ORDER K.B. Asthana, J. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the validity of an order dated 23-5-1966 passed by Sri D.M. Sinha, District Magistrate, Meerut, in the purported exercise of powers u/s 3 of the UP (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 (UP Act No. 25 of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act) requisitioning the accommodation described as Kothi No. 311 situate in Begum Bagh, Meerut, has been questioned. It is prayed that a writ or direction be issued for quashing the said order and further a writ or direction be issued commanding the District Magistrate, Meerut and the Munsif (City), Meerut, not to give effect to that order. It is further prayed that any other necessary direction or order be given which the court may deem fit. 2. Admittedly, the Petitioners were tenants in the accommodation requisitioned for more than 25 years in the past. One Begum Siddiq Fatima was the landlady and owner of the accommodation. She has been impleaded as Respondent No. 2 to this petition. It is established from the affidavits on record that the landlady was interested in ejecting the Petitioners who were her tenants. A series of litigations were carried on between the landlady and the Petitioners. Various steps were taken on behalf of the landlady before District authorities with a view to get the accommodation vacated by the Petitioners. The landlady filed a regular suit for ejectment of the Petitioners. This suit was dismissed by the trial court as well as by the lower appellate court. The landlady persisted and came up in second appeal from the decree of the court below to the High Court in that suit. The second appeal was also dismissed by this Court. The attempt of the landlady to eject the Petitioners from the accommodation thus failed. The judgment in second appeal by this Court was delivered in December, 1965. It appears that, during the pendency of the second appeal in the High Court, the then District Magistrate requisitioned the accommodation in question by an order dated 29-6-1963 allegedly for accommodating Government Officers. The allegation of the Petitioners is that this order was passed by the then District Magistrate at the instance of the landlady who had failed to eject the Petitioners in the regular suit. The allegation of the Petitioners is that this order was passed by the then District Magistrate at the instance of the landlady who had failed to eject the Petitioners in the regular suit. It is curious that this order of requisition dated 29-6-1963 passed in all solemnity u/s 3 of the UP (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act was never given effect to and it seems to have been treated as a mere paper transaction by the authority who passed the order. This will show that there was no genuine need or necessity in 1963 when that order was passed for requisitioning the disputed accommodation. Nothing happened till February, 1966 when the landlady served the Petitioners with a notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and also seems to have taken some proceedings before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Again a peculiar notice was served on the Petitioners on 4-3-1966 asking them not to hand over the possession of the house to any other person and that they should inform the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as and when they vacate the house. The suit filed by the landlady for ejecting the Petitioners having been dismissed there was absolutely no chance of the accommodation being vacated by the Petitioners, what such a notice meant is not easily comprehensible. Then as alleged by the Petitioners in March 1966, the Petitioners received an intimation from the City Magistrate, Meerut, to the effect that Om Prakash Petitioner No. 2 should see him in his Court on any working day. As alleged by the Petitioners this order was made on some application given by one Sri M.M. Ullah son of the landlady. According to the Petitioners when Om Prakash went to see the City Magistrate, Meerut, the later told the former that there was some complaint against the Petitioners and they should vacate the house and settle the matter. Om Prakash Petitioner No. 2 there-upon is said to have sent an application to the City Magistrate, Meerut, explaining that the landlady was harassing her tenants and that if the contents of the application presented by Sri M.M. Ullah were known to them by supplying them with a copy, the Petitioners would be able to give a reply. These allegations of the Petitioners contained in para 11 of the petition have not been controverted on behalf of the Respondents. These allegations of the Petitioners contained in para 11 of the petition have not been controverted on behalf of the Respondents. What were the contents of the application of Sri M.M. Ullah have not been revealed before this Court by the Respondents. The letter which was sent by the Petitioners to the City Magistrate after the said interview does indicate that the talk between the Civil Magistrate and the Petitioner No. 2 related to the disputed accommodation. However in her counter-affidavit, Begum Siddiq Fatima Respondent No. 2 tried to explain that the City Magistrate had called Om Prakash in connection with some complaint to the effect that some Pakistani agents were being harboured by her in her house. Her counter affidavit as worded shows that it was what she thought. Thus on the record the Petitioners, averment that one of them was called by the City Magistrate and was told to vacate the accommodation in question or come to terms with the landlady remains unrefuted. Then in May 1966 the impugned order requisitioning the accommodation was passed by Sri D.M. Sinha, District Magistrate. This was the second requisition order in respect of the disputed accommodation. The alternative accommodation which was offered to the Petitioners was found wholly unsuitable by them and more over as the affidavits disclose that alternative accommodation was not even available as it was not vacant. The allegation of the Petitioners that the alternative accommodation was not available for occupation as it was actually occupied throughout is established from the material on record. Since the Petitioners did not occupy the alternative accommodation offered, the District Magistrate, allotted it to some other person. The Petitioners then approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and procured an exparte interim order for protecting their possession. It may be mentioned that the District Magistrate had sent the matter to the court of the City Munsif for taking proceedings for dispossession of the Petitioners from the accommodation requisitioned and the learned Munsif directed execution of the order of ejectment through the Amin. It may be mentioned that the District Magistrate had sent the matter to the court of the City Munsif for taking proceedings for dispossession of the Petitioners from the accommodation requisitioned and the learned Munsif directed execution of the order of ejectment through the Amin. As ill-luck would have it the Petitioners were not able to obtain the interim order before 10 O'clock in the morning of 22nd of July 1966, but at 8 A.M. on that day at Meerut the Petitioners were ejected by force in presence of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, by the court Amin with the help of a posse of police constables. 3. The impugned order of requisition of the accommodation and the proceedings for dispossession of the Petitioners in consequence thereof have been challenged inter alia, on the following main grounds: (1) That the impugned order was malafide having been passed at the instance of Respondent No. 2 and for her benefit, there being actually and really no necessity for accommodating Government Servants. (2) That at the time of the passing of the requisition order there was no existing alternative accommodation available thus the condition precedent for the exercise of power was absent (3) That the impugned order ex facie is bad as it does not mention the name of any particular Government servants, for whom the accommodation was needed on 23rd June 1966. 4. In the counter-affidavits sworn by Sri D.M. Sinha, District Magistrate, it has been tried to be explained that the power was exercised by him bonafide in order to meet the needs of the Government Officers and overcome their difficulties in finding accommodation due to dearth of accommodation. However, I find that in neither of the counter-affidavits sworn by Sri Sinha, the averment about the interview which took place between the City Magistrate of Meerut and the Petitioner No. 2 Om Prakash and what transpired there have been controverted. There is no counter affidavit on behalf of the City Magistrate. The other fact which has not been refuted is that on 23rd of May 1986, Sri K.N. Sharma the Regional Transport Magistrate, was not posted at Meerut and he did not arrive in Meerut till 22nd July 1966. There is no counter affidavit on behalf of the City Magistrate. The other fact which has not been refuted is that on 23rd of May 1986, Sri K.N. Sharma the Regional Transport Magistrate, was not posted at Meerut and he did not arrive in Meerut till 22nd July 1966. The further fact that all the Government Officers posted at Meerut had been suitably accommodated in May 1966, has not been controverted, though of course there is a general denial of the allegations made by the Petitioners in this regard and an assertion has been made by Sri Sinha that there was dearth of accommodation and many Government Officers posted at Meerut were in need of accommodation. Sri M. Ansari appearing for the Petitioners vehemently urged that Sri D.M. Sinha be called for cross examination and the correctness of the allegation made by him in the counter affidavits be tested. At an earlier stage of hearing also such prayer was made by Sri Ansari then I thought fit to give further time to the Standing Counsel to file affidavits specifically denying the above mentioned facts. 5. On 23rd May 1966 when the impugned order was passed the circumstance that emerge out from the affidavits on record may be summarised now: (1) That no officer posted at Meerut was in need of any accommodation. (2) That Sri K.N. Sharma Regional Transport Officer who ultimately occupied the said accommodation almost two months later was not in Meerut at all. It is to be noted that there is complete absence of any averment On behalf of the Respondents that in May 1966 the District Magistrate was aware that Sri K.N. Sharma was to be posted in the near future as Regional Transport Officer. (3) That the alternative accommodation offered to the Petitioners in house No. 130 known as Shiam Kutir situate in Azad Road Meerut was not vacant and was not available for immediate occupation. (4) That the landlady had failed in her attempt by a regular suit to eject the Petitioners, she having lost her case from the highest court of the State. (5) That the City Magistrate had called Om Prakash, Petitioner No. 2 and told him to vacate the accommodation or come to terms with the landlady. (6) That the landlady was even then making an attempt before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to have the accommodation released. 6. (5) That the City Magistrate had called Om Prakash, Petitioner No. 2 and told him to vacate the accommodation or come to terms with the landlady. (6) That the landlady was even then making an attempt before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to have the accommodation released. 6. The fact that the alternative accommodation was not available for occupation in May 1966 will be clear from the fact that attempts were being made by Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Meerut for having it vacated which is clear from 'Annexure' E, F and G to the rejoinder-affidavit of Ram Rakashpal Petitioner No. 1 dated 31-8-1966. The most charitable view that can be taken in the circumstance in favour of the District Magistrate may be that when he passed the order on 23-5-1966 and fixed upon the house No. 130(74) Shiam Kutir at Azad Road as alternative accommodation, he had the fullest hope that in the exercise of his wide powers under the Rent Control and Eviction Act he would oust the actual occupant and make it available to the Petitioners. It was pointed out by Sri Gopi Nath, learned Junior Standing Counsel, that the conduct of the Petitioners in refusing to accept the alternative accommodation offered was such that this Court ought not allow the Petitioners to say that there was no alternative accommodation actually in existence and which could under the law be made available for occupation. I do not think the Petitioners can be shut out from arguing that as a matter of law the order dated 23-5-1966 was vitiated as the alternative accommodation was not in existence and the District Magistrate's satisfaction that the accommodation was available was merely based on the possibility of certain accommodation being made available in future. It was contended for the Petitioners that from this an inference of malafides or want of bonafide on the part of District Magistrate clearly follows, but I do not think I can attribute any malafides to the District Magistrate. It may be an error of judgment on his part and he may well be under the honest impression that the possibility of making an accommodation available in the near future is sufficient basis for satisfaction when exercising the power u/s 3 of the Act. 7. It may be an error of judgment on his part and he may well be under the honest impression that the possibility of making an accommodation available in the near future is sufficient basis for satisfaction when exercising the power u/s 3 of the Act. 7. It was also contended for the Petitioners that the alternative accommodation offered was not at all suitable for them and on that score also the impugned order was bad. I do not think for the purpose of deciding this case I should enter into the vexed question of law and fact involved in this argument. Whether the satisfaction of the District Magistrate that suitable alternative accommodation was available is justiciable or is subjective under the scheme of Section 3 of the Act is a question of some difficulty and complexity. I think even if the matter was not justiciable, it is open for an aggrieved party to establish before this Court that the so called alternative accommodation was not in existence, that is to say not available for occupation within 15 days of the order of requisition or was not an accommodation as such, in order to show that there was no basis at all for affording satisfaction as required by law. The material on record establishes that the alternative accommodation offered was not got vacated till 22nd July 1966, thus it was not available for occupation on 23rd May, 1966 and even within fifteen days from that date. I do not think, however the Petitioners have any case on the score that the alternative accommodation was not suitable for them. 8. Still the question remains whether on the facts as established the power exercised by the District Magistrate u/s 3 of the Act was justified even though on the date when the order of requisition was passed there was no necessity of any accommodation being required for any Government servant posted at Meerut. It is significant to note that in paragraph 11 of his counter-affidavit sworn on 28-8-1966, Sri D.M. Sinha, the District Magistrate, averred as follows: That Sri K.N. Sharma, Regional Transport Magistrate took over charge on 22-7-1966 and as the allotted house of his predecessor-in-office was not available to him I gave priority to him and allotted the requisitioned accommodation to him. Moreover, it was not possible for me to provide any accommodation suitable to his status forthwith. Moreover, it was not possible for me to provide any accommodation suitable to his status forthwith. It is clearly implied from the above averment that the need to accommodate Sri K.N. Sharma, Regional Transport? Magistrate, arose near about 22nd July 1966 and the requisitioned accommodation was given to Sri Sharma as in the opinion of the District Magistrate Sri Sharma had a prior right to it and there was no other accommodation suitable to the status of Sri Sharma. I do not understand exactly what is meant by an accommodation suitable to the status of Sri K.N. Sharma unless the District Magistrate also stated that the alternative accommodation offered to the Petitioners under the requisition order was not in his opinion suitable to the status of Sri Sharma. That Sri K.N. Sharma had to be accommodated in the requisitioned accommodation on 22nd July 1966 and that the order of requisition was passed on 23rd May, 1966, clearly shows that there was no necessity of accommodating any Government servant during the period of about two months. The District Magistrate, as already observed, did not say that he had anticipated the difficulty that the predecessor-in-office of Sri K.N. Sharma would not leave the accommodation which he was occupying. 9. Sri Gopi Nath, learned Junior Standing Counsel, contended that the formation of opinion by the District Magistrate u/s 3 of the Act was not justiciable and not open to review by this Court as the Legislature thought that the District Magistrate was the best judge of the situation and left it entirely to his discretion to appreciate the circumstances and then consider whether it was necessary to requisition any accommodation for any public purpose. Even though I agree with the learned Junior Standing Counsel that the formation of opinion as to the necessity of requisitioning an accommodation is not a justiciable issue in the sense that if material facts are brought to the notice of the Court on which that opinion was based it would not be open to this Court to judge for itself whether those facts or circumstances were sufficient for forming an opinion as to the necessity of requisition and I may go even to this extent that once those facts of circumstances were shown to be relevant for the purpose, howsoever insufficient they appear to be for showing that there was any necessity for the action of the Distt. Magistrate in forming his opinion on these facts and circumstances would be upheld yet in my opinion where in a case on the facts it is established that ho such circumstance existed on the basis of which it could be said that there was necessity for requisitioning any accommodation for any public purpose, in the instant case for housing a Government servant, the formation of opinion by the District Magistrate can be struck down as it would be founded on no such facts or circumstances which could properly be made the foundation for the exercise of powers vested in the District Magistrate u/s 3 of the Act. When the facts show that there was ho Government servant to be accommodated at the time when the requisition order was passed there would, in my judgment, be a complete absence of the foundation for the exercise of power by the District Magistrate and the order passed by him would not only amount to colourable exercise of power but will almost be a fraud on the statute. The power u/s 3 of the Act, in my opinion, has hot been conferred upon the District Magistrate to be exercised without first forming an opinion as to the necessity of requisitioning an accommodation, that is to say, it is to be exercised only when there is in fact and in reality a necessity and not what may appear to be an imaginary or illusory necessity in the mind of the District Magistrate. 10. Sri Gopi Nath, learned Junior Standing Counsel, then submitted that it was possible to construe Section 3 of the Act in a manner so as to vest the Distt. Magistrate with the power to requisition any accommodation even if he anticipated that in future a necessity will arise. I do not propose to consider and examine the validity of this submission of the learned Junior Standing Counsel as on the facts, as far as this case is concerned, the District Magistrate has not taken the stand that he had on 23rd May, 1966 anticipated that two months hence when Sri K.N. Sharma, Regional Transport Magistrate, would arrive and he would need new accommodation as his predecessor-in-office would not be able to vacate the accommodation occupied by him. The case as put in the counter-affidavit by the District Magistrate attempts to justify that the action of the District Magistrate was valid and legal as there was a necessity in present on 23rd May, 1966 for accommodating Government servants. On the facts as established, however, I find that there is absolutely no justification for holding that there was in fact and in reality any particular Government servant to be accommodated on 23rd May 1966 when the order of requisition was passed. This is not made out from the counter-affidavit. No satisfactory explanation has been given by the Distt. Magistrate as to why he requisitioned the accommodation on 23rd May, 1966 except for a vague allegation made by him in the counter-affidavit that there was a general dearth of accommodation and Government officers had to be housed. I am thus driven to the conclusion that there was complete absence of any circumstance which could be made the basis for the exercise of powers u/s 3 of the Act inasmuch as the formation of opinion that there was a necessity to requisition an accommodation for housing Government servants, though may not be justiciable and being a condition precedent for the exercise of that power the District Magistrate, on his own showing, has failed to establish that on 23rd May, 1966 there was some urgency in the nature of a necessity for requisitioning the accommodation in question for housing a Government servant. The past history of this accommodation and the out of way officious acts of some of the authorities in intervening on behalf of the landlady further fortifies the stand taken by the Petitioners that the Distt. Magistrate really wanted to oust the Petitioners to oblige the landlady and it was. With this view that in the purported exercise of his powers u/s 3 of the Act the District Magistrate passed the impugned order. I have no hesitation in holding oh the facts and circumstances established in this case that the District Magistrate did not exercise his power u/s 3 for any bonafide need or necessity for the fulfillment of any public purpose. Under the scheme of the Act fifteen days' time is always allowed to the occupier of the requisitioned accommodation offered. The facts of this case show that the District Magistrate had not even ensured the actual availability of the alternative accommodation offered. Under the scheme of the Act fifteen days' time is always allowed to the occupier of the requisitioned accommodation offered. The facts of this case show that the District Magistrate had not even ensured the actual availability of the alternative accommodation offered. This circumstance also speaks of the hurry in which the requisition order was passed. It is also clear that even if the Petitioners had vacated the requisitioned accommodation within fifteen days i.e., by 9th June 1966 it would have remained vacant till some new officer had come to Meerut on being posted. It was on 22nd July 1966 that Sri K.N. Sharma appears to have come to Meerut and the District Magistrate at once thought of giving him this requisitioned accommodation by taking all possible coercive steps for ousting the Petitioners who according to him were in illegal occupation of the same. All this goes to show that in May 1966 when the impugned order was passed there was no real and actual necessity for requisitioning the accommodation. 11. As regards the third contention to the effect that the impugned order of requisition was bad as it did not disclose the name of the officer who was to be accommodated I have already considered a similar question in the case of H.A. Sarkies and Another Vs. District Magistrate and Another, AIR 1966 All 458 and for the reasons given in that judgment I hold that the impugned order in the instant case suffers from legal infirmity. 12. There remains to consider the question whether this Court ought to interfere now at this state when the Petitioners have in fact, been ousted. The Petitioners were merely tenants in the premises requisitioned and not owners. But that status of the Petitioners, to my mind, does not mean that they have no interest left in the requisitioned accommodation. It is well established that the right of tenancy is a right in property. It is a valuable right. So long as the tenancy does not cease in accordance with law the tenant has a right to the peaceful possession of the demised property. In the instant case on the date when the requisition order was passed the Petitioners were tenants in the requisitioned accommodation and were occupying the same under a lawful right. It is a valuable right. So long as the tenancy does not cease in accordance with law the tenant has a right to the peaceful possession of the demised property. In the instant case on the date when the requisition order was passed the Petitioners were tenants in the requisitioned accommodation and were occupying the same under a lawful right. If the requisition order purported to have been passed by the District Magistrate u/s 3 of the Act is not a valid order the tenancy of the Petitioners did not cease in accordance with law and their status as tenants would be deemed to have continued throughout despite the passing of the impugned order. Thus in dispossessing the Petitioners on 22nd July 1966 by force and coercion Respondents Nos. 1 and 3 and the other subordinate officials concerned under their orders acted without the authority of law. Further, Respondent No. 1 the District Magistrate, without any authority nominated Sri K.N. Sharma, Regional Transport Magistrate, to become a tenant in the requisitioned accommodation and wrongly gave him possession. Sri K.N. Sharma who has been impleaded as Respondent No. 4 is thus occupying the disputed premises without any right or authority of law. In these circumstances, I think, the Petitioners in vindication of their right of tenancy are entitled to a writ or direction from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to be restored to possession. 13. For the reasons given above I allow this petition. I quash the order of the District Magistrate, Meerut, dated 23rd May, 1966 purporting to requisition the accommodation in question. I also quash all proceedings taken by the third Respondent, the Munsif City, Meerut, for ejecting the Petitioners. I further direct the first Respondent, the District Magistrate, Meerut and the fourth Respondent, Sri K.N., Sharma, to restore possession of the premises in question to the Petitioners forthwith. The, Petitioners would be entitled to their costs.