ORDER 1. This Second Appeal is by the judgment debtors whose objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been negatived by both the lower Courts. 2. In execution of a money decree obtained by respondent No. 1 against the appellants certain fields held by the appellants in 'Bhumiswami' rights were attached and sold. Respondent No.2 is the auction purchaser thereof. At the time of attachment or sale of the property or even up to the confirmation of the sale, no objection was raised by the appellants that the land was not liable to be attached or sold by reason of provisions contained in section 165 (7) (a) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. It appears that when the land was attached, the Code had come into force, but at the time of sale or its confirmation, that objection was available to the appellants. After the sale was confirmed the auction purchaser moved the Executing Court on 21-12-1965 for delivery of possession. That application was resisted on verious grounds by the appellants, but not on the ground that the sale was prohibited under the above said section. The objections preferred by the appellants were rejected by the Executing Court. Thereupon the appellants for the first time filed application purporting to be under section 47 Civil Procedure Code, in which objection based on section 165 (7) (a) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code was raised. The Executing Court dismissed the application summarily, while the lower appellate Court found that the application was barred by limitation and also by the principle of constructive res judicata. 3. Shri Shukla, learned counsel for the appellants, on authority of the decision of the Supreme Court in Merla Ramanna Vs. Nallanarain and others [AIR 1950 SC 87], urged before me that the lower appellate Court was in error in holding that the application was barred by limitation. 3. Shri Shukla, learned counsel for the appellants, on authority of the decision of the Supreme Court in Merla Ramanna Vs. Nallanarain and others [AIR 1950 SC 87], urged before me that the lower appellate Court was in error in holding that the application was barred by limitation. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in that case that interference with possession or dispossession itself and not sale of the property that gives a party fight to file an application and time begins to run from that point of time and that where the sale is void, the appropriate Article applicable is Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act (since repealed), which is as under: ‘Any other application for Three years When the fight to apply accrues’ which no period of limitation is provided else where in this Division. In this view of the matter it will have to be held that when proceedings under Order 21 Rule 95 Civil Procedure Code were instituted that the time started running against the appellants and not when the M.P. Land Revenue Code came into operation. The application appear, to be within limitation. Even if this point is decided in favour of the appellants, the bar of constructive res judicata still remains to be considered. 4. On this aspect of the matter on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ahmed Hafiz Khan Vs. Mohammad Hassan Khan [1963 JLJ 657 =1964 RN 374], Shri Shukla submits that the sale is void and without jurisdiction and that it is not required to be set aside. By the application in question what the appellants did was to point out the Court that the sale effected by it was void and without jurisdiction and that the Court should retrace its steps. As no application or suit is required to set aside the sale which is void no objection need be filed and the failure to raise such an objection need not result in bringing into operation the principles of constructive res judicata. As no application or suit is required to set aside the sale which is void no objection need be filed and the failure to raise such an objection need not result in bringing into operation the principles of constructive res judicata. Section 165 (7) (a) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 reads as under:- "(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or in any other law for the time being in force-(a) only that part of a holding of a Bhumiswami shall be liable to attachment or sale in execution of any decree or order as is in excess of five acres of irrigated or ten acres of un-irrigated land;" 5. It is plain from the reading of the section that attachment or sale of the land in excess of the minimum prescribed is not prohibited. Whether the land attached or sold comes within the minimum prescribed, is a matter to be investigated into on an objection being raised. In these circumstances when in the execution any 'Bhumiswami' land is attached or sold, it cannot be said that the Executing Court has no initial jurisdiction. The executing Court before which objection based on Section 165 (7) (a) of the Code is raised, it may decide, though erroneously, that the land attached or sold is not covered within the minimum and that the prohibition contain ed in the above said Section is not attracted. If that decision is not challenged under the procedure prescribed, it will become final. No serious objection can be taken to this proposition. If the wrong decision thus becomes operative as a res judicata it follows as a corollary that if a party fails to raise the objection at the appropriate stage it will be debarred from raising that objection subsequently by operation of principles of constructive res judicata. 6. In Mohanlal Vs. Benoy Krishna [ AIR 1953 SC 65 ], their Lordships of the' Supreme Court confirmed the following proposition of law: "If an erroneous decision on questions of law operates as res judicata between the parties to it, the correctness or otherwise of the judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as res judicata. The decision between the parties that the matter is not within the competence of the executing Court even though erroneous, is binding on the parties". The decision between the parties that the matter is not within the competence of the executing Court even though erroneous, is binding on the parties". And "that the 'principle of constructive res judicata' is applicable to execution proceedings, is no longer open to doubt." 7. From this decision, it is clear that a decision express or implied even an erroueous decision on a question of law or jurisdiction operates as res judicata. 8. That to execution proceedings the general principle of res judicata even constructive res judicata applies, is clear from the decision of the Privy Council also. See Mungul Parshad Dikshit Vs. Girja Kant Lahiri [LR 45 IA 123]: T.R. Arjunachellam Chetti Vs. V.R.N.A.R. Aminachellam [LR 15 IA 171], Raja of Ramnad Vs. Velusami Tewar [LR 48 IA 45] and Bindeswari Vs. Bagheshwari [AIR 1936 PC 46]. 9. I have already stated above that the question as to whether the sale is affected by the provisions of Section 165 (7) (a) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code depends on the decision of the Court. On correct decision it may turn out that no sale could have been effected and on the authority of Ahmed Hafiz Vs. Mohd. Hasankhan (supra) it may be held in those circumstances that the sale was void or without jurisdiction. On the country if an erroneous decision is given by a competent Court that the sale is not void, that decision shall still operate between the parties an even though the sale is in fact void it will not be open to a challenge. The same result will follow if the principle of constructive res judicata comes into operation. This aspect of the matter was considered in great details in. Venkataseshavya Vs. A. Virayya [5 AIR 1958 AP 1 (FB), and Baijnath Prasad Vs. Ramphal [ AIR 1962 Pat. 72 (FB)]. In A. Venkataseshavya Vs. A. Virayya (Supra) the facts were that on the basis of a mortgage decree for sale certain 'Inam' lands were brought to sale and purchased by an auction purchaser, who on his turn sold them to a third party. Ramphal [ AIR 1962 Pat. 72 (FB)]. In A. Venkataseshavya Vs. A. Virayya (Supra) the facts were that on the basis of a mortgage decree for sale certain 'Inam' lands were brought to sale and purchased by an auction purchaser, who on his turn sold them to a third party. Thereupon the judgment-debtor brought a suit for injuction restraining permanently the auction purchaser or his vendee from disturbing the judgment debtor's possession on the ground that by reason of prohibition contained in Section 5 of the Madras Hereditary Village-Offices Act (3 of 1895) the 'Inam' lands in question could not have been sold and the sale was null and void. The defence was that the suit was not tenable by virtue of the operation of constructive res judicata. The matter came up to the High Court when the following questions' were referred for the decision of the Full Bench. “(1) Whether, when service Inam lands have been sold in execution of a mortgage decree without any objection being raised at any stage of the proceedings to their saleability by reason of the prohibition contained in Section 5 of Madras Act III of 1895, it is open to the Inamdar to treat the Court sale as nun and void and recover possession of the lands from the purchaser at a Court sale or resist the claim of the purchaser to be put in possession of the lands ? (2) Whether Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code is a bar to the maintainability of the suit? The Chief justice of Andhra Pradesh (Subba Rao C.J. as he then was) after considering the various authorities enunciated the following proposition:- "(i) The rule of res judicata embodied in Section 11 does not exempt from its operation issues raising question of public policy depending upon either common or statutory prohibitions. Section 11 is not exhaustive and the principle of res judicata could be applied to interlocutory orders and to execution proceedings. So too, it has been recognised by decided cases that the principles of constructive res judicata can also be invoked to a limited extent in the case of orders made in execution. (ii) There is an essential distinction between the question of the jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a suit and the rule of law which precludes a man from avowing the same thing in successive litigations. (ii) There is an essential distinction between the question of the jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a suit and the rule of law which precludes a man from avowing the same thing in successive litigations. There is also a marked difference between inherent want of jurisdiction to entertain a matter and the irregular exercise of it. The jurisdiction of a Court depends upon the pecuniary and territorrial limits laid down by law and also on the subject-matter, while the doctrine of res judicata operates on the decision of a Court in a suit or other proceeding which the Court had inherent jurisdiction to entertain. (iii) There is no conflict between the principle of res judicata and that of prohibited alienation of particular properties on the ground of public policy. An alienation of properties prohibited by public policy or statute may be void. But the said prohibition cannot have the effect of depriving the jurisdiction of Courts to decide in a particular suit whether the alienation is void or not. Nor can it override the principles of res judicata. The former belongs to the domain of substantive law and the latter to the rule giving finality to decrees of competent Courts. (iv) The sanctity of final judgment is as much based on public policy as prohibition against the alienation of properties annexure to certain public offices. The fundamental question in each case therefore is whether the Court has inherent jurisdiction to entertain a particular suit A duty is cast upon a Court to raise relevant issues arising on the pleading, and give definite findings on each of the issues. The question whether a service Inam is alienable raises a mixed question of fact and law which is .certainly within the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. When it decides the question one way the finding will be res judicata in another suit. If the defence which ought to be raised is not raised the Court must be deemed to have decided against the contention not raised 10. When it decides the question one way the finding will be res judicata in another suit. If the defence which ought to be raised is not raised the Court must be deemed to have decided against the contention not raised 10. On these principles it was held by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court that the objection based on Section 5 of the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895 should have been raised at the initial stage and not at the stage it was done, and that the orders directing the sale of the property would operate as res judicata on the assumption that the objection was raised and was rejected. The case of A. Venkataseshyya Vs. A. Virayya (Supra) is a complete answer to the arguments raised by Shri Shukla, that in case of a void sale the principle of res judicata cannot be attracted. I respectfully agree with the view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and bold accordingly. The same view on facts similar to the present case has been taken by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case referred to above. I, therefore, refrain from elaborating on the point any further. 11. For the reasons stated in the said two decisions, with which I respectfully agree, I bold that the lower appellate Court was right in holding that the application in question was barred by constructive res judicata. 12. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.