JUDGMENT H. C. P. Tripathi, J. - These petitions under Sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenge the validity of the Orders dated 1st August, 1965, which are similar in nature and passed by the Government of India under Rule 30, sub-rule (1), Clause (b) of the Defendant of India Rules, 1962, raise common questions of law and facts and can conveniently disposed of together. 2. The undisputed facts which are relevant to the questions in controversy are stated briefly. 3. The petitioners are active members of the Communist Party India. They were first arrested and detained in various jails in the State of Uttar Pradesh in pursuance of the orders passed in the name of Governor of Uttar Pradesh under Rule 3 (1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules. In the case of some of these petitioners the order of detentio was reviewed by the authorities an their detention was continued. 4. A number of writ petitions was filed in this Court challenging the orders of detention passed by the State Government under the defendant of India Rules inter alia on the assertions that the State Government was not satisfied about the requirements of the detention orders. On of such petitions filed by Sri Teg Bahadur Singh came up for hear in before the Court on 26-7-1965 and Sri B. P. Joshi, Home Secretary, and Sri R, K. Kaul, Deputy Home Secretary, who had filed affidavits saying that the Chief Minister of U.P. was satisfied about the requirements of the detention order passed by the State Government, were summoned for examination. 5. On 31st of July, 1965, the State Government cancelled its order of detention relating to these petitioners. On the 1st of August, 1965, however, the impugned orders were passed by the Central Government directing the detention of the petitioners which were served on them and since then they are in detention. 6. While the petitioners were under detention in pursuance to the order of the State Government they were convicted by a Magistrate First Class, Basti, under Sec. 147, and 427/149 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sec. 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and each of them was sentenced to three months rigorous imprisonment under each count. Their sentences, however, were to run concurrently. Their sentences, however, were to run concurrently. The impugned order of detention passed by the Central Government was served on the petitioners on 2-8-1965 in jail while they were undergoing the sentence of imprisonment awarded to them in the aforesaid criminal case. 7. Although in these petitions the validity for the orders of detention has been challenged on several grounds only a few of them have been canvassed at the bar. 8. Mr. Asif Ansari, learned counsel for the petitioners, has raised several points in support of these petitions most of which are covered by a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Anand Madhav Trivedi v. Superintendent of Central Jail, Crl. Misc. Case No. 2621 of 1965. As we agree with that decision it is not necessary to refer to those points. 9. Mr. Ansari has, however, contended that as the petitioners were in jail as convicted persons whose sentences were still to run for some length of time the impugned orders are illegal inasmuch as before the detaining authority could legitimately come to the conclusion that the detention of the petitioners was necessary to prevent them from acting in a prejudicial manner the authority has to be satisfied that if the person is not detained he would act in a prejudicial manner and that inevitably postulates freedom of action to the said person at the relevant time. It is contended that even if it is held that the order of detention could have been passed by the detaining authority taking into account the materials relating to the activities of the petitioners before they had been detained or put in jail as convicted persons that order could not have been served on them while they were undergoing sentence of imprisonment in jail and their sentences were still to' run for a period of about two months. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1120: "The service of a detention order on a person who is already in jail custody virtually seeks to effectuate what may be called a double detention and such double detention is not intended either by Sec. 3 (1) (a) or by Rule 30(1) (b); it is plainly unnecessary and outside the purview of both the provisions." 10. The aforesaid observations were made by the Supreme Court in a case in which the detinue was already in jail as under trial prisoner for an interminate period when the order of detention was served on him. That is not the case here. The petitioner's term of imprisonment was to conclude within a few months. In the case of Godavari Shamrao Parulekar v. The State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1128 while referring to the cases of Rameshwar Shaw, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 334 and Makhan Singh Tarsikka, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1120 the Supreme Court was pleased to observe: "Those two cases were concerned with the service for an order of detention under the Preventive Detention Act or under the Rules on a person who. was in jail in one of two circumstances namely (1) where he was in jail as an under trial prisoner and the period for which he was in jail was indeterminate, or (2) where he was in jail as a convicted person and the period of his sentence has still to run for some length of time. In those cases the service of the order of detention under the Prevention Detention Act or under the Rules in jail would not be legal for one of the necessary ingredients about which the authority had to be satisfied would be absent, namely, that it was necessary to detain the person concerned which could only be postulated of a person who was not already in prison. In the present cases, however, the appellants were not under detention either as under-trial prisoners for an indeterminate time or as convicted persons whose sentences were still to run for some length of time." 11. It is therefore, obvious that where a person has been in jail not for an indefinite period and where his release is to take effect within a few months there is no bar for passing a fresh order of detention on a consideration of materials antecedent to his detention in jail and in serving the same while he is still in jail. It will be an empty formality to allow such persons to get out of jail on the expiry of their short period of imprisonment and then to serve the order which had already been passed legally on the basis of materials available to the detaining authority. 12. It will be an empty formality to allow such persons to get out of jail on the expiry of their short period of imprisonment and then to serve the order which had already been passed legally on the basis of materials available to the detaining authority. 12. In this view of the matter we are for opinion that there is no force in these petitions and they are dismissed accordingly. Petitions dismissed.