JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal from the decree of the Third Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur reversing that of the First Additional Munsif, Kanpur, and dismissing his suit for the recovery of Rs. 1941/13/- from a person who had been declared an evacuee under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. The facts are these. The plaintiff appellant Amjad Ali and the first defendant respondent Ali Hasan are brothers. They owed two debts to two different persons (creditors' names are immaterial) . Both these creditors obtained decrees against Amjad Ali and Ali Hasan for Rs. 1850/- and Rs. 2033/- respectively. The plaintiff appellant paid oil the decretal amounts to both decree holders. He then filed a suit against his brother and co-debtor Ali Hasan under Section 43 of the Contract Act for recovery of Rs. 1941/13/- as the latter's share of the debt and impleaded the Union of India as a co-defendant because Ali Hasan had been declared evacuee. The appellant paid off the decrees in 1952. But Ali Hasan had already been declared an evacuee and his property evacuee property in 1951. The decree holders who had filed suits against the appellant and his brother and obtained satisfaction of their decrees from the appellant did not implead the Custodian as a party nor did the appellant give notice of payment to the Custodian. 2. In the present suit Ali Hasan did not appear but the Custodian did, they pleaded in defence that Court had no jurisdiction. to entertain the suit. He relied on Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act as barring the jurisdiction of the Court. This defence was rejected by the trial court which decreed the suit against both Ali Hasan and the Custodian. Qn appeal the learned Civil Judge disagreed with the trial court and held that the civil court had no jurisdiction because the matter was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Custodian to determine. He affirmed the decree against Ali Hasan but dismissed the suit against the Custodian. Amjad Ali has come here in second appeal. 3. I have read the judgments of the courts below and heard Mr. S. N. Varma for the appellant and Mr. N. D. Pant for the respondent Union of India at some length. I am of the opinion that the decision of the lower appellate court is erroneous. 4. Amjad Ali has come here in second appeal. 3. I have read the judgments of the courts below and heard Mr. S. N. Varma for the appellant and Mr. N. D. Pant for the respondent Union of India at some length. I am of the opinion that the decision of the lower appellate court is erroneous. 4. The facts are not in dispute. It was not denied by the respondent Union of India that the appellant Amjad Ali and his evacuee brother were jointly indebted to two persons who obtained decrees against them and that Amjad Ali alone satisfied these decrees. It was not denied that under Section 43 of the Contract Act Amjad Ali was ordinarily entitled to claim contribution from his co-debtor. But it was contended that his proper remedy was to file a claim before the Custodian under Rule 22 (as it then existed) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Rules (to be called the Rules) and not a suit in the civil court. It was contended that the Custodian had the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the appellant's claim and, therefore, the civil courts jurisdiction was barred under Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (to be called the Act) . This objection was upheld by the lower appellate court. 5. In my opinion the Court was in error. The appellant had a legal right to enforce against his co-debtor. The Civil court had the jurisdiction under S. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to entertain his suit unless its jurisdiction was barred under any other law. It is contended by counsel for the Union of India that Section 46 of the Act provides the bar. This Section runs as follows: "Jurisdiction of civil courts barred in certain matters. Save as otherwise expressly provided in. this Act, no civil or revenue court shall have jurisdiction. (a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether any property or any right to or interest in any property is not evacuee property; or (b) (Deleted) (c) to question the legality of any action taken by the Custodian-General or the Custodian under this Act; or (d) in respect of any matter which the Custodian-General or the Custodian is empowered by or under this Act to determine." 6. It is conceded that clauses (a) and (c) do not apply to the present case because there is no question whether any property is or is not evacuee property nor is the legality of the action taken by the Custodian-General or the Custodian under this Act in question. But Mr. N. D. Pant relied on Clause (d) and contended that the claim of the appellant could be determined by the Custodian who was empowered under this Act to determine it, and therefore the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred. I cannot agree. 7. There is no section empowering the Custodian to determine a claim made against an evacuee by a co-debtor who has paid off a joint decree and wants to compel the evacuee to contribute his share of the decretal amount under Section 43 of the Contract Act. But Mr. Pant relied on Section 10 of the Act which defined the powers and duties of the Custodian generally and contains 17 clauses specifying these powers in particular manner. He relied on Clauses (2) (j) and (n) which run thus: "(2) : Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contain in sub-sec. (1) , the Custodian may, for any of the purposes aforesaid. (j) : institute, defend, or continue any legal proceeding in any civil or revenue court on behalf of the evacuee or refer any dispute between the evacuee and any other person to arbitration or compromise any' claims, debts or liabilities on behalf of the evacuee; (k) ................. (l) ................. (m) ................. (n) pay to the evacuee, or to any member of his family or to any other person as in the opinion of the Custodian is entitled thereto, any sums of money out of the funds in his possession." 8. According to learned counsel, Clause (n) confers on the Custodian the jurisdiction to determine whether any person is entitled to any sum of money out of the funds of the evacuee in his possession, and therefore this is a matter which cannot be determined by the civil courts in view of the bar of Section 46 of the Act. He also contended that Clause (j) confers on the Custodian the power to compromise any claim made by any .person against the evacuee or any debts or liabilities on behalf of the evacuee. He also contended that Clause (j) confers on the Custodian the power to compromise any claim made by any .person against the evacuee or any debts or liabilities on behalf of the evacuee. According to counsel this Clause confers on the Custodian the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain any claim against an evacuee and to compromise any debt or liability of the evacuee, and, therefore, the appellant's claim against the evacuee Ali Hasan could not be entertained by the Civil Court. 9. I cannot agree. The fundamental object of Section 10 (as it then existed) is to confer upon the Custodian, as the statutory manager of the evacuee, certain powers "for the purposes of securing, administering, preserving and managing any evacuee property and generally for the purpose of enabling him satisfactorily to discharge any of the duties imposed on him by or under this Act." Under Section 8 of the Act any property declared to be evacuee property vested in the Custodian. He thereby became the statutory manager of this property. But in order to enable him to dis-charge his duties as manager he had to be given certain powers. These are conferred on him under Section 10. They are somewhat similar to the power conferred on an official liquidator under the Companies Act. For example, under Clause (a) he could carry on the business of the evacuee; under Clause (b) appoint a manager for the property of the evacuee; under Clause (c) enter any premises to inspect any evacuee property; under Clause (d) take all measures to keep any evacuee property in good repair; under Clause (i) take action for the recovery of any debt due to the evacuee; under Clause (j) institute, defend, or continue any legal proceedings on behalf of the evacuee; and even compromise any disputed claims; and under Clause (k) he could raise on the security of the evacuee property any loans, and so on. 10. But I find no provision in Section 10 which, either expressly or even by implication, confers on the Custodian any jurisdiction to adjudicate on any claim preferred against the evacuee or bars the jurisdiction of the civil courts to entertain any suit by a creditor for the recovery of any debt or enforcement of any legal right against the evacuee. But I find no provision in Section 10 which, either expressly or even by implication, confers on the Custodian any jurisdiction to adjudicate on any claim preferred against the evacuee or bars the jurisdiction of the civil courts to entertain any suit by a creditor for the recovery of any debt or enforcement of any legal right against the evacuee. On the contrary: Clause (j) of Section 10 clearly implies that such a suit or claim can be entertained by the civil courts for it empowers the Custodian to defend any legal proceeding on behalf of the evacuee. There was no point in conferring this power if the Act was intended to bar the jurisdiction of the civil courts to entertain any suit for the recovery of a debt against the evacuee. 11. It is true that a creditor who obtains a decree against the evacuee or against the Custodian (after impleading him under Section 50 of the Act) cannot execute it against the property of the evacuee, because Section 17 expressly bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to proceed against the evacuee property in any manner whatsoever in execution of any decree or orders of any court. But Section 17 comes into effect only after a creditor has obtained his decree against the evacuee and wants to execute it against any property which has been declared to be evacuee property. It does not bar the jurisdiction of the civil courts to entertain a suit against the evacuee. In fact the language of this section impliedly concedes that such a suit may be filed, because the immunity of evacuee property from attachment arises only after a decree has been passed. Moreover, this immunity continues only so long as it remains vested in the Custodian. If for any reason the property is subsequently declared to be not evacuee property, it shall become immediately liable to attachment in execution of a decree obtained against the evacuee. If Mr. Pant's argument is accepted the result may be that a creditor will be unable to file a suit for the recovery of his debt against the evacuee and find himself without any remedy even if the evacuee is released from the handicaps of the Act and his property ceases to be evacuee property. 12. Mr. If Mr. Pant's argument is accepted the result may be that a creditor will be unable to file a suit for the recovery of his debt against the evacuee and find himself without any remedy even if the evacuee is released from the handicaps of the Act and his property ceases to be evacuee property. 12. Mr. Pant relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Raja Bhanoo Pratap Singh v. The Assistant Custodian Bahraich, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 245 and contended that this decision supports the view that the Custodian has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine any claim against an evacuee. I do not think the decision supports this view. In that case a decree was obtained against an evacuee, Nawab Mohd. Ali Khan Qizial Bash. On his death his five heirs were impleaded as his legal representatives, one of whom was Nawab Ali Raza Khan. In 1950 he migrated to Pakistan and was declared an evacuee. The Custodian took possession of his estate and applied to the execution court for the removal of the attachment of his property in execution of the aforesaid court. This application was allowed and the property released from attachment. Then the decree-holder applied to the Custodian that his claim for Rs. 1,27,638121- under the two decrees be satisfied out of the assets of the evacuee in the hands of the Custodian. The application was rejected by the Assistant Custodian General (exercising the powers of the Custodian) on the ground that he had no power to allow this claim. The Custodian General affirmed this decision and the decree-holder went to the Supreme Court by special leave. Reversing the decision of the Tribunals below, the court held that Section 10 (2) (n) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act empowered the Custodian to settle any claim of a creditor against an evacuee and pay the amount out of any funds of the evacuee in his possession. The court held that the words "or to any other person" in clause (n) were not to be read ejusdem genris but as an independent item and were wide enough to include a creditor of the evacuee. But in this case there was no dispute with regard to the claim of the creditor and the Custodian was not called upon to decide the merits of the claim. But in this case there was no dispute with regard to the claim of the creditor and the Custodian was not called upon to decide the merits of the claim. The only question in issue was whether, assuming that the creditor had a claim against the evacuee, the Custodian had the power to pay it off from the funds of the evacuee in his possession. The Supreme Court was not called upon and did not decide whether the Custodian had the power to decide the claim itself on merits. Therefore this decision does not support the view that the Custodian had the exclusive jurisdiction to determine a creditor's claim against the evacuee. It only held that the Custodian may concede the claim and pay the amount out of the funds of the evacuee in his hands. The question who should determine the dispute if the Custodian disputes the claim did not arise in that case. 13. Lastly Mr. Pant contended that Section 17 bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit of this nature. I cannot agree. That section provides that the property of an evacuee cannot be proceeded against in any, manner whatsoever in the execution of a decree. But before the section can apply there has to be a decree against the evacuee. If the present suit is decreed Section 17 will come into effect-assuming that the property still remains evacuee property. 14. For these reasons I allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and decree the plaintiff appellant's suit against both he defendant-respondents for the record of Rs. 1941/13/- with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.