JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - In Original Suit No. 3 of 1933 (III) in the Court of the Munsif, Khurda, opposite party-l (Plaintiff) brought a suit for arrears of rent against Defendants 1 to 3 as tenants. Petitioner Gagan Behari Patnaik, who is not a party to that suit filed an application under Order 1, Rule 10(2), CPC Code, for being implicated as a party on the allegation that the disputed house in respect of which rent was being claimed belonged to him and not to the Plaintiff. This petition was rejected. The Civil Revision has been filed against the order of the learned Munsif. It is to be noted that the Petitioner has filed Original Suit No. 86 of 1960 in the same Court for a declaration that he is the real owner of the suit house and some other properties and the Plaintiff is merely a Benamidar. Petitioner's case that he is a necessary party to the suit and that the multiplicity, the suits will be avoided if his title to the disputed house is decided in this suit. 2. Order 1, Rule 10(2) lays down that the name of any person who ought to have joined, whether as Plaintiff or Defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. The point for consideration is whether in a suit for recovery of rent by the landlord, a third party claiming title to the property in respect of which rent is claimed is a necessary party and in his absence the suit is liable to be dismissed. 3. On the plain language of the Rule, a third party is not a necessary party. The suit is one for recovery of rent. All that is necessary to be established in such a suit for obtaining a decree is that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that the Defendant had fallen into arrears of rent. Even in a case where the Plaintiff has no title to the property but the Defendant was inducted into the property by the Plaintiff as a tenant, Defendant is liable to pay rent to the Plaintiff and is precluded from challenging the title of the Plaintiff during the continuance of the tenancy. Even in a case where the Plaintiff has no title to the property but the Defendant was inducted into the property by the Plaintiff as a tenant, Defendant is liable to pay rent to the Plaintiff and is precluded from challenging the title of the Plaintiff during the continuance of the tenancy. The principles of estoppel u/s 116 of the Evidence Act apply to such a case. In a suit of this simple nature, the competing title of the rival claimants, namely, the Plaintiff and the third party, who makes an application for being impleaded, need not be gone into. For, deciding two questions-whether there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the Plaintiff and the Defendant and that the Defendant was in arrears of rent-the determination of the rival title of the Plaintiff and the third party is not necessary. A complete and effectual adjudication of the two questions in issue can be made in the absence of the third party. A simple suit for rent should not, therefore be converted into a complicated title suit. There are some well known exceptions to the aforesaid dictum, viz., if the third party claims a share of the rent sued for, or where the third party is alleged to be a transferee from the tenant with the landlord's consent, or where the Defendant in a suit for rent by the lessee against the sub-lessee pleads payment to the third party with the owner's consent. Subject to the various exceptions, some of which have been illustrated above, a suit for rent should not be converted into a complicated title suit and the third party claiming a title rival to that of the Plaintiff-landlord, is not a necessary party. The leading decision on the point is Abdul Gafur and Others Vs. Ali Miah, Sub-Registrar. Their Lordships observed as follows: It is plain that the effect of the addition of the Appellants as Defendants has been to transform a simple suit into a complex title suit.(....) To guard against possible apprehension, we must state at the outset that it cannot be affirmed as a broad proposition of law that a question of title may not be incidentally investigated in a suit for arrears of rent. Where the tenant Defendant disputes the extent of the title of the Plaintiff to the arrears demanded, it is incumbent on the Court to determine the point before the claim is allowed or disallowed. This view is supported by Rahimannessa Bibi v. Mahadeb Das Mall 12 C.L.J. 428. But subject to this reservation, parties should not be added in a suit for rent so as to alter its nature and scope and to transform it into a suit for determination of a complicated question of title to land. This decision does not appear to have been dissented from. The same view has been taken in Kunchelan v. Damodaran AIR 1960 Ker 234 , and Uttam Gulabrao Sakhare Vs. Champatrao Gulabrao Gawande, . 4. An unreported decision of this Court in Nityananda Sahu v. Joyrarn Das and Ors. C.R. No. 281 of 1957, decided on 2nd July, 1958, has been relied upon by Mr. Patnaik in support of the contention that a third party was allowed to raise the question of title. In that case, the vendor of the Plaintiff had made the application to be added as a party Defendant. The trial Court had allowed the application. His Lordship, Mohapatra, J., did not interfere in revision merely on the ground that in the presence of the vendor, the question of title would be settled for all, time to come. This decision does not lay down any principle of law i counter to the discussions already made by me. In that particular case his Lordship did not seem to be inclined to interfere in revision. This decision is not an authority for the proposition that in an ordinary suit for rent, complicated question of the title must be gone into. 5. I have already stated that the Petitioner has filed, O.S. 86/60 before the Munsif, Khurda, claiming that he is; though real owner of the disputed property. The decision in the rent suit would not adversely affect him as he is not a party to this suit. Both the suits have been long delayed. The Munshif Khurda, is directed to dispose them of separately and not analogously within a period of four months from today with intimation to this Court. 6. For reasons already stated, the Civil Revision fails and is dismissed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Revision dismissed Final Result : Dismissed