JUDGMENT Lakshmi Prasad, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner was initially assessed to agricultural income tax for Rs. 5,55,184/11/3, for the year 1359 Fasli. He preferred an appeal which was dismissed, and the assessment order dated 24th November, 1961 was upheld. He then went in revision before the Agricultural Income Tax Board which was allowed in part by an order dated 10th April, 1964. The operative portion of the order passed in revision may usefully be reproduced, which runs as below: "In the result the revision is allowed to the extent that the amount of Rs. 18,4331- added to the income of the assessee on account of grain rental will be deducted from the total income and the tax re, calculated accordingly." 2. Subsequent to the aforesaid order passed in revision the matter was again taken up before the Assessing Authority which by its order dated 10th July, 1964 made calculations as directed by the Revision Board and held that a sum of Rs. 5,44,525/8/9 was due from the petitioner on account of Agricultural Income Tax for the year 1359-F. In pursuance to its order dated 10th July, 1964 the Assessing Authority issued a notice of demand which is dated 28th July, 1964. The notice of demand was served on the petitioner on 3rd August, 1964 directing him to pay the amount mentioned in two instalments. A copy of that notice is annexure B. The allegation in the petition is that in ignorance of the correct legal position the petitioner agreed to the adjustment of a sum of Rs. 1,15,592-67 P. which was due to the petitioner to be paid in cash on account of interim compensation, against the sum mentioned in the notice of demand annexure 3. On the petitioner's failure to comply with the notice of demand his zamindari abolition compensation bonds to the value of Rs. 5,70,000/- lying with Compensation Officer, Nanpara, district Bahraich were attached on 16th May, 1966 and 6th June, 1966 was fixed for the sale of those attached bonds. On the petitioner's failure to comply with the notice of demand his zamindari abolition compensation bonds to the value of Rs. 5,70,000/- lying with Compensation Officer, Nanpara, district Bahraich were attached on 16th May, 1966 and 6th June, 1966 was fixed for the sale of those attached bonds. It is thereupon that the present petition is filed with the prayer that a writ of mandamus may issue directing opposite parties viz., the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Assessing Authority not to enforce the notice of demand annexure 3 and a further direction be given that the zamindari abolition compensation bonds under attachment be released and the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1,15,592-67 P. agreed to by the petitioner to be adjusted against the amount mentioned in the notice of demand be refunded to the petitioner. 3. The petition is opposed by the opposite parties. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that having in view the provision of Section 20 of the U. P. Agricultural Income Tax Act a notice of demand could issue only on the determination of the sum payable by an assessee under Section 16 or on the passing of an order under Section 17 for the payment of penalty. He argues relying on a portion of the order passed in revision and reproduced above that this order can by no means be construed as an order to the Assessing Authority to reassess the petitioner in the light of the observations made in the order, and as such, there arose no occasion for the Assessing Authority to take up the matter of assessment once again and determine the amount as it actually did by its order dated 10th July, 1964, and that being so, there arose no occasion for the issue of a notice of demand. He thus contends that the notice of demand issued in the instant case being bad ab initio, cannot be enforced, and as such, all that has been done towards the enforcement of the notice of demand dated 20th July, 1964 must be struck down as bad in law. He thus contends that the notice of demand issued in the instant case being bad ab initio, cannot be enforced, and as such, all that has been done towards the enforcement of the notice of demand dated 20th July, 1964 must be struck down as bad in law. He points out to Section 23 of the Act in support of the contention that it is the duty of the Authority passing a final order under Section 21 or 22, i.e. in appeal or in revision, to communicate the order passed in appeal or revision, as the case may be, to the assessee, and as provided in Section 30 (1) of the Act, the amount specified in any order communicated under Section 23 shall be payable in certain instalments as mentioned therein. The argument thus is that it was for the Revision Board in the Instant case to specify the amount which it thought could correctly be assessed as agricultural income tax in the order, it passed and then that amount would become payable by virtue of the provision in Section 30 of the Act in certain instalments as specified in it. Thus, he maintains that the omission on the part of the Revision Board to specify the amount in the final order passed by it could not be made good by the Assessing Authority by taking up the matter afresh and issuing another notice of demand on the basis of its subsequent determination. 4. It is not disputed by the learned counsel that it was open to the Revision Board to pass an order of remand directing the Assessing Authority to determine the amount due as agricultural income tax afresh in the light of the observations made in the judgment passed by the Revision Board. He concedes that had there been such an order of remand the Assessing Authority would have been competent to recalculate the amount and issue a notice of demand on the basis thereof. He further argues that the order dated 10th April, 1964, a copy of which is annexure 1, passed by the Revision Board in the instant case, can by no means be treated to be an order of remand. He further argues that the order dated 10th April, 1964, a copy of which is annexure 1, passed by the Revision Board in the instant case, can by no means be treated to be an order of remand. It shall thus be seen that all the arguments raised by the learned counsel centre round the question as to whether or not the order annexure 1 can be treated to be an order of remand. Of course, had the order in question expressly said that the case was being remanded to the Assessing Authority for recalculating the amount on the basis mentioned in it, there would have been no occasion to raise any controversy on the point. The controvery has arisen simply because the order does not specifically state that it is an order of remand. In my view, the mere omission in the order to state specifically that the case is being remanded to the Assessing Authority will not be sufficient to hold that it is not an order of remand, if otherwise it appears to be so. On an entire consideration of the material portion of the order which has been reproduced above, I am of the opinion that it can reasonably be construed to be an order of remand. It is pertinent to notice in this connection that even the petitioner himself construed it to be so as appears from the fact that he never challenged the reassessment started by the Assessing Authority subsequent to this order dated 10th April, 1964. Not only, that the petitioner failed to challenge before the Assessing Authority that he had no jurisdiction to calculate the amount afresh because the Revision Board by its order did not pass any order of remand but also he, on his own showing submitted to the notice of demand to the extent that he allowed an adjustment of a sum of over Rs. 100,000/- towards the amount mentioned in the notice of demand. It appears that it is only at a late stage when the petitioner found himself in the position of a defaulter that he though of challenging all the proceeding that took place subsequent to the order passed in revision on 10th April, 1964. 100,000/- towards the amount mentioned in the notice of demand. It appears that it is only at a late stage when the petitioner found himself in the position of a defaulter that he though of challenging all the proceeding that took place subsequent to the order passed in revision on 10th April, 1964. Considering all these facts, I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel that in the instant case there arose no occasion for the Assessing Authority either to make the assessment dated 10th July, 1964 or to issue a notice of demand dated 20th July, 1964. 5. The other contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner challenging the validity of the notice of demand dated 20th July, 1964 is that instead of requiring the payment in four equal instalments as provided in Section 30 of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by U. P. Act 14 of 1953, it requires payment of the entire amount in two instalments specified in it. In support of his contention he relies on the proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Section 1 of U. P. Act 14 of 1953, by which Section 30 was amended so as to provide for payment in two instalments as against four instalments occurring in the Act as it stood prior to this amendment. The said proviso runs as below : "Provided that the assessments for the agricultural year ending on or before the 30th day of June, 1953 whether such assessments have been or have not been made before the commencement of this Act shall continue to be made as if (a) Sections 4, 6 and 30 of the principal Act had not been amended by this Act, and (b) ............................" 6. Admittedly, the assessment in question pertains to the year 1359-F, i.e. for the agricultural year ending on 30th June, 1953. That being so, notwithstanding the fact as to when the assessment actually came to be made and notice of demand came to be issued, the provisions of Section 30 (unamended) would continue to apply to it. In that view of the matter the contention that the notice of demand annexure 3 is bad in so far as it requires payment in two instalments instead of four as provided by Section 30 (unamended) appear to be correct. In that view of the matter the contention that the notice of demand annexure 3 is bad in so far as it requires payment in two instalments instead of four as provided by Section 30 (unamended) appear to be correct. All the same, that does not appear to be a basis on which the notice of demand is to be struck down as a whole, because the liability to pay the amount stated in the notice arises u/s 30 itself and not by virtue of demand contained in the notice though of course any departure in the notice regarding mode of payment is to be ignored and an assessee can insist on payment in the manner required by Section 30. However, on the basis of departure in the notice regarding mode of payment he cannot refuse to pay at all. Hence, the contention must fail. In the end, the petition is dismissed. Parties e directed to bear their costs. Petition dismissed.