Judgment 1. It is a plaintiffs appeal. He brought a suit for possession and mesne profits on the basis that he was a purchaser of Tauzi No. 9691 (which had been carved out of present Tauzi No. 2301) af a revenue sale. The recorded proprietors were the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants fifth and sixth parties. The defendants first party had taken thicca settlements from the previous proprietors in respect of that tauzi on the 8th March 1921 for the years 1330 and 1331 Fs. Similar thicca settlements were taken for the period 1342 to 1348 Fs. on the 27th September, 1926 and the 10th July, 1931. The three documents in that connection were marked in trial as Exts. 9, 9/a and 10, respectively. The first two were Kabulivats executed by the defendants first party, and the third one a patta executed by the proprietors. During the thicca settlement, defendants first party had acquired 71.375 acres of land for Rs. 2,623/7 in execution of rent decrees obtained against the recorded tenants. These lands were described in schedule 1 of the plaint. Similarly, they had acquired 148.48 acres for Rs. 3,099/14 in execution of rent decrees, and they have been described in schedule 2 attached to the plaint. The defendants first party transferred some of those lands to others and some of those transferees also transferred them to persons included as defendants second, third and fourth parties in the suit. Some of the transferees of the defendants first party are also included amongst them. Since it had been stipulated in the kabuliyats and the patta relating to the thicca settlements that whatever land will be taker in possession of the thiccadars from he tenants will be delivered to the proprietary if they wished so, on the termination of the thicca settlement, on payment of the money that might have been paid by the thiccadar-settlees, the plaintiff wanted to enforce that right through the present suit. The defence, in brief, among other things, was that, at the end of the thicca settlement, the defendants first party had offered to the proprietors to take the lands acquired in execution of rent decree from the different tenants, but they pleaded their inability to pay the money for that and, therefore, the lands continued to be in possession of the thiccadars, and, thereafter, that was either settled with or transferred to others in part. 2. 2. The trial Court decreed the suit only in part against the defendants first party in regard to the properties which were admitted by them in their written statement to be in their possession, and dismissed the suit against others and in respect of other lands. The prayer for mesne profits had the same treatment. The Court below held that there was no effective lease in favour of the defendants first party, because none of the documents, Exts. 9, 9/a and 10, could create such a lease within the meaning of Sec 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, as it stood before or after its amendment in 1930. Two of the documents, Exts. 9 and 9/a, related to a period prior to the amendment. The third document Ext. 10, was after it. The first two documents were in the years 1921 and 1926 respectively, and the third in the year 1931. Since those were not effective leases, no condition stipulated therein could be enforced, and, in that view, the plaintiffs suit was dismissed, except for the part that was almost admitted by the defendants first party in their written statement. The trial Court also held that none of the transferees from the defendants first party, or the transferees from such transferees, had any notice of the stipulation about re-conveyance of the properties to the lessors. Against all this, the plaintiff has come in appeal. 3. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the provisions under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, either before or after the amendment in 1930, were not applicable to this case. Under Sec.117, that section (Section 107) was not applicable to an agricultural lease. Exts. 9. 9/a and 10, which were registered instruments, showed that they were in respect of an agricultural lease. According to the practice prevalent for a very very long period in the country, a kabuliyat in respect of an agricultural lease, executed by a tenant and acted upon by the landlord, by acceptance of rent from him, or by realisation of rent through Court, would constitute a perfect agricultural lease. In support of this, learned counsel relied upon the case of Raj Kishore Prasad Jaiswal V/s. Subak Narain Singh, AIR 1959 Pat 89 . But, we are afraid that that lecision will not help the appellant here, because, on a proper construction of the documents Exts. In support of this, learned counsel relied upon the case of Raj Kishore Prasad Jaiswal V/s. Subak Narain Singh, AIR 1959 Pat 89 . But, we are afraid that that lecision will not help the appellant here, because, on a proper construction of the documents Exts. 9, 9/a and 10, it cannot be said that the thicca settlement was in respect of agricultural lands. The thicca settlement, ordinarily, indicates a lease of the right to collect rent; it is a rent farming. A thicca lease of a village for the purpose of collecting rents does not create a tenancy within the purview of the Bihar Tenancy Act, and, therefore, will not have the exemption as provided under Sec.117 of the Transfer of Property Act. Learned counsel stressed upon paragraph 6 of Ext 9, paragraph 3 of Ext. 9/a and para graph 3 of Ext. 10. In the latter two paragraphs, it was stated: "It is required that the said Thikadar should enter into and continue to remain in possession and occupation of the shares let out in thika property cultivate and get the same cultivated ...." In the first one, the recital is "It is required that we, the executants, should enter into and continue to remain in possession and occupation of the property let out re-thika to us....." It cannot be denied that the main purpose of the settlement in favour of the defendants first party was in respect of collection of rent from the tenants, from no part of any of the three documents, it appears that any land such as, bakasht was given to the settlees for cultivation. True the word used in the two documents was "cultivate" but that appears to have been used more as a matter of form than of substance The first document. Ext. 9, does not speak of such word as "cultivate" at all. The documents should be read as a whole, and, when done so, no doubt is left in the mind that the purpose of those documents was only to settle the right of collection of rent from the tenants with the defendants first party. If the primary and main purpose was rent farming, and along with it the settlees were given the right to cultivate some land by the way, that will not convert the transaction into an agricultural lease. To quote Mr. If the primary and main purpose was rent farming, and along with it the settlees were given the right to cultivate some land by the way, that will not convert the transaction into an agricultural lease. To quote Mr. Justice Mukherji in Ballabh Das V/s. Murat Narain Singh. ILR 48 All 385: (AIR 1926 All 432), where a permanent lease of an entire village was under consideration. "The lease, read as a whole, shows that the zamindar put the lessee in the same position as he himself occupied, except in a few minor matters, in consideration of a small sum of money to he paid to him year by year. The primary object of the lease was to obtain the proprietary rights of the lessor and not to utilise any land for the purpose of agriculture Of course it would he open to the lessee to cultivate any particular land if he so desired. But that is a secondary object and not the primary object. In this view we cannot treat this lease as a lease of a farm". The document under consideration in that case provided that the lessee would he entitled to all the income, produce, mal and profit arising from mal, sair items, sir land, high and low lands, water and forest produce, tanks and ponds, groves, markets, enclosures, land on the banks of the Ganges which may appear or disappear by fluvial action of the river. Their Lordships also found that the lessee had the power to cultivate lands also. Yet reading the document as a whole, it was held that the primary object of the transaction was not agriculture. That is to say, the entire village had not been left out to the lessee for the purpose of cultivation but for other than agricultural purposes. There the village consisted of waste and abadi lands. The ease of Maheswari Prasad V/s. Manrajo Kuer, AIR 1944 Pat 87 (FB) may also be seen in this connection. In the instant case before us, the kabuliyats and the patta are more or less, in the same form. We have no hesitation, after reading the documents carefully, to say that the main purpose of the settlement in favour of the defendants first party was not agriculture, and, therefore, Sec.117 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be invoked. 4. In the instant case before us, the kabuliyats and the patta are more or less, in the same form. We have no hesitation, after reading the documents carefully, to say that the main purpose of the settlement in favour of the defendants first party was not agriculture, and, therefore, Sec.117 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be invoked. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant also challenged the finding of the trial Court that the transferees from the defendants first party had no constructive notice. He contended that the documents, Ext. 9, 9/a and 10 being registered instruments and the transferees, knowing that their vendors were only thicca settlees, should have, in the ordinary course, looked to the conditions of the settlement and if they did so, they would have been aware of the fact that all lands acquired by the thiccadars in exeution of rent decrees against the tenants were liable to be taken by the proprietors on the termination of the thicca settlement. The thiccadar, during the thicca settlement or thereafter, had no right either to settle them or to transfer them in any other way. He referred to the case reported in (1893) ILR 16 Mad 301 Rajaram V/s. Krishnasami in support of this contention. There, the well-established principle in English law, that constructive notice of a deed is and amounts to constructive notice of its contents provided that the deed is a deed relating to the title and forms part of the chain of title, was adopted. To similar effect is the case of Hamiduddin Khan V/s. Ramanikanta Roy AIR 1933 Cal 321. Learned counsel also referred to Sec.23, Clause (3) of the Bihar Tenancy Act where it is specifically provided that a thicca settlee will not acquire a right of occupancy in the lands covered by the settlement. All these questions do not arise to be considered in view of the finding at which we have arrived that the settlement if in favour of the defendants first party was not for agricultural purpose. 5. Another question cropped up during argument and we put it to the learned counsel for the appellant. The vesting of the estate in which the suit lands are situate took place, under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, in September 1954. At that time, these lands had already been acquired in rent sales from the tenants. 5. Another question cropped up during argument and we put it to the learned counsel for the appellant. The vesting of the estate in which the suit lands are situate took place, under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, in September 1954. At that time, these lands had already been acquired in rent sales from the tenants. They had merged with the proprietors right. In that case, those lands bad become the bakasht lands of the proprietors. At the time of vesting, the proprietors were not in khas possession of those lands, as, admittedly, the defendants first party or their transferees had already taken possession of those lands. The benefits of Sec. 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act could not be claimed by the proprietors on the date of vesting. In that view, a suit for recovery of possession of such lands could not he maintained after the vesting. This point, however, need not be pursued in this case, because there is no cross appeal by the defendants first party against whom the suit had been decreed in part. 6. For all the reasons given above, the appeal is bound to fail, and is dismissed. Since none of the defendants second, third, fourth and fifth parties have entered appearance, there will be no order for costs.