JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - This second appeal arises out of a suit filed by the Plaintiff-Appellant on 16-3-1960 under Order XXI, Rule 103 CPC for the ejectment of the Defendant-Respondent Girdhari Lal from a certain shop in paltan Bazar in the town of Dehra Dun. The suit was dismissed by the Additional Civil Judge of Dehra Dun on 24-9-1962 and the appeal filed by the Plaintiff was likewise dismissed by the District Judge of Saharanpur on 15-3-1963. 2. The facts leading up to the suit are as follows. The Plaintiff-Appellant, Mahant Suryanand Giri, is the Manager of the Maha Nirvani Panchaiti Akhara of Allahabad, which owns certain immovable properties in Dehra Dun, including two shops in paltan Bazar, which were previously let out to Niranjan Singh and Jiwan Singh. These tenants fell into arrears with their rent and the Plaintiff consequently sued for their ejectment and secured a decree against them from the Munsif of Dehra Dun on 30-3-1957. The decree was put into execution, but when the Plaintiff went to take possession of the shops he found that a certain Fakir Singh was in possession of one of the shops, in respect of which he had obtained an allotment order in August 1956. Possession of the second shop was delivered to the Plaintiff on 15-11-1957,and that shop was subsequently occupied by the Gandhi Ashram under an allotment order on 6-12-1957. The Plaintiff made attempts to secure possession of the shop occupied by Fakir Singh by making an application under Order XXI, Rule 97 Code of Civil Procedure; and on 21-7-1958 the Munsif allowed this application, holding that the allotment order issued in Fakir Singh's favour on 3-8-1956 was without jurisdiction, since no vacancy was in existence or about to come into existence at that time. But when the Plaintiff went to take possession from Fakir Singh, he found Girdhari Lal (the present Respondent) occupying the shop. On being apprised of this the Munsif at first ordered Girdhari Lal to be evicted, the same as Fakir Singh; but Girdhari Lal filed an objection, claiming that he had taken possession in pursuance of an allotment order granted on 25-7-1958 and the result was that the Munsif on 19-9-1959 dismissed the execution application againt him. On being apprised of this the Munsif at first ordered Girdhari Lal to be evicted, the same as Fakir Singh; but Girdhari Lal filed an objection, claiming that he had taken possession in pursuance of an allotment order granted on 25-7-1958 and the result was that the Munsif on 19-9-1959 dismissed the execution application againt him. Thereafter the Plaintiff-Appellant filed the suit out of which this present second appeal arises on 16-3-1960, challenging the legality of the allotment order passed in favour of Girdhari Lal and praying for his ejectment from the disputed shop. 3. The courts below have held that there is no illegality in the allotment order requiring the Plaintiff-Appellant to let the disputed premises to Girdhari Lal and that Girdhari Lal is in the position of a "statutory tenant" and is not liable to ejectment. 4. Mr. S.N. Kacker, who has appeared on behalf of the Appellant, has made the following three submissions: 1. That the allotment order issued in favour of Girdhari Lal is bad because the premises allotted had not fallen vacant. 2. That the allotment order is bad because it has been passed in respect of a portion of an accommodation, not the whole accommodation. 3. That even assuming that the allotment order was not illegal, the Defendant had no right to take actual possession of the premises without the consent of the Plaintiff-landlord. 5. We find absolutely no force in the first contention advanced on behalf of the Appellant. When a decree for ejectment had been passed against the Previous tenants Niranjan Singh and Jiwan Singh on 30-3-1957 and execution proceedings had been initiated by the decree-holder in pursuance of that decree, the Rent Control Officer was fully justified in assuming that the accommodation in question had fallen vacant, or at any rate was about to fall vacant. Warrants for delivery of possession were issued on 15-11-1957 against the judgment-debtors Niranjan Singh and Jiwan Singh and on 21-7-1958 against Fakir Singh, who had taken possession of the premises in collusion with the judgment-debtors; and it is clear that both the judgment-debtors and Fakir Singh had ceased to occupy the premises by the time the allotment order was issued in favour of Girdhari Lal on 25-7-1958. We are satisfied in the circumstances that the premises had actually fallen vacant by that time and that the allotment order in favour of Girdhari Lal cannot be challenged on the ground that there was no vacancy. 6. In support of his second argument (regarding the splitting up of the accommodation) Mr. Kacker relies on the Full Bench decision in N.C. Agarwal v. Krishna Lal Mehra 1960 AWR 559 , in which it has been held that a District Magistrate, acting u/s 7(2) of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act, is bound to treat the entire accommodation comprised in the tenancy as a single unit and cannot direct the landlord to let a portion of the accommodation to one person and the remaining portion to another person. In the present case the previous tenants Niranjan Singh and Jiwan Singh appear to have jointly held a tenancy in two adjacent shops; and one of these shops was allotted to the Gandhi Ashram by the allotment order dated 6-12-1957, while the second has been allotted to Girdhari Lal on 25-7-1958. At first sight, therefore, it would seem that the Rent Control Officer has split up the accommodation into two portions and allotted them separately, which would be illegal, in view of the dictum given by the Full Bench in the aforementioned case. The finding given by the courts below, however, is that the Plaintiff agreed to the letting out of the one shop to the Gandhi Ashram and thus has himself disrupted the single unit of accommodation and split it into two. It is obvious; that when the landlord himself agrees to or acquiesces in the splitting of an accommodation, the Rent Control Officer is fully entitled to pass separate allotment orders in respect of the portions so formed, treating each of them a separate accommodation; and in such circumstances the ruling relied upon will not be applicable. Mr. Kacker contends that the allotment order in favour of the Gandhi Ashram covered both the shops, but possession could be taken of only one, as the other was occupied by Fakir Singh; and faced with this situation, it is argued, the landlord had perforce to accept the Gandhi Ashram as his tenant in one shop only for the time being. Kacker contends that the allotment order in favour of the Gandhi Ashram covered both the shops, but possession could be taken of only one, as the other was occupied by Fakir Singh; and faced with this situation, it is argued, the landlord had perforce to accept the Gandhi Ashram as his tenant in one shop only for the time being. This argument might have had some force if the Plaintiff had sought to get possession of the remaining shop with the object of handing it over to the Gandhi Ashram; but it is clear from the material on record that in actual fact he has been trying to get the possession delivered to himself with the idea of keeping this second shop in his own occupation. The Plaintiff allowed the Gandhi Ashram to occupy the one shop and agreed to accept rent from the Gandhi Ashram for that one shop alone, without making any kind of stipulation regarding the second shop; and we find ourselves in full agreement with the courts below in holding that by adopting such a course he was himself responsible for splitting what had previously been a single accommodation into two. He obviously cannot be permitted now to turn round and claim that the two shops form one single unit and cannot be allotted separately. 7. We are now left with the third argument viz. that the Defendant-Respondent had no right to take possession of the disputed shop without the landlord's consent, even if he had an allotment order in his favour. Mr. Kacker points out that an 'allotment order' u/s 7(2) is nothing but a direction to the landlord to let the accommodation to a certain person; and he argues that until the landlord agrees to comply with this direction, the 'allottee' has no status and no rights in the premises allotted. In support of this contention reliance is placed on certain observations made in various reported decisions of this Court. In the first of these cases Lachmi Narain v. R.C. and E.O. Lucknow 1962 AWR 161 the passage relied on runs as follow: Shanker Dutt had never approached the Appellant and the Appellant had never let out the shop to him. Shanker Dutt could not, therefore, claim any right of occupancy on the basis of the allotment order. In the first of these cases Lachmi Narain v. R.C. and E.O. Lucknow 1962 AWR 161 the passage relied on runs as follow: Shanker Dutt had never approached the Appellant and the Appellant had never let out the shop to him. Shanker Dutt could not, therefore, claim any right of occupancy on the basis of the allotment order. The allotment order was simply an order calling upon the Appellant to let out the accommodation to him and so long as it was not let out to him he acquired no rights whatsoever. But that case dealt with an entirely different situation and can afford no guidance for the decision of the present appeal. There the allottee had been living in the disputed premises for about three years before the allotment order was issued in his favour and there could be no question of his taking possession on the strength of the allotment order : he merely continued to remain in possession after that order, the same as before. The present case is clearly distinguishable. 8. The second ruling to which our attention has been drawn (Krishna Chandra Sharma v. State of U.P. 1962 AWR 304 contains the following remarks: All what the District Magistrate ....could direct was that the landlord shall let out the accommodation to a particular person or not to let out an accommodation to him. If what was intended was that the accommodation be let out to Chhail Behari, Chhail Behari would still have to approach the landlord and obtain a lease of the premises from him. Chhail Behari would not be entitled to occupy the house merely by virtue of being an allottee of the accommodation. But in that case too the facts were peculiar, for it was found that no proper order had been passed in accordance with the terms of Section 7(2), requiring the landlord to let the accommodation to Chhail Behari. The remarks as to what the legal rights of Chhail Behari would have been, if a valid order u/s 7(2) had been passed, are thus hypothetical and obiter. 9. In the third case relied on by Mr. Kacker Udhao Dass v. Prem Prakash 1963 AWR 125 it was observed by Desai C.J.: The State Government had no justification to call the order an 'allotment order'; it is an order directing a landlord to let out an accommodation to a particular person. 9. In the third case relied on by Mr. Kacker Udhao Dass v. Prem Prakash 1963 AWR 125 it was observed by Desai C.J.: The State Government had no justification to call the order an 'allotment order'; it is an order directing a landlord to let out an accommodation to a particular person. It confers no right whatsoever upon the person other than of requiring the landlord to let out the accommodation to him. These remarks, however, besides being obiter, are to be found in the judgment of only one of the Judges comprising the Bench and consequently cannot be construed as expressing the opinion of the Court or as having any binding force. 10. The fourth case cited by Mr. Kacker is Smt. Malika Bai v. R.G.E.O., Allahabad 1964 AWR 656, in which we find the following passage: The order on the basis of which the opposite party took possession of the accommodation was an order neither addressed to her nor authorising her to take possession of the accommodation; it was an order addressed to the Appellant requiring her only to give the accommodation to her. The only right that the Respondent acquired under it was to a lease of the accommodation from the Appellant and her duty was to approach her and enter into a contract of tenancy with her. Unless she entered into a contract of tenancy with her she had no right to take possession of the accommodation. In that case too, however, the remarks relied on are purey obiter, for the judgment goes on to state : "But we are not concerned in this appeal with this act of the Respondent, however unlawful it may be, done subsequently to the impugned order." 11. We find nothing, therefore, in any of the cases cited by Mr. Kacker that can be treated as a binding authority for the proposition put forward by him, viz. that if the allottee of premises in respect of which an allotment order has been passed u/s 7(2) of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act takes possession of the premises in pursuance of that order without first obtaining the consent of the landlord, his possession is unlawful. that if the allottee of premises in respect of which an allotment order has been passed u/s 7(2) of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act takes possession of the premises in pursuance of that order without first obtaining the consent of the landlord, his possession is unlawful. In our opion, if such an allottee, acting in good faith, finds the accommodation in question lying vacant and proceeds to take possession of it, he cannot be said to be acting illegally and possession taken in this manner cannot be deemed to be unlawful. Fraud or malafides may vitiate his claim to retain possession; but assuming that he has throughout acted in good faith, we see no reason to hold that the allottee would not be justified in taking possession of the accommodation which the landlord has been commanded to let out to him. It is true that the order u/s 7(2) does not expressly authorise the prospective tenant to take possession, but it is implicit in such an order that he is entitled to do so, provided the accommodation is lying vacant and is not already in the occupation of the landlord or any one else. The order directs the landlord to let the accommodation to the allottee; and thereupon, unless the landlord can pursuade the Rent Control Officer (or the State Government) to withdraw the order by showing it to be illegal or otherwise unjust or inexpedient, he is obliged to allow the allottee to take possession of the accommodation (presuming it is vacant; and is entitled to realise rent from him. In some cases the landlord may at first refuse to submit to the order and may make representations to the Rent Control Officer or approach the State Government u/s 7-F, but when he has exhausted his remedies, he will have no option but to comply with the directions given to him by the competent authority. Until those remedies are exhausted, of course, no one can force him to accept rent from the allottee or to recognise the allottee as his tenant; but if in the meantime, the allottee has taken possession of the premises without obtaining the landlord's permission, he cannot be held to have acted illegally or without justification. Until those remedies are exhausted, of course, no one can force him to accept rent from the allottee or to recognise the allottee as his tenant; but if in the meantime, the allottee has taken possession of the premises without obtaining the landlord's permission, he cannot be held to have acted illegally or without justification. We are unable to agree with the view that the prospective tenant, for whose benefit an order u/s 7(2) has been passed, is precluded from taking possession of the accommodation, when he finds it lying vacant and that he is bound to adopt a course of action that will further the dilatory tactics of a landlord who wishes to delay the implementation of the order. To hold otherwise would run counter to the very aims and objects of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 12. Mr. Kacker lays emphasis on the fact that the landlord in the present case had secured a decree for possession and argues that he was entitled to obtain actual possession of the premises before they could be allotted to any fresh tenant. But we fail to see how the decree could confer on the Plaintiff any enhanced rights; he can have no greater claim to possession than a landlord whose tenant has vacated the accommodation voluntarily in the normal course, without being sued. And if an accommodation governed by the provisions of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act, which has been let out to a tenant, falls vacant the landlord is not entitled to take actual possession unless be obtains a release order from the Rent Control Officer under Rule 6. The legal position was made clear in Jangi Lal v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad 1953 AWR 540 , in which it was observed: If the tenant had left of his own accord and the premises had fallen vacant, the vacant premises could be allotted to a tenant or to the landlord himself, if he wanted to occupy the premises, with the permission of the District Magistrate. In such a case it was not open to the landlord, without the permission of the District Magistrate, to occupy the premises and claim that he was not liable to ejectment u/s 7A of the Act. In such a case it was not open to the landlord, without the permission of the District Magistrate, to occupy the premises and claim that he was not liable to ejectment u/s 7A of the Act. To premises to which Section 7 of the Act applies even the landlord's right, on the premises falling vacant, is subject to the District Magistrate and it is not open to the landlord either to let out the premises to a new tenant without an allotment order or even to step in and occupy it without the permission of the District Magistrate. We see no difference between such a case and a case like the present where the premises fell vacant as the tenant had to leave by reason of a decree for ejectment passed by a court of law. 13. The result is that we find no merit in any of the contentions advanced on behalf of the Appellant. The allotment order requiring the premises to be let to Girdhari Lal was perfectly valid; and Girdhari Lal, finding the premises vacant, was fully entitled to occupy them on the strength of that order and cannot be dislodged by the Plaintiff-Appellant. This second appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed