JUDGMENT S.N. Singh, J. - This is a defendant's appeal in a suit for recovery of possession under Section 141209 of the U. P. Zamindari Aboli ion and Land Reforms Act. 2. The plaintiffs respondents claimed that they were under-proprietors in village Katka Khanpur, Pcrgana Baraunsa, district Sultar pur. They alleged that they were sir-holders of the disputed plots and that in the year 1944 since they were in need of money they requested Rampal defendant respondent to advance him Rs. 2001.. In lieu thereof they urged that Rampal Singh should get a usufructuary mortgage executed in his favour. It was alleged that Rampal Singh agreed but because of certain difficulties in getting a usufructuary mortgage executed it was settled between the parties that plaintiffs would execute a simple mortgage and that a lease would be executed in favour of one of the members of the family of the defendants. In consequence thereof a simple mortgage was executed on 24th July, 1944 stipulating three years for the payment of the mortgage money in favour of Ramdular defendant No. 2. On the same date a lease was executed in favour of Jagdish defendant No. 3 through his guardian Rampal defendant No. 1. It was alleged that these two transactions formed part of the same transaction as such they constituted a usufruetuary mortgage. It was further alleged that since the plots in suit were sir plots and the defendants were in possession immediately before the date of vesting on the uassing of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the plaintiffs. who became bhumidhars and were entitled to recover possession in view of Section 141209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 3. This suit was contested by the defendants who filed a joint written statement. They denied to have taken the usufructuary mortgage. They alleged that the two documents executed on the 24th July, 1944 were separate documents and that the defendant No. 3 on account of the execution of the lease had become adhivasi and sirdar of the land in suit as such the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief claimed. 4. The trial court on a consideration of the evidence on the record came to the conclusion that the two documents did not constitute one transaction although they had been executed on the same date. 4. The trial court on a consideration of the evidence on the record came to the conclusion that the two documents did not constitute one transaction although they had been executed on the same date. Having accepted the third defendant as sirdar it dismissed the suit. 5. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the lower appellate court and the lower appellate court accepted that the two documents formed one transaction which amounted to a usufructuary mortgage and since the defendants who were memo as of joint Hindu family were in possession immediately before the date of vesting, the plaintiffs who became bhurnidhars in the eye of law were entitled to the relief of possession. Hence having reversed the judgment of the trial court it decreed the suit for possession. 6. The defendants have .come up in appeals this Court. It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that the tenor of the document clearly shows that the intention of the parties was to execute a simple mortgage. It was submitted that the term of the simple mortgage showed that the mortgage amount was to be paid within a period of three years. It was submitted that the lease was for a period of five years and the lessee could only be ejected after the lapse of five years. According to the learned counsel the two documents read together did not constitute an usufructuary mortgage. It was submitted that the document was unambiguous. It was not necessary to look into any other evidence. Learned counsel for the appellants relied on K.S. Minn Feroz Shah v. Sohbat Khan, A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 178, Kuer Mohammad Ashraf Ali Khan v. Behari Lala, A.I.R. 1937 Alld. 478 and Chunchun Jha v. Ebadat Ali, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 345. These decisions do support the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. In Chunchun Jha v. Ebadat Ali, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 345 head note (b) it was held that. "Where a document has to be construed, the intention must be gathered, in the first place, from the document itself. If the words are express and clear, effect must be given to them and any extraneous enquiry into what was thought or intended is ruled out. The real question in such a case is not what the parties intended or meant but what is the legal affect of the words which they used. If the words are express and clear, effect must be given to them and any extraneous enquiry into what was thought or intended is ruled out. The real question in such a case is not what the parties intended or meant but what is the legal affect of the words which they used. If, however, there is ambiguity in the language employed, then it is permissible to look to the surrounding circumstances to determine what was intended." 7. In this case the two documents read together would clearly show that the parties intended the execution of a simple mortgage and a lease in favour of two different persons. The two documents in my opinion clearly show that one was simple mortgage and the other was a lease deed. Apart from this the statement of facts given in the plaint itself clearly shows that the parties never intended to execute a usufructuary mortgage because at that time no person was prepared to get a usufructuary mortgage executed in his favour. Therefore, apart from the tenor of the document the intention of the parties also appears to be clear from the plaint and the statement of the parties. In my opinion.the lower appellate court erred in accepting the two documents as a usufructuary mortgage. The trial court rightly interpreted the two documents and came to the conclusion that the two documents read together could not be accepted as a usufruct wary mortgage. Once it is held that the defendants were the lessees and not the mortgagees they did acquire adhivasi and sardari rights on the passing of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 8. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the lease executed in favour of defendant No. 3 who was a minor at the time of the execution of the lease could not be held to be binding on him since this contract was entered into between a major and a minor as such the same was invalid. In support of this contention the learned counsel relied on Pramila Balidas v. Jogeshar Mandal, A.I.R. 1918 Pat. 626. The facts of that case are distinguishable. In that case the lease had been executed in favour of the minor but in this case the lease has been executed in favour of the father of the minor who acted on behalf of the minor. 626. The facts of that case are distinguishable. In that case the lease had been executed in favour of the minor but in this case the lease has been executed in favour of the father of the minor who acted on behalf of the minor. The learned counsel further submitted that since this matter has not been decided by the lower appellate court the case may be son back for decision on this point. 9. I have considered this submission of the learned counsel but in my opinion no useful purpose will be served by remanding the case. Whether the lease is accept-ed to be valid or invalid the defendant No. 3 acquires right to a sirdar. if the lease is a valid one the defendant No. 3 acquired right of a hereditary tenant after the lapse of two year from the date of the execution of the lease, and thereafter on the passing of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act became sirdar. In this view of the matter in my opinion the judgment of the lower appellate court cannot stand. The judgment of the trial court has to be restored. Accordingly this appeal is allowed, the judgment of the lower appellate court is set aside and that of the trila court restored with costs. Appeal allowed.