JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - These are two connected appeals from the decree of the Additional District Judge, Kanpur reversing that of the First Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur and dismissing the appellant's suit for an injunction to restrain the Kanpur Mahapalika from demolishing certain constructions made by the appellant in his house. They raised an important question of law-namely, whether the U. P. Government had the power to authorise the Administrator of any KAVAL towns (KANPUR, ALLAHABAD, VARANASI, AGRA, LUCKNOW) to delegate to another official the power of issuing a notice of demolition under Section 186 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. It is not necessary to relate all the facts or allegations made in the plaint and I shall state only those facts which are relevant to the decision of this appeal. The plaintiff-appellant, Kailash Chandra Nigam, is the owner of two houses in Kanpur known as Nos. 40171 and 40172 Parade Kanpur. Though separately numbered they really form one building today. The appellant, after purchasing the two houses from previous owners, decided to re-build and renovate portions of them. He submitted to the Municipal Board, Kanpur (to be called the Board) a consolidated plan for building a single house. Certain objections against the plan were made by the Board kind the appellant modified it to meet them. According to the appellant he started making the constructions in accordance with the plan, but on 11-3-1957 he received a notice signed by an official describing himself as the Scheme Secretary of the Board, and requiring him to demolish a portion of the constructions already made by him. On 31-3-1957 he received a second notice signed by the same official and requiring him to demolish another portion already constructed by him. Both these notices purported to have been issued under Section 186 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. The appellant pleaded that both the notices were ultra vires, without jurisdiction, null and void. He asked for an injunction to restrain the Board from demolishing the constructions in pursuance of these illegal notices. As two notices had been issued the plaintiff filed two suits which were, however, consolidated and disposed of by a common hearing. 2. The Board resisted both the suits and denied that the notices were without jurisdiction or illegal. It raised a preliminary objection that the suit was barred under Section 321 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. As two notices had been issued the plaintiff filed two suits which were, however, consolidated and disposed of by a common hearing. 2. The Board resisted both the suits and denied that the notices were without jurisdiction or illegal. It raised a preliminary objection that the suit was barred under Section 321 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. On merits it pleaded that the appellant had raised the constructions in violation of the bye-laws of the Board and consequently these were liable to be demolished. It further contended that the notice was validly issued by the Scheme Secretary of the Board under the authority of the Administrator who had been empowered by a notification of the State Government to delegate his power under Section 186 of the Act to any other official of the Board. 3. The trial court held that the plaintiff had violated the bye-laws of the Board but was entitled to make the constructions because these would be deemed to have been sanctioned under Section 180 (3) of the U. P. Municipalities Act. It further held that the two notices issued under Section 186 of the Act were invalid as they had not been issued under the orders of the Board but only signed by the Scheme Secretary. Accordingly it decreed the suit and issued an in-junction to restrain the Board from demolishing the constructions in pursuance of the illegal notices. 4. On appeal the Additional District Judge also Weld that the plaintiff appellant had violated the bye-laws of the Board in making the constructions but disagreed that the plaintiff was entitled to make these constructions. He held that though Section 180 (3) provides that the sanction of the Board shall be deemed to have been given under certain circumstances (enumerated in that provision) , the proviso expressly stated that "nothing in sub-sec. (3) shall be construed to authorise any person to act in contravention of the U. P. Municipalities Act or of any bye-law". The learned Judge also held that notices of demolition issued under Section 186 of the Act were not invalid by reason of their having been signed by the Scheme Secretary as this official had been given the power to act under Section 186 by an order of the Administrator. On these findings he allowed the Board's appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The latter has come to this Court in second appeal. On these findings he allowed the Board's appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The latter has come to this Court in second appeal. 5. Mr. N. D. Pant for the Board has raised a preliminary objection that the plaintiff's suit itself was incompetent, being barred under Section 321 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. The aforesaid Section provides, "Finality of order of appellate authority. (1) No order or direction referred to in Section 318 shall be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided therein. (2) The order of the appellate authority confirming, setting aside or modifying any such order or direction shall be final: Provided that it shall be lawful for the appellate authority, upon application, and after giving notice to the other party, to review any order passed by hint in appeal by a further order passed within three months from the date of his original order." 6. Mr. Pant contended that any order or direction made by a Board under the powers conferred upon it by Section 186 of the Act is appealable under Section 318, but the order of the appellate authority in appeal is final under Section 321 (a) of the Act. Counsel pointed out that in the present case the appellant had filed no appeal against the two notices served on him under Section 186 of the Act but had chosen to challenge their validity by means of a suit in the civil court. Counsel submitted that such a suit is expressly barred under Section 321 (1) which enjoins in effect that an order or direction made under Section 186 shall not be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than that provided in Section 318. Counsel's argument in a nutshell is that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit questioning the validity of an order or direction under Section 186 and the plaintiff's sole remedy was by way of appeal under Section 318; therefore the suit itself is incompetent and was rightly dis-missed by the lower appellate court on this ground. 7. In my opinion, the present suit is not barred under Section 321. That Section provides in effect that the orders or directions mentioned in Section 318 shall not be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than the one provided in that Section. 7. In my opinion, the present suit is not barred under Section 321. That Section provides in effect that the orders or directions mentioned in Section 318 shall not be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than the one provided in that Section. It is true that one of them is an order or direction made by a Board under the powers conferred upon it by Section 186. But the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred only if the order or direction under Section 186 was passed by an authority competent to pass it. The protection of Section 321 against any scrutiny by the Civil Court extends only to an order which was within the jurisdiction of the authority which passed it, but not to one which was without jurisdiction. The relevant words of Section 318 are "any order or direction made by a Board under the powers conferred upon it by Sections (Then follow the numbers of various sections of the Act...) ". These words clearly mean that the immunity from civil suits under Section 321 is limited to those orders which were passed in the exercise of powers conferred under certain sections. It follows that if the orders were passed by an authority which has no power under the section concerned, these will not be immune from the jurisdiction of the civil court. 8. In the present case the plaintiff appellant contends that the Scheme Secretary who issued the two notices of demolition had no power to issue them and, therefore, they are without jurisdiction. If he establishes that the Scheme Secretary had no power to issue these notices, the civil court has the jurisdiction to interfere on the ground that the notices were not issued in the exercise of any power under the Act. The bar of Section 321 is confined to the merits of an order and does not protect one which is without jurisdiction. I shall, therefore, consider whether the two notices issued by the Scheme Secretary are without jurisdiction. 9. I have read these notices which are Exhibits 8 and 9 respectively. Both are signed by an official who describes himself as the Scheme Secretary (Yojana Mantri). Both purport to have been issued 'under Section 186 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. I shall, therefore, consider whether the two notices issued by the Scheme Secretary are without jurisdiction. 9. I have read these notices which are Exhibits 8 and 9 respectively. Both are signed by an official who describes himself as the Scheme Secretary (Yojana Mantri). Both purport to have been issued 'under Section 186 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. The simple question in this appeal is whether the Scheme Secretary had the power to issue a notice under Section 186 of the Act. This Section runs thus: "Power of board to stop erection and to demolish building erected.The board may at any time by written notice direct the owner or occupier of any land to stop the erection, re-erection or alteration of a building or part of a building or the construction or enlargement of a well thereon in any case where the board considers that such erection, re-erection, alteration, construction or enlargement is an offence under Section 185 and may, in like manner, direct the alteration or demolition as it deems necessary of the building, part of. a building, or the well, as the case may be." 10. It may be noted that the Section read by itself confers the power to issue a notice of demolition on the Board and on no other authority. The reason for this is fairly obvious. A decision to order the demolition of a building already constructed is a serious one and can have grave consequences for the person against whom it is made. Before directing demolition the Board must come to the conclusion that the offending erection is an offence under Section 185 of the Act. In other words, the Board has to apply its mind to the question whether the person against whom the order of demolition is to be made is guilty of an offence under Section 185. I am inclined to think that this function is, of a quasi-judicial nature. For these reasons the legislature thought fit that a power of this nature must be exercised by the Board itself. 11. But Section 50 of the Act provides that certain powers, duties and functions of the Board may be exercised, and shall be performed or discharged by the President of the Board and not otherwise. These are specified in the section. 11. But Section 50 of the Act provides that certain powers, duties and functions of the Board may be exercised, and shall be performed or discharged by the President of the Board and not otherwise. These are specified in the section. It is not necessary to enumerate any of them except those mentioned in clause (e) which are as follows: "All other duties, powers and functions but there is no remark, "may be delegated of a Board with the exception of (i) (not relevant), (ii) those specified in the second Reading Schedule I and Section 111 together, column of Schedule I, and (iii) those delegated by the Board under Section 112." 12. Thus under Section 50 certain powers, duties, and functions of a Board must be performed by its President, but those specified in 1 the second column of Schedule I of the Act are expressly excluded. The powers of the Board under Section 186 are specified in the second column of this Schedule, and, therefore, cannot be exercised by the President with the aid of Section 50. 13. Mr. N. D. Pant contended that Section 50 provides for the automatic exercise of certain powers by the President, but certain other powers can be delegated by the Board, and the power to issue notices and directions for demolition under Section 186 can be so delegated. I cannot agree. The power of delegation is conferred on the Board by Sections 111 (1) and 112 of the Act. Section 111 (1) runs thus: "The powers, duties, and functions specified in the second column of Schedule I, with the exception of those against which an entry is shown in the third column of that schedule, may he exercised, and shall be performed or discharged, by a board by resolution passed at a meeting of the board and not otherwise." To understand the meaning and effect of this provision, it is necessary to describe the nature of Schedule I. It consists of three columns. The first specifies the section which confers the particular power or imposes a particular duty, the second describes the nature of this power of duty, and the third is a remarks column specifying whether the power may be delegated. The first specifies the section which confers the particular power or imposes a particular duty, the second describes the nature of this power of duty, and the third is a remarks column specifying whether the power may be delegated. It is important to note that whereas the first and second columns contain 81 entries relating to different kinds of powers to be exercised by the Board, the remarks column contains the remarks, "may be delegated" only against seven of these items. 14. The power to issue notices or directions for demolition under Section 186 is included in the entries under Schedule I, and Sec. III together, it is clear that this power must be exercised "by a board by resolution passed at a meeting of the board and not otherwise". Sec. I 1 I expressly prohibits the delegation of this power to any other authority. Section 112 (I) confirms this prohibition. It says "With the exception of a power, duty or function (a) specified in the second column, and against which no entry is shown in the third column of Schedule I; (b) ; and (c) not relevant; a board may delegate by resolution all or any of the powers, duties or functions conferred or imposed on, or assigned to, a board under this Act. "Thus though there is a power to delegate its functions etcetera under Section 112, it does not extend to those powers and functions in respect of which Schedule I contains no remark, "may be delegated". 15. Therefore, the Act not only contains no provision for the delegation by the Board of its power to issue directions for demolition under Section 186, but also expressly prohibits such delegation. 16. Mr. Pant then contended that whatever may have been the position under the U. P. Municipalities Act, it has changed since the passing of the U. P. Local Bodies (Appointment of Administrators) Act, 1953, which empowered the State Government to appoint Administrators of the Municipal Board of the "five Kaval Towns" and also to adopt, alter, modify or suspend any provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act. Learned counsel contended that the State Government has, in the exercise of the power conferred under this Act, not only appointed an Administrator of the Kanpur Municipal Board but also suspended the provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act which prohibit the delegation of the power under Section 186 to any other officer. 17. The U.P. Local Bodies (Appointment of Administrators) Act, 1953 (U.P. Act 17 of 1953) confers on the State Government the power to appoint Administrators for the Towns of Kanpur, Agra, Banaras, Allahabad and Lucknow (to e called Kaval towns) and also a limited power to make incidental and consequential provisions which may appear necessary for the purpose of enabling Administrator to perform their functions. As Mr. Pant's argument that the State Government derives its power to authorise the Administrators to delegate the power to direct demolition under Section 186 to any other official is based entirely on Section 3 of the Act, it is necessary to quote it verbatim:- 3" Appointment of Administrators - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, the U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919, or the Kanpur Urban Area Development Act, 1945, the State Government may, with a view to facilitate the establishment of Corporations in Kaval Towns and to ensure smooth transition, by order published in the Gazette, appoint Administrators for any local body in any Kaval Towns and - (a) declare that with effect from the date to be specified all powers, duties and functions of the local body, its President, Chairman or a Committee thereof, whether under the said enactment or any other law, shall be vested in such Administrator and shall, until the Order is superseded or repealed, be exercised, performed and discharged by or under the authority of the Administrator who shall be deemed in law to be the Board, Trust, President, Chairman or Committee, as the occasion may require; and (b) make such incidental and consequential provisions including provisions for suspending any provisions of the said Acts as may appear to be necessary or desirable for this purpose; Provided that the State Government may appoint one and the same person as Administrator for more than one local body in the same town. (2) Upon the publication of the Order under sub-sec. (2) Upon the publication of the Order under sub-sec. (1) - (a) the Board or Trust constituted as such shall cease to function and all members of the Board or Trust including the Chairman, President, or any Committee thereof shall, as the case may be, vacate their offices with effect from the date specified under clause (a) of sub-sec. (1); (b) where a President or Chairman has before his vacating the seat been granted any leave of absence and the period of leave has not expired, he may, notwithstanding that he may have vacated his seat, draw his leave salary for the remainder of the period. (3) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of clause (b) of sub-sec. (1), the State Government may by the same or subsequent Order provide - (a) that the Acts aforesaid shall, during such period as may be specified, have effect, in the area of the local body for which the Administrator has been appointed, with such adaptations, alterations or modifications as may be necessary for giving effect to the provisions of clause (a) of the said sub-section; (b) for the payment of the salary or allowances of the Administrator out of the local fund or funds concerned; and (c) where the same person has been appointed Administrator for more than one local body in any town, that the posts or offices to be specified under any such local body or local bodies shall not be filled up on a joint basis for all the local bodies, and for the payment of the salary and allowances of the person so appointed out of the local fund or funds concerned. (4) Any order made under clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (3) shall have affect notwithstanding anything contained in the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, the U. P. Town Improvement Act, 1919 or the Kanpur Urban Area Development Act, 1945. 18. Learned counsel contended that clause B of sub-sec. (1) empowers the State Government to suspend any provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act for the purpose of enabling the Administrator to dis-charge his function and therefore it was competent to authorise this official to delegate his powers under Section 186 to any other officialthereby suspending the relevant provision of the Act which enjoins that this power must be exercised by the "Board itself. Counsel also relied on clause (a) of sub-sec. Counsel also relied on clause (a) of sub-sec. (3) and argued that it authorises the State Government to make such adaptation, alterations or modification in the Act as may appear necessary. 19. Counsel further relied on a notification issued by the State Government on 18th December, 1953 which authorises the Administrator to nominate an officer for the purpose of exercising his powers, with the 'caption inter alia that any power or duty revisable by the Board by resolution shall ,'{Age' exercisable by the Administrator by an order in writing and further that these powers, with certain exceptions specified in the notification, may be exercised by any _ officer nominated by the Administrator. The learned counsel pointed out that the power to direct demolition under Section 186 is not an exception and therefore may be exercised by any officer nominated and authorised by the Administrator. 20. Counsel stated that the Administrator had in fact nominated the Scheme Secretary of the Board to exercise on behalf of the power to direct demolition under Section 186. He relied on a special order (Vishesh Agyao) of the Administrator nominating different officials of the Board and authorising them to exercise certain powers of the Board. One of these officials mentioned in this order is the Scheme Secretary who had been authorised to exercise a large number of powers including the power to issue notice and directions for demolition under Section 186 of the Act. The Administrator's order does not specify the date on which it was issued and learned counsel was unable to give the date. He however asked the Court to infer that this order must have been issued before the issue of the two impugned notices of demolition because these two notices were issued by the Scheme .Secretary who is the very authority nominating in the Administrator's undated order. Counsel argued that the very fact that the authority nominated in the Administrator's order josued the 'notices of demolition clearly indicates that the order must have been passed before the notices were issued. There is some force in this argument and I am inclined to hold that the Administrator's order was issued before the notices and that the Scheme Secretary issued them because he had been authorised by the Administrator. 21. But the real question is whether the Administrator had the power to authorise any other official to exercise the power under Section 186. 21. But the real question is whether the Administrator had the power to authorise any other official to exercise the power under Section 186. He purported to act under order of the State Government dated 18th December, 1953, which has been mentioned above. Did the State Government have the power to amend U. P. Municipalities Act to this extent that the power to direct demolition under Section 186 could be delegated though the Act forbids this delegation. If the Government did not have the power to make the modification in the Act, its notification of 18th December, 1953 must be treated as ultra vires to this extent, and the order of the Administrator delegating the same power to the Scheme Secretary must in turn be declared ultra vires, and consequently the two notices issued by the Scheme Secretary be held to be beyond his powers. 22. As the fountain source of the authority for the issue of notices of demolition is the notification of the State Government dated 18th December, 1953, it is necessary to decide whether that part of it which purports to authorise the Administrator to delegate his power under Section 186 is valid. It is conceded by both counsel that if this notification is valid, the two notices of demolition issued by the Scheme Secretary must also be treated as valid, but if the notification was ultra vires the State Government the notices must also be held to be without jurisdiction. 23. As the question involved a validity of a notification issued by the Sate Government notice was issued to the Advocate General, and Mr. S.N. Upadhya addressed the Court at some length after Mr. N. D. Pant had concluded his arguments. 24. After a careful consideration of Section 3 of the U. P. Local Bodies Appointment of Administrators Act 1953) read in the light of the various sections and the entire scheme of the U. P. Municipalities Act 1 am of the opinion that the State Government had no power to modify or change or suspend the provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act to this extent that the Administrator was authorised to delegate his powers of directing demolition tinder Section 186 to any other official. 25. Section 3 of the U.P. Local Bodies (Appointment of Administrators Act 1953) contains four sub-sections. 25. Section 3 of the U.P. Local Bodies (Appointment of Administrators Act 1953) contains four sub-sections. The first authorises the State Government to appoint Administrators for the Municipal Boards in the five Kaval Towns. -It also authorises the Government to issue declarations of a certain nature. These are classified into two classes which are stated in clauses (a) and (b) respectively. Clause (a) authorises the Government to declare that the duties and functions of the Municipal Board, its President, Chairman, or a Committee shall be vested in the Administrator appointed by the Government and shall be exercised, performed and discharged by or under the authority of these Administrators. Clause (b) authorises the Government to make such incidental and consequential provisions, including provisions for suspending any provisions of the Municipalities Act as may appear to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of enabling the Administrator to exercise the powers, perform the duties, and discharge the function of the Board, and of its President, Chairman, or any Committee. 26. The words "for this purpose" and "make such incidental and consequential profession" are important. They limit the power of the Government to make changes in the Act after appointing an Administrator: it is limited to the making of such provisions as may be incidental and consequential to the purpose stated in clause (a). 27. This purpose is that an Administrator appointed by the State Government would be able to exercise all the powers, perform all the duties, and discharge all the functions of the Board and of its President, Chairman or any Committee. Section 3 empowers the Government to substitute for the Board an Administrator and to authorise him to exercise all the powers of the Board, but it does not modify those provisions of the Act which require that certain powers are to be exercised by the Board in a particular manner specified in the Act, and in no other. For example, certain powers are to be exercised by the Board by means' of a resolution. Obviously the Administrator cannot exercise the same powers in the manner provided in the Act. For example, certain powers are to be exercised by the Board by means' of a resolution. Obviously the Administrator cannot exercise the same powers in the manner provided in the Act. Therefore in order that the Administrator may be able to exercise this particular power without violating the Act, the State Government is empowered to make incidental and consequential provisions which may be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the purpose of Section 3 namely, to enable the Administrator to discharge the function of the Board. The State Government may issue notification providing that the provisions of the Municipalities Act requiring certain powers of the Board to be exercised by resolution shall not apply to the Administrator. 28. But Section 3 does not confer upon the State Government an unlimited power to modify the provisions of the Act as it pleases. This power is limited to the extent of giving effect to the purpose of Section 3 namely, to enable the Administrator to exercise the powers of Board without violating the provisions of the Act. As regards the manner of the exercise of those powers, Section 3 empowers the State Government to substitute for the Board an Administrator, but not to confer upon him any powers or functions not vested in the Board under the Act nor does it authorise the Government to _suspend those provisions of the Act which impose salutary precautions against an arbitrary exercise of its power. For example, if the Act provides that a particular power must be exercised by the 'Board itself and does not provide for its delegation, this power must be exercised by the Administrator. Again, if the Act provides, expressly or by necessary implication, that a certain.... power is quasi judicial in nature and the Board must give an opportunity of being heard to persons concerned before exercising it, this statutory provision cannot be suspended by the Government so as to change the character of the function from a judicial to a non-judicial one. 29. Applying these principles to the notifications of the U.P. Gazette dated December 18, 1953, I am of the opinion that the Government had no power to direct that all the powers exercisable by the Board or any Committee by a resolution or a special resolution may be exercised, with a few specified exceptions, by any officer nominated in that behalf by the Administrator. If the notification had merely said that the aforesaid powers shall be exercised by the Administrator by an order in writing and that the provisions requiring the passing of the resolution shall remain suspend. ed during the appointment of the Administrator, it would be quite valid, but it went further and authorised the Administrator to transfer some of the important powers of the Board to his subordinate officers. Thus, whereas the U. P. Local Bodies (Appointment of Administrators Act 1953) purports to equate the Administrator with the Board, the notification dated 18th December, 1953 authorises the Administrator to equate his subordinate officers with the Board. This was beyond powers of the State Government and the notification to this limited extent is ultra vires. 30. Section 186 of the Municipalities Act em-powers the Board to issue a notice in writing directing any owner or occupier of any land to stop the constructions of any building. It further empowers it to direct the alteration and demolition of a building already constructed, but there is a condition attached to the exercise of this powernamely, that the Board "considers that such erection and alterations, construction or encroachment, is an offence under Section 185." The words within quotation impose a condition precedent to the exercise of the power to direct demolition. The condition is that the Board must come to conclusion that the person making the construction has been guilty of an offence under Section 185. It is obvious that the power to came to this conclusion is quasi judicial in nature and the Board must give an opportunity to the person concerned before giving a finding against him. 31. Section 3 of the U. P. Local Bodies Appointment of the Administrators Act authorises the State Government to replace the Board by an Administrator. It also gives the State Government the power to make such incidental and consequential provisions as may be necessary for enabling the Administrator to exercise the powers of the Board. 31. Section 3 of the U. P. Local Bodies Appointment of the Administrators Act authorises the State Government to replace the Board by an Administrator. It also gives the State Government the power to make such incidental and consequential provisions as may be necessary for enabling the Administrator to exercise the powers of the Board. I have already explained that the words "incidental and consequential" provisions refers to the manner of the exercise of this power but do not confer on the State Government any authority to change the nature of the power or to confer upon the Administrator any powers which the Board did not possess, or to remove any statutory safeguards in the Act for the protection of the citizens, or to authorise the Administrator to disregard these safeguards. The power of demolition under Section 3 is, as I pointed out above, a serious one and its exercise may have very grave consequences, for the person against whom they are exercised. That is why the Municipalities Act provides that it must be exercised by the Board itself and prohibits its delegation to any official of the Board. Section 3 of the U. P. Local Bodies (Appointment of Administrator) Act authorises the State Government to substitute an Administrator for the Board and to authorise him to exercise all the powers of the latter, but the power under Section 186 must be exercised by the Administrator himself as the Act forbids its delegation to any official of the Board. The Administrator can effectively exercise the power without violating the safeguards contained in Section 186. These are (1) that before directing demolition the Board must come to a conclusion that the offending construction is an offence under Section 185, and (2) that the direction for demolition must be given by the Board itself. If the Board is substituted by an Administrator, he must also observe the provisions of Section 186, and the State Government has no power to suspend them because such suspension is neither incidental nor consequential to the main purpose of Section 3 namely, the exercise of the power of the Board by the Administrator. 32. Mr. Upadhya argued that Section 3 of the U. P. Local Bodies (Appointment of Administrator) Act confers a general power on the Administrator to delegate all his powers and functions to any other official. 32. Mr. Upadhya argued that Section 3 of the U. P. Local Bodies (Appointment of Administrator) Act confers a general power on the Administrator to delegate all his powers and functions to any other official. He relied on the words in Section 3 (1) (a)"........ and shall until the order is superseded or repealed be exercised, performed, and discharged by order under the authority of the Administrator " Mr. Upadhya contended that the words "under the authority of the Administrator" means that the State Government has the power under Section 3 not only to appoint an Administrator but also to declare that all powers, duties, and functions of the Board may be exercised either by the Administrator himself or under his authorityin other words exercised by a delegate of the Administrator. I cannot agree. Section 3 (1) (a) must be read as a whole. The relevant words are "all powers, duties and functions of the local body, its President, Chairman or a committee thereof ... shall .... be exercised, performed, and discharged by order under the authority of the Administrator who shall be deemed in law to be the Board, Trust, President, the Chairman or committee as the occasion may require:" As I understand this provision it means (1) that the Government may by notification appoint an Administrator who from the date of his appointment shall be deemed in law to be the Board; (2) all the powers, duties and functions of the Board shall be vested in him; (3) these powers shall be exercised by. him or under his authority as the case may be. The words "under his authority" refer to those powers which the Board could delegate in the exercise of its powers under Section 112 of the Municipalities Act when so delegated, and were exercisable under the authority of the Board. After the appointment of an Administrator these delegated powers will be exercised under his authority because he shall be deemed to be the Board. I do not think that the words "under his authority" were intended to confer on the Government the power to authorise the Administrator to delegate all his powers including those the delegation of which is prohibited by the Municipalities Act. I do not think that the words "under his authority" were intended to confer on the Government the power to authorise the Administrator to delegate all his powers including those the delegation of which is prohibited by the Municipalities Act. It must be borne in mind that though the Administrator takes the place of the Board his powers are derived from the Municipalities Act and are subject to the conditions and restrictions governing their exercise except in so far as these restrictions are removed by any subsequent legislation. Mr. Upadhya's argument really amounts to this that the words "under the authority of the Administrator" have the effect of repealing a part of Section 112 of the U. P. Municipalities Act which prohibits the delegation of certain powers. Learned counsel conceded that his argument, if accepted, will lead to this result. I am not prepared to hold that the legislature intended to repeal a provision of the Municipalities Act in this indirect manner by inserting a vague phrase in their Act authorising the appointment of an Administrator. If there had been any such intention it would have been expressly declared. It is noteworthy that in 1964 the State Legislature passed an amending Act which transferred the powers under Section 186 of the Municipalities Act from Schedule I to Schedule II of the Act. The Amending Act makes no reference to the powers of the Administrator appointed under Section 3 of the Act of 1953. 33. Mr. Upadhya also contended that the change in the Act introduced by the impugned notification comes within the scope of "incidental and consequential provision". This argument was addressed to me by Mr. N. D. Pant at some length and I have dealt with it above. In my opinion, the Government cannot under the guise of making an incidental and consequential provision remove an effective safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of the powers provided under the Act. The Legislature alone can remove this safeguard. 34. I allow both the appeals, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court in each appeal, and decree the appellant's suit with costs throughout. An injunction will issue from this Court to restrain the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur from demolishing constructions in pursuance of the illegal notices dated 11th March, 1957 and 21st March, 1957. Appeals allowed.