ORDER S.N. Singh, J. - This petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arises out of proceedings u/s 209 of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 2. One Lodhwa was the tenure-holder of the plots in suit. He died on 25-4-1953. On his death the plots in suit came in possession of Smt. Surji the married daughter of Lodhwa and after the death of Smt. Surji which followed soon after her husband came in possession of the same. At the time when Lodhwa died, in accordance with the law in force then there were no heirs of Lodhwa with the result that the property went to the Gaon Samaj. Since after the death of Lodhwa Smt. Surji and her husband came in possession their possession was considered to be unlawful by the Gaon Samaj. Gaon Samaj treating them as trespassers proceeded under Rule 115-C of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules for their ejectment and got them ejected and took possession on 22 -7-1954. Thereafter the Gram Samaj leased out the disputed plots to the Junior High School, Chandra Bhushanganj, district Rae Bareli Petitioner No. 1. It appears that the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was amended by Act XVI of 1953 by which amendment sister and sister's sons were made legal heirs to a tenure-holder and this amendment was directed to have effect retrospectively from the date of vesting. The result of this amendment was that although at the time of the death of Lodhwa Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 were not his legal heirs but by virtue of the amendment they were deemed to be heirs and legal representatives of the deceased tenureholder Lodhwa from the time of his death. 3. Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 Sahib Din and others having given the above facts instituted the present suit on 29-7-1956 for the ejectment of the Petitioner No. 1 treating the possession of Petitioner No. 1 as that of a trespasser. 4. This suit was contested by the Petitioners on the grounds inter alia that Lodhwa died heirless and the Gram Samaj, Bahariya, came into possession, Smt. Surji and Jugeshwar who were trespassers were ejected and lease executed in favour of Petitioner No. 1 which was said to be in possession as a matter of right. 4. This suit was contested by the Petitioners on the grounds inter alia that Lodhwa died heirless and the Gram Samaj, Bahariya, came into possession, Smt. Surji and Jugeshwar who were trespassers were ejected and lease executed in favour of Petitioner No. 1 which was said to be in possession as a matter of right. The suit was alleged to be time barred and not maintainable in view of defective notice u/s 80 of the Code of Civil procedure. 5. The Judicial Officer and the Additional Collector (J) acting as Additional Commissioner, Rae Bareli, dismissed the suit on the ground that the suit was bad on account of defective notice u/s 80 of the CPC and that the suit was barred by time. Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 preferred a second appeal against the two concurrent decisions of the Judicial Officer and the Additional Commissioner. The Board of Revenue reversed the judgment of the two subordinate authorities and decreed the suit as prayed. It held the notice to be valid and further held that the suit was not barred by time consequently decreed the suit. 6. The Petitioners have filed the present writ petition praying for the quashing of the order of the opposite party No. 1 on the ground that the Board of Revenue has committed a mistake apparent on the face of the record in holding that the suit was within time and that the notice u/s 80 CPC was not defective inasmuch as the Plaintiff had amended the plaint and no notice of the amended plaint which changed the cause of action had been given to the Petitioners. It was also argued that at the time when Lodhwa died the property in suit vested in Gram Samaj, subsequent legislation could not divest the Gram Samaj hence the Plaintiff did not get any interest in the property in suit. 7. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties on this point but I am of opinion that this petition lacks force and should be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties on this point but I am of opinion that this petition lacks force and should be dismissed. Taking the last question about vesting and divesting of the property this will be seen that the legislature in very clear and unambiguous words amended the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act with retrospective effect by Act XVI of 1953 and there cannot be any doubt about the intention of the legislature as such in my opinion there is no force in this contention that the property once vested in the Gram Samaj could not be divested by subsequent legislation. It cannot be disputed that the legislature has authority to amend the law retrospectively thereby causing the divestment of already vested rights. But in order to give effect to such an amendment the amendment should be clear and unambiguous. In this case there cannot be two opinions that the amendment made is clear and intended to divest vested right even. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners in respect of his submission that rights once vested could not be divested relied on Krishnamurthi Vasudeorao Deshpande and Another Vs. Dhruwaraj, AIR 1962 SC 59 . I have looked into this authority. In my opinion this does not support the contention put forth by the learned Counsel, on the contrary it would support the contention of the Respondents. Respondents have relied on All India Shia Conference through Syed Kalbe Abbas, Hony. General Secretary v. Syed Taqi Hadi and Ors. 1955 ALJ 504 and Nanda Lal Vs. Askaran Baboo, AIR 1944 Cal 310 and Brojendra Lal Ray, on his death, Swarnamayi Ray and Others Vs. Mubeswar Ali Choudhury and Another, AIR 1944 Cal 426 . These authorities clearly support the submission that such legislative enactment can be retrospective and can be given retrospective effect even though the result of such a retrospective effect may be divesting of already vested right. In view of the authorities already cited above it is clear that the Plaintiff did get right in the property left by Lodhwa and had right to maintain the suit. 8. The second question that needs determination is as to whether the suit was within time or not. On the death of Lodhwa it is an admitted fact that Smt. Surji his daughter and Jageshwar his son-in-law entered into posssssion. 8. The second question that needs determination is as to whether the suit was within time or not. On the death of Lodhwa it is an admitted fact that Smt. Surji his daughter and Jageshwar his son-in-law entered into posssssion. The Gram Samaj entered into possession admittedly after 30-7-1954. Therefore, the possession of the Petitioners started from July 1954 and according to the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act limitation has to be computed from July next following the illegal occupation and the suit having been instituted on 29-7-1956 is clearly within time. It has been argued on behalf of the Petitioner that limitation in this case should start from the date of the death of Lodhwa. In my opinion this submission is not correct and loses sight of serial No. 30 appendix 3 of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules which prescribes the period of limitation for Section 209 of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Serial No. 30 Sub-clauses (iii)(a) and (b) are relevant which are as follows: Sl. No. Section of the Act Description of suit application and other proceeding Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 30 209 Suit for ejectment of a person taking or retaining posssession of the "and unlawfully and for damage. * * * (iii) in any other case: (a) Where action under Rule 115-C has been started before the expiry of the period of limitation under sub-item (b). Three years. From the date of order under Rule 115-E. (b) In other cases. Three years. From the first of July following the date of occupation. 9. Looking to this provision it is apparent that period of limitation would not have started before the order passed Under Rule 115-C of the UPZA and LR Rules or before the possession taken by the Petitioners. There does not appear to be any mistake in the decision of the Board of Revenue on the question of limitation. 10. Lastly coming to the question of the invalidity of the notice we find that the only ground on which it has been attacked is that during the pendency of the suit the cause of action which had been given in the plaint as the death of Lodhwa was changed to that of the date of the possession of the Junior High School, Chandra Bhushanganj, district Rae Bareli. The notice that had been given clearly showed that the suit was u/s 209 of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and it was based on the death of Lodhwa and the illegal possession of the Petitioners till the time of the institution of the suit it appears that exact date of the possession of the Petitioner No. 1 had not been known to the Plaintiffs hence the latter date had not been given. It cannot be said that non giving of the latter date was a fatal defect for the Defendants who were sued clearly knew the cause of action upon which they were being sued. The Supreme Court has emphasised that the notice u/s 80 of the CPC should not be interpreted in a pedantic manner. The Board appears to be right in holding that the notice u/s 80 CPC was valid. In any view of the matter substantial justice having been even though there might have been some technical defect in the notice I would not have exercised my discretionary jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of the Petitioners. 11. In view of what has been said above this petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.