ORDER Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This application in revision is directed against the order of I Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge of Allahabad confirming in appeal the order of a Magistrate 1st Class by which he convicted the Applicant Roshan L. u/s 447 IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment till the rising of the court and to a fine of Rs. 10/-. 2. The Applicant was an employee of the 4 E.D. Manuari. The case against him was that on March 5, 1964 at about 11.00 p.m. he was seen moving about within the Air Force prohibited area of 4 E.D. Manuari, police Station Puramufti. Corporals S.L. Sharma and Bir Singh and Watchman Nanda Singh challenged him near the domestic quarter T/204 lying within the said prohibited area and arrested him. About ten steps from the place where the Applicant was arrested a cycle was discovered resting against the barbed wire fencing of the prohibited area. There was a Jhola hanging from the handle of the cycle and it contained a tiffin carrier. The Applicant was taken to the guard room where Warrant Officer Sri J.B. Thomas wrote out a report and the Applicant was thereafter sent to Police Station Puramufti. A report u/s 447 IPC was registered there against him and after investigation, he was sent up for trial. 3. The Applicant pleaded not guilty. He stated that at the time of his arrest he was really returning on his cycle to his house after seeing a cinema show in the town and when he reached the main gate of the prohibited area he saw Corporal Sharma teasing a woman to which he objected, whereupon Corporal Sharma felt annoyed and got up a false case against him. The courts below have disbelieved the story put forward by the accused and I think, rightly. They have also accepted the case of the prosecution in regard to the circumstances in which the Applicant was arrested and I find no reason for not accepting this finding of fact. 4. The question, however, is whether on the proved facts of the case an offence u/s 447, IPC can be said to have been made out. An entry into or upon property in the possession of another constitutes criminal trespass only when it is with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property. An entry into or upon property in the possession of another constitutes criminal trespass only when it is with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property. It is true that intent is a mental state and it is not susceptible of proof by direct evidence but can only be inferred from the external acts in which it manifests itself and by the surrounding circumstances. But, where intent is an ingredient of an offence the conduct from which it is sought to be inferred must be so unequivocal and the circumstances so conclusive that the inference becomes irresistible. In the instant case the trial Magistrate did not record a finding that the Applicant entered into the prohibited area with intent to commit an offence and all that he held was that the trespass made by the Applicant was clearly to the annoyance of the Air Force authorities. The learned Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge dealt at length with the circumstances in which the Applicant was arrested but disposed of the question of the Applicant's intent by merely observing that 'there can be no doubt about the fact that he had gone there to do some mischief as one chisel had been recovered from his possession. 5. It may first to be noted that although Corporal S.L. Sharma stated in his evidence that a chisel was recovered from the pocket of the Applicant the evidence of Watchman Nanda Singh was to the effect that the chisel was found in the Jhola hanging from the handle of the cycle. The recovery of a chisel from the Applicant's Jhola appears to be altogether insufficient for a finding that he had the intent to commit an offence. Even if, however, it were a fact that the chisel was found on the person of the Applicant it would have been a very meagre foundation for a finding regarding the existence of such an intent. The point for consideration, therefore, is whether the Applicant had the intent to annoy any person in possession of the prohibited area. 6. Even if, however, it were a fact that the chisel was found on the person of the Applicant it would have been a very meagre foundation for a finding regarding the existence of such an intent. The point for consideration, therefore, is whether the Applicant had the intent to annoy any person in possession of the prohibited area. 6. The trial Magistrate did not find that the entry into the prohibited area made by the Applicant was with intent to cause annoyance to the Air Force authorities and the only meaning attributable to his finding, which I have quoted above, is that annoyance to the said authorities was likely to be the necessary result of the entry. Presumably, the learned Magistrate thought that the Applicant should be deemed to have intended the natural consequence of his act and the Applicant should accordingly be held to have intended to annoy the. Air Force authorities. 7. There was some divergence of judicial opinion on the question whether knowledge of the fact that an, entry into or upon the property of a person would in all likelihood result in annoyance to such person is sufficient to prove that the entry was with intent to annoy. In view, however, of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mathuri and Others Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 986 that divergence has lost its significance and the question has now been authoritatively settled. In view, however, of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mathuri and Others Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 986 that divergence has lost its significance and the question has now been authoritatively settled. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have explained at length what is meant in Section 441 IPC by an intent to intimidate, insult or annoy and have summed up the position in the following words: The correct position in law may, in our opinion, be stated thus: In order to establish that the entry on the property was with the intent to annoy, intimidate or insult, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult was the aim of the entry; that it is not sufficient for that purpose to show merely that the natural consequence of the entry was likely to be annoyance, intimidation or insult and that this likely consequence was known to the persons entering; that in deciding whether the aim of the entry was the causing of such annoyance, intimidation or insult, the Court has to consider all the relevant circumstances including the presence of knowledge that its natural consequences would be such annoyance, intimidation or insult and including also the probability of something else than the causing of such intimidation, insult or annoyance, being the dominant intention which prompted the entry. Earlier in the judgment, their Lordships have quoted with approval an observation of Batty, J. in Bhagwant v. Kedari ILR 25 Bom 202 as to the meaning of the word 'intent' in Section 25 IPC and have observed that 'the fact that these observations were made for the purpose of ascertaining what is meant by the word 'fraudulently' does not diminish their general value and correctness. The said observation of Batty, J. are: The word 'intent' by its etymology, seems to have metaphorical allusion to archery and implies "aim" and thus connotes not a casual or merely possible result foreseen perhaps as a not improbable incident, but not desired--but rather connotes the one object for which the effort is made--and thus has reference to what has been called the dominant motive, without which the action would not have been taken. 8. In this connection I have been referred to two decisions of this Court, viz. Motilal Vs. Emperor through Kanhaiya Lal, AIR 1925 All 540 and Keshar Singh and Ors. 8. In this connection I have been referred to two decisions of this Court, viz. Motilal Vs. Emperor through Kanhaiya Lal, AIR 1925 All 540 and Keshar Singh and Ors. v. Rex 1950 AWR (HC) 19. Both of these decisions have been noticed and commented upon in the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The former is a Division Bench case in which Mears, C.J, delivering the judgment of the Banch, said: In our opinion the words of the section must be closely adhered to and there must in all these cases be found an intent to cause intimidation, insult or annoyance. A conviction cannot, in our opinion, follow merely because one can pronounce with certainty that the accused must have known that his act would, as one of its inevitable incidents, cause annoyance. The latter is a single Judge case where it was observed: Unless the man committing criminal trespass gave expression to his intention, it would be impossible to produce direct evidence of the intention. The intention has in most cases to be inferred from the circumstances. Where the probable consequence of the act alleged to be criminal trespass was to cause annoyance to the persons in possession it will be presumed that it was committed with that intention. The presumption will hold good if it is not rebutted. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the former decision of this Court is in accord with the view expressed by them in the above case and have accordingly given their approval to it and as to the latter decision they have observed that the statement of law in it is not quite accurate. The true legal position, therefore, is that although the natural consequence of an entry made by a person, into or upon property of another and the knowledge that such consequence will ensue are, certainly, factors to be taken into account in determining whether the entry was with intent to intimidate, insult or annoy, they are not by themselves sufficient to prove such intent. The aim or the dominant motive of the entry may not be intimidation, insult or annoyance even though one or more of these things may be the natural consequence of the entry and the person making the entry may also be aware of that consequence. 9. The aim or the dominant motive of the entry may not be intimidation, insult or annoyance even though one or more of these things may be the natural consequence of the entry and the person making the entry may also be aware of that consequence. 9. The entry of the Applicant in the Air Force prohibited area took place in the night at about 11.15 p.m. and the circumstances indicate that it was intended to be a secret entry. It is, therefore, not possible to say that the Applicant had the intent to annoy the persons in possession of the area, even if annoyance to such persons was the natural consequence if the entry was noticed or discovered. No offence punishable u/s 447 IPC has, therefore, been established against the Applicant and he is entitled to acquittal. What the intent of the Applicant was may be involved in mystry, but that cannot justify a finding that the entry was with intent either to commit an offence or to annoy. 10. The application is accordingly allowed. The conviction and sentence of the Applicant are set aside and he is acquitted The fine, if paid, shall be refunded.