JUDGMENT G.D. Sahgal, J. - Respondent No. 1 was a mortgagee of 67 villages belonging to the father of appellant Rana Uma Nath Bux Singh, Talukdar of Khajurgaon on the basis of which a decree was obtained for the sale of the same. The appellant and respondents Nos. 2 to 9 are the legal representatives of Rana Uma Nath Bux Singh. During the course of the execution of decree, zamindari was abolished as a result of the coming into force of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (Act I of 1951) (Hereinafter referred to the Act) and the 67 villages could not be sold as they stood transferred to and vested in the state free from all encumbrances. Consequently on the 20th of September, 1952 the decree-holder made an application that as the Zamindari rights could not be sold, only such rights of the judgment-debtor as remained with him after the coming into force of the Act may be sold, namely, the rights in trees and wells in abadi and buildings situate in various villages. It was also prayed that the judgment-debtor's proprietary rights in grove-land and sir and khudkasht land which had continued under Section 18 of the Act and which constituted substituted security in place of the proprietary rights mortgaged with the decree-holder should also be sold. There was a prayer also that the compensation money payable to the judgment-debtor on the acquisition of the proprietary rights by the State might be treated as substituted security. 2. There is no dispute that the rights of the judgment-debtor in trees and wells in the abadi and buildings situated in various villages could be sold and there is also no dispute that compensation money payable to the judgment-debtor for the acquisition of the proprietary rights by the State also could be the subject-matter of execution as substituted security. The dispute, how. ever, was whether the bhumidhari rights of the judgment-debtor in sir, khudkasht land and grove-land could also be sold as substituted security in place of the proprietali rights mortgaged with respondent No. 1. The executing court decided that they could be sold and dismissed the objection of the judgment-debtor to the effect that they did not constitute part of the substituted security in place of the proprietary rights. The executing court decided that they could be sold and dismissed the objection of the judgment-debtor to the effect that they did not constitute part of the substituted security in place of the proprietary rights. There was an appeal and this Court by judgment of a Special Bench in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. The Allahabad Bank, 1959 ALJ 229 dismissed the appeal. There was an appeal to the Supreme Court which was allowed, the Supreme Cann holding that the bhumidhari rights created under Section 18 of the Act in the sir, khudkasht land or the grove-land of the judgment-debtor were not compensation, but were new rights conferred on the intermediary on account of his being in possession thereof vide Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. The Allahabad Bank Ltd., Allahabad, A.I.R. 1961 SC 1790 : 1961 ALJ 716. The mortgagee, therefore, could not enforce his rights under the mortgage by sale of the bhumidhari property. The argument that the bhumidhari rights could be followed as substituted security, therefore, failed. 3. After that decision the decree-holder wanted to proceed in execution against the groves of the judgment-debtor. This was also objected to, but the objection was dismissed in so far as it related to trees in the groves of the judgment-debtor. The result was that according to the decision of the learned Civil Judge though execution could not be proceeded against bhumidhari property, it could be proceeded against trees in the groves situated in bhumidhari property. It is against this decision that this appeal has been directed by one of the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor. 4. The sole question for determination in this appeal, therefore, is whether the trees forming part of the groves standing in the bhumidhari property of the judgment-debtor constitute part of the bhumidhari property or they are separate from it and constitute part of the substituted security in the hands of the judgment-debtor after the abolition of the zamindari by Act I of 1951. 5. In order to find an answer to the above question certain provisions of the Act and A- the Rules framed under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) have been referred to. 6. Sub-sec. 5. In order to find an answer to the above question certain provisions of the Act and A- the Rules framed under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) have been referred to. 6. Sub-sec. (1) of Section 4 of the Act provides :- "As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the State Government may, by notification, declare that, as from a date to be specified, all estates situate in Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State and, as from the beginning of the date so specified (hereinafter called the date of vesting) , all such estates shall stand transferred to and vest, except as herein-after provided, in the State free from all encumbrances." 7. There is no dispute that the 67 villages constituted an estate. The notification referred to in Section 4 came into force on the 1st of July, 1952 with the result that the entire estate stood transferred to the State of Uttar Pradesh and vested in it as from that date except as provided in the Act. 8. We have, therefore, to examine whether the trees in question come within the exception contemplated in the phrase "except as hereinafter provided". 9. The first provision which has to be examined in this connection is Section 6 (a) (i) of the Act. In so far as it is relevant, it provides :- "When the notification under Section 4 has been published in the Gazette, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or document or in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, the consequences as hereinafter set forth shall, from the beginning of the date of vesting, ensue in the area to which the notification relates, namely- (a) all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries- (i) in every estate in such area including land (cultivable or barren) , grove-land .... trees (other than trees in village abadi, holding or grove) , .......... abadi sites ............ shall cease and be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh tree from all encumbrances". 10. It would thus appear that all rights, title and interest of the appellant and respondents Nos. 2 to 9 in the 67 villages including land, grove-land and trees vested in the State with the exception of trees in village abadi, holding or grove. shall cease and be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh tree from all encumbrances". 10. It would thus appear that all rights, title and interest of the appellant and respondents Nos. 2 to 9 in the 67 villages including land, grove-land and trees vested in the State with the exception of trees in village abadi, holding or grove. Thus apparently the trees situated in village abadi, holding or grove constituted an exception to the vesting. Under Section 4 of the Act the entire estate stood transferred to and vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh "except as hereinafter provided". Section 6 provides for the exception with respect to the trees in the village abadi, holding or grove. Therefore, the trees in the village abadi, holding or grove did not vest in the State and continued to belong to the intermediaries, the successors-in-interest of the judgment-debtor, namely, the appellant and respondents Nos. 2 to 9. If the Act had not come into force, then they would have been sold along with the estate of the intermediaries in execution of the decree. They, therefore, continued to be part of the property of the judgment-debtor which could be sold in execution of the decree. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, contests this position. His contention is that as a result of the notification under Section 4 the entire estate vested in the State and after it had vested, the State reconferred the rights in trees in the village abadi, holding or grove on various persons. According to him, the words "other than trees in village abadi, holding or grove" do not constitute an exception to property that stood transferred to and vested in the State, but their purpose was to leave them out for the purpose of their being granted again by the State to some persons if once they have vested in the State. In support of his argument he has relied on the provisions of Sections 9 and 18 of the Act and Rule 26-A of the Rules. 12. In support of his argument he has relied on the provisions of Sections 9 and 18 of the Act and Rule 26-A of the Rules. 12. Section 9 of the Act provides : "All wells, trees in abadi and all buildings situate within the limits of an estate, belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other person, whether residing in the village or not, shall continue to belong to or be held by such intermediary, tenant or person, as the case may be, and the site of the wells or the buildings with the area appurtenant thereto shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed." 13. A perusal of the section would show that the contention of the learned counsel cannot be up-held. It describes, among other things, trees in the abadi as belonging to or held by an intermediary and it provides for their continuing to belong to or be held by the intermediary. If the trees in the abadi had vested as a result of the notification under Section 4 in the State, they could not be described as belonging to or held by the intermediary. They could neither belong to the intermediary after their being transferred to the State and their vesting in the State nor could they be described as being held by the intermediary. Their being described as continuing to belong to or being held by the intermediary does show that, in spite of the notification under Section 4, the intermediary was not divested of their ownership or his right to hold them. The wells and the buildings situate within the limits of an estate that belonged to the intermediary also continued to belong to him and as they did not form part of the estate, they were not mentioned in Section 6 as part of the exception like trees in the village abadi, holding or grove. The land constituting abadi site however, stood transferred to the State and vested in the State. It was on this account that the area appurtenant to such wells and buildings was deemed to be settled with the intermediary by the State. The land constituting abadi site however, stood transferred to the State and vested in the State. It was on this account that the area appurtenant to such wells and buildings was deemed to be settled with the intermediary by the State. Section 9, therefore, is only explanatory to Section 6 in so far as the trees situate in the abadi are concerned and as to the wells and buildings, as they were never part of the estate and did not vest along with the estate in the State, the area appurtenant thereto which had vested in the State was transferred to the intermediary as having been settled with him in order that he might enjoy his rights in such wells and buildings. 14. Let us now come to Section 18. Under this provision of law, in so far as it is relevant, subject to the provisions of Sections 10, 15, 16 and 17, all lands in possession of or held by an intermediary as an intermediary's grove on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such intermediary, who shall be entitled to take or retain possession as a bhumidhar thereof. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that as the trees constitute part of the intermediary's grove, they constitute part of the bhumidhari right created under the section and as the bhumidhari right is a new right created for an intermediary, as has been held by the Supreme Court in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. The Allahabad Bank Limited (supra) , the trees which constituted part of that right could not be treated either as part of the estate mortgaged or as a substituted security thereof. It is pointed out that the words used are "all lands in possession of or held by an intermediary as an intermediary's grove." The word "land" under Section 3 (14) of the Act, among other things, means land held or occupied for purposes connected with horticulture. The argument is that as the trees stand on the land, it is the land held or occupied for purposes of horticulture and, therefore, the trees go along with it. We find it difficult to accept this contention. The argument is that as the trees stand on the land, it is the land held or occupied for purposes of horticulture and, therefore, the trees go along with it. We find it difficult to accept this contention. Land may include land held or occupied for purposes of horticulture, but simply because it is held or occupied for that purpose, it cannot be said that the trees form part of the land. The land on which the trees stand as a grove may be land, but that does not mean that the trees also form part of the land. The definition only means that the land will not cease to be land if the trees are planted thereon for the purpose of a grove. It does not mean that by the planting of the trees for horticulture they became part of the land. 15. It was also pointed out that the land has been described as being held as an intermediary's grove and as a grove consists of trees, the trees also go with the land, which under this provision of law becomes the bhumidhari of the intermediary. This argument also it is difficult to accept in view of the definition of the term "intermediary's grove" under Section 3 (13) of the Act. In that definition "intermediary's glove" means grove-land held or occupied by an intermediary as such (the italicising is ours). Thus the term "intermediary's grove" has been given a technical meaning as indicating grove-land only and not the trees thereon though ordinarily the word grove constitutes the trees standing on grove-land. Therefore, when the words "intermediary's grove" are used in Section 18 of the Act, they mean grove-land. Bhumtdhari rights thus have been conferred only in the land and not in the trees, the trees having already been left with the intermediary under Section 6 (a) (i) of the Act. 16. Reliance was then placed on Rule 26-A of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. The Rules of which this rule forms part, have under Section 26 of the Act been framed for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Chapter in which Sections 4, 6 and 18 lie. 16. Reliance was then placed on Rule 26-A of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. The Rules of which this rule forms part, have under Section 26 of the Act been framed for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Chapter in which Sections 4, 6 and 18 lie. It was pointed out that Rule 26-A inasmuch as it provides for the settlement of the trees with the bhumidhar, supplements the provisions of Section 6 under which the trees in a grove, though they had vested in the State, have been left out to be dealt with later. This rule thus, according to the argument of the learned counsel, helps us in coming to the conclusion that the trees also vested in the State and as it had not been provided as to what the State will do with them, it provided under Rule 26-A that the trees in a holding, among other things, shall be deemed to be settled with the bhumidhar. IS In other words, the State in whom the trees had vested, settled them back with the bhumidhar to whom the land had also been granted under Section 18 of the Act. The learned counsel points out that although Section 18 itself was sufficient for transferring the trees in a grove to the intermediary as part of the bhumidhari in his grove, this rule has been provided by way of abundant caution to put the matter beyond any controversy. Rule 26-A, which was introduced for the first time in the Rules by a notification dated the 25th of August, 1953, reads as follows :- "26-A. Trees planted by a person other than an intermediary on land other than land comprised in his holding shall be deemed to be settled with such person as owner thereof and trees in a holding shall be deemed to be settled with the bhumidhar or sirdar of the holding along with the land." 17. The first part of this rule relates to trees planted by a person other than an intermediary. We are not concerned in this case with trees planted by such a person. We need not, therefore, detain ourselves with this part of the rule. It is not necessary to find out to which trees actually is this rule contemplated to relate. The first part of this rule relates to trees planted by a person other than an intermediary. We are not concerned in this case with trees planted by such a person. We need not, therefore, detain ourselves with this part of the rule. It is not necessary to find out to which trees actually is this rule contemplated to relate. We are concerned only with the second part of the rule which relates to the trees in a holding which are deemed to be settled with the bhumidhar of the holding along with the land. This part of the rule presumes that the trees also vest in the State for it provides for its being settled with the bhumidhar of the holding along with the land. Bhumidhari rights are created under Section 18. This section according to the argument already discussed contemplated that the trees also be settled along with the land. If the argument of the learned counsel that the - grove-land in which bhumidhari rights are created in favour of the intermediary, carried along with it the trees also is accepted, then there was no necessity of having this 'rule at all. But as to it, as has already been pointed out above, the argument was that it is only by way of abundant caution that this rule has been framed to put it beyond the shadow of controversy that the trees had vested in the State and were granted to the bhumidhar along with the grove-land as part of his bhumidhari. 18. The learned counsel for the appellant places reliance on the cases of Rathnammal alias Rajamani Animal v. The Secretary of Stale for India in Council, ILR 1940 Madras 87 and Pramod C. Bhat v. Kanwar Raj Nath, A.I.R. 1954 Bombay 518 for the purpose of showing that in cases where there is ambiguity in the language used in an Act or where more than one construction is possible, then the rules framed may help the Court in coming to the right conclusion in the interpretation of the language of the Act. For this proposition reliance has been placed on Ex. Parte Wier: Inre Wier, 1871 (6) Chancery Appeals 875 at page 879 where Lord Justice Mellish lays down :- "......... For this proposition reliance has been placed on Ex. Parte Wier: Inre Wier, 1871 (6) Chancery Appeals 875 at page 879 where Lord Justice Mellish lays down :- "......... We are of opinion that, where the construction of the Act is ambiguous and doubtful on any point, recourse may be had to the rules which have been made by the Lord Chancellor under the authority of the Act, and if we find that in the rules any particular construction has been put on the Act, that it is our duty to adopt and follow that construction". 19. These cases appear to us to be beside the point in view of the unequivocal language of Section 6 of the Act. When the trees in a grove did not vest in the State at all, there was no occasion for their being given back to the intermediary as forming part of his bhumidhari and if the rule does so, it will be ultra vires, for the State cannot give to another which does not belong to it. 20. Rule 26-A was later on substituted by another rule by a notification dated December 14, 1959 and a notification dated March 31, 1960. The amended rule reads as follows :- "26.-A (1) Unless a tree has already vested in a person in accordance with the provisions of the laws applicable to an area prior to the date of vesting under Section 4, trees planted by a person other than an intermediary on land not comprised in the holding of the planter prior to the date of vesting, shall be deemed to be settled, with such persons as owner thereof. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (1) trees in a holding shall be deemed to be settled with the bhumidhar or sirdar of the holding along with the land." What has been said above applies to this rule also. It may, however, be pointed out that this rule has been deleted altogether by a notification dated March 30, 1963 and is no longer a part of the Rules. 21. We may now look to another provision of the Act which may be of some help in considering whether the trees. forming part of the grove of an intermediary in the estate vested in the State or not. 21. We may now look to another provision of the Act which may be of some help in considering whether the trees. forming part of the grove of an intermediary in the estate vested in the State or not. Section 117 of the Act provides that at any time after the publication of the notification mentioned in Section 4 the State Government may by notification in the Gazette declare that as from the date to be specified, among other things, all trees other than trees in a holding or on the boundary thereof in a grove or abadi situate in a Circle which had vested in the State under this Act, shall vest in the Gaon Sabha established for the Circle. This section also puts the trees in a grove to be an exception while it provides that trees which had vested in the State shall vest in the Gaon Sabha. This also lends assurance to a certain extent to the view that we have taken of the provisions of Section 6. of the Act. 22. Let us now examine Section 39 of the Act also. Under this provision of law gross assets as respects a mahal shall be the aggregate gross income of the land or estate comprised in the mahal and shall include the amount computed at the rates applicable to exproprietary tenants of similar land for land in the personal cultivation of or held as intermediary's grove, khudkasht or sir by all the intermediaries in the estate in which hereditary rights do not accrue. Thus no compensation is contemplated to be given to the intermediary for the trees standing on the land. What has to be taken into consideration is only the amount computed at the rates applicable to the ex-proprietary tenants. Under Section 44 when the net assets of an intermediary are calculated, deduction is made from his gross assets assets under clause "(d) where the intermediary holds any land in his personal cultivation or as khudkasht, intermediary's grove or sir (other than sir in which hereditary rights accrued) , an amount computed at the ex-proprietary rates less certain deductions. Even here we find that, as a result of the bhumidhari rights being granted to the intermediary, in sir, khudkasht or grove-land, from the gross assets has to be deducted only the rental value of the land and not any value of the trees standing therein. Even here we find that, as a result of the bhumidhari rights being granted to the intermediary, in sir, khudkasht or grove-land, from the gross assets has to be deducted only the rental value of the land and not any value of the trees standing therein. 23. In any view of the case, therefore, the trees continued to be the property of the intermediary for they never vested in the State and as they did not vest in the State, no compensation was included for them in the gross assets nor any amount deducted from the gross assets for calculating the net assets, because no rights in the trees were being conferred on the intermediary as bhumidhar on account of their continuing to belong to the intermediary. 24. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied on the case of Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. The Allahabad Bank Ltd., Allahabad (supra) to show that Section 6 was never taken as an exception to the property vesting in the State and he has relied on a passage at page 1792 wherein referring to the provisions of Section 9 of the Act it was remarked :- "This provision clearly creates an exception to the property which vests in the State on the making of a notification under Section 4. The exception is in favour of all wells and trees in abadi and all buildings and it is significant to note that these things will continue to belong to the intermediary, though the further provision shows that the site of the wells, and buildings with the area appurtenant thereto would vest in the Government and would be deemed to be settled with the intermediary on such conditions and turns as may be prescribed." 25. This, however, does not mean that Section 6 of the Act does not create any exception. Moreover, these remarks were made when their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the contention of the respondents in which reliance was placed only on Sections 9 and 18 of the Act as creating an exception and not on Section 6. 26. Lastly, it was urged that the whole of the right in a property could be acquired and not a part of the right only if Article 31 of the Constitution is not to hit such an acquisition. 26. Lastly, it was urged that the whole of the right in a property could be acquired and not a part of the right only if Article 31 of the Constitution is not to hit such an acquisition. Thus if the trees which constituted part of the estate were not acquired but only the estate that is left after taking out the trees, the acquisition would be hit by the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution,' This argument has only to be mentioned to be rejected. A similar argument was advanced before the Supreme Court in the case of The State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar Singh, A.I.R. 1952 SC 252, but it was rejected by Mahajan, J. (as he then was) with the remark that the proposition sounded strange. It was pointed out that it was open to the Government to acquire the whole of the right of an owner or a part of that right. Lease-hold and other similar rights can always be acquired and if a person owns the totality or rights, it is not necessary to acquire the whole interest of that person if it is not needed for public purposes. 27. Altogether, therefore, there is no force in this appeal and it should be dismissed. The trees in the groves constitute part of the mortgaged property and are thus liable to be sold in execution of the mortgage decree. 28. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Respondent no. 1 is entitled to proceed in execution by the sale of the trees standing in the groves of the judgment-debtor.