JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an application for an order that the suit against the petitioner be dismissed and for certain alternative orders. The petitioner is the Corporation of lloyd's. The petitioner is the defendant No. 2 in the suit. 2. THE suit was instituted against Eagle Metal and Industrial Product, Pvt. Ltd. and the Corporation of Lloyd's for a decree for Rs. 7,051. 21 paise. In paragraph 5 of the plaint it is alleged that the goods sold by the defendant to the plaintiff and shipped to the plaintiff at Calcutta were insured by the defendant No. 2 by and under two certificates of insurance bearing Nos. C60/146479 and C60/146480 both dated 31 October, 1980. The certificate of insurance is couched in the following language : "this is to certify that there has been deposited with the Committee of Lloyd's an open cover effected by M/s. Walrond, Scarman and Company of Lloyd's acting on behalf of Eagle Metal and Industrial Products Pvt. Ltd. with underwriters at Lloyd's dated 6 August 1959 by which they undertake to issue to M/s. Walrond, Scarman and Company duly stamped floating policies of Marine Insurance at Lloyd's to cover up to 50000, in all by any one steamer and/or motor vessel or sending by air and/or conveyance, metal of all kinds including scrap and/or chemicals and/or general merchandise, to be shipped on or before the 30 September 1960 from any port or ports, place or places in the world to any port or ports, place or places in the world." It appears from the certificate of insurance that the brokers are M/s. Walrond, scarman and Company. The Eagle Metal and Industrial Products Pvt. Ltd. were the shippers. There is no dispute as to the certificate of insurance. The policy No. 130940 dated 30 December, 1960 was also used in this application and there is no dispute as to the policy. The Eagle Metal and Industrial Products Pvt. Ltd. were the shippers. There is no dispute as to the certificate of insurance. The policy No. 130940 dated 30 December, 1960 was also used in this application and there is no dispute as to the policy. In the policy it appears that the Assurers, members of the Syndicate whose definitive numbers in the attached list are set out in the Table overleaf, or attached overleaf, bind themselves each for his own part and not one for another and in respect of his due proportion only, to pay or make good to the assured all such loss and or damage which he or they may sustain by any one or more of the aforesaid perils, and so that the due proportion for which each of the Assurers is liable shall be ascertained by reference to the proportion as ascertained according to the said list of amount, percentage or proportion of the total sum assured which is in the said Table set opposite the definitive number of the Syndicate of which such assurers is a member. The list shows names of various assurers as also their definitive number and the digits mentioned in the policy. The Corporation of Lloyd's consists of various members. In paragraph 125 seq at page 104 seq in Arnold Marine Insurance, Volume 1 (British Shipping Laws. Volume 9, 1961 edition) appears the constitution and administration of the Lloyd's organisation and the manner in which the insurance business is carried on. It appears that Lloyd's agents are appointed by the Corporation and. they are not the agents of the individual underwriters. They perform important functions as surveyor and in many ways render services. The Committee of Lloyd's have made arrangements whereby claims on policies of underwriters at Lloyd's can be made payable by Lloyd's agents all over the world, thereby obviating the necessity of referring claims to London for settlement. The entire underwriting business at Lloyd's is transacted by the individual members of the society each of whom carries on his business for his own account and risk, either himself or through an authorised un-writing agent. It is a general practice for the members of the association to carry on their business through an agent who underwrites and acts for the whole group, or Syndicate. It is a general practice for the members of the association to carry on their business through an agent who underwrites and acts for the whole group, or Syndicate. It should be borne in mind that such members do not form any partnership but are individual and several members. The Corporation of Lloyd's does not engage in the business of insuring. The policies issued by Lloyd's underwriters contain a tabular form for the insertion of the reference numbers of the Syndicate on the risk together with the proportion of the sum insured unwritten by each and the names of the individual underwriters in each Syndicate are also shown. Each underwriter makes a separate contract with the assured to the extent of his proportion of amount underwritten by the Syndicate. The right of action in the assured is consequently against each separately and not against all jointly. 3. IN paragraph 154 at page 135 in Arnold Marine Insurance, Volume 1, the actual course of business in marine insurance is also described. It is stated there that the word 'underwriter' is used to denote the underwriting agent to whom the broker actually shows the risk and who accepts or declines it for the Syndicate or Insurance Company for which he underwrites. The non-active members of Syndicates at Lloyd's are generally referred to as 'names'. The agent may or may not be a member of the Syndicate for which he writes ; each member of the Syndicate including the agent himself, if a member, is of course liable only for the proportion of the risk. 4. IT is manifest from the nature of the policy as also the terms thereof that the Corporation of Lloyd's is neither the contracting party nor has any liability on the policy itself. The policy does not indicate that the Corporation of Lloyd's has any liability on the policy. The proper procedure for issuing such policies is to be found in Arnold Marine Insurance, Volume 2, being Volume 10 of British Shipping Laws, 1961 Edition. The procedure is stated in paragraph 1259 at page 1235. Each underwriter of Lloyd's policy is only severally bound for the amount of his own subscription and a judgment against one underwriter would not, apart from agreement, or some mode of procedure introduced to meet the case, bind other underwriters who had subscribed the same policy. The procedure is stated in paragraph 1259 at page 1235. Each underwriter of Lloyd's policy is only severally bound for the amount of his own subscription and a judgment against one underwriter would not, apart from agreement, or some mode of procedure introduced to meet the case, bind other underwriters who had subscribed the same policy. The assured would therefore be entitled to bring and in former times frequently did bring, a separate action against all the separate underwriters on the same policy in respect of the same loss and same risk. As a contract of indemnity consists of two parties, namely the assured on the one side and the whole body of underwriters on the other and as the claim to a loss on such policy must generally rest on the same grounds, when preferred against one of the underwriters as when preferred against the other, it is desirable that in action on policies, a single trial should decide what is, in fact, but a single question. The rules of the supreme Court in England have evolved what is commonly called 'agreement to be bound' that is an agreement by all the underwriters on the risk to be bound by the result of an action brought against one of their numbers nominated by themselves. In the present case the Corporation of Lloyd's by letter dated 15 January, 1964 informed the plaintiff that if the plaintiff decided to commence proceedings against the underwriters the representative underwriter was Simon Arnold Haydon White who might be sued on behalf of himself and all other underwriters. The original of the letter was asked by a notice addressed by Lloyd's solicitor to be produced. Counsel for the plaintiff stated on instruction that the letter could not be traced. 5. BE that as it may, the question now is whether the petitioner is entitled to an order. Counsel for the plaintiff contended that he should only look at the plaint as it is and it was a question of fact to be found out as to whether the corporation was a contracting party or not. The plaintiff has sued upon the agreement. The agreement is in writing. The agreement has been produced and no reason has been assigned as to why the Committee or Corporation of Lloyd's is a contracting party or can be a contracting party. The plaintiff has sued upon the agreement. The agreement is in writing. The agreement has been produced and no reason has been assigned as to why the Committee or Corporation of Lloyd's is a contracting party or can be a contracting party. Just because the plaintiff alleges the defendant No. 2 to be a contracting party when the contract on the intrinsic evidence repels and completely nullifies such a case, it does not follow that yet the plaintiff should be allowed to assert that the defendant, Corporation of Lloyd's is a contracting party. 6. COUNSEL for the Committee of lloyd's relied on the decision in (1)South Hetton Coal Company v. Haswell shotton and Easington Coal and Coke company reported in 1898, I Chancery, 465, where Lindley, M. R. said that an action could be dismissed if it appeared that there was no contract disclosed between the plaintiff and the defendant. In that case the owner of certain coal mines proposed to receive sealed tenders from 2 parties who were competing for the purchase of them and undertook to accept the highest net money tender. One of the competitors offered such a sum as would exceed by 200 pound the amount offered by the other. It was held that a tender in the form did not answer the description of the highest net money tender, and an order was made striking out the statement of claim in an action for specific performance of an alleged contract founded on such tender as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. In the present case the facts are stronger as to whether there was a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 2. The answer is, in my opinion, in the negative on the basis of the agreement itself. In the present case the facts are stronger as to whether there was a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 2. The answer is, in my opinion, in the negative on the basis of the agreement itself. Counsel for the Lloyds' Committee also relied on the decision in (2) Carpenter v. Ebblewhite and others, reported in (1939) 1 King's Bench 347, where the plaintiff having been injured in a collision between their motor-bicycle and a motor car alleged that their injuries were due to the negligence of the driver of the car, and brought an action against the registered owner of the car, the driver thereof, and insurers who had insured the registered owner, and any person driving the car with his consent, claiming as against the registered owner and the driver damages for negligence, and as against the insurer a declaration that they were obliged to satisfy any judgment obtained by the plaintiff against the other two defendants or either of them. The defendants in that case made an application that the plaintiff's claim as against the insurer should be struck out and they gave evidence that before the date of the collision the registered owner of the car had sold it to the driver. Greer, L. J. said : "it would, I think, be wrong and entirely premature to determine in this action or even in a separate action, at the present time a dispute which has never as yet arisen between the parties. A claim by the plaintiff for a declaration of liability against the insurance company is a claim that ought not to be entertained by the court, because at the time of the claim there was not in existence any dispute between the parties on the only question that can arise between them whether it be raised in this action or in an independent action." As I have already indicated the pre-eminent question in the present case is simpler and stronger, namely, that the defendant No. 2 has neither any liability on the contract nor is a contracting party. For all these reasons I am of opinion that the petitioner is entitled to succeed, I therefore make an order that the suit be dismissed against the petitioner with costs. Certified for counsel.