Judgment :- 1. This second appeal is in a motion to set aside a court-sale which has been dismissed by the Courts below. 2. The order of the executing Court is dated June 15,1962. An appeal therefrom "under R.1 Order XLI C.P.C." has been entertained by the District Judge, Kottayam, without objection as to its maintainability and been disposed of on its merits against the appellant on July 20, 1962. The 4th defendant has come up in second appeal and here also no objection as to the maintainability of the second appeal has been taken. Counsel for the appellant submits that there is an averment in the petition drafted as "under Order XXI R.90 and S.151 C.P.C." that no notice on the proclamation has been given to the appellant and that therefore the court-sale had on that proclamation is liable to be set aside and that plea goes beyond the scope of Order XXI R.90 C.P.C. and comes within the scope of S.47 CPC. and that it was therefore that the first appeal had been entertained in the Court below under R.1 of Order XLI C.P.C. In the circumstances I leave the matter there. 3. On merits of the case, counsel contended inter alia that the execution sale was illegal and has, on that ground, to be set aside. E. P. No. 625 of 1959, filed on December 3,1959, for attachment and sale of the judgment-debtor's properties, had been dismissed on April 1, 1960, though the ground for its dismissal was quite unsustainable. (The dismissal was on account of stay of execution by the appellate Court.) E. P. No. 372 of 1960 has been filed thereafter, on May 27th, 1960, with fresh proclamations for sale of the appellant's properties. On May 28, the Court ordered notice on the proclamation obviously under Order XXI R.66 C.P.C. On May 30, the decree-holder applied for review of that order and to post the case only for conduct of sale. No notice appears to have been given to the appellant or other judgment-debtors. On May 31, 1960, the Court allowed the decree holder's application and posted the case for sale on July 15,1960 and ordered publication of proclamation therefor. On July 15,1960 the sale did not take place. It was adjourned to July 19, and then to July 28, when item No.1 of the proclamation was sold for Rs. On May 31, 1960, the Court allowed the decree holder's application and posted the case for sale on July 15,1960 and ordered publication of proclamation therefor. On July 15,1960 the sale did not take place. It was adjourned to July 19, and then to July 28, when item No.1 of the proclamation was sold for Rs. 982.04 to the decree holder in satisfaction of the decree. On August 26,1960, the 4th defendant made the motion which gave rise to this appeal. 4. Counsel for the appellant contends, that with the dismissal of the E. P. No. 625 of 1959, the proclamation that had been accepted for purposes of that E. P. became inoperative and thereafter when a fresh motion for execution was made with fresh proclamations the Court had to settle the proclamation afresh after notice to the judgment-debtor. He urges that the dismissal of an Execution Petition puts an end to the execution proceedings had till then, even though the dismissal of the E. P. may be reckoned as a ministerial order for purposes of limitation, and that a fresh start of execution proceedings for sale of judgment-debtor's property necessitates all proceedings under Order XXI R.66 onwards. 5. That execution proceedings are judicial proceedings is not disputed. The dismissal of an execution petition is therefore the disposal of a judicial proceeding, irrespective of the correctness of that order. No doubt, by a long catena of decisions the dismissal of an E. P. for no fault or default of the decree holder has been held to be a ministerial disposal for purposes of limitation and that a subsequent E. P. for identical reliefs may be treated as a motion to continue the prior E. P. & allowed to be prosecuted as such. Counsel for appellant contends that an order of disposal of a judicial proceeding is always a judicial proceeding in itself and that the exception made in the case of E. Ps. is only for purposes of limitation and is not available for other purposes. The contention seems to have force. It cannot be said that the executing Court had no jurisdiction to dismiss the E. P., however wrong the dismissal may be. 6. In Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey (AIR. is only for purposes of limitation and is not available for other purposes. The contention seems to have force. It cannot be said that the executing Court had no jurisdiction to dismiss the E. P., however wrong the dismissal may be. 6. In Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey (AIR. 1964 S. C. 907) it is observed: ...it is well settled that a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong; and that even though it decided wrong it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. It had the jurisdiction over the subject-matter and it had the jurisdiction over the party and, therefore, merely because it made an errer in deciding a vital issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction. As has often been said, courts have jurisdiction to decide right or to decide wrong and even though they decide wrong the decrees rendered by them cannot be treated as nullities." 7. Earlier in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque (AIR. 1955 S. C. 233, 243) a Bench of seven learned judges of the Supreme Court have observed: "...a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right...." 8. I am afraid that except on the principle of stare decisis it is very difficult to hold that an order dismissing an application moved in a Court of law will not be a judicial order unless the reason for such dismissal is sound in law. Simply because the order is wrong it would not be a nullity and the normal remedy of an aggrieved party is only to get it rectified by appropriate proceedings provided by law and not to ignore it. It is well settled that when a suit is dismissed wrongly it terminates the suit unless the wrong dismissal is set aside; and the analogy must hold good with dismissals of other proceedings too, except to the extent it has been otherwise established by law (inclusive of case-law). I would therefore hold that, except for purposes of limitation, the dismissal of an execution petition terminates all proceedings in execution had on that petition and that when a subsequent application is made for execution all requisite steps in execution have to be taken afresh. I would therefore hold that, except for purposes of limitation, the dismissal of an execution petition terminates all proceedings in execution had on that petition and that when a subsequent application is made for execution all requisite steps in execution have to be taken afresh. Otherwise, an Execution Petition dismissed incorrectly and therefore deemed to be pending for purposes of limitation, may be revived a hundred years hence and properties proclaimed for sale under the old E. P. 100 years ago may be sold without fresh proclamation. I hold that after dismissal of E. P. No. 625 of 1959, a fresh settlement of proclamation is required in law to sell the judgment-debtor's property on a later motion in execution and as that has not been done in the present case, the impugned court-sale has to be held without jurisdiction. 9. In the above view, this appeal is allowed and the Court sale held on July 28, 1960, is set aside. It is stated at the bar that on May 26, 1962, the 4th defendant has deposited a sum of Rs. 1031.75p. for purposes of setting aside the sale. Counsel agrees that that deposit may be treated as one made for payment to the decree holder and it will be available for the decree holder to be drawn towards satisfaction of the decree. In ;the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their respective costs throughout. Allowed.