Guru Prasad Pandey v. State — 1966 DIGILAW 509 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Mahesh Chandra, J. - The question referred to this Bench for decision by Tripathi, J. is: Whether an order passed by a Magistrate Under Sub-section (1-B) of Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure disposing of the proceeding u/s 145 in conformity with the decision of the civil court is amenable to the revisional powers of the Sessions Judge and the High Court. 2. For an answer of the question it will be useful first to examine the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (1) of Section 145 Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the procedure-to be followed by the Magistrates when a dispute concerning any "land or water" of the boundaries thereof is likely to cause breach of peace. 3. Sub-section (1) of Section 145 Code of Criminal Procedure runs thus-- Whenever a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class is satisfied from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within the local limits of his Jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, within a time to be fixed by such Magistrate and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute and further requiring them to put in such documents, or to adduce, by putting in affidavits, the evidence of such persons, as they rely upon in support of such claims. 4. Sub-section (2) of Section 145 Code of Criminal Procedure, defines the expression "land or water". Sub-section (3) provides for the manner of service of the order Under Sub-section (1). Sub-section (4) then provides for a speedy enquiry by the Magistrate as to possession without reference to the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute. 5. Sub-section (3) provides for the manner of service of the order Under Sub-section (1). Sub-section (4) then provides for a speedy enquiry by the Magistrate as to possession without reference to the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute. 5. The old Section 146, Code of Criminal Procedure provided that where the Magistrate decided that none of the parties was in possession at the relevant time or was unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute he might attach it until a competent Court had determined the rights of the parties thereto or the person entitled to the possession thereof. Sub-section (1) of Section 146, Code of Criminal Procedure was, however, amended by Act XXVI of 1955 and now runs as follows: 146. (1) If the Magistrate is of opinion that none of the parties was then in such possession, or is unable to decide as to which of them was then in such possession, of the subject of dispute, he may attach it and draw up a statement of the facts of the case and forward the record of the proceeding to a civil court of competent jurisdiction to decide the question whether any and which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute at the date of the order as explained in Sub-section (4) of Section 145 and he shall direct the parties to appear before the Civil Court on a date to be fixed by him; Provided that the District Magistrate or the Magistrate who has attached-the subject of dispute may withdraw the attachment at any time, if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of a breach of the peace in regard to the subject of dispute. (1A) On receipt of any such reference, the Civil Court shall peruse the evidence on record and take such further evidence as maybe produced by the parties respectively, consider the effect of all such evidence and after hearing the parties, decide the question of possession so referred to it. (1A) On receipt of any such reference, the Civil Court shall peruse the evidence on record and take such further evidence as maybe produced by the parties respectively, consider the effect of all such evidence and after hearing the parties, decide the question of possession so referred to it. (1B) The Civil Court shall as far as may be practicable, within a period of three months from the date of the appearance of the parties before it, conclude the inquiry and transmit its finding together with the record of the proceeding to the Magistrate by whom the reference was made; and the Magistrate shall, on receipt thereof, proceed to dispose of the proceeding u/s 145 in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court. (1C) The costs, if any, consequent on a reference for the decision of the Civil Court, shall be costs in the proceedings under this section. (1D) No appeal shall lie from any finding of the Civil Court given on a reference under this section nor shall any review or revision of any such finding be allowed. (1E) An order under this section shall be subject to any subsequent decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction. (2) When the Magistrate attaches the subject of dispute, he may, if he thinks fit and if no receiver of the property the subject of dispute, has been appointed by any Civil Court appoint a receiver thereof, who, subject to the control of the Magistrate, shall have all the powers of a receiver appointed under the Code of Civil Procedure. Provided that, in the event of a receiver of the property, the subject of dispute, being subsequently appointed by any civil Court, possession shall be made over to him by the receiver appointed by the Magistrate, who shall thereupon be discharged. 6. It is thus evident that when a Magistrate is unable to decide as to which of the parties in dispute was in possession or finds that none of the parties was in possession he may even now attach the property. But he does not stop there and let the parties themselves go to the Civil Court. Now, he himself refers the matter to the Civil Court for decision of the question. But he does not stop there and let the parties themselves go to the Civil Court. Now, he himself refers the matter to the Civil Court for decision of the question. The Civil Court will consider the evidence on record and may also take further evidence as may be produced by the parties and then after hearing them decide the question of possession. Against this finding of the Civil Court there can be no appeal, review or revision Under Sub-section (1D) of Section 146 Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. On receipt of the decision the Magistrate has to proceed to dispose of the proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court. The question then arises whether the order of the Magistrate in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court is revisable. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Applicant is that such an order is revisable u/s 439, Code of Criminal Procedure because it has merged in the order of the Magistrate. 8. Section 439(1) Code of Criminal Procedure runs as follows: In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which has been reported for orders, or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by Sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 or on a Court by Section 338 and may enhance the sentence; and when the Judges composing the Court of Revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in manner provided by Section 429. 9. The important words which need consideration in this section are "any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which has been reported for orders, or which otherwise comes to its knowledge". The contention of the learned Counsel for the Applicant is that the words "any proceeding" in this case are very wide and would also include consideration of the findings of the civil Court when they have merged in the finding of the Magistrate in view of the fact that the order of the Magistrate is in conformity with the finding of the Civil Court. 10. 10. Before we consider that question it is necessary also to consider the provisions of Sections 435 to 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 435, Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the power to call for the records of inferior Courts and runs as follows: 435 (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, or any Sub-Divisional Magistrate empowered by the State Government in this behalf, may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within the local limits of its or his jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation--All Magistrates, whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 437. (2) If any sub-Divisional Magistrate acting Under Sub-section (1) considers that any such finding, sentence or order is illegal or improper, or that any such proceedings are irregular, he shall forward the record with such remarks thereon as he thinks fit, to the District Magistrate. (3)* * * (4) If an application under this section has been made either to the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate no further application shall be entertained by the other of them. 11. This section not only gives the power to call for the records but also to examine the record of a proceeding. The proceeding must be of an inferior Criminal Court and not of "any Court." This is obvious because the purpose of examining the record of the proceeding is to "satisfy itself or himself" as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the finding, sentence or order recorded or passed and also as to the regularity of the proceedings of that inferior Court. Thus Section 435, Code of Criminal Procedure specifically mentions the restriction that the proceedings of which the record is called for and examined is to be of an inferior criminal Court. Thus Section 435, Code of Criminal Procedure specifically mentions the restriction that the proceedings of which the record is called for and examined is to be of an inferior criminal Court. Sec. 436, Code of Criminal Procedure gives the power to the High Court or the Sessions Judge to order after examination of the record further enquiry into any complaint which has been dismissed u/s 203 or Sub-section (3) of Section 204, or into the case of any person accused of an offence who has been discharged. 12. Section 437, Code of Criminal Procedure gives the power to the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate to order commitment for trial. This power has also to be exercised after an examination of the record of the proceedings of the inferior criminal Court. Such Judge or Magistrate has also the power to direct the inferior court to enquire into the offence if he finds that the evidence shows that some other offence has been committed by the accused. It runs as follows: 437. When on examining the record of any case u/s 435 or otherwise, the Sessions Judge or Distt. Magistrate considers that such case is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions and that an accused person has been improperly discharged by the inferior Court, the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate may cause him to be arrested and may thereupon, instead of directing a fresh inquiry, order him to be committed for trial upon the matter of which he has been, in the opinion of the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, improperly discharged: Provided as follows: (a) that the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause to such Judge or Magistrate why the commitment should not be made; (b) that., if such Judge or Magistrate thinks that the evidence shows that some other offence has been committed by the accused, such Judge or Magistrate may direct the inferior Court to inquire into such offence. 13. Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure gives the power to the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate after examination of the record of the proceeding to report for the orders of the High Court the result of the examination and also to recommend that a sentence or an order be reversed or altered. This power is also given to an Additional Sessions Judge. This power is also given to an Additional Sessions Judge. Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure runs as follows: 438 (1) The Sessions Judge or District Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, on examining u/s 435 or otherwise the record of any proceeding, report for the orders of the High Court the result of such examination and when such report contains a recommendation that a sentence or an order be reversed or altered, may order that the execution of such sentence or order be suspended and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond. (2) An Additional Sessions Judge shall have and may exercise all the powers of a Sessions Judge under this Chapter in respect of any case which may be transferred to him by or under any general or special order of the Sessions Judge. In all these Sections 436 to 438, Code of Criminal Procedure there is a specific reference to Section 435, Code of Criminal Procedure. This and the nature of the provisions themselves clearly show that the powers under these sections can be exercised only in respect of a proceeding before any inferior criminal Court. The words "or otherwise" used in Sections 436 to 438, Code of Criminal Procedure do not mean "in any other way whatsoever" but in any other way provided by the Code. For instance, a Court hearing an appeal may have to exercise the power under this section. Or, a Sessions Judge in the course of a sessions trial may find it necessary to direct u/s 437, Code of Criminal Procedure the commitment of persons discharged u/s 209, Code of Criminal Procedure by the committing Magistrate. These words are, therefore, to be restricted to powers found under the Code. They do not confer a power by themselves but only save a power which already exists. It is not unusual to find such general saving words in statutes. Such words cannot, therefore, refer to powers which do not already exist under the Code. These words are, therefore, to be restricted to powers found under the Code. They do not confer a power by themselves but only save a power which already exists. It is not unusual to find such general saving words in statutes. Such words cannot, therefore, refer to powers which do not already exist under the Code. When they follow the particular words "Under Section 435" they must be construed according to the general rule and cannot have reference to any power outside the Code or "in any other way whatsoever" but only mean "in any other way provided by the Code" and would, therefore, relate to the proceedings of an inferior criminal Court only and not of a Court which is not inferior and is not a criminal Court. 14. The word "proceeding" used in Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure must also be a proceeding referred to in Section 435, Code of Criminal Procedure that is a proceeding before an inferior criminal Court. For instance, it cannot refer to a proceeding in which the District Magistrate or an officer is acting in an executive capacity. Nor can it refer to a proceeding before a civil Court. 15. It will then be evident that the words "the record of which has been called for by itself or which has been reported for orders" occurring in Section 439, Code of Criminal Procedure refer to the provisions contained in Sections 435 to 438 Code of Criminal Procedure and will, therefore, relate to the proceeding of an inferior criminal Court. 16. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Applicant is that the words "or which otherwise comes to its knowledge" relate to proceedings not only of an inferior criminal Court but to proceedings of other courts. This contention is without force. The phrase "or which otherwise comes to its knowledge" follows the earlier phrases "record of which has been called for by itself" and "which has been reported for orders" and relates to the earlier words "any proceeding". The words "any proceeding" must, therefore, have the same meaning in all the three eventualities. This contention is without force. The phrase "or which otherwise comes to its knowledge" follows the earlier phrases "record of which has been called for by itself" and "which has been reported for orders" and relates to the earlier words "any proceeding". The words "any proceeding" must, therefore, have the same meaning in all the three eventualities. Obviously, in view of the previous Sections 435 to 438, Code of Criminal Procedure the phrase "the record of which has been called for" and the phrase "which has been reported for orders" cannot refer to any proceeding which is not a proceeding of an inferior criminal Court, for Sections 435 to 438, Code of Criminal Procedure refer, as already pointed out only to the proceeding of such a Court. 17. In a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in In the matter of the Petition of Bhup Kunwar and Anr. ILR All 249 the Full Bench, in the words of Stanley, C.J., held: The general words with which the section opens, namely in the case of any proceeding, must, I think be understood as used in reference to the subject-matter in the mind of the Legislature, which was undoubtedly, the records and orders of inferior Criminal Courts referred in the earlier section, Section 435 and must be strictly limited to it. They cannot have general application. For example, the Court could not exercise powers of revision in respect of proceedings of Courts outside the local limits of its jurisdiction. The words "any proceeding" are undoubtedly qualified words and a meaning must be given to them which best suits the scope and object of the statute. That meaning is to be found in Section 435. I have no hesitation in holding that these words "any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within the local limits of the Court's jurisdiction.... 18. A contrary view has been taken by the full Benches of the Lahore and Bombay High Courts in AIR 1931 761 (Lahore) and Emperor Vs. Bhatu Sadu Mali, AIR 1938 Bom 225 . We, however, for the reasons already mentioned, find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by Stanley, C.J. and Blair, J. and would follow the Full Bench decision of this Court. 19. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the Applicant that this view had been doubted as early as 1926 in Banwari Lal Vs. We, however, for the reasons already mentioned, find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by Stanley, C.J. and Blair, J. and would follow the Full Bench decision of this Court. 19. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the Applicant that this view had been doubted as early as 1926 in Banwari Lal Vs. Jhunka, AIR 1926 All 229 by Sulaiman, J. What Sulaiman, J., as he then was, actually said is-- It may be that the word 'proceeding' in Section 439 may mean the proceeding in any criminal Court referred to in Section 439 or it may possibly mean any proceeding to which the Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable. Sulaiman, J. did not there express his inclination to accept either of the meanings. He merely referred to the two meanings possible of the word "proceeding" in Section 439, Code of Criminal Procedure and then observed that the Full Bench had accepted the view that the word "proceeding" meant: proceeding in any Criminal Court and not necessarily any proceeding referred to in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 20. It cannot, therefore, be said that the meaning attributed to the word "proceeding" by the Full Bench of this Court was doubted in Banwari Lal v. Jhunka (supra). Indeed, Sulaiman, J. said that he was bound to follow that view and saw nothing in the amended Code which could alter the effect of that Full Bench decision. 21. There is no doubt that so far as the proceeding before the Magistrate is concerned, it would be amenable to revision if an error has been committed by the Magistrate in not passing an order in conformity with the finding of a civil Court. But when he had passed an order in conformity with the finding of the civil Court he had committed no error. To make such an order liable to interference in revision would be, in effect to provide for a revision of the finding and the proceeding before the civil Court, which is not a Criminal Court at all, much less an inferior Criminal Court. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the Applicant that the proceedings before the civil Court also retain the character of a criminal proceeding inasmuch as it is a proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the Applicant that the proceedings before the civil Court also retain the character of a criminal proceeding inasmuch as it is a proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is obvious that the proceedings before a civil Court do not retain the character of a proceeding of a criminal court. This is also clear from the fact that Section 146(1-D) does not bar only an appeal or a revision but also review of a finding. There is no question of a review in a criminal proceeding. The very fact that a provision barring for a review is made in Section 146 itself shows that the proceeding before the civil Court does not retain the character of a criminal proceeding. 22. In Ram Chandra Agarwal v. State 966 AWR 674 SC Mudholkar, J. speaking for the Court, referred to the following words of jagdish Sahai, J. in Sri Sheonath Prasad v. City Magistrate Varanasi 1959 AWR 595 -- a proceeding even on reference made to a civil court retains its old moorings and does not change its character from a criminal proceeding to a civil proceeding and does not become a proceeding in the suit. Mudholkar, J. 23. Observed with reference to this decision of this Court-- This decision ignores the vast body of authority which is to the effect that when a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary courts of the country are seized of such dispute the courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable to them. 24. The contention of Mr. Goyal, the learned Counsel for the Applicant in the case before the Supreme Court was "that since the proceeding before the Criminal court u/s 145 is a criminal proceeding any matter arising out of it, including a reference, to a civil court, does not lose its initial character of a criminal proceeding." In respect of this contention Mudholkar, J. observed: No doubt, the Magistrate, while discharging his function under the Code of Criminal Procedure u/s 145(1) would be exercising his criminal jurisdiction because that is the only kind of jurisdiction which the Code confers upon the Magistrates but when the Magistrate refers the question to a civil court he does not confer a part of his criminal jurisdiction upon the civil court. There is no provision under which he can clothe a court or a tribunal which is not specified in the Code of Criminal Procedure with Criminal jurisdiction. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Mr. Goyal. 25. It is thus clear that even though the proceedings before the civil Court arise out of a, reference made in a criminal proceeding they do not retain the character of a criminal proceeding and cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to be proceedings of a criminal Court. It was definitely held by the Supreme Court that it was a proceeding before the civil Court. Section 439 Code of Criminal Procedure would not, therefore, apply to those proceedings. 26. The learned Counsel for the Applicant relied on a decision of the Patna High Court reported in Raja Singh and Another Vs. Mahendra Singh and Others, AIR 1963 Patna 243 and also on Rengammal Vs. Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar, AIR 1960 Mad 169 , Indersingh and Others Vs. State and Others, AIR 1964 Raj 81 , Dhanpat Rai v. Balak Ram and Emperor v. Bhatu Sadu. 27. In Raja Singh v. Mahendra Singh (supra) the Full Bench of the Patna High Court held that the High Court would interfere with the finding of a civil Court Under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after the finding is adopted by the Magistrate and the final order is passed. With respect, we find ourselves unable to agree with that view. Section 435, Code of Criminal Procedure is expressly restricted to a proceeding before an inferior criminal Court. The decision proceeded on the basis that the finding of the civil Court had been adopted by the Magistrate and had thus become a part of its finding or in other words a finding of a criminal Court. This is obviously against the provisions of Section 146, Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (1-D) of Section 146, Code of Criminal Procedure specifically provides that the Magistrate shall on receipt of the finding proceed to dispose of the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure in conformity with the decision of the civil court. This is obviously against the provisions of Section 146, Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (1-D) of Section 146, Code of Criminal Procedure specifically provides that the Magistrate shall on receipt of the finding proceed to dispose of the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure in conformity with the decision of the civil court. The very use of the phrase "in conformity with" shows that the proceeding before the civil Court is a separate proceeding and the decision of the proceeding before the Magistrate is to be in conformity with the decision of the civil court. It is not similar to the proceedings before a civil Court after reference of certain issues to the revenue Court where a certain issue is referred for finding by a revenue Court. The civil Court there does not merely pass an order in conformity with the decision of the revenue Court but decides certain issues itself wherever necessary and then incorporates the finding of the revenue Court in its own decision and gives a decision thereafter in accordance with the findings of the revenue court on certain issues and its own findings on other issues. Even then it may be said that the proceeding before the revenue Court is not the same as the proceeding before the civil Court and it had been specifically provided in Section 332-B of the UP ZA and LR Act (now deleted) that for the purpose of appeal the finding of the revenue court will be deemed to be a part of a finding of the civil court. There is no such provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the proceedings before the civil Court retain their character as such and do not become a part of, or merge in, the finding of a Magistrate or a criminal Court and retains its individual character of the proceeding of a civil Court. That Full Bench decision was earlier than the Supreme Court decision in Ram Chandra's case (supra) in which the nature of the proceeding on a reference to the civil Court has been clarified by the Supreme Court. 28. In Rengammal's case (supra) Ramaswami, J. observed: This restriction is but proper because the findings get merged in the decision of the Magistrate and all the grounds that can be urged against the finding can be urged against the finalised decision.... 29. 28. In Rengammal's case (supra) Ramaswami, J. observed: This restriction is but proper because the findings get merged in the decision of the Magistrate and all the grounds that can be urged against the finding can be urged against the finalised decision.... 29. This also proceeds on the basis that the findings get merged in the decision of the Magistrate. For the reasons already mentioned we find ourselves unable to agree with the view of Ramaswami, J. In fact, Ramaswami, J. himself relied on an earlier decision in Muthu Sethurayar and Another Vs. Louduswami Odayar and Others, AIR 1959 Mad 111 . In that case itself it was held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or legality or otherwise of the findings of the civil Court. Somasundaram, J. observed that to do that "would be to do a thing indirectly what is directly prohibited. What at the most this Court can do in revision is to ascertain whether the criminal court has implemented the decision of the civil Court." To this limited extent only a revision can lie according to Sri Somasundaram, J. Although this decision was cited by Ramaswami, J. in Rengammal's case (supra) the earlier decision of the Madras High Court was not dissented from by him. 30. In Indersing's case (supra) C.B. Bhargava, J. of Rajasthan High Court held: If the legislature intended that finality should be attached to the orders passed u/s 146(1-B) then a provision could have been inserted in this section that the order passed u/s 146(1-B) would be final and no revision would lie against that order. 31. He consequently thought that a revision lay against the orders passed u/s 146(1B). With respect we find ourselves unable to agree with that view. Such a conclusion does not follow from the provisions of Section 146(1D) which bars an appeal, a review or revision against the finding of the civil Court. Nor does it follow from the provisions of Sub-section (1B) of the section. When the proceeding before a civil Court is not a criminal proceeding we have to see if such a decision of the civil court is amenable to revision under any provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure merely because the Magistrate has passed an order in conformity with the decision of the civil Court. When the proceeding before a civil Court is not a criminal proceeding we have to see if such a decision of the civil court is amenable to revision under any provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure merely because the Magistrate has passed an order in conformity with the decision of the civil Court. In fact, the very use of the words "decision of the civil Court" gives it a character which is different from a mere finding. So far as Section 439, Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, we have already seen that it is confined to the proceeding of an inferior criminal Court. 32. For the same reasons we do not agree with the decisions in Dhanpat Rai v. Balak Ram (supra) and Emperor v. Bhatu Sadu (supra). 33. It was also contended by the learned Counsel for the Applicant that if the order of the Magistrate in conformity with the decision of the civil Court is manifestly incorrect in view of a gross legal error by the civil Court, there is no reason why the Applicant should be forced to take recourse to a regular suit and this Court should exercise powers u/s 439 Code of Criminal Procedure. This contention is without substance. We find that even in the earlier Code there was no provision for a revision against an order passed u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure. Even at that time recourse was had to the High Court's powers under the Letters' Patent and its powers of superintendence. Similar powers can now be exercised Under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 34. In a series of decisions of this Court reported in Taashuq Hussain v. State 1958 AWR 301 , Chokhey Lal Moti Ram and Others Vs. Babulal Behari Lal, AIR 1960 All 599 and Badri Nath Panday v. UP State and Ors. 1963 AWR 772 it has been held that the revisional Court cannot go into the propriety of a finding of a civil Court in a revision made to challenge the final order of the Magistrate based on the finding of the civil Court. These are all single Judge decisions of this Court, but for the reasons already mentioned we agree with the conclusions reached in those decisions. 35. The learned Counsel for the Applicant also relied on a decision of this Court reported in Ram Samujh v. State and Anr. These are all single Judge decisions of this Court, but for the reasons already mentioned we agree with the conclusions reached in those decisions. 35. The learned Counsel for the Applicant also relied on a decision of this Court reported in Ram Samujh v. State and Anr. 1962 AWR 165 . Broome, J. interfered and allowed a revision against an order based on the finding of the civil Court. In that case, however, Broome, J. observed that since the Court acted without jurisdiction his decision was a nullity in the eye of law. Since the judgment was a mere nullity it must be entirely disregarded. Obviously, when the City Munsif of Azamgarh was divested of jurisdiction in view of the order of stay of the High Court there could be no order in conformity with the decision of a Court divested of jurisdiction. This decision does not help the Applicant. 36. In another case reported in Mohammad Vakil v. Md. Muinuddin and Ors. 1963 AWR 622 relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Applicant, Gyanendra Kumar, J. observed: Moreover, it is only in exceptional and appropriate cases that the High Court could interfere with the findings of the Civil Court as well, if they were in flagrant violation of the well recognised principles of law. 37. The revision was, in fact, dismissed and this was a stray observation made by the learned Judge in that case on a point which was not really canvassed before him. In any case, we find ourselves unable to agree with the view that such a power of interference is given by Section 439, Code of Criminal Procedure. 38. For the reasons already mentioned our answer to the reference is that an order passed by a Magistrate Under Sub-section (1B) of Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure disposing of the proceeding u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure if it is in conformity with the decision of the civil Court, is not amenable to the revisional powers of the sessions Judge and the High Court in so far as the decision of the civil Court is concerned. 39. Let the records of this case and the connected criminal revisions be put up before the Judge concerned.