nationalise a particular route was no ground for declining to renew stage carriage permits. The U. P. State Road Transport Act, II of 1951 was thereafter passed wherein the State Government was empowered to take over any passenger route within the State. By judgment dated October 30, 1954 in Sagheer Ahmad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh", the said U. P. A. ct was declared unconstitutional. Thereafter U. P. Road Transport Services Development Act, 9 of 1955 was passed. In 1956 the Motor Vehicles Act, 4 of 1939 was amended by Central Act 100 of 1956 whereby Chapter IV-A was added to the principal Act. In the meantime there were some negotiations between the private operators and the Transpart Minister for the State of U. P. though the parties are not wholly agreed as to what was actually decided in those meetings, it is not disputed that as a result of those negotiations the private operators originally plying on the Delhi Balandshahar route were given permits to operate on the Delhi Saharanpur route. In or about May, 1958 the State Government frarned rules under section 68-1 of the Central Act which were called the U. P. State Road Transport Services (Development) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter called the 1958 rules ). It is only rule 7 of those rules which is relevant for deciding this case. On February 26, 1959 a notification under section 68-C of the Central Act was issued by the State Government. With this notification (annexure A) the draft scheme for notionalisation of the disputed route was published on or about 28th February, 1959. Objections by various private operators including the petitioner were filed against the scheme. The State Government published the finally modified scheme as approved by it on October 10, 1959 under section 68d (3) of the Central Act read with rule 8 of the 1958 rules. By that notification it was provided that the State Transport will commence running on the route in question to the exclusion of the private operators with effect from November 1, 1959 and that the stage carriage permits of the affected private operators would stand cancelled with effect from that date. In pursuance of the aforesaid notification the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut, proceeded to cancel the stage carriage permit of the petitioner in the course of meetings held in the end of November and beginning of December, 1959. This led the petitioner and other private operators to file writ petitions in the Allahabad High Court impugning the notification under the Central Act as well as the resolutions of the Regional Transport Authority cancelling the perinits. Large number of these petitions were allowed by one common judgment of the High Court dated 31st October, 1961 of which copy has been attached to this writ petition as annexure B. Subsequently the petitioner s case and 17 other connected writ petitions came up belore the some Court and they were also allowed by order dated February 7. 1962 (annexure C ). 1962 (annexure C ). In short the direction issued by the Allahabad High Court in those cases including that of the petitioner was that they should be allowed a fresh period of 30 days to file objections against the scherne in question and should be allowed an opportunity of leading evidence and of being heard in support of their objections, it was only after such opportunity being allowed to the petitioners that the scheme was to be enforced against them in case the scheme was approved after the disposal of the objections. ( 3 ) IN pursuance of the directions of the High Court a fresh notification dated March 7, 1962 was issued inviting objections within 30 days from the persons who had filed writ petitions in the High Court and whose cases had been decided either on the 31st October, 1961 or on the 7th February, 1962. The petitioner s case is that he filed a sep state set objection in pursuance of the above-said notification dated 7th March 1962. This fact has been disputed by the respondents in their written statement. The State Government authorised mr. R. Chandra, the then Joint Legal Remembrancer to hear the objections. The objection to the jurisdiction of the Joint Legal Remembrancer to hear the objections was taken by one Hasan Agha in writ petition No. 179 of 1962 before the Allahabad High Court. Early in June, 1962 interim stay of the hearing of objections by the said officer was granted by the High Court. During the pendency of the said writ petition when the hearing of the objections had been stayed, rule 7 of the 1958 rules was further amended. A copy of the finally amended rule has been filed as annexure E to the Writ petition and is quoted verbatim below:- "7. Consideration and disposal of obections: (1) The objections received shall be considered and disposed of by such officer of the State Government as is authorised in this behalf by or under the rules made by the Governor in pursuance of clause (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India. Consideration and disposal of obections: (1) The objections received shall be considered and disposed of by such officer of the State Government as is authorised in this behalf by or under the rules made by the Governor in pursuance of clause (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India. (2) The said officer shall fix the date, time and place for the hearing of the objections and issue notices thereof to the objectors, and the representatives of the State Transport Undertaking, calling upon them to appear before him in person or through a duly authorised agent or counsel and to produce their oral and documentary evidence on the date fixed for hearing. (3) The notices under sub-rule (2) shall be served by - (a) publishing a general notice in the Gazette giving the date, time and place fixed for the hearing of objections ; and (b) sending notice by registered post to the address of objector as noted in the memorandum of objections ; and when a notice has been so published and sent service shall be deemed to have been duly effected on the objector and the State Transport Undertaking, provided the notice is despatched and published a least ten days before the date of hearing. (4) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (7) the objector and the State Transport. Undertaking shall produce their evidence and witnesses necessary and relevant to the inquiry, on the first date fixed for the hearing. (5) No objector shall be entitled to be heard unless the objections are made in accordance with the provisions of these rules. (6) The said officer shall have all the powers of controlling the giving and recording of evidence so as to prevent the production of unnecessary evidence or the misuse of the process: (7) (a) The said officer may, if sufficient case is shown at any stage of the hearing, grant time to the parties or to any of them and may from time to time adjourn the hearing. (b) In every case the officer shall fix the date for the further hearing of the objections and may make such orders as it thinks fit with respect to the costs occasioned by the adjournment. (8) The cost of producing any evidence shall be borne by the party producing the same. (b) In every case the officer shall fix the date for the further hearing of the objections and may make such orders as it thinks fit with respect to the costs occasioned by the adjournment. (8) The cost of producing any evidence shall be borne by the party producing the same. (9) After the hearing of such parties as appear the officer shall givea decision approving or modifying the scheme as he may deem proper. " ( 4 ) IN the meantime the Joint Legal Remembrancer became the Legal Remembrancer. This brought to an end the controversy which had been raised by Hasan Agha, before the High Court. In April, 1954, therefore, the stay order granted by the High Court was vacated. By notification dated May 2, 1964 Shri Jagmohan Lal, respondent No. 2 was appointed by the State Government as the authority to hear objections against the scheme. He commenced hearing some of the objections preferred against the scheme and it is not disputed that there were certain hearings before him. But it is admitted that no notice of these hearings was ever served on the petitioner. For the first time the petitioner received notice dated January 17, 1966 on 22nd January, 1966. This notice stated that hearing of the objections would be "resumed" on January 29, 1966. On that day the petitioner appeared before the second respondent and made an application in writing (annexure G) praying for:- (I) treatingasnullandvoidalltheproceedingswhich were held in the absence of the petitioner as these were heard without any notice to him; (ii) for opportunity to lead evidence in support of his objections ; and (iii) to start the proceedings for hearing the objections afresh for that purpose. According to the petitioner the order passed on his said application on the same day (Annexure H) was in the following terms :- "the case is at the stage of hearing arguments. There is no provision in the rules nor does it appear necessary, to bring the legal representatives of the deceased on record and stay the proceedings I till then. If the legal representatives are present they can be permitted to address arguments. "it looked queer that the above-quoted order could have been passed on the petitioner s application of which annexure G to the writ petition is a copy. I have, however, seen the original record and find that it is indeed so. If the legal representatives are present they can be permitted to address arguments. "it looked queer that the above-quoted order could have been passed on the petitioner s application of which annexure G to the writ petition is a copy. I have, however, seen the original record and find that it is indeed so. The learned counsel for the respondents has rightly pointed out that the above quoted order has been passed on the aforesaid application of the petitioner merely on account of oversight and that the correct order, which should have been passed on the said application, has been endorsed on a different application of some other applicant on the same day. This appears to be correct because the petitioner admits that he never made any application for bringing on record any legal representatives of a deceased party before respondent No. 2 The correct order of which a copy has now been filed at the hearing of the case and which is now admitted to be deemed to have been passed on the petitioner s application dated January 29, 1966 is in the following terms:- "the stage of leading oral evidence has passed. It is now the stage of arguments. The applicant may address his arguments on the next day. "the case was consequently adjourned for arguments to February 5, 1966. On that day the petitioner is stated to have fallen ill and he, therefore, submitted an application (copy annexure 1) supported by the I" medical certificate of Civil Surgeon, Meerut (copy attached to annexure (1) wherein it was stated that Shri Musaddi Lal, the proprietor of the petitioner company had got a heart attack and, therefore, an adjournlment of the hearing of the objections for a period of two months was I prayed for. There is some little controversy about the exact words of the order that was passed by respondent No. 2 on the application for adjournment dated 5th February, 1966. I will, therefore, take the order as quoted by the respondents in para. 22 of the written statement to be the correct order. The same reads as follows:- "the arguments are still continuing and the personal presence of this particular person is not necessary as he is represented by a counsel". I will, therefore, take the order as quoted by the respondents in para. 22 of the written statement to be the correct order. The same reads as follows:- "the arguments are still continuing and the personal presence of this particular person is not necessary as he is represented by a counsel". ( 5 ) IT was in the situation detailed above that the present writ petition was filed in this Court on February 17, 1963 with a prayer to quash all the proceedings which had taken place prior to January 28, 1966 as well as the orders dated 29th January, 1966 and 5th February, 1966 and to prohibit respondent No. 2 from proceeding further with the hearing of the objections otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of section 8 D,2) of the Central Act and rule 7 of the 1958 rules, A specific prayer has been made in the writ petition to prohibit the second respondent from proceeding with the case without allowing the petitioner adequate opportunity of leading evidence in support of hi s objections. The writ petition was admitted by the Motion Bench (Dniat and S. K. Kapur, JJ.) on 18th February, 19fc6 and further proceedings were ordered to be stayed. ( 6 ) BY way of return to the rule, an affidavit of the Deputy Secretary to the Government of UP. in the Transport Department dated 4th March, 1966 has been filed. Most of the relevant facts have been frankly admitted in the written statement. Some dispute appears to have been raised only about two matters. The first matter is about the filing of objections claimed to have been filed by the petitioner in pursuance of the fresh notification issued on 7th of March, 1962. It is, however, significant that in paragraph 13 of the written statement where this denial is made the respondents specifically admit that 50 operators, however, did file objections. " An affidavit in rejoinder dated 15th March, 1986 has been filed on behalf of the petitioner wherein it has been unequivocally stated that the petitioner was one of those 50 operators. By order dated March 8, 1966 Khanna, J. allowed the parties to file any further affidavits which they might like to file in this case. " An affidavit in rejoinder dated 15th March, 1986 has been filed on behalf of the petitioner wherein it has been unequivocally stated that the petitioner was one of those 50 operators. By order dated March 8, 1966 Khanna, J. allowed the parties to file any further affidavits which they might like to file in this case. No counter-affidavit in reply to the allegations made in para 6 of the rejoinder has been filed on behalf of the State nor has any permission for doing so been sought. I would, therefore, take it that the denial of the respondents about the filing of fresh objection by the petitioner in pursuance of the notification dated 7th March, 1962 was due to some misapprehension. In this connection it is also significant that the petitioner has filed as annexure A to his rejoinder a copy of the disputed objections. The only other factual matter in relation to which some objection has been raised in the written statement of the respondents is about the issue of the notice of proceedings to the petitioner. It has been stated in para 18 of the written statement that "there is a note by the office to the effect that notices to parties issued". I will presently deal with this objection. So far as the factual aspect is concerned, itwas fairly and frankly conceded by Mr. K. N. Singh, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the petitioner has not been allowed to lead evidence in this case in support of his objections and that the Respondent 1s not in a position to show to the Court any notification published in the official gazette relating to the date of hearing of the objections of the petitioner for which notice dated 17th January, 1966 was issued to him. It is also not disputed that no notice prior to 17th January, 1966 was ever issued to the petitioner. In this view of the matter it is wholly unnecessary for me to go into the meaning, scope and effect of the plea taken in para 18 of the written statement about the note to the effect that the notices were issued. ( 7 ) STAGE is now clear for me to deal with the only legal question that arises in this case. Section 68-D (2) of the Central Act reads as follows:- "68d. Objection to the scheme. ( 7 ) STAGE is now clear for me to deal with the only legal question that arises in this case. Section 68-D (2) of the Central Act reads as follows:- "68d. Objection to the scheme. (1) Any person affected by the scheme published under section 68-C may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the scheme in the Official Gazette, file objections thereto before the State Government. (2) The State Government may, after considering the objections and after giving an opportunity to the objector or his representatives and the representatives of the State Transport undertaking to be heard in the matter, if they so desire, approve or modify the scheme. (3) The scheme as approved or modified under sub-section (2) shall then be published In the Official Gazette by the State Government and the same shall thereupon become final and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area of notified route: Provided that no such scheme which relates to any inter State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheme unless it has been published in the Official Gazette with the previous approval of the Central Government. " ( 8 ) THE scope of the hearing provided in the above quoted section has been succinctly defined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Malik Ram v. State of Rajasthan. It has been held in that case that the hearing provided by section 68d (2) of the Central Act includes taking of evidence whether oral or documentary that may be desired to be produced by either party and that it would be necessary for the State Government to record such evidence in order to arrive at a just conclusion with respect to the objections to the draft scheme. The Supreme Court repelled in that case the argument addressed on behalf of the State authorities to the effect that the scope of hearing under that provision did not include the necessity to record evidence. In this connection their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as below:- "it seems to us, considering the nature of the objections and the purpose for which the hearing is given that production of evidence, either oral or documentary, is comprehended within the hearing contemplated in S. 68-D (2)". In this connection their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as below:- "it seems to us, considering the nature of the objections and the purpose for which the hearing is given that production of evidence, either oral or documentary, is comprehended within the hearing contemplated in S. 68-D (2)". I have already quoted above rule 7 of the 1958 Rules as finally amended. The notice envisaged by sub-rule (2) of that rule requires the authorities to state that the objector may produce his oral and documentary evidence on the date fixed for hearing Besides the statutory provisions of section 68-D (2) of the Central Act the above-quoted provision in rule 7 (2) also envisages the necessity of affording every objector adequate opportunity of producing such oral and documentary evidence as he may like to give in support of his objections. Over and above the requirements of the Central Act and the 1958 Rules the parties are bound in this case with the orders passed by their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court in 1962 in the petitioner s writ petition. I am surprised that in the face of those orders the. authorities concerned have declined to afford the petitioner an opportunity of leading evidence and have thought that hearing his arguments is enough. Possibly the Authority has b?. en misled by the fact that some evidence has already been given by some other objectors. The State has also produced some evidence behind the back of the petitioner. That evidence is of no avail to the authorities against the petitioner. No amount of evidence recorded without notice to an objector and behind his back can be utilised against him. Such a course would be seriously opposed to all principles of natural justice. In fact it has been impliedly held by the Supreme Court in A. V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Shobharaj Wadhani that where the order prejudicial to a writ petitioner has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice it could be treated as void and non est. It is a well-known and recognised principle of natural justice that the entire evidence on which a person may be sought to be prejudiced should be recorded in his presence. It is a well-known and recognised principle of natural justice that the entire evidence on which a person may be sought to be prejudiced should be recorded in his presence. ( 9 ) THE evidence which has already been recorded may or may not be available against the other objectors but is certainly not available against the petitioner at whose back it was recorded. ( 10 ) IN the above ci-cumstances I hold that in order to comply with the mandatory provisions of section 68-D (2) of the Central Act and with Rule 7 of the 1958 Rules it is necessary - (I) for the appropriate State Authority to give notice to every person who has field objections against the scheme within time and to give him adequate opportunity of being heard in support of those objections; (II) That hearing of objections under section 6s-D (2) of the Central Act includes the requirement of affording the petitioner an opportunity of leading evidence in support of his objections, and if necessary cross-examining the witnesses produced in support of the scheme; (III) that any evidence which is sought to be used against an objector in the above-mentioned proceedings must be recorded in his presence; (IV) that since rule 7 of the 1958 Rules as finally amended ia in force it is necessary for proceedings under the above-said provision being valid that notice of the first date fixed for hearing of the objections should not only be issued to the objector by registered post but should also be published in the official gazette as provided in clause (a) of sub-rule (3) of the rule; (V) that the proceedings so far held by respondent No. 2 in connection with the objections filed by the petitioner were "procedurally ultra vires" as defined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh , as they have been held in utter disregard of the statutory provisions referred to above. ( 11 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents states that no steps whatever in connection with the objections of the petitioner were taken by respondent No. 2 prior to the issue of notice dated 17th January, 1966 and that no proceedings in connection with those objections were taken prior to 2?th January, 196 -. ( 11 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents states that no steps whatever in connection with the objections of the petitioner were taken by respondent No. 2 prior to the issue of notice dated 17th January, 1966 and that no proceedings in connection with those objections were taken prior to 2?th January, 196 -. ( 12 ) IN view of the above state of law and the admitted fact that not only the petitioner has not been allowed an opportunity to lead evidence but such an opportunity has been declined to him, I allow this writ petition with costs and set aside the order of respondent No. 2 dated 29th January, 1966 and direct the respondents to hear and dispose of the petitioner s objections in accordance with law bearing in mind the observations made in this judgment. Nothing stated in this judgment would, by itself, affect the other objectors or relite to their objections.