JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal from the decree of the Civil Judge, Etawah, reversing that of the Additional Munsif, Etawah and decreeing the plaintiff-respondent's suit for her ejectment. 2. The plaintiff-respondent Smt. Chandra Mukhi alleged that she was the owner of a shop and the appellant had been her tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 21/-. She further alleged that the appellant had not paid rent for tour years in spite a service of a notice of demand and, therefore, she (the plaintiff) had terminated the tenancy. 3. The defendant-appellant resisted the suit and denied that she had committed any default in payment of rent. Her version of the dispute was as follows. The house' originally belonged to one Dwarka Prasad, the father of the plaintiff. He had two children, a son Sitab Rai and a daughter, the plaintiff. According to the appellant, she was admitted to the tenancy by Sitab Rai and regularly paid rent to him. After his death, she continued to pay the same rent to Sitab Rai's son one Debi Shanker. On 13th August, 1956 she receive a notice from the present plaintiff alleging that she had paid no rent and demanding payment. On receipt of this notice she consulted her lawyer who advised her to deposit the rent under Section 7-C of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. She accepted this advice and deposited a sum of Rs. 721- along with an application under Section 7-C. The plaintiff and Debi Shanker (Sitab Rai's son) were made respondents to this application. The appellant alleged in it that she had been admitted to the tenancy by Sitab Rai and had paid rent to him and after his death to Sitab Rai's son, and she prayed that the amount deposited by her be paid to whichever of the two respondents was entitled to it. The respondents entered appearance and filed a written statement. They did not deny the allegations made in the application but merely remarked that some of them were not relevant. The respondents entered appearance and filed a written statement. They did not deny the allegations made in the application but merely remarked that some of them were not relevant. They further alleged that there should be no doubt in the mind of the tenant as to who was entitled to receive the rent, and that in any case, the respondent Debi Shanker conceded the claim of the respondent Chandra Mukhi (the present plaintiff) and would have no objection if Chandra Mukhi would withdraw the amount. On this application the learned Munsif passed the following order: "Heard applicant's counsel. The prayer set forth in the application cannot be granted as it is an application Ills 7-C of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act in which it is not to be decided who is landlord and how such rent is due. In it the applicant is to specifically allege one landlord and to specifically allege rate of rent. ORDER Application is rejected. Costs on parties. Applicant to withdraw the amount deposited by her." 4. On the rejection of this application the present suit for the ejectment of the appellant was 'filed on account of non-payment of lent. 5. The trial court held that the appellant was entitled to deposit the rent under Section 7-C and the learned Munsif had acted wrongly in rejecting the application under Section 7-C and, therefore, the appellant had committed no default. It dismissed the suit for ejectment. But on appeal the learned Civil Judge held that the appellant was not entitled to make a deposit under Section 7-C because she had not stated in her application that a doubt had arisen as to the person who was entitled to receive the rent. He observed that the object of the application under Section 7-C had been filed had wrongly rejected it; and observed that the trial court had no business to sit in judgment on the correctness of the Munsif s decision. He allowed the appeal and decreed the suit for ejectment. The appellant has come here in second appeal. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the judgments of the courts below, the application under Section 7-C and the reply of the respondents to it. In my opinion, the view of the trial court is correct and that of the Civil Judge wrong. The appellant has come here in second appeal. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the judgments of the courts below, the application under Section 7-C and the reply of the respondents to it. In my opinion, the view of the trial court is correct and that of the Civil Judge wrong. The learned Judge took the view that the appellant was not entitled to make a deposit under Section 7-C because she had not stated in her application that any doubt has arisen as to who was entitled to receive the rent. He was in error. An application under Section 7-C, like any other document, must be read as a whole. If on a perusal of the facts stated in it, the court finds that it has been filed because a doubt or dispute had arisen as to the person who is entitled to receive the rent, it must entertain the application and accept the rent even though the word doubt is not mentioned in the application itself. In the present case the appellant stated that she had been admitted to tenancy by Sitab Rai and had paid rent to him for a long time but the respondent was demanding rent from her. She asked the court to accept the deposit and pay the amount to whichever of the two respondents was entitled to receive the rent. This should have left no doubt in the minds of the learned Judge that the application had been filed because the tenant was in, doubt as to which of the two respondents was entitled to receive the rent under the law. Learned Judge took a too technical view. Moreover his criticism of the trial court for holding that the Munsif had wrongly rejected the application under Section 7-C is unjustified. The learned Judge took the view that the order under Section 7-C had become final. Evidently, he thought it operated as res judicata. In this he was in error. He misunderstood the nature and purpose of the proceedings under Section 7-C. When an application is filed under that section, there is no dispute to be decided. Sub-Sec. (4) provides : "On any deposit being made under sub-sec. Evidently, he thought it operated as res judicata. In this he was in error. He misunderstood the nature and purpose of the proceedings under Section 7-C. When an application is filed under that section, there is no dispute to be decided. Sub-Sec. (4) provides : "On any deposit being made under sub-sec. (1) the Court shall cause a notice of the deposit to be served on the landlord, and the amount of deposit may be with-drawn by the landlord on an application made by him to the Court in this behalf." It is significant that sub-sec. (4) does not say that the Munsif shall send a notice to the landlord to show' cause against the application. The purpose of the notice under sub-sec. (4) is to inform the landlord that a deposit has been made and he may withdraw it on an application to the court. Thus the court becomes a sort of custodian of any deposit made under Section 7-C., but it does not have to decide whether any dispute or doubt has arisen as to the person entitled to receive the rent. This is a matter which is left for the decision of the appropriate court if and when the tenant claims that he made no default in payment of rent because he deposited it under Section 7-C. It is for the court hearing the suit for ejectment to decide whether the tenant was entitled to make a deposit under Section 7-C. It is for the court hearing the suit it will dismiss the suit for ejectment even if the Munsif had rejected the application under Section 7-C for some erroneous reason. 7. I think the court hearing the ejectment suit is not bound by the order of rejection and consider afresh whether the tenant was entitled to make a deposit under Section 7-0 and whether the court was justified in refusing to accept. 8. This appeal is allowed with costs. I set aside the decree for the ejectment of the appellant passed by the lower appellate court. Appeal allowed.