ORDER J.N. Takru, J. - This is a petition by Amar Chand Kapoor praying that proceedings for contempt of Court be taken against the opposite-parties. 2. The facts of the case in so far as they are material for its decision, are not in dispute and stated briefly are as follows: The opposite-parties filed a second appeal in this Court against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court ordering their ejectment from a house in Moradabad and awarding compensation and mesne profits to the Petitioner. After conclusion of the arguments in this Court, the parties arrived at an agreement, which was incorporated in the judgment of this Court dated 1-11-1965, as follows : The learned Counsel for the Respondent has agreed not to execute the decree for a period of five months if the Appellant undertook to vacate the premises within that period. The Appellant has given an undertaking to that effect. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. The Appellant, however, will not be evicted for a period of five months from to-day in view of the above undertaking. 4. For some reason or the other, the opposite-parties did not keep their promise and thereupon the Petitioner filed the present petition on 10-5-1966 for the relief stated above. On the petition coming up for hearing on 16-5-1966 notice was issued to opposite party No. 1 only and in response to it, he appeared on 18-6-1966 and took time for filing a counter affidavit. On 21-7-1966, however, the parties entered into a compromise whereby the Petitioner gave the opposite-parties time upto 31-6-1966, for vacating the premises in return for the opposite-parties agreeing to vacate the premises and paying the entire amount due from them by that date. It is admitted that both the undertakings were complied with by opposite-party No. 1 on 31-7-1966. 3. On behalf of the Petitioner it was contended that as opposite-parties did not abide by the undertaking given by them to this Court on 1-11-1965 they must be held guilty of committing contempt of Court. It is admitted that both the undertakings were complied with by opposite-party No. 1 on 31-7-1966. 3. On behalf of the Petitioner it was contended that as opposite-parties did not abide by the undertaking given by them to this Court on 1-11-1965 they must be held guilty of committing contempt of Court. On behalf of the opposite-party No 1 it was however urged that as the undertaking in question was not given to the Court but was merely in the nature of a promise, opposite-party No. 1 cannot be held to have wilfully disobeyed any undertaking given by him to this Court so as to render him liable for contempt of Court. Thus from the rival contentions set out above it is clear that the decision of this case turns upon the interpretation which is to be placed on the aforesaid order it being undisputed that if it contains an undertaking to the Court then its wilful default would constitute contempt of this Court. 4. Now a plain reading of the first paragraph of this order shows that it consists of two parts--the first part containing the offer which the Petitioner made to opposite-party No. 1 and the second part containing its acceptance by the latter. The offer and acceptance are purely inter-parties and it is not possible to find any thing express or implied in the said order amounting to an undertaking given by opposite-party No. 1 to the Court. As a matter of fact the words has agreed not to execute the decree for a period of five months' show that the only consequence which the contracting parties had in mind in case opposite-party No. 1 did not perform his part of the agreement within the stipulated period, was that the Petitioner would be free to execute his decree. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision in Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhury Vs. Smt. Saroj Bashini Goho, AIR 1948 Cal 294 which is very similar on facts to the present case. In this case the owner of certain premises brought a suit for ejectment against the lessee on the ground that the latter had installed certain image on the premises without the formers consent. The suit was compromised. Smt. Saroj Bashini Goho, AIR 1948 Cal 294 which is very similar on facts to the present case. In this case the owner of certain premises brought a suit for ejectment against the lessee on the ground that the latter had installed certain image on the premises without the formers consent. The suit was compromised. The material paragraph of this compromise stated: The Defendant hereby undertakes to remove the said kali image as also all permanent brick built and other structures in and around the place where the image of Kali is situate before he gives up possession of the said shop room or at any time prior thereto on demand by the Plaintiff or the owner for the time being of the said premises No. 1-A Abhoy Goho Road. The compromise was presented to the Court and a decree was passed in terms thereof. The lessee, however, subsequently declined to remove the image on demand by the owner, whereupon the latter applied to commit the lessee for contempt of Court on the ground that he had broken an undertaking given to the Court. The application was heard by a learned Single judge and he came to the conclusion that the lessee had given an undertaking to the Court to remove the Kali image etc. upon demand made by the owner and as he had declined or neglected to do so after such demand he was guilty of a breach of his undertaking to the Court. On appeal by the lessee a Division Bench of that Court held that on a true construction of the compromise the mere use of the word undertake did not mean a promise to the Court. It was simply a solemn promise by the lessee to the owner and the nature of that promise or undertaking could never be changed by reason of the compromise being accepted by the Court and a decree passed in its terms. Hence the lessee could not be convicted for contempt of Court. The aforesaid decision therefore fully supports the view taken by me above. 5. On behalf of the Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka and Another Vs. Kapurchand Ltd., AIR 1950 Bom 336 was cited. Hence the lessee could not be convicted for contempt of Court. The aforesaid decision therefore fully supports the view taken by me above. 5. On behalf of the Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka and Another Vs. Kapurchand Ltd., AIR 1950 Bom 336 was cited. In this case it was held that: Although the Court may be bound to record a compromise still when it passes a decree, it puts its imprinature upon those terms and makes the terms a rule of the Court and it would be open to the Court to accept an undertaking given by a party to the Court. Therefore there is nothing contrary to any provision of the law where by an undertaking cannot be given by a party to the Court in the consent decree which undertaking can be enforced by proper committal proceedings. No doubt this case supports the Petitioner's contention but as the word 'undertaking' used in it was construed as an undertaking to the Court on account of the fact that through long practice that word had come to acquire a technical meaning as distinguished from its dictionary meaning in the Bombay High Court the said decision loses its force so far as the present case is concerned. This distinction became more significant when we see that earlier in this decision it was observed thus: It is perfectly true that if the words 'undertake' bore its plain and natural meaning then there would be no justification for construing that expression to mean that the undertaking was given to the Court. The clause does not state to whom the undertaking is given and it may be that it would be possible to hold that as the parties were setting the dispute between themselves the undertaking as given by one party to the other.... But in our opinion the expression 'undertake' has come to acquire through long practice a technical meaning...and that undertaking is always understood to be an undertaking to the Court which could be enforced by the committal proceedings. I have quoted at length from this judgment as it is my endavour to show that the construction put upon the word 'undertaking' by the Bombay High Court is based not upon its plain and natural meaning but upon the technical meaning which it has come to acquire in that Court over a number of years. I have quoted at length from this judgment as it is my endavour to show that the construction put upon the word 'undertaking' by the Bombay High Court is based not upon its plain and natural meaning but upon the technical meaning which it has come to acquire in that Court over a number of years. No such technical meaning has been acquired by that word in this Court. It is therefore clear that the Bombay decision must be held confined to cases arising in that Court and has no application to the present case. I am therefore satisfied that the order relied upon by the Petitioner only contains a 'solemn promise' to vacate the premises in question within five months and does not contain any undertaking by him to that effect to the Court. The result, therefore, is that, this petition fails and is dismissed and the notice issued to opposite-party No. 1 is discharged, but in all the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.