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1966 DIGILAW 49 (CAL)

SHANTI BALA DASI v. MADHAI KUNDU

1966-03-04

A.C.GUPTA, P.CHATTERJEE

body1966
CHATTERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against an order passed in an appeal allowing pre-emption under Section 26f of the Bengal Tenancy Act. ( 2 ) SIVADAS Kundu, Opposite Party No. 4 executed a registered Deed of Settlement in favour of the petitioner, who is the widow of a pre-deceased son of the said Sivadas Kundu and granted to her a life estate of the property now in dispute. On the 27th September, 1961 the said Sivadas executed a registered deed of sale with respect to his right to reversion in favour of the petitioner. The opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 thereafter applied for pre-emption under Section 26f of the Bengal Tenancy Act on the basis of the aforesaid sale. It was urged that the sale which is to be pre-empted was not a sale at all but a Benami transaction. But that point has been over-ruled by the final Court of fact and therefore that point was not urged in this Court. The trial Court further held that as the transferee was actually in possession under an earlier grant for her life the pre-emptor could not dispossess her and therefore, the application for pre-emption was dismissed. An appeal to the Court of appeal below was successful. The appeal Court held that as soon as the petitioner transferee got both life estate as well as a vested remainder there was a merger and the application for pre-emption would be maintainable. We do not very much appreciate this point of merger urged in the Court of Appeal below. This is not a merger within the meaning of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. If there is merger otherwise than under Section 111 would be a question of intention but that question was not raised. Further, what was sought to be pre-empted was the latter kobala and the pre-emptee could not get anything more than what was transferred by the later kobala. The grant of life estate by the earlier document was not the subject-matter of pre-emption and we do not follow how could be pre-emptee get that right as well without paying for it. ( 3 ) MR. Chittotosh Mukherjee, who appeared for the petitioner, has urged three points. The grant of life estate by the earlier document was not the subject-matter of pre-emption and we do not follow how could be pre-emptee get that right as well without paying for it. ( 3 ) MR. Chittotosh Mukherjee, who appeared for the petitioner, has urged three points. The first point is that under Section 26f of the Bengal Tenancy Act the transferee being already a co-sharer otherwise than by purchase the transfer in question was not liable to be pre-empted. Secondly, even if pre-emption be available to the pre-emptor the pre-emptor could not get any thing more than what was sold and therefore, the pre-emptor could not get actual possession during the life time of the petitioner transferee and thirdly, pre-emption under Section 26f of the Bengal Tenancy Act cannot be availed of after the Estates Acquisition Act came into force. ( 4 ) SECTION 26f of the Bengal Tenancy Act provides as follows: (1) Excepting the case of a transfer a co-sharer in the tenancy whose existing interest has accrued otherwise than by purchase. . . . . . one or more of the co-sharer tenancy by holding a portion or share of which is transferred may within four months of the service of notice under Section 26c apply to the Court for the said portion or share to be transferred to himself of themselves. ( 5 ) THE first question is whether the transferee petitioner was a co-sharer in the tenancy whose existing interest has accrued otherwise than by purchase. There is no doubt that the existing interest of the transferee accrued by the grant of a life estate and not by purchase. It has been urged by Mr. Bagchi that the transferee had no existing interest whatsoever. The alleged grant of life estate was not such a grant at all. It would merely operate as licence against the transferee who had no right of alienation. Whether it was a licence or not was not urged in the Court below and the document (Ex. A) does not show that a licence was given. The grant is a grant of the right to possess as also of interest in the property for life. The word 'sattaw' (interest) has specifically been used and not mere 'dakhal' which means possession. But there are certain other restrictions regarding the transfer by the grantor. A) does not show that a licence was given. The grant is a grant of the right to possess as also of interest in the property for life. The word 'sattaw' (interest) has specifically been used and not mere 'dakhal' which means possession. But there are certain other restrictions regarding the transfer by the grantor. Whether such restrictions are good or bad are not for our consideration. It is sufficient for us to hold that by the document there was a grant of interest in land together with delivery of possession and it was not mere licence where possession was delivered and no interest in land was granted. We, however, overrule the first point that by Ex. 1 a licence was granted in favour of the transferee. We hold that some interest in land was created and possession was delivered by the aforesaid document. The next question is whether the grantee of such an interest becomes a co-sharer in the occupancy holding. The word 'co-sharer' ordinarily used means a person who shares in the profits and the petitioner transferee has some share in the property having some right thereto. The Bengal Tenancy Act under Section 5 recognizes three types of tenants. (1) Tenure holder, (2) Rayt (3) Under-rayats. As the transferor was himself an occupancy rayat having a share in the occupancy holding there is no question that the grant of life interest could not be a tenure holder. The transferee being an Occupancy Rayat and having a right to transfer under Section 26b of the Transfer of Property Act there transferee could not be a non-occupancy rayat. There is no question of non-occupancy rayat being a co-sharer of a holding of occupancy rayat. Any transfer of an occupancy rayat except of course in the case of a transfer by way of lease. In the latter case such a transferee would be considered to be an under rayat. There is no argument before us that the document (Ex. A) was a lease in favour of the grantee of life interest. Therefore, there is no scope for saying that the grantee became an under rayat. Hence, the grantee cannot but be classified as an occupancy rayat. We may also refer to Section 26g of the Bengal Tenancy Act. There is no argument before us that the document (Ex. A) was a lease in favour of the grantee of life interest. Therefore, there is no scope for saying that the grantee became an under rayat. Hence, the grantee cannot but be classified as an occupancy rayat. We may also refer to Section 26g of the Bengal Tenancy Act. If there is a mortgage the mortgagee also becomes a co-sharer in the occupancy holding and the rights of such mortgagor and mortgagee are defined in Section 26 (g ). ( 6 ) FURTHER Section 26 (f) refers to the rights of one or more co-sharer tenants of the holding or a portion of the holding or a share of the holding. Section 26 (F) refers to (1) co-sharer tenants of a holding, (2) co-sharer tenant of a portion of a holding, (3) co-sharer tenants of a share of a holding. The Grantor of the Life-interest was a co-sharer tenant of the holding before he granted the life interest in favour of the petitioner. Having granted a life interest to the petitioner, he became a co-sharer of his share of the holding. Before the grant of the life estate he was a co-sharer of a holding to the extent of half share in the holding but after the grant of the life estate he introduced some body who shared with him the said half share of the holding. Or in other words after the transfer a sharer which the transferor had in the whole holding. We do not find, therefore, any difficulty in holding that the transferee was a co-sharer tenant of half-share in the holding though the transferee might not be called a co-sharer tenant of the holding. But he was merely a co-sharer tenant of a share of the holding as a half share of the holding was shared by herself and her father-in-law. Thus, she became a co-sharer in the tenancy? in terms of sub-section (1), clause (a) and her interest accrued otherwise than by purchase i. e. made by grant of life estate. Therefore, this transfer is protected under Section 26f (1) (a) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. ( 7 ) THE aforesaid interpretation agrees with the definition of the word 'holding' which after the 1928 amendment means a parcel or a share or even an undivided share of a holding. Therefore, this transfer is protected under Section 26f (1) (a) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. ( 7 ) THE aforesaid interpretation agrees with the definition of the word 'holding' which after the 1928 amendment means a parcel or a share or even an undivided share of a holding. We, therefore, hold that Section 26f has no application and the transfer in question is protected by Section 26f (1) (a) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In this view of the matter the application for pre-emption must be dismissed and it is not necessary for us to consider the other two points urged by Mr. Mukherjee. The Rule is therefore made absolute, the order of the appeal Court below is set aside and that of the trial court restored and we direct each party will bear his cost thereto. GUPTA, J.- I agree. Rule made absolute.