ORDER Mahesh Chandra, J. - This is a Defendant's second appeal against the judgment and decree of the Court below. Sardar Karam Singh Respondent sued Pattan Din Appellant for recovery of possession and Rs. 24.75 as compensation for use and occupation of a shop including the site. The Respondent alleged that the Appellant was a tenant of the shop which was taken back by the Respondent later on for being included in his compound, that the Appellant wanted the Respondent to accommodate him and the Respondent allowed the Appellant to occupy the shop in suit as a licensee, that the licence was revoked by means of two notices given to him to vacate the shop and that even if the Appellant be treated as a tenant the tenancy had been terminated by notices u/s 106, Transfer of Property Act. 2. The Appellant contended that he was a tenant of the shop in suit, that he had invested Rs. 24.75 in the repairs of the shop and that in a suit filed by the Appellant against the Respondent for permanent injunction the Appellant was treated as a tenant of the Respondent, an that the Respondent was not entitled to have the shop vacated or to any decree for any compensation. 3. The trial court held that the Appellant was a tenant of the Respondent in respect of the shop in suit and not a licensee, that the notice was valid u/s 106, Transfer of Property Act, that no notice for termination of tenancy was served as required u/s 3 of Act III of 1947 and that the Appellant had failed to prove that he had spent Rs. 24.75 towards the repairs of the shop. The suit was accordingly dismissed by the trial Court for ejectment but decreed for recovery of Rs. 24.75 as arrears of rent. In first appeal the Court below held that the Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (Act No. III of 1947) did not apply and that the Respondent was entitled to a decree for ejectment also. Consequently, the suit for ejectment also was decreed by the first appellate Court. 4. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the Control of Rent and Eviction Act applies to the present suit. This contention is without force. Consequently, the suit for ejectment also was decreed by the first appellate Court. 4. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the Control of Rent and Eviction Act applies to the present suit. This contention is without force. As mentioned by the first appellate Court it is the common case of the parties that the shop in dispute had no roof over it when it was taken by the Appellant from the Respondent. Section 1(2-A)(iii) of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 clearly says-- Nothing in the Act shall apply to any tenancy or other relationship in respect of any plot of land not covered by roofed structure. This provides a complete answer to the contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant. I agree with the Court below that the Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 will not apply to the property in suit, which, when taken by the Appellant from the Respondent, was without roof. 6. The second contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that it was not a notice for termination of tenancy u/s 106, Transfer of Properly Act. The first notice dated 23/25 May, 1959 runs as follows: Bamujib hidayat apne malik Raja Karam Singh Saheb aap ko ittila de raha hun ki San 1956 Iswi me aap Raja Saheb mausuf ke zamin par sarak ke pachchhim janib dukan lagate the aur tin rakh kar dukan qayam kar ii thi jisko aap ne apni razamandi se khali kar diya aur tin waghairah ke dam Raja Saheb mausuf se le liya. Magar chunki us waqt aap ko koyi dusri dukan shahar me nahin mil rahi thi aapki istedua par Raja Saheb mausuf ne aapko yeh ijazat de di thi ki arzi taur par aap apni dukan unki arazi jo sarak ke purab waqai hai us par laga len magar jab wah chahen aap yeh arazi khali kar den aapne use manzoor kiya tha aur aapki majid istedua par us jagah. dewar arzi uthwa kar wahi tin lagwa di. Inhi wajooh se koyi sarkhat nahin likhaya gaya aur na'kiraya wasool kiya gaya. Ab itna arsa ho chuka hai aur aap ab tak hila hawala karte rahe ab Raja Saheb ko is jagah dukan tamir karana hai jiski ijazat municipal board se mil chuki hai. dewar arzi uthwa kar wahi tin lagwa di. Inhi wajooh se koyi sarkhat nahin likhaya gaya aur na'kiraya wasool kiya gaya. Ab itna arsa ho chuka hai aur aap ab tak hila hawala karte rahe ab Raja Saheb ko is jagah dukan tamir karana hai jiski ijazat municipal board se mil chuki hai. Lihaza yeh ittila de raha hun ki bamiyad 30 din Jagah khali kar deejiye warna aap par dawa hoga aur zer bar kharcha adalat ke honge aur harja bhi dena parega. Faqat Ta. 23/25 May San 1959 Iswi. 7. It will be evident from the above notice that it was not a notice in respect of any tenancy, for the Respondent treated the Appellant not as a tenant but as a licensee. It was a pure and simple notice requiring him to vacate the land as a licensee. 8. In Ahmad Ali v. Mohd. Jamal Uddin 1963 AWR 490 a Division Bench of this Court, following the earlier Full Bench decision in Bradley v. Atkinson ILR All. 899 held that-- A notice terminating the tenancy may include a demand for possession but a notice only demanding possession cannot be interpreted as a notice terminating the tenancy. Whatever the position may be if the notice is by the landlord treating the opposite party a tenant, there is no doubt that a notice by an owner treating the opposite party merely to be a licensee and demanding merely possession would not be a notice terminating the tenancy. There was no tenancy at that time in the contemplation of the person giving the notice. On the contrary, even when he filed the suit, he filed it treating the Appellant to be a licensee. Neither notice dated 23/25, 1959 nor dated 5-1-1960, which reiterated the earlier notice treating the Appellant to be a mere licensee, can, therefore, be said to be a valid notice for termination of tenancy contemplated by Section 106, Transfer of Property Act. 9. As pointed out by the first appellate Court the learned Counsel for the Respondent did not challenge in the Court below the finding of the trial Court that the Appellant was a tenant and not a licensee. The Appellant cannot then be ejected without valid notice u/s 106, Transfer of Property Act and no such notice Was given. 10. The appeal is Accordingly allowed with costs. The Appellant cannot then be ejected without valid notice u/s 106, Transfer of Property Act and no such notice Was given. 10. The appeal is Accordingly allowed with costs. The decree of the first appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court restored.